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The Africa’s Great Lakes Region has been the site of the most devastating armed conflicts and 
humanitarian crises the world has witnessed since the end of the Cold War. The 1994 Rwandan 
genocide, the epicenter of the Great Lakes conflicts, sparked a horrific multinational conflict that 
swept across the region. This has ultimately intensified in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), where it dragged the armies of eight neighbouring countries, guerrilla movements and 
militias; with millions dying in the fights and attendant massacres, starvations and diseases. 
Although this catastrophic conflict has attracted a relatively little attention from the international 
community and powerful institutions like the UN, it calls for a critical re-examination of the 
approaches to conflict prevention and management, currently available within the UN system.  
 
This study critically examines the adequacy and effectiveness of the various methods and 
approaches to conflict prevention and management as have been applied in resolving the Africa's 
Great Lakes conflicts. In so doing, it augments the various comprehensive efforts undertaken to 
address the root causes of these conflicts and lay the foundations for their resolution and for 
sustainable peace in the region.  
 
Conflict prevention is a central goal of the UN system, but it also constitutes one of the UN’s 
greatest challenges. In light of the challenges presented by events in Somalia, the Africa’s Great 
Lakes (especially Rwanda genocide and Congo crises), Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan, 
to mention but only a few, a great deal of research over the past few years have sought to 
demonstrate the virtues of conflict prevention and to identify how it can better be operationalized.  
 
However, the resolution of conflict and achievement of durable peace in any particular part of the 
world is not confined to a single strategy. Thus a range of tools and strategies available for conflict 
prevention and management reflect the complex mix of legal, political, economic, social, cultural 
and institutional factors that coalesce to form violent conflict complexes that frequently transcend 
state boundaries. Thus there is a need for a holistic approach to prevention, one that addresses the 
linkage between human rights and conflicts, and recognizes the nexus between the two. 
 
In this study therefore, I discuss different approaches to conflict prevention and management before 
I come to a settled conclusion that each of the different approaches existing within the UN conflict 
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resolution system, lacks some precision and effectiveness, so much that a human rights approach is 
proposed. 
 
The main argument is rooted on the general failure of traditional approaches to conflict prevention 
and management within the UN system. In measuring success and failure of such approaches, I test 
the most often used conflict resolution mechanisms within the UN, namely; negotiation, 
peacekeeping operation and international adjudication, as case studies. The choice of these, among 
the many UN approaches to conflict resolution, is inspired by their use in resolving the Africa’s 
Great Lakes conflict, where the combination of all these had been applied. The Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue (ICD) political negotiations, the deployment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission 
in Congo (MONUC) and international adjudication-both in the Case Concerning Armed Activities 
in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) which ended in 2005 
before the ICJ and Thomas Lubanga Case, which, at the time of writing is pending before the ICC, 
form part of these approaches. Furthermore, in relation to international adjudication, the role of the 
ICTR is briefly examined in the regional dimension of the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts. 
 
Having presented the conceptual framework for the study on a human rights approach to conflict 
prevention, management and resolution, the Africa’s Great Lakes conflict is analyzed with a view to 
portray the features, historical underpinnings as well as the impact that the conflict have had on the 
rights of individuals and communities in the region. 
 
Before testing the efficacy or otherwise of each of the conflict resolution methods above mentioned, 
an overview of the major approaches to conflict prevention and management is made in Chapter 
Three. Both the UN and non-UN based mechanisms for conflict prevention and management are 
reviewed, pointing out the limits and shortcomings of these mechanisms, especially in resolving 
internal armed conflicts, like those in the Africa’s Great Lakes region.  
 
In the final analysis, the need for a new approach is realized, wherein, a human rights approach to 
conflict prevention and management is strongly proposed. As chapter six attests, the relationship 
between conflict prevention and management on the one hand, and human rights promotion and 
protection on the other, is multifaceted, intricate, and fluid, evolving in response not only to 
changes in the nature of contemporary violent conflict but also to the two camp’s growing 
experience in working as partners instead of competitors. The chapter also makes clear that to see 
the relationship as two-sided distorts reality, for there are in fact three camps involved: conflict 
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resolution, human rights and international humanitarian law. The last of these seeks to regulate the 
conduct of war and to protect civilians during armed conflict, and is a human rights and legal tool 
that can strengthen a peace process or agreement by helping to reduce suffering and creating 
legitimacy for settlement. 
 
Through a mixture of both analysis of field data and interpretive research, the complexity of the 
Africa’s Great Lakes Conflicts is investigated with a view to examining methods applied to resolve 
it, and to determine a viable conflict management mechanism. At this beginning, the role played by 
human rights at different stages in the conflict cycle; from human rights abuses that precipitate 
violent conflicts through third party intervention in the form of peacekeeping and adjudication, to a 
clear human rights approach to conflict prevention, management and conflict resolution. The same 
touches upon the chapters throughout the study with the existence of human rights concerns in each 
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1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW  
 
1.1 General Introduction 
This chapter is set to provide the conceptual and methodological framework for the 
study on the application of human rights in conflict prevention and management, with 
the focus on the Great Lakes Conflict. Its main objective is to open discussion on the 
research subject, by laying down the foundations for a deeper understanding of human 
rights concerns in resolution of armed conflicts. By highlighting the background and 
motivation of the issue, the first chapter acts as an eye opener for the understanding of 
the limits and weaknesses that attend contemporary UN conflict resolution 
mechanisms, and argues for the need for a multidisciplinary approach to the subject 
that incorporates a human rights approach. The chapter further defines the various 
main research concepts, including different perspectives through which the concept of 
human rights is viewed and describes the methods applied in conducting the study. 
Before making the final concluding remarks on the chapter, the structure and scope of 
the study is presented; the subject contents of each chapter in the study is highlighted. 
 
Two bodies of international law govern internal armed conflicts such as civil wars.1 
Humanitarian law,2 or ‘the law of armed conflicts’ applies to the parties to a conflict, 
laying down certain rules for the protection of those who are not, or who are no longer 
taking part in fighting. It also restricts the means of warfare – in particular weapons– 
and the methods of warfare, such as military tactics, etc. The rules provided by 
humanitarian law are typically fairly specific, as they are designed to be interpreted 
and applied by military commanders.3 Owing to the controversy surrounding 
                                                 
1 The international law of warfare has been based on the assumption that a basic difference exists 
between international law of war, that is to say armed conflicts between two or more States, and non-
international armed conflicts, namely conflict breaking out of the territory of a State between rebels 
and the central authority.  
2 See Greenwood, C. ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’ in Fleck, D (Ed.), (1995). Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.8-12. 
3 See these rules elaborated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols: Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (Geneva Convention I), 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention II), 75 
UNTS 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III), 
75 UNTS 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Geneva Convention IV), 75 UNTS 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 
UNTS 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 UNTS 609 and 
   2 
applicability of humanitarian law principles to some of the conflict management 
methods, there have been many ongoing debates.  One of the topical debates concerns 
the extent to which UN forces deployed in conflict situations are obliged to respect 
humanitarian law.4 One stumbling block for peacekeeping forces for instance, is that 
the relevant principles are enshrined in the international instruments governing the 
conduct of combatants engaged in armed conflict of an international or non-
international character.5 Given the fact that such principles are still predominantly 
concerned with international armed conflicts as opposed to non-international ones, the 
nature of conflict is relevant to the success or failure of the deployed peacekeeping 
force. Nonetheless, it is now generally accepted that UN forces are bound by 
humanitarian law, whether in performing duties of a peacekeeping or enforcement 
action.6  
Human rights law is applicable in both pre-and post armed conflict times, during 
which humanitarian law clearly does not apply; but the query as to which set of laws 
will apply in a particular conflict situation is not always easily discerned. If one holds 
to the common historical position that the two regimes are applicable depending on 
the categorization of the conflict,7 then, a dangerous lacuna may exist if the 
applicability of both regimes is denied. An example involving non-state actors, who 
are neither party to the international humanitarian and human rights law instruments 
nor recognised internationally, may create such a situation. However, in situations 
where the law does not apply, the international accountability of such groups for 
human rights abuses remains unclear (although such acts would be criminalized under 
domestic criminal law).8  
                                                                                                                                            
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an 
Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III). 
4 See Palwankar, R. (1993) ‘Applicability of international humanitarian law to United Nations peace-
keeping forces’ in International Review of the Red Cross No 294, p.227-240. 
5 Murphy, R. (2007). UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal 
Issues in Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 214. 
6 See Cerone J, (2006) ‘Holding Military and Paramilitary Forces Accountable’ in Mertus, J & Helsing, 
J. (2006). Human Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Links Between Rights, Law and Peacebuilding, 
Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 217; See further Greenwood, C.  
(1995)‘Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law’ in Fleck, supra note 2, p.46. This is not just a 
practical necessity, but may arise from obligations of states to respect, and ensure respect for the 
Geneva Conventions and Protocols in all circumstances. See also Tittemore, B. (1997) ‘Belligerents in 
Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations’ Standford Journal of International Law, vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 67-117. at 107. 
7 See this argument clearly brought forward in Meron, T. (1983) ‘On the Inadequate reach of 
Humanitarian and Human Right Law and the Need for a New Instrument’ in American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 589-606.at 602. 
8 See Robinson, D and Von Hebel, H. (1992) ‘War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts: Article 8 of the  
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The leading theory among publicists and advocates is that humanitarian law is lex 
specialis to human rights law in situations of armed conflicts.9 The most influential 
statement of this doctrine was given by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 
1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons:  
“The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and  
Political Rights [ICCPR] does not cease in times of war. In principle, the right  
not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of 
what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by  
the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflicts which is  
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of  
life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an  
arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be  
decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from 
the terms of the Covenant itself.”10 
The effect of this is that humanitarian law is to be used to interpret a human rights 
rule. Conversely, in the context of the conduct of hostilities, human rights law may 
not be interpreted differently from humanitarian law.11 Human rights are a key issue 
in guaranteeing consistent and effective conflict resolution mechanisms. Their neglect 
discredits the UN approaches while undermining other advances in conflict 
management. This fact manifested itself in the various efforts taken to try to resolve 
the Africa’s Great Lakes conflict. Although much has already been done, the conflict 
persists. This is probably not due entirely to lack of appropriate conflict resolution 
strategies or to incapacity, but to several other elements. First, there is lack of interest. 
Africa is considered too peripheral to the contemporary interest of the international 
community to actually be part of it. The September 11 crisis and its vast consequences 
only accelerated the process of Africa’s international marginalization. Compared to 
                                                                                                                                            
ICC Statute’ Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol. 2, pp. 193-209. 
9 Koskenniemi, M. (2003).‘Fragmentation of International Law: Topic (a): The Function and Scope of 
the Lex Specialis Rule and the Question of ‘Self-Contained Regimes: An Outline’, prepared for the 
Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law of the International Law Commission, available at 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/ 55/fragmentation_outline.pdf, § 2.2>, last visited, September 8, 
2009. 
10 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (8 July 1996), pp. 
24–25; see also ICJ, Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (9 July 2004), pp.102, 105. 
11 Doswald-Beck, L. (1997) ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Advisory Opinion of the  
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or the Use of Nuclear Weapons’  
International Review of the Red Cross, No.316, pp. 35-55. 
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the conflicts in the Middle East, the Balkans in Eastern Europe, the fight against the 
Taliban in the Afghans and Pakistan, Africa carries only a limited fear factor. 
 
Second, there is a very low pain threshold of the economically developed Western 
world. This threshold, as Prunier puts, is so low that we cannot even tolerate watching 
the pain of others on television.12 So one of the diplomat’s jobs is to remove the 
visible signs of pain from the CNN or other broadcasts before they can prevent 
Western spectators from going about their familiar domestic pleasures. Humanitarian 
action becomes a substitute for political decision. High-protein supplementary feeding 
is brought in, a vaccination campaign is undertaken, reassuring shots of black babies 
with white nurses are displayed, and then the cameras roll off. Mission accomplished! 
These factors, and many similar ones, have given rise to the persistence of the “Great 
Lakes Conflict” storyboard of the past decade, from the 1994 Rwanda Genocide to the 
ensuing refugee crisis in the region, from the fall of Mobutu to the 1998 “Africa’s 
First World War” and the continued efforts to resolve the DRC conflict.   
 
Conflict resolution strategies applied in the region have increasingly sought to address 
both political and economic issues and to incorporate regional and international 
dimensions, in the absence of incorporation of human rights issues, which are both the 
cause and the result of conflicts.13 This study examines the applicability and relevance 
of human rights to all types of conflict resolution mechanisms generally and 
particularly those applied in resolving the Africa’s Great Lakes Conflict. It considers 
the various conflict resolution methods and the general approaches to conflict 
management both within the UN Charter and those outside the ambit of the Charter, 
peacekeeping, peace-building, peace enforcement and preventive diplomacy.14  It 
combines academic analysis, field experience, and reflection with forward-looking 
proposals for more effective conflict resolution mechanisms designed within the UN 
in partnership with regional, sub regional and local actors. 
 
                                                 
12 Prunier, G. (2009). From Genocide to Continental War: The Congo Conflict and the Crisis of 
Contemporary Africa, London: Hurst & Company, p. xxxv. 
13 Mertus & Helsing, supra note 6, p. 5. 
14 See further discussions of these terms in Galtung, J. (Ed.), (1976), Peace, War and Defense: Essays 
in Peace Research, Vol.II, Copenhagen: Ejlers, p. 282. 
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With all of this in mind, this study focuses not only on the management of conflicts, 
but also on the prevention and resolution of conflicts. The reason for this is that it is 
more effective to contain conflicts than to deal with them once they have begun. It 
contends that a human rights approach to conflict offers an epistemological and 
practical basis for better understanding and preventing conflicts.15 The greatest 
advantage of the human rights-approach is the legitimacy that is attached to the whole 
idea of human rights. The language of rights can therefore be employed for the benefit 
of conflict resolution processes. 
 
1.1.1 Background to the Study and Motivation  
 
There is a substantial weakness and limitation in the existing mechanisms for the 
prevention of violent conflicts in international law. Despite the need to be able to 
move quickly to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity, the United Nations 
has no capacity to avert such catastrophes, even when prompt action could save 
hundreds of thousands of lives. The international community's failure to prevent and 
resolve conflicts culminated in its failure to stop genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and to 
avert "ethnic cleansing" occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan. Such examples 
illustrate this incapacity, as do the other massive killings of civilians in Cambodia, the 
former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Liberia, and elsewhere.16  
 
All these episodes led to intense studies, debates and evaluations over the UN 
capacities to address conflicts generally and internal armed conflicts in particular. The 
central conclusion indicated the existence of serious weaknesses within the 
organization, calling for various alternatives.  Conflict prevention and management 
have thus acquired a relatively uncontested status within the UN community.  
Significant thought is the question of which types of strategies are worthy of being 
adopted in preventing and managing conflicts.   
 
                                                 
15 Murray, R. ‘Conflict Prevention and the Human Rights Framework in Africa’ In McEvoy, K & 
Newburn, T. (Eds.), (2003) Criminology, Conflict Resolution and Restorative Justice, New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 83-100. 
16 Peck, C. (1996), The United Nation as a Dispute Settlement System: Improving Mechanisms for the 
Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 11 
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Peace building strategies, properly conceptualized, lie at the point where the UN 
Charter’s main concerns-peace and security, development and human rights- intersect 
and overlap. Policies which enhance economic development and distributive justice, 
encourage the rule of law and protect fundamental human rights- including the right 
to participate through the ballot box in the making of the government decisions which 
fundamentally affect peoples’ lives- are all in their own way security policies as well, 
addressing many of the problems which lie at the heart of violent conflicts.17 
   
Although there is an attempt to regulate and manage armed conflicts, these efforts are 
seriously hampered by a number of factors. The basic presumption of international 
law post-1945 according to Article 2 (4) and 2 (7) of the UN Charter that the use of 
force is illegal, is qualified by the rules to the effect that self-defence and collective 
security are allowed. Furthermore, post-1990s legal framework accepted or at least 
tolerated the use of force for humanitarian intervention, which is defined as a coercive 
interference in the internal affairs of a state involving the use of armed force with the 
purposes of addressing massive human rights violation or preventing widespread 
human suffering.18  At the same time, international humanitarian law, which is 
intended to provide for rules regulating the actual conduct of warfare, has not always 
been respected and it is further limited by the distinction between international and 
non-international armed conflicts.19 It remains obvious, therefore, that preventing 
wars and massive human rights violations requires an alternative approach.  
This study proposes a multidisciplinary approach to conflict prevention and 
management. The study is not positioned in any single family of legal sciences, but it 
rather combines public international law rules, human rights and theoretical as well as 
methodological perspectives of conflict resolution. Human rights violations have been 
a major source of conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes region.20 Discrimination, 
                                                 
17 Peck, Ibid, p.ix 
18 See generally Simon, C. (2001). Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Law, Oxford:  Oxford University Press; Welsh, J. ‘Authorizing Humanitarian 
Intervention’ in Price, R. & Zacher, M. (Eds.) (2004). United Nations and Global Security, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan; Gray, C. (2000) International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford; Gray, C. ‘The Use of Force and the International Legal Order’ in Evans, M. (ed.), 
(2003). International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 589. 
19 For a thorough discussion of contemporary distinction between Wars and Belligerents, see Cassese, 
A. (2008). The Human Dimension of International Law: Selected Papers, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 99. 
20 Mugwanya, G (2003) Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the African 
Regional Human Rights System, New York: Transnational Publishers, pp. 180-224. 
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disregard for the rule of law, electoral malpractices, dictatorial regimes, suppression 
of popular participation in the affairs of government and impunity are but a few of the 
factors that violate human rights and lead to conflicts in the region. The perpetration 
of gruesome acts of sexual violence against women and girls in the conflicts in 
Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) bears testimony to 
the impact of conflict on human rights. 
 
The Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts (and others) have shown that traditional conflict 
resolution approaches currently applied under the auspices of the UN and regional 
bodies such as the AU are limited in impact and sustainability when undertaken 
without due consideration of human rights concerns. The relationship between 
conflict and human rights is both short-term and long-term in nature. In the short 
term, violent and destructive conflicts can lead to human rights violations. In the long 
term, a sustained denial of human rights can lead to conflicts, as fundamental needs of 
human beings are frustrated.21 The protection of rights is therefore of the utmost 
importance if conflicts are to be dealt with in an effective and constructive manner 
and lasting peace is to be created.   
 
This direct relationship between rights and conflict has been generally under-explored 
in trying to resolve the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts. In view of the effects of 
conflict on human rights, any attempt at resolving them must take into account the 
protection of human rights, rather than just the cessation of hostilities and negotiation 
of peace agreements. Though these measures have been successful in some conflicts, 
more often than not the protection of human rights is not given its necessary due 
prominence in conflict resolution. 
 
Since the early 1990s the Africa’s Great Lakes region has been convulsed by 
interlocking civil wars, inter-state conflict and flawed democratic transitions.22 Many 
                                                 
21 Mertus & Helsing, supra note, 6. p.28. 
22 Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (2003) The Congo from Leopold to Kabila, London: Zed Books, p. 215-16. 
According to Nzongola-Ntalaja the countries included in the designation ‘Great Lakes’ varies greatly 
from context to context.  However, without delving into the various divergent views as to what 
constitutes Africa’s Great Lakes Region, the region is understood here to include not only the political 
“core” countries of Burundi, Rwanda and DRC, but also includes such neighbouring states in East 
Africa as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. For further description of this region, see for example 
Mpangala, G. (2000). Ethnic conflicts in the Region of the Great Lakes: Origins and Prospects, Dar Es 
Salaam: Dar Es Salaam University Press, p. 1. 
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millions of lives across the region have been lost or blighted as a result of violence 
and displacement. Of the countries in the region, only Tanzania has managed to avoid 
such catastrophe, although it has been heavily affected by the strain of hosting 
hundreds of thousands of refugees.23 
 
In addressing the above arguments, the conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes Region 
are closely examined, with the DRC as a case study. The conflicts of the last decade 
across the region must be understood in the context of longer-term dynamics of ethnic 
conflict and state formation. It is particularly important to study patterns of 
intervention in each other’s affairs by the states of the region and the role of natural 
resources in fuelling conflict.24 Three factors have been identified by analysts as key 
contributors to conflict in the region: ethnicity, state failure and greed.  Peace-building 
strategies have increasingly sought to address these factors.25 But, have these efforts 
sought to acknowledge the historical contexts within which these factors emerged? 
There is no question that ethnicity has been an important factor in generating conflict 
in the Great Lakes region. However, ethnicity must be understood in a historical and 
political context. For example, Hutu and Tutsi identities are in no way ‘primordial.’ 
These identities hardened under colonial rule and became virtually the sole basis for 
political action in Burundi and Rwanda after the colonial era ended. Ethnicity has also 
undoubtedly played a major role in causing conflict in Uganda and the DRC. 
 
In the case of the DRC, the people of the Congo have suffered cruelty throughout the 
past century from a particularly brutal experience of colonial rule.  Following 
independence in 1960 and external interference by the United States and other 
Western powers, there was a generation-long spoliation at the hands of Mobutu (the 
dictator installed by the West in 1965), and periodic warfare which continues fitfully 
                                                 
23 By the end of 2004, more than 1 million refugees from the Great Lakes region were hosted in 
Tanzania, although by 2008 the number dropped to 334,862 following voluntary repatriation, local 
integration and resettlement to a third country, available at <http://www.moha.go.tz>, last visited 
September 8, 2009. See further for these statistics, Mwachifi, S.(2006) ‘Security and Related 
Implications of Forced Migration: East Africa and Great Lakes Region’, paper presented to the East 
African Summer School for Refugee and Humanitarian Affairs, Nairobi, 2006, p. 5. (On file with the 
Author) 
24 Huggins, C. (2004) ‘Preventing Conflict through Improved Policies on Land Tenure, Natural 
Resource Rights, and Migration in the Great Lakes Region’ Eco-Conflicts, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 1-4. 
25 Lunn, J. (2006) ‘The African Great Lakes Region: An End to Conflict?’ RESEARCH PAPER  
06/51 25 OCTOBER 2006, available at < ttp://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-
051.pdf>. last visited, September 8, 2009. 
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even now in the east of the country. But, as an insightful political history of the 
Congolese democratic movement in the 20th century decisively makes it clear, the 
Congolese people have responded by trying both to establish democratic institutions 
at home and to free themselves from exploitation from abroad.  (Indeed, internal and 
external exploitation cannot be separated one from the other).26 Much of what is 
happening derives from the inbuilt culture of brutality from the time of King Leopold 
II of Belgium, who owned the “Congo Free State” as his private property. Leopold 
has gone down in history as a man of greed, who carved out an empire based on terror 
to harvest rubber.27 Congolese families were held hostages, starving to death if the 
men failed to produce enough rubber. The shocking massacres and widespread 
brutality of the Belgian staff of a company which was ‘trading’ (substitute word for 
‘plundering’) in the Congo, provided an outline for Joseph Conrad’s famous historical 
novel on Congo ‘Heart of Darkness’28 which, set in the 1890s, remain a true 
testimony of crimes committed by colonial rulers in the heart of Africa, the current 
DRC.  In this way, a terror was unleashed that, by all accounts, would eventually 
halve the population of the Congo.  “During the Leopold period and its immediate 
aftermath the population of the territory dropped by approximately ten million 
people"29 
 
Congo was to attain independence smoothly in 1960. However, under the turbulent 
ghost of King Leopold II it fell under General Joseph Mobutu, who staged a military 
take over, and tyrannically misruled the country for 32 years while receiving 
misguided Western foreign assistance. His criminal government was preoccupied with 
extraction and extortion such that, like King Leopold II, he ran the country as a 
personal property until Laurent Kabila’s forces overthrew him in 1997. Kabila was 
himself assassinated four years later, to be succeeded by his son, the current President 
Joseph Kabila. The conflict under current study started all over in 1998, and efforts to 
resolve it motivated this study. 
                                                 
26 Nzongola-Ntalaja, supra note 22, cover page. 
27 Prunier, supra note 12, p. 76. 
28 See generally Cox, C. (Ed.), (1982) Conrad: Heart of Darkness, Nostromo and Under Western eyes: 
A Casebook, London:  Macmillan; Conrad, J. (1999) Heart of Darkness and Selections from The 
Congo Diary of Joseph Conrad, New York: Modern Library. 
29 Hochschild, A. (1988). King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial 
Africa, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, p. 233. 
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As pointed out early, for the purposes of this study, only one country in the Africa’s 
Great Lakes region, the DRC will be studied. Only by looking at the Great Lakes 
region as whole, however, with this one country as a case study, can one comprehend 
the calamities suffered by this part of the African continent. 
 
The DRC is chosen as a case study for a number of reasons. Different traditional 
conflict resolution initiatives have been applied in the DRC since the war broke in 
August 1998. The involvement of many parties in the war and the complexity of 
interests have made conflict resolution initiatives rather complicated.30 From the time 
the war broke various initiatives were taken under a sub-regional organization 
(SADC), a regional set up (AU) and the international community, particularly under 
the UN.  Firstly, the SADC and AU led various negotiations, culminating in the 
process of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue from the aborted Addis Ababa meeting, 
through the Sun City I process of February-April 2002, the December Pretoria 
Agreement up to the Sun City II final talks of April 2003.31  
 
Following the April 2003 Sun City Agreement, the composition of Transitional 
Government was finally settled and agreement reached to integrate all rebel factions 
into an integrated national army. Under a ‘1+4 formula’, the Transitional Government 
involved the appointment of four Vice-Presidents under President Joseph Kabila, 
thereby ensuring the representation of the main armed Congolese parties to the 
conflict.32 The parties declared the conflict in the DRC formally over. The new 
Transitional Government was promulgated in June 2003, leading to relatively 
peaceful parliamentary and presidential elections in July 30th, 2006 with the run-off 
on October 29th 2006. 
 
                                                 
30 For a thorough discussion on the parties involved in the DRC conflict and their varying interests, see 
Mpangala, supra note 22, p. 92 
31 See detailed discussions of this dialogue in Apuuli, P. (2004). ‘The Politics of Conflict Resolution in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Inter-Congolese Dialogue Process’ in African Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, vol. 4 No.1, pp. 65-84. 
32 The various elements and entities involved in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Parties to the Global 
and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: were the Government 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), the Movement 
for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), the political opposition, civil society, the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy/Liberation Movement (RDC/ML), the Congolese Rally for Democracy/National (RCD/N) 
and the Mai-Mai. 
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The second set of conflict resolution initiatives in the DRC conflicts was that 
conducted under the auspices of the UN or UN led institutions. Firstly, the UN 
deployed a more military approach in the form of Peacekeeping operations, the 
MONUC,33 which comprises of more than 17,000 personnel, being the biggest UN 
force in the world and costing $1.2 billion a year.34 The mission must be seen as the 
start of the long road to change leading to free elections and sustainable and 
responsible government. Furthermore, should peacekeepers deploy to enforce peace 
and/or respond to a humanitarian crisis they must deploy in significant numbers with 
the appropriate command structure, mandate and capability to coerce effectively as 
required. 
 
Additionally, judicial settlement or rather an adjudication-as-conflict-resolution 
approach has been tried in resolving the Congo conflict. Following armed activities 
committed by foreign troops from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi in the DRC territory, 
the latter initiated proceedings before the ICJ in June 1999, alleging inter alia, that 
acts of armed aggression carried out by Uganda on the DRC territory constituted a 
flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU).35 The case, which continued against Uganda alone, ended in 
2005 with the ICJ verdict implicating Uganda to have breached international law 
against the DRC and was thus ordered to pay damages. In another vein, following the 
issuing of a warrant of arrest in January 2006, in March Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a 
former Ituri militia leader, was handed over to the ICC by the DRC authorities.36 
However, other militia leaders in custody are reported to have been released, by the 
Congolese authorities.37 At the time of writing this thesis, this case was still pending 
before the ICC. It remains to be seen what impact the ICC’s decision will have on the 
developments in the DRC conflict.  
 
                                                 
33 This is an initial name of the French words “Mission de l' Organisation des Nations Unies en 
République démocratique du Congo, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (hereinafter to be referred to as “the MONUC”) 
34 Wrong, M. (2006)  ‘Congo on the Edge’. Available from the website of the All Party Parliamentary 
Group on the Great Lakes and Genocide Prevention at: <http://www.appggreatlakes.org>, last visited, 
September 8, 2009. 
35 The original case was brought against Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda.  The DRC discontinued the 
cases against Burundi and Rwanda in 2001 and filed a new submission against Uganda in 2002.  
36 For a copy of the ICC’s arrest warrant, see < http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/RDC.html>, last visited 
September 8, 2009. 
37 Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General, 13 June 2006, para. 54. 
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Despite these notable initiatives by various organizations and ‘never again’ call after 
Rwanda genocide, the conflict prevention performance has been and is still ad hoc 
and ineffective because it does not address the root causes of conflicts.  All the 
approaches have rarely addressed human rights, local dynamics and the historical as 
well as the multifaceted nature of the conflicts. Furthermore, participants in the peace 
process are restricted to representatives of political parties, the state and rebel 
movements, to the total exclusion of the civil society and other human rights groups. 
In order to understand the present conflict situation in the Great Lakes region, it 
appears that focus should be placed not on the ancient past, but rather on the recent 
history, starting from colonialism, which has a great impact on the origin of these 
conflicts. 
The various approaches to resolution of conflicts, as applied within the region will 
also be thoroughly studied. Proper analysis of these conflicts together with the 
suggestions on the new approaches to durable resolution of the same and prevention 
of other conflicts of similar nature will be fully addressed. 
 
1.1.2 Human Rights Discourse as a Contentious Reality 
 
In the contemporary human rights discourse and practice, human rights are 
constructed as both a ‘sword’ and a ‘shield’. As Shivji puts it, human rights are a 
contentious discourse in which different, and often-contradictory, perspectives 
representing different interests in national and international society seek dominance or 
hegemony.38 Just as dominant and dominating interests may employ the ideology of 
human rights to justify and rationalize their dominance, so also the forces that seek to 
resist dominance may deploy human rights to mobilize their resistance.  With such 
divergent scholarly views within and about human rights, it becomes imperative for 
one to examine the very concept of human rights before one can justify its use as an 
appropriate approach to conflict resolution. 
The most celebrated document in the history of human rights, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,39 was adopted in 1948 when the world had just 
emerged from one of the most devastating conflicts, the Second World War. It was a 
                                                 
38 Shivji, I. (Ed.) (2004) Constitutional and Legal System of Tanzania, Dar Es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota 
Publishers, p. 104.  
39 UN.G.A Res.217 (III) of December 10, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the UDHR”). 
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direct response to the barbarous acts, which outraged the conscience of mankind,40 
and, it was hoped, would therefore become a cornerstone for future conflict resolution 
processes. Whether this ambitious hope lived up to reality, remains to be seen. 
 
Even today, when the declaration has just turned to its 60th anniversary recently, there 
are still divergent views as to the validity of these so-called universal values, “human 
rights.” In one view, it is argued that there were only 56 out of the current 192 
member states of the United Nations with only three from Africa, including the then 
apartheid South Africa, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
adopted.41 More than two-thirds of the world’s peoples were under colonial rule, and 
they were referred to as ‘natives.’ They were not thought to be human enough to have 
human rights!  Many scholars and policy makers of multicultural heritage and 
orientation, though familiar and sometimes even comfortable with the West,42 see 
cross-cultural referencing as the most critical variable in the construction of human 
rights discourse.43 They critique the existing human rights corpus as culturally 
exclusive in some aspect and therefore view parts of it as illegitimate or, at the very 
least, irrelevant in non-Western societies. These challenges have raised important 
questions about whether human rights norms deserve the authority they claim to have 
acquired: whether their claims to universality are justified, or whether they are just 
another cunning exercise in Western moral imperialism. That is, having no more 
ability to dominate the world through direct imperial rule, the West (led by the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France) now masks its own will to the power in the 
impartial, universalizing language of human rights and seeks to impose this fake 
agenda on a plethora of world cultures that do not actually share the West’s 
conception of individuality and liberal democracies.44  Some, including Makau Wa 
                                                 
40 Preamble, para 1 of the UDHR. 
41 See Shivji, (2004), supra note 38; See further Avruch, K. (2006) ‘Culture, Relativism and Human 
Rights’ in Mertus & Helsing, supra note 6, p. 98. 
42 “The term West” or “Western" is used here to refer to Western Europe and North America.  
43 For views of this nature, see Mutua, M (1995) ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural 
Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 35, 
No. 2, pp. 339-380, (arguing that the current human rights regime is Eurocentric and that the creation 
of a truly universal human rights jurisprudence can result only from the multicultural elaboration of 
norms). 
44 Ignatieff, M. (2001), ‘The Attack on Human Rights’, Foreign Affairs 80/6, p. 102-116. 
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Mutua, have called for a multicultural approach to reform the human rights regime so 
as to make it more universal.45 
 While Mutua repeatedly affirms his respect for the human rights movement’s noble 
goals and ideals, he contends that its eurocentric bias has led to the unwitting 
imposition of Western political, economic, and cultural norms on non-Western 
societies.46 
 
The “constitutionalists” are the academics of the movement—including Louis Henkin, 
Henry Steiner, Philip Alston, and Thomas Franck—who view the human rights 
corpus as a constitutional framework. The “cultural pluralists,” to which Mutua 
presumably belongs, are non-Western thinkers who accept the human rights ideology 
and its European genesis, but who criticize its political implications, and emphasis on 
the individual, and its prioritization of certain rights. “Political strategists” are 
governments, especially the United States, and institutions, including the IMF and 
World Bank, who champion human rights inconsistently, near-sightedly, and usually 
for political benefit. 
Admittedly, Africa urgently needs to build a culture of respect for human rights if it is 
to resolve ongoing conflicts and achieve political stability and social and economic 
progress. But this culture cannot take hold if it is imposed paternalistically as a 
Western creation that non-Western societies must swallow uncritically -- especially if 
human rights are packaged with liberal democracy and market fundamentalism, now 
both widely associated with the hypocrisies of Western-driven globalization. The 
growth of a legitimate human rights culture in Africa depends on a reconstruction of 
the international human rights corpus to replace its Eurocentric bias ("runaway 
individualism") with a truly universal cross-fertilization of cultural, religious, and 
legal traditions.47 
This may partly explain the peculiarity of the present African Human Rights regime 
and its departure from the dominant or prevailing discourse of the concept. By 
dominant here, I mean the mainstream of the debate of the Western liberal 
conception, which depicts human rights as individualistic and universalistic. The 
                                                 
45 See Mutua (1995), supra note 43, at p. 345-346. 
46 See generally Mutua M (2002) Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 256. 
47 An-Naim, A & Deng, F. (1990) Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution, p. 290. 
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development of African human rights standards awarded a kind of priority to the 
community over the individual, which is characteristic of African societies in general 
and to the African perception of human rights in particular.48 This is clearly reflected 
in the major African human rights instrument, the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights (also called the Banjul Charter).49  Compared to other regional human 
rights regimes, the Banjul Charter has taken a holistic approach in the rights to be 
protected in Africa. The Charter does not only contain the ordinary individual civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights, but it also contains a number of 
collective rights of the peoples such as the right to equality, self-determination, 
development, peace and satisfactory environment, or the so-called ‘solidarity rights.’   
 
However, the prevailing rights discourse on Africa has been singularly deficient in 
contextualizing the human rights ideology within the neo-imperialist domination of 
Africa. Indeed, even the role of Western imperialism in the violation of human rights 
in Africa is hardly discussed in spite of the massive literature on the subject. To cite 
some few examples: in the dominantly western literature and media, one finds, again 
and again, references to such African leaders as Amin, Bokassa, Nguema, Mobutu, 
etc, as gruesome perpetrators of human rights violations, which indeed they were, but 
these citations go without mentioning the fact that Bokassa was France’s protege, that 
Nguema received support from Spain and the US,50 that Amin was installed and 
supported by Britain, while the US closely supported Mobutu in exchange for its 
political, economic and strategic interests from the mineral rich DRC. Thus, in a way, 
most of the human rights violations in Africa are a result of a chain of endless civil 
wars, most of which are manufactured in the West. 
 
Now if this is the true nature of human rights discourse as portrayed in the foregoing 
discussion, how possible is it that a human rights approach to conflict resolution is 
proposed in this study? Although some of these critiques are valid, and although there 
is some truth in the statement that the idea of human rights was first articulated in the 
West in modern times, it would appear to be an approach particularly suited to 
                                                 
48 Nowak, M (2003), Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime, London: Martinus  
     Nijhoff Publishers, p. 205. 
49 Adopted on June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1986. 
50 Shivji, I. (1989) The Concept of Human Rights in Africa, Dakar: CODESRIA, p. 53. 
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contemporary social, political and economic conditions, and thus of widespread 
contemporary relevance to the resolution of conflicts, both in the West and the Third 
World. Again, if the idea of the concept of human rights as both a ‘sword’ and a 
‘shield’ is plausible, then human rights can properly be employed in conflict 
resolution processes. 
 
Thus, in this study, a relationship between human rights and conflicts is analyzed in 
efforts aimed at resolving the latter. Human rights are portrayed as both the source 
and solution to conflicts. When the George W. Bush administration invaded Iraq, it 
justified its actions partly, by appealing to the need to liberate the Iraqi people from 
the oppression of Saddam Hussein, making a normative argument based implicitly on 
universal human rights.51 This has been considered as a dramatic recent occasion 
when rights arguments have been used to legitimize the use of arms.    
 
Human rights stand as an integral part of every armed conflict and are central 
concerns, even in cases in which the motive for a conflict has no connection to human 
rights, or in which human rights are not invoked as a rationale for a conflict. In the 
American Civil war, one of the Union’s objectives was to end Southern blacks’ 
slavery. Abuses of human rights also spawned many wars of liberation against 
colonial powers and wars waged by leftist guerrilla insurgents against corrupt or 
dictatorial governing regimes. In the wars in former Yugoslavia, Serbian political 
leaders incited Serbs to join them in their nationalist territorial claims by reminding 
them of the unredressed ancient and World War II-era human rights violations against 
Serbs, and blaming that suffering on other Yugoslav national groups.52 
 
1.1.3 Defining Relevant Research Concepts 
 
Africa’s Great Lakes Region: There are divergent views as to what exactly constitutes 
the Africa’s Great Lakes Region, hence the need for a definition. Furthermore, an 
unqualified reference to the Great Lakes Region implies to many, especially in the 
Western World understanding, the region of North America, formed by the Great 
                                                 
51 Lund, M. (2006). ‘Human Rights: A Source of Conflict, State Making and State Breaking’ in Mertus 
& Helsing, supra note 6, p. 39 
52 Ibid, p.26. 
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Lakes of Superior, Michigan, Huron, Ontario and Erie.53  Even when it is clear that it 
is Africa’s Great Lakes Region, definitions vary.54   One considers the core countries 
to include Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),55 Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda; and parts of other countries, notably the Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Sudan and Zambia.56 A second definition 
considers the region as that part of Africa which encompasses the countries of 
Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan. 
The third definition is a narrower one, which considers the Great Lakes Region as 
being the same as the Interlacustrine region.57  In this definition, the area includes 
Burundi, the DRC, Eastern Kenya, Rwanda, Northern Tanzania and Uganda.  A 
fourth perspective considers the Africa’s Great Lakes Region as constituting only the 
six countries of Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.58  
Given the historical developments in the Africa’s Great Lakes Conflicts, which are of 
concern to this study, the last definition is preferred. 59  
 
It must be admitted that the Great Lakes is a geopolitical concept and a recent one.  In 
fact, the concept itself is intricately intertwined with the region’s troubled history;60 
and any description of the area must be contextual if confusion is to be avoided.  The 
                                                 
53 Karni, M  et al (Eds.), (1975). The Finnish Experience in the Western Great Lakes: News 
Perspectives, Turku: Institute for Migration, p.34. 
54 Mpangala, G and Mwansasu, B (eds) (2004), Beyond Conflict in Burundi, Dar es Salaam: The       
Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, p.388. 
55 In order to avoid any confusion with the other Congo, we use “the DRC” to refers to Congo-
Kinshasa as opposed to Congo-Brazzaville; formerly the Congo Free State under King Leopold II 
(1885-1908); the Belgian Congo under the Belgian colonial administration (1908-1960); known also as 
Zaire (from 1972 to 1997); and renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo by Laurent Kabila when 
he overthrew Mobutu Sese Seko who misruled the country for 32 years. Where the context so admits, 
we also use “Congo” to refer to the same.  The DRC is the third largest country in Africa, situated on 
the Equator and bordering nine other countries and with a population estimated to be 55 million people. 
After Sudan, it is the largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is made up of many ethnic groups. The 
largest amongst them are the Kongo, Kwangu-Kwilu, Mongo, Bwaka, Luba and Zande. The country is 
no less diverse linguistically. The DRC is richly endowed with natural resources, including diamonds, 
which are its most valuable export. Other valuable mineral assets include gold, copper, cobalt, casserite 
and coltan. It also has enormous timber resources. An estimated 4 million Congolese have died as a 
result of conflict over the last decade. 
56 This definition follows the geographical extension of the area of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). 
57 See also Mpangala, G. (2004), ‘Origins of Political Conflicts and Peace Building in the Great Lakes 
Region,’ Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar Es salaam, Paper presented at a 
Symposium on “Ramifications of Instability in the Great Lakes Zone” Arusha, February 2004, p.6. (On 
file with the Author). 
58 Ibid 
59 Uurtimo, Y and Väyrynen, T (Eds) (2000). ’Peace-Building in the Great Lakes Region of Africa,’  
Tampere Peace Research Institute.  Occasional Papers No.79, p.15 
60 See Nzongola, supra note 22, p. 43. 
   18 
name derives from the system of lakes and tributaries draining the central section of 
the Rift Valley of Africa. The Great Lakes in the system, some of which were named 
after European Monarchs by the first European travellers to see them, are Lakes 
Victoria, Tanganyika, Kioga, Kivu, Edward and Lake Albert. Lake Victoria is the 
second largest lake in the World and the largest in Africa, while Tanganyika is the 
second largest in Africa and the fifth largest in the World.61  
 
It is important to note however that although the concept of the Africa’s Great Lakes 
may be a recent phenomenon in the international discussions, the countries in the 
region have had a long historical linkage. Such linkages are traceable from the 
developments of centralized states around the interlacustrine region in the 13th century 
A.D,62 the long distance trade which linked all the six countries in the region,63 
colonialism64 and recently by violent conflicts. 
 
This region, which has since the 1960s, been the arena of civil strife of an often 
protracted nature65 has sometimes been described as a “conflict system” with mutual 
interdependencies.  These include the potential for the prolongation and extension of 
violence conflict, as for potential for conflict resolution.66 It is a region that has been 
in turmoil for the last four decades with the violent conflicts particularly in the DRC, 
Burundi and Rwanda. The civil war in the latter was characterized by widespread acts 
of genocide culminating in the killings of a minimum of 800,000 people in 1994.67  
This catastrophic event was a logical outcome of an ideology and politics of exclusion 
that had generated earlier episodes of large-scale massacres and the flight of 
Rwandans of Tutsi origin into exile. But the roots of the genocide ideology lie deep in 
the history of ethnic identity construction and mobilization under colonial rule. The 
                                                 
61Ibid. 
62 The period was marked with the interactions between the Hima and Nilotic pastoralists from the 
North with the Bantu agriculturalists, giving rise to the formation of centralized states around the 
region  
63 See Mpangala and Mwansau, supra note 54. The period also marked the beginning of the spread of 
Kiswahili language within the region. 
64German East Africa, which lasted for thirty years, constituted Tanzania Mainland, Rwanda and 
Burundi. Following defeat of the Germans during the First World War, Rwanda and Burundi came to 
be linked to the DR Congo under the Belgian Colonial rule, while Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were 
linked under British colonialism. 
65 Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC have experienced violent conflicts of varying degrees since colonial 
rule, and especially since the 1960s. 
66 Uurtimo and Väyrynen, supra note 59. 
67 Ibid. 
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variety of protracted conflicts with different degrees of escalation faced by these 
countries is what came to be described as the “Africa’s Great Lakes Conflicts.”68   
 
Conflict: From the Latin for ‘to clash or engage in a fight’, a confrontation between 
one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends.69 
Conflict may be either manifest, recognizable through actions or behaviours, or latent, 
in which case it remains dormant for some time, as incompatibilities are unarticulated 
or are built into systems or such institutional arrangements as governments, 
corporations, or even civil society.70 Within the field of international relations, Peter 
Wallensteen71 identifies three general forms of conflict: interstate, internal, and state-
formation conflicts. Interstate conflicts are disputes between nation-states or 
violations of the state system of alliances. The international community, however, has 
become increasingly concerned with the rise in frequency and intensity of internal 
conflicts, which are contributing to the expanding nature, sophistication, and, at times, 
legitimization of interventionist policies. Examples of internal and state-formation 
conflicts include civil and ethnic wars, anti-colonial struggles, secessionist and 
autonomous movements, territorial conflicts, and battles over control of government. 
Today, attention has also focused on ‘global conflicts’, where non-state groups 
combat international and regional organizations.72 
 
A primary assumption underlying this study is that conflict is a natural, normal and 
inevitable part of life.73  This implies that conflict as a social and political 
phenomenon cannot be eliminated, prevented, or resolved.  The challenge is to 
manage it in a constructive way that allows for the expression of discord and 
legitimate struggle without violence.  One can, however, speak of the resolution and 
prevention of a specific conflict concerning a particular issue or set of issues.   
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International law recognizes at least four different types of conflict situations, each of 
which is governed by a different set of legal norms: (i.) situations of tensions and 
disturbances; (ii.) international armed conflicts; (iii.) wars of national liberation; and 
(iv.) internal armed conflicts. 
 
Situations of Internal Tensions and Disturbances: The term “internal tensions and 
disturbances” refers to situations that fall short of armed conflict, but involve the use 
of force and other repressive measures by a government to maintain or restore public 
order or public safety.74 Only IHRL applies in such situations, although it should be 
noted that governments are permitted to derogate from or limit a restricted set of 
obligations under IHRL in the context of tensions and disturbances.75 
 
International Armed Conflict: The term “international armed conflict” refers to 
situations that involve two or more states engaged in armed conflict. In such 
situations, the central provisions of IHL become operative, particularly those 
contained in the four Geneva Conventions and Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. 
In addition, most human rights guarantees remain applicable in such situations, albeit 
subject to the same types of derogations and limitations permitted to governments in 
situations of internal tensions and disturbances. 
 
Wars of National Liberation: The term “wars of national liberation” refers to armed 
conflicts in which “peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-
determination.”76  Generally speaking, the same provisions of IHL and IHRL that 
                                                 
74 A non-exhaustive list of examples of situations of tensions and internal disturbances are provided in 
Article 1(2) of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, and include “riots, isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence and other acts of a similar nature.” Article 1(2) expressly provides that Protocol II does not 
apply to situations of tensions and disturbances. 
75 Many IHRL treaties, including the ICCPR (Articles 12, 13, 18, 21 and 22) and the CRC (Articles 10, 
14 and 15), contain limitation clauses that permit governments to lawfully restrict the free exercise of 
certain rights in such situations. For example, a government may legitimately impose restrictions on 
freedom of movement in an environment in which riots are occurring without actually violating the 
right to freedom of movement of affected persons. However, such restrictions are in general only 
permissible to the extent that they are (i.) prescribed by law, and (ii.) strictly necessary for achieving 
their legitimate purposes. Some IHRL treaties also contain derogation clauses, which permit states to 
temporarily derogate from (i.e., suspend) certain guarantees in times of genuine public emergency. 
However, treaties containing derogation clauses typically list several rights that cannot be suspended 
even in times of emergency. 
76 Article 1(4) of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. 
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apply in the context of international armed conflict apply equally in the context of 
wars of national liberation.77 
 
Internal Armed Conflict: The term “internal armed conflict” refers to all armed 
conflicts that cannot be characterized as either international armed conflicts or wars of 
national liberation.78 Protocol II provides that internal armed conflicts “must take 
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and 
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement (Protocol II).”79  
The ICTY Appeals Chamber has further refined this definition, inter alia, in its 
landmark decision, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a “Dule”.80   
 
This study will refer to "violent" or "armed" conflict if direct, physical violence is 
involved, and will simply use the term "conflict" if violence is not an issue.  Where 
the term "prevention" is used, it refers to the prevention of violent or armed conflict, 
and the study focuses mostly on intra-state conflict rather than inter-state conflict.81 
 
 Conflict management:  Like the associate term ‘conflict regulation’, is sometimes 
used as a generic term to cover the whole gamut of positive conflict handling, but is 
used here to refer to the limitation, mitigation and containment of violent conflict. 
Interventionist efforts towards preventing the escalation and negative effects, 
especially violent ones, of ongoing conflicts. Rarely are conflicts completely resolved. 
                                                 
77 Ibid. It should be noted, however, that different legal norms would apply in a state that is not party to 
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78 Article 1(1) of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. 
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appropriate geographic and temporal frames of reference for internal armed conflicts. 
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Ababa: University for Peace. 
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More often, they are reduced, downgraded, or contained. Such developments can be 
followed by a reorientation of the issue, reconstitution of the divisions among 
conflicting parties, or even by a re-emergence of past issues or grievances. Conflict 
management when actively conducted is, therefore, a constant process.82 
 
A variety of techniques have been identified and employed in conflict management 
efforts. The following are the most prominent: First, conflicting parties are brought 
together to establish a mutual agreement. Second, governments or third parties to the 
strife may directly intervene to introduce or impose a decision. Third, new initiatives, 
programmes, or institutional structures (for example, elections) are implemented to 
address the conflict in question. Fourth, contending parties are compelled or coerced 
to utilize previously established means of resolution or containment. Fifth, 
government or another third party may use coercion to eliminate or instill fear among 
one or all those engaged in a given conflict, leading to subsidence. 
  
Conflict management should not be viewed as a simple, linear or structured process. 
Those assuming or charged with such a task must usually overcome an intensely 
chaotic situation. Conflicts are frequently managed directly by the society in which 
they occur. When not possible or when conflicts become national in scope, 
government normally assumes the task, provided it is not a party to the conflict. In 
cases where the government is unable or unwilling to intervene, international 
organizations increasingly assume the role of conflict manager. 
 
 Conflict prevention: The anticipation of conflict that seeks to redress causal 
grievances to avoid the escalation of violent forms of conflict engagement or to curtail 
the re-occurrence of violent exchanges or some combination of these elements. The 
term ‘conflict prevention’ can be misleading, because theoretically none of the 
aforementioned aspects aspire to ‘prevent’ conflict as such. Instead, the aim is often to 
resolve a conflict at hand or more typically to prevent escalation or violent 
manifestations, through conflict management mechanisms. Although at times referred 
to as ‘preventive diplomacy’ and ‘crisis prevention’, such activities usually involve 
maintaining the status quo due to potential threats associated with crises or the 
anticipated outcomes from engaging in a dispute. Conflict prevention, however, 
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recognizes that in order to avoid the catastrophes associated with strife, particularly 
violent upheaval, change is usually necessary, for example, through new institutions, 
revitalized processes, or the sharing of power. 
 
In any case, conflict prevention as an approach relies heavily on accurate analysis of 
any latent or minor disputes in the hope of identifying appropriate strategies for 
resolution or intervention. Such efforts are collectively categorized as ‘early warning 
systems’, which vary in complexity and approach. They may include fact-finding 
missions, consultations, inspections, report mechanisms, and monitoring.83 The 
predictive nature of conflict prevention raises several issues, particularly regarding the 
timing of intervention and the possibility of precipitating pre-emptive action by 
parties beyond the conflict. 
 
Humanitarian and moral concerns are often insufficient for initiating effective conflict 
prevention efforts, even in the face of egregiously violent circumstances. As a result, 
numerous arguments are put forth on behalf of conflict prevention, for example, geo-
strategic concerns, security interests, cost-benefit analyses, and refugee issues. 
Despite the increasing technical capacity and human ability to identify deadly 
conflicts before they erupt, as well as the likelihood of extreme costs in life, social 
cohesion, and regional instability, conflict prevention remains in the realm of theory 
more than practice.84 
  
Conflict prevention has predominantly been viewed as the task, if not the 
responsibility, of international organizations or nation-states neutral to the given 
conflict. It, however, does not necessarily, nor should it depend solely, on external 
parties. The most effective method of conflict prevention, although not described as 
such, is accountable governance, whereby citizens and groups have access to effective 
avenues and mechanisms for resolving the range of disputes and conflicts that 
ordinarily arise within societies. Such access not only involves governmental 
structures, but also requires the cooperation of civil societies and business 
communities. This is particularly true in settings where violent conflict has already 
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occurred and conflict prevention focuses on inhibiting recurrences, for example 
through some form of reconciliation. 
 
According to Michael Lund, conflict prevention entails “any structure or interactive 
means to keep intrastate and interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into 
significant violence and to strengthen the capabilities to resolve such quarrels 
peacefully as well as alleviating the underlying problems that produce them, including 
forestalling the spread of hostilities into new places.”85  Thus, it is a medium and 
long-term strategy instead of short-term, undertaken by a variety of actors, intended to 
create a stable and fair environment.  There are other terms which are similar to 
conflict prevention such as prevention action, preventive engagement, preventive 
deployment, which are used very loosely and even interchangeably with other phrases 
such as peacemaking, conflict management, conflict resolution, democracy building 
and peacekeeping.86  For example, the definition of preventive diplomacy described in 
An Agenda for Peace as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties and 
escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur”87 can be 
easily interpreted as conflict prevention. 
 
Prevention can be divided into a few categories.  The Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict lists two categories: “structural prevention,” which 
address as the root causes of deadly conflict, and “operational prevention,” described 
as “early engagement to help create conditions in which responsible authorities can 
resolve tensions before they lead to violence.”88  The former consists of measures to 
ensure that crises do not arise in the first place or to ensure that they will not recur, 
whereas the latter refers to measures applicable in the face of immediate crisis.   
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The UN International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
identifies other types of prevention: 
• “structural prevention”: ongoing efforts that target issues of economic 
development, human rights, arms trafficking and governance and that help 
build international regimes or a “culture of prevention” 
• “early prevention”: initiatives generated as soon as early warnings indicate a 
serious dispute in the context of uneasy stability 
• “late prevention”: crisis diplomacy when serious armed conflicts appear 
imminent or have begun and 
• “post-conflict peace building”; initiatives designed to prevent a recurrence of 
armed conflict89  
 
The above-mentioned description of post-conflict peace-building is a little ambiguous. 
However, using its definition explained in An Agenda for Peace, ‘in the largest sense, 
to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and 
political oppression’,90 it is comprehensible that it has a strong preventive character.  
Therefore, pre-conflict structural prevention and post-conflict peace-building are 
more or less the same activities, which can broadly include from development to 
governance issues.  There are strong arguments supporting the view that this strategy 
of structural prevention and peace-building should be enhanced prior to conflict. 
 
Although conflict prevention seems to be a new concept, it is actually one of the 
primary obligations of Member States set forth under Chapter VI in the UN Charter in 
1945.91 The term preventive diplomacy was first coined by the then UN Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjold in 1960.92 Nevertheless, it received relatively little 
attention as a distinct concept due to the Cold War.  Following the demise of the Cold 
War, preventive diplomacy attracted attention partially due to the issuance of An 
Agenda for Peace in 1992, which identified it as “the most desirable and efficient” 
option, among four key elements, for managing conflicts, together with other 
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capacities such as confidence building measures, fact-finding, early-warning, and 
preventive deployment.93  
  
Conflict resolution is a range of processes aimed at alleviating or eliminating sources 
of conflict. The term "conflict resolution" is sometimes used interchangeably with the 
term dispute resolution or alternative dispute resolution. Conflict resolution has been 
developing as a field since the 1950s. Its emergence as an interdisciplinary field can 
be traced to the human relations and inter-group relations movements, which followed 
the Second World War.94 The creation of conflict resolution as an academic discipline 
and field of practice grew out of five movements: 1) the industrial and labour 
management based on the work of Shepard and Mouton (1964)95 which emerged from 
the organizational relations in the 1960s; 2) the problem-solving workshops and 
mediation which was introduced in international relations by Burton (1969),96 Kelman 
(1976),97 Doob (1971),98 and Mitchell (1981);99 3) religious figures redirected their 
work in peace-related endeavours to an emphasis on "peace-making";100  4) lawyers 
and the court system were criticized by the general public which resulted in what is 
known today as alternative dispute resolution (ADR); and 5) the interpersonal and 
family disputes practices emerged as another level of conflict resolution derived from 
human relations practices, as led by Walton (1971), Hynes (1981),101 and Coogler 
(1978).102 
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p. 22.  
99 See generally, Mitchell, C. (1981) Peace Making and Consultant's Role, New York: Nichols 
Publishing Company. 
100 Scimecca, J., ‘Conflict Resolution the Bases for Social Control or Social Change?’ in  Sandole, D. 
& Sandole, I., (Eds:), (1987) Conflict Management and Problem Solving, New York: New York UP, 
pp- 30-34. 
101 Haynes, J. M., (1981) Divorce Mediation: A Practical Guide for Therapists And Counselors, New 
York: Springer. 
102 Coogler, O. J., (1978) Structured Mediation in Divorce Settlement: A Handbook for Marital 
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Out of these movements, several intervention approaches are being developed and 
applied to different levels of conflict. However, the main processes of conflict 
resolution are conciliation, facilitation, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. While 
conflict resolution scholars disagree on the boundaries of this field, some scholars 
include arbitration as a conflict resolution intervention process, and exclude 
conciliation processes. For the purpose of this study, Western conflict resolution will 
include all five intervention processes. Conflict resolution is multifaceted in that it 
refers to a process, a result, and an identified field of academic study as well as an 
activity in which persons and communities engage every day without ever using the 
term. The antagonisms in question may involve interpersonal relationships, labour-
management issues, business decisions, inter-group disputes, disagreements between 
nation-states, or international quarrels. 
 
As pointed out elsewhere, not all conflicts are harmful. Some may ultimately result in 
positive social change. As noted by Nigerian sociologists Onigu Otite and Isaac 
Olawale Albert, ‘although conflicts have negative connotations many constitute an 
essential creative element for changing societies and achieving the goals and 
aspirations of individuals and groups’.103 Conflict resolution involves recognition by 
the clashing parties of one another’s interests, needs, perspectives, and continued 
existence. The most effective forms identify the underlying causes of the conflict and 
address them through solutions that are mutually satisfactory, self-perpetuating, and 
sustaining. Conflict resolution can also be practiced with a variety of emphases, 
including but not limited to cooperation, non-confrontation, non-competition, and 
positive-sum orientation. Serious challenges are found when parties at times favour, 
for various reasons, continuation of conflict over its resolution. In such cases, the role 
of external parties can be critical in creating a balance of power, enacting sanctions or 





                                                 
103 Otite, O and Olawale, I. (1999). Community Conflict in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and 
Transformation. Spectrum Books, Ibadan, p. 17. 
104 Miller, supra note 81. 
   28 
1.1.4 Research Questions 
 
The research problem in this study is weakness and limitation in the existing 
mechanisms aimed at preventing and resolving conflicts in international law. 
Consequently, the following research questions will be addressed: 
o First, are the currently existing UN and AU conflict prevention and 
management mechanisms adequate and effective? The currently existing UN 
and AU approaches to conflict prevention and resolution will be assessed in 
answer to this question. 
o Second, how have human rights violations (abuses) contributed to the eruption 
of conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes Region? The question will be 
addressed by assessing the extent to which different local laws and regulations 
which violate specific human rights have triggered armed conflicts within the 
country under study. In this case, the Congolese nationality legislation is 
examined to determine its contribution to the eruption of conflicts particularly 
in eastern DRC. 
o Third, how does the impact of human rights ensure effective conflict 
resolution in the African Great Lakes Region? The question will be answered 
by exploring the various ways of bridging the current gap between human 
rights and conflict prevention and management as applied generally and in the 
Great Lakes Region of Africa in particular. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives and Significance of the Study 
 
The main objective of the current study is to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of 
the existing mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, and the extent to 
which the link between Human Rights Norms and Conflict Prevention and 
Management may act as an alternative approach to preventing and resolving the 
Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts.  
Specifically, the study is intended to achieve, inter alia, the following objectives: 
• To assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the currently existing UN and AU 
approaches to conflict prevention and resolutions as has been applied in 
relation to the Africa's great lakes generally and in the DRC conflicts in 
particular. 
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• To assess the extent to which, violations of human rights standards within the 
region has been one of the major contributing factors for the frequent 
eruptions of internal violent conflicts in the region. In this respect, the study is 
intended to review the various (local) laws and regulations, particularly those 
relating to citizenship, to determine their contribution to the eruption of 
conflicts in the religion; 
• To research on the best ways in which the link between human rights and 
conflict prevention and management will enhance the capacity of the region 
for conflict prevention, management and resolution. 
This study will therefore identify the various types of human rights the violation of 
which is prone to triggering conflicts in the region, with a view to arguing that respect 
for such rights will not only reduce the possibility of eruption of more conflicts, but 
will also resolve the existing ones. 
At the end, incorporation of human rights in current efforts to build strong and 
reliable mechanisms for Peace and Conflicts Prevention and management is highly 
recommended with the intention to enhance the state of security and stability in the 
region and in the African continent at large.  
 
1.3 Methods of Research and Data Collection  
This research is based mainly on an analysis of primary and secondary texts. The 
documents used are UN documents, such as UN Treaties, Security Council 
resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, reports of the Secretary-General and other 
reports from researches conducted under the auspices of the UN. Secondly, various 
research projects by scholars on human rights, conflicts and conflict resolution, 
peacekeeping, legal studies of related issues and the history of the areas concerned 
were broadly referred to and consulted.  Thirdly, reports of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) that were involved in human rights and conflict resolution 
processes in the areas concerned, together with written work by people who actually 
worked on the field were studied carefully in order to revisit what had been 
represented by the UN official documents and to reconstruct the view on each conflict 
resolution approach. 
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Fourthly, some journalistic reports concerning the Great Lakes conflicts and indeed 
the Congo conflict were used to obtain additional information. However, the use of 
journalistic reports was deliberately restricted, since any presentation of a situation 
cannot be immune from an individual’s own interpretation and value judgement. This 
also applies to academic studies, and to any written work, but the nature of journalism 
and the structure and environment where journalism functions appear to intensify this 
tendency. Different articles on a supposedly unique event sometimes create an 
impression that there were different facts. 
 
To supplement the documentary research, some empirical studies were conducted 
between January and June 2007 in the research subject data collection areas. Such 
research was aimed at obtaining both grass roots information as well as the views of 
people who had actually been involved in the various conflict resolution processes 
research areas. The field research applied qualitative research strategy in data 
collection. As argued by Denzin and Lincoln105 qualitative research is applicable in 
studying phenomenon in their natural settings, and interpreting them in terms of the 
meanings that people bring them. To achieve this goal, fieldwork, which is one of the 
primary elements of qualitative research,106 was conducted. The relevant sites selected 
for field research were various offices, organizations and institutions within 
Tanzania,107 Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
In Tanzania the field research entailed data collection from persons who were 
involved in the Burundi Peace Process, a mediation process initiated in 1996 by the 
former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere in Arusha town, Northern Tanzania, and 
continued later by former South African President Nelson Mandela.108 This peace 
process, which was fully endorsed by the UN Security Council in 2002,109 was aimed 
                                                 
105 Denzin, N & Lincoln, Y, (Eds.)  (2003). The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and 
Issues, 3rd Edn., California: Sage,  p. 46. 
106 Merriam, S. (1998). Qualitative Research and Case Study Application in Education, 2nd ed. San 
Francisco; Jossey-Bass, p. 43. 
107 Although Tanzania has never been an actual party to any of the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts, it has 
been closely involved in the conflict resolution initiatives for both the Rwanda and Burundi conflicts 
since 1990s, with most of the conflict management institutions located in Tanzania. 
108 Mr. Mandela was designated by the Eighth Arusha Regional Summit on December 1, 1999, to 
succeed as Facilitator former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere who died in October 1999. 
109 Following a briefing by Mandela on the situation in Burundi, the UN Security Council under 
Resolution 1286 (2000) Unanimously endorsed his designation as the new Facilitator of the peace 
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at preventing and resolving the conflicts between the government and the various 
rebellious groups involved in the conflict in Burundi.110  As such, the fieldwork in this 
research component involved visiting various important research centres in Dar es-
salaam, including the Nyerere Foundation, which is the documentation and research 
center involved in conflict resolution initiatives in the Africa’s Great Lakes region. 
Other institutions visited in Tanzania were the University of Dar es salaam Center for 
the Study of Forced Migration, which conducts researches on the migration of 
refugees due to the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the main office of the UNHCR in Dar es-salaam. 
 
One of the major impacts of armed conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes region is the 
production of thousands of refugees fleeing their home countries and seeking refuge 
in neighbouring states.111 This fact connotes a failure of the existing mechanisms to 
prevent and resolve conflicts in the region. Another target area for data collection in 
Tanzania was therefore Refugees camps located in Northern Tanzania, where 
interviews and informal discussions were conducted with Congo and Burundi 
Refugees staying in three refugee camps: Kibondo, Kasulu and Nyalugusu. The 
fieldwork within refugees’ camps lasted for one week only, with interviews conducted 
with three refugees in each camp, making a total of nine interviewees. 
 
In Congo the field research aimed at, among other things, taking a close look at the 
effectiveness or otherwise of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in the DRC (MONUC)112 
in resolving the Congo conflict. It entailed a one-month visit to Eastern Congo towns 
in the Kivu Provinces, which is the main source area of conflicts in the Congo. 
Interviews and informal discussions on the conflict in the DRC involved twenty-one 
people in total who were met and interviewed at different times. They included 
MONUC senior personnels, the Division and the MONUC Human Rights 
Coordinators, leaders of three different Human Rights civil society organizations, 
ordinary members of the local population, government officials, leaders of political 
                                                                                                                                            
process and a successor to the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and expressed its strong support for his 
efforts to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict; See Press Release SC/6787 of January 19, 2000. 
110 Thirteen of the 19 warring parties of Burundi were involved in a historic Burundi Peace Process, 
which culminated in signing of an agreement aimed at ending a seven-year civil conflict in the country. 
111 Number of Burundian refugees in Tanzania 
112 See supra note 33.  
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parties, academicians and church leaders. In cases where interviews and informal 
discussions were considered inappropriate, questionnaires were administered. 
 
In Burundi 10 people were interviewees at different times. Due to time constraint, a 
research assistant was engaged to continue collecting further data from Burundi by 
interviewing persons who played varying roles in the Burundi Peace process and in 
the Burundi government in general. These include former senior political and 
government officials, leaders of the principal opposition political parties, members of 
parliament, legal practitioners (advocates and judges), local and international 
organisations (NGOs) working as human rights defenders in Burundi. The idea was to 
receive as much diverse views as possible from interviewees of different cadres and 
backgrounds. 
 The field research aimed at collecting empirical data from research components as 
per research proposal and plan, with focus on the following general research 
questions: 
 
1. How Laws and Regulations in the Great Lakes Region violate human rights of 
specific groups and therefore cause conflict? 
2. To what extent were human rights violated during armed violent conflicts in 
Great Lakes Region? 
3. How successful/effective have the various UN/AU approaches to conflict 
resolution been in resolving the Great Lakes conflict? 
4. How successful/effective is the UN Peacekeeping Mission in the DRC 
(MONUC) in resolving the Congo conflict? 
 
1.3.1 Research Philosophical Perspectives  
 
Since this study employs qualitative research strategy for data collection, as was 
pointed out earlier, it encompasses a wide range of philosophical positions, 
methodological strategies and analytical procedures.113 As for methodological tools, 
therefore, I used more than one technique of data collection utilized in the social 
                                                 
113 See discussion on this point in Morse, J. ‘Emerging from the data; The Cognitive Processes of 
Analysis in Qualitative Inquiry’ in Morse, J. (Ed.) (1994). Critical Issues in Qualitative Research 
Methods, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp.23-43.  
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sciences.114 Review of relevant literature, author’s participation in international and 
national conferences and workshops, historical methods, descriptive methods, 
interview and survey questionnaire methods, were employed in the collecting data 
process. 
According to social science research methodologists,115 there are three different 
philosophical perspectives that underlie qualitative research: positivism,116 
interpretive and critical perspective. This three-fold classification is the one that is 
adopted here. However, it needs to be stated that, while these three research 
epistemologies are philosophically distinct (as ideal types), in the practice of social 
research these distinctions are not always clear. There is considerable disagreement as 
to whether these research paradigms or underlying epistemologies are necessarily 
opposed or can be accommodated within the one study.  
 
It should be clear from the above that the word ‘qualitative’ is not a synonym for 
‘interpretive,’ Qualitative research may or may not be interpretive, depending upon 
the underlying philosophical assumptions of the researcher. Qualitative research can 
be positivist, interpretive, or critical (see Figure 1 below). It follows therefore from 
this that the choice of a specific qualitative research method (such as the case study 
method) is independent of the underlying philosophical position adopted. For 
instance, case study research can be positivist, interpretive or critical, just as action 





                                                 
114 See Krishnaswami, O.R (1998), Methodology of Research in Social Sciences, Bombay: Himalaya 
Publishing House, at p.65.                                                         
115 Guba, G & Lincoln, S. (1998). ‘Do Inquiry Paradigm Imply Inquiry Methodology?’ in Fetteman, M. 
(Ed.), Qualitative Approaches to Evaluation in Education: The Silent Scientific Revolution, Praeger, 
New York, p.25. See this idea offered by Klein, K & Myers, D. (1999). ‘A Set of Principles for 
Conducting and Evaluating Interpretive Field Studies in Information Systems.’ MIC Quarterly, vol. 23, 
No.1, p. 67-94. 
116 Positivism is an epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of the natural 
sciences to the study of social reality and beyond. See more details on this definition in Bryman, A, 
(Ed.), (2004). Social Research Methods, New York: Oxford University Press, p.12. 
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  Figure 1. Underlying philosophical assumptions 
 
A research can be classified as positivist if it is presented as being objective, seeking 
to explain what happens in the world by searching for regularities and causal 
relationships between its constituent elements.117  Generally, it assumes that reality is 
objectively given and can be described by measurable properties, which are 
independent of the observer (researcher) and his or her instruments.118 It means that 
the observation of phenomenon must be neutral and uncorrupted by theory, if the 
verification principle is to hold.119 This often involves manipulation of reality with 
variations in a single independent variable in order to identify regularities in, and to 
form relationships between, some of the constituent elements of the social world. 
Predictions are made on the basis of previous observations and realities and their 
interrelationships. Positivist research can therefore be replicated by carrying out the 
test in the conditions that originally existed. Although there has been much debate on 
whether or not positivism paradigm is suitable for the social sciences, one may still 
safely conclude that, being reductionist in nature, positivism tackles specific aspects 
of the phenomenon being investigated, building understanding of parts rather than 
wholes.120    
                                                 
117 Burrel, B & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis. London: 
Heinemann. p.9. 
118 Levin, C. (1988). Sociology Ideas: Concepts and Applications, Washington, DC: Wadsworth, p.66; 
See also Carson, et al (2001). Qualitative Research, London: Sage, p.78. 
119 Williams, M & May, T. (1996). Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Research, London: 
Routledge,  p.99. 
120Bryman, supra note 116, p. 15. 
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A research is classified as interpretive if it is assumed that our knowledge of reality is 
gained through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared 
meanings, documents, tools and other artefacts.121  
 
Interpretive research addresses the world from the point of view of the people studied, 
attempting to understand phenomenon through meanings that people assign to 
them.122 The main idea is to reach an in-depth understanding of the social world and 
to interpret the meaningful character of social action. Such an in-depth understanding 
requires a researcher to immerse himself or herself in the phenomenon to be 
studied.123 Thus instead of separating the researchers from the subjects and seeing 
them as simple sources of data, interpretive research defends and promotes the 
engagement between the researcher and the subject. However, such engagement must 
be exposed transparently so as to describe the conditions in which the results were 
found, i.e. research should be conducted not subjectively. It is from this reality that 
subject matters have to be set in their social and historical context so that the intended 
audience can see how the current situation under investigation emerged.  Interpretive 
research does not define dependent and independent variables, but focuses on the 
complexity of human sense-making as the situation emerges.124 In this view, 
interpretive research seeks to understand a moving target, and each instance is treated 
as a unique historical occurrence. Because of this reality, some interpreters have 
accused interpretive research as lacking generalisations.  
 
On this point, it may be stated that one of the outcomes of the extensive debates in 
philosophy is that there is a philosophical basis for the abstraction and generalisation 
in interpretive research. According to Walsham,125 there are four types of 
generalisation from interpretive case studies: the development of concepts, the 
generation of theory, the drawing of specific implications and the contribution of rich 
insight. And as Walsham stresses, the key point is that theory plays a crucial role in 
                                                 
121 See Klein  & Myers, supra note 115, p.29. 
122 Hammersley, M. (1995). The Politics of Social Research, London: Sage, p.88. 
123 See generally Simon, supra note 18. 
124See generally  Kaplan, B. & Maxwell, J. (1994). ‘Qualitative Research Methods for Evaluating 
Computer Information Systems’, in Andreson, J. et al, (Eds.). Evaluating Health Care Information 
Systems: Methods and Applications, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, p. 54. 
125 Walsham, G. (1995). ‘Interpretive Case Study in IS Research: Nature and Methods,’ in European  
Journal of Information Systems, vol. 4, No.2, pp. 74-91. 
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interpretive research, and clearly distinguishes it from just anecdotes. But it should be 
noted that theory is used in a different way than is commonly applied in positivist 
research where researchers are interested in falsifying theories. In interpretive 
research, theory is used as a “sensitising device” to view the world in a certain way.126 
 
The critical approach is concerned with the way in which current social arrangements 
fail to meet human needs and ideals.127 Their objective is a political one, which is to 
fight oppression and radically change the status quo.128 Proponents of this approach 
believe that social reality is historically constituted and that people produce it. While 
recognising that people can consciously act to change their social and economic 
conditions, they argue that their ability to do so is constrained by various forms of 
social, cultural and political domination.129  Their main focus is on the oppositions, 
conflicts and contradictions in contemporary society, and thus seek to be 
emancipatory.  
 
After reviewing the three perspectives described above, I have concluded that the best 
approach for the current study is primarily interpretive research. Two main points are 
among the many reasons for favouring interpretive research approach. First, since I 
am interested in investigating the complexity of the Africa’s Great Lakes conflict with 
a view to determining a viable conflict management mechanism, it becomes inevitable 
to gain an in-depth understanding of the conflict situation by tracing the actors; the 
root causes and to be able to make a concise analysis. Using interpretive approach 
will allow me to increase my understanding of the critical social, historical and 
political issues related to the persistence of conflicts in the research area, despite 
various efforts in resolving them. Second, as interpretive approach recognises the 
value content of research, it encourages to expose these values and to be more aware 
of them during the research process so as to be more conscious of their biases. 
   
 
                                                 
126See Klein  & Myers, supra note 115.  
127 See Hammersley, supra note 122, p.22. 
128 See Burrel & Morgan, supra note 117, p. 21. 
129 See this argument stressed in Klein  & Myers, supra note 115. 
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1.3.2 Field Research and Literary Sources 
1.3.2.1 Informal Interviews 
The current study employed, among other tools, semi-structured interviews with a 
sample of informants in each research component. The choice of this method was 
considered to be most suitable, as it allows both parties to explore the meaning of the 
questions and answers involved. The method naturally allows the interviewer to 
depart significantly from any schedule or guide that is being used and can ask new 
questions following up interviewees’ replies. In this way, there is a clear sharing 
through interactions, an element which is usually not so central or lacking all together 
in other research procedures. As Bryman130 claims, the interview is the most widely 
employed method for the collection of qualitative data. It is generally assumed that 
the interview acts as a medium through which the researcher can gain access to 
information and share knowledge with those who have it and thus be able to organise 
and remember the presentation of their knowledge.  
 
Interviews were conducted at different times, with respondents identified in three 
different data collection areas. In Tanzania, the selected data collection areas for this 
study were such centers as Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation; Center for the Study of 
Forced Migration; three refugee camps in North Western Tanzania, namely Kibondo, 
Kasulu and Nyalugusu; Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, the latter being the government unit responsible for all 
migrations and refugees issues in the country. In these areas, respondents consisted of 
refugees from the three refugee camps mentioned above. The selection of respondents 
was such that from each camp, three refuges were interviewed. Four were from 
Congo while the rest were from Burundi. The aim was to maintain gender balance in 
ideas and also to gain insight on different responses from each country. The group 
further consisted of three diplomats who were very instrumental and played key roles 
in the Burundi Peace Process which took place in Arusha. The last in this group of 
respondents was a famous professor and researcher who had researched and written at 
length on the Africa’s Great Lakes Conflicts. 
 
                                                 
130 Ibid, p.319. 
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From Burundi, respondents consisted of legal practitioners (advocates and two 
judges); long-experienced members of parliament of Burundi; leaders of human rights 
NGOs; leaders of the principal political parties in Burundi and members of the local 
population from the four areas which have been mostly affected by civil wars in 
Burundi. From the DRC respondents interviewed consisted of church leaders; 
MONUC personnel, including those from the mission’s human rights department; 
leaders of civil society organisations; members of the local community; government 
officials; academicians and legal practitioners (advocates).    
 
Before embarking on the actual interviews, a pilot study of few of the respondents 
was conducted in order to test the interview guide and develop the subsequent 
revision of the instrument used for data collection. Interviews were then conducted 
with each subject. Each interview lasted between 45 to 75 minutes, the longest being 
90 minutes. Subsequent interviews were conducted either in the respondents’ 
respective offices or in their places of residence. Preparations for the interviews were 
such that respondents were given prior information, either through telephone or 
through research assistants who arranged the interview sessions. Before the start of 
each interview, each respondent was notified on the aim of the interview, that it only 
serves academic purposes and that the information passed on will be kept strictly 
confidential. The option for anonymity was also explained to each respondent.  
 
Most interviews were audio-recorded using a digital recorder and transcribed in order 
to provide accuracy in data collection. Interviews with some of the respondents were 
however jotted down some time after the informal interview time elapsed. These 
practices were considered important in that they allowed the interviewer to check for 
errors in interpretation of data and to use extensive quotations in the text of this thesis. 
Field notes (scratches or jotted notes) were taken during the interview to record 
important and meaningful interactions between subjects and the interviewer. 
Transcriptions were coded and categorized inductively using content analysis to 
organise data.   
It must be pointed out however that interviewing, though it is one crucial method of 
qualitative research, is not free from problems.  The main challenges perceived in 
applying interviews as a data collection research method are numerous. In the first 
place, given the sensitivity of the research topic with its main focus on armed and 
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ethnic conflicts, respondents’ scepticism was prevalent as they became alarmed at the 
prospect on their words being preserved using a recorder, despite prior notice of the 
purpose of the interview and accession. As a result, some of the interviews were not 
as interesting as they were expected to be. Another big stumbling block was a 
linguistic one. With the exception of informants from Tanzania, interviewees from 
both Burundi and the DRC had difficulties in expressing themselves in a language in 
which the interviewer was fluent. Both countries are the so-called “francophone”, 
using French as a second or official language. At times, those respondents who could 
speak Swahili,131 poor as it might be, were preferred in the selection process, to those 
who spoke only French and their local native languages.  
Also, at times, some of the interviewees distorted the required information through 
selective perceptions, with a desire to please the interviewer. In such cases, there was 
no option but to replace such an interviewee with a more straightforward one. 
  
Interviewing, the transcription of interviews and the analysis of the transcripts are all 
very time-consuming,132 but the advantages derived therefrom are immense.133  The 
views of respondents certainly gave the interviewer and researcher of this study 
valuable insight in approaching the topic on the application of human rights in 
conflict prevention and management. 
1.3.2.2 Questionnaires 
 
A survey questionnaire method was found appropriate to extract information from 
informants who could not be directly interviewed due to various reasons. Survey 
questionnaires usually inform research by providing information from a known 
sample of informants selected on the basis of specified criteria. Typically, data from 
survey questionnaires is collected without the researcher intervention. 
 
Specific questions were prepared in the light of the current study research objectives. 
Different sets of questionnaires were designed and administered to different target 
respondents. In the first set, I administered both structured and semi-structured 
questionnaires to different respondents in the research areas. Given the multilingual 
                                                 
131 The local native language of the interviewer. 
132 See Bryman, supra note 116, p.319. 
133 On the advantages of interviewing vis-à-vis other methods of data collection in qualitative research, 
see Ibid p.338. 
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nature of the informants selected from the DRC and Burundi, questionnaires were 
administered in three different languages, namely Swahili, French and English. The 
contents, structure, format and sequence of the questionnaires used are as shown in 
appendix “C.” 
Pre-testing of the survey questionnaires was carried out among a few refugees in the 
three refugee camps in Tanzania (men and women), and they were collected 
immediately for verification. This allowed minor changes to be made to improve the 
contents and form of the questionnaires.  The questionnaires were sent to contact 
persons identified through research assistants in both Burundi and the DRC, others 
identified through the embassies of both countries and the Mwalimu Nyerere 
Foundation Centre. In the course of field research in Congo and Burundi, more 
persons were identified, making a total number of persons who received the 
questionnaires to be 45. The survey questionnaire was administered via electronic 
mails, personal visits and telephoning. Two research assistants in the DRC and one in 
Burundi also facilitated the work. The number of people who responded and returned 
the survey questionnaires was 31. As some questionnaires were responded to in 
Swahili and French language, proper translation was sought before the findings were 
analysed.  
1.3.2.3 Case Study  
 
The need to study a complex topic within its organisational context led me to adopt a 
case study methodology. A case study involves a detailed examination of a single or a 
particular occurrence.134 Its main concern is the detail and complexity of the case, 
which it treats as a bound system. In general, a case study methodology is a preferred 
method for investigating questions that ask how or why of both historical and 
contemporary events.135 It can produce an in-depth understanding of a particular 
situation and an analysis of its meaning in a discovery process.136 Case study evidence 
can be drawn from a variety of sources, including interviews, direct observations, 
participant observation, and even documents and archival records. Three main types 
of case studies are distinguished: namely, explanatory, causal and descriptive.137 
                                                 
134 See Burrel and Morgan, supra note 117, p.49. 
135 Yin, R (2003), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd Ed, London/New Delhi: SAGE  
       Publications, p. 112.                           
136 See Merriam, supra note 106, p. 46. 
137 See Yin, supra note 135, p. 114. 
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Explanatory case studies collect data before theories or specific research questions are 
formulated. Causal case study focuses in looking at the cause-and-effect relationships, 
and search for explanatory theories of the phenomena.  
  
Descriptive case study requires a theory to guide the collection of data and this theory 
should then be openly stated at the outset. The more thoughtful the theory, the better 
the descriptive case study will be. Insights from this type of research can exert a 
strong influence on policy, practice and research, with the role of the researcher being 
that of a versatile, functioning simultaneously as a scientist, a fieldworker, and a 
toolmaker and as a technical developer.138 While the conclusions from such case 
study research may not be generalizable, they focus strongly on qualitative issues; 
they may nevertheless suggest important implications for other similar contexts.139 In 
the current study, the Africa’s Great Lakes Region is an overall research area. 
However, given the vastness of the region,140 it will be unrealistic, if not impossible to 
try and conduct the current research for the whole region. Although the Africa’s Great 
Lakes is considered as a conflict system, the DRC conflict, which is among the many 
other conflicts in the region, was selected for this study. Again, only some aspects of 
the conflict in the DRC are thoroughly studied. 
 
1.3.3 Reliability and Validity 
 
Although there is a view that reliability and validity are important criteria for 
establishing and assessing the quality of research for the quantitative research,141 
qualitative researchers have employed the same terms in very similar ways when 
seeking to assess or evaluate the quality of qualitative research. It has however been 
proposed to specify terms that provide an alternative to reliability and validity, to be 
trustworthiness and authenticity.142 The latter encompasses credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability of research and research findings.  
Credibility, which replaces internal validity, entails both ensuring that the research is 
carried out according to the canons of good practice and respondent validation of 
                                                 
138 Denzin & Lincoln, supra note 105, p. 48. 
139 See Bryaman, supra note 116, p.51. 
140 For geographical coverage of this region, see generally Nzongola –Ntajala, supra note 22. 
141 See Bryman, supra note 116, p.272. 
142 Ibid, p.273. 
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findings.143 In this study, the opportunity I was afforded to discuss, with members of 
the target group, concepts as they appeared in the semi-structured questionnaires and 
in the interview instruments, before and after field research, provided the basis for 
ensuring credibility of the research findings. 
On transferability (or external validity), Guba and Lincoln144argue that qualitative 
findings tend to be oriented to the contextual uniqueness and significance of the social 
world being studied. Thus, whether findings hold in some other contexts, or even in 
the same context at some other times, is an empirical issue. The study on the 
relevance of human rights in prevention and management of the Africa’s Great Lakes 
conflicts is not necessarily contextual. It is however clear that its outcomes cannot be 
generalized in all other situations. They can only be used as a basis of investigation of 
other similar conflicts within the other times and places. The applicability of this 
research to other regional conflicts and conflict resolution initiatives is therefore to be 
determined by the similarity of the nature of those other initiatives. 
 
As a parallel to reliability in quantitative research, dependability establishes the merit 
of research in terms of trustworthiness through auditing approach. While 
dependability allows a researcher to make methodological changes during the course 
of the research, these have to be well described and reported.145 The literary sources 
and review of relevant literature (Section 1.3.5), the case study description and review 
of research methods with my research supervisor together with peer researchers 
during the course of research, provide a reasoned justification for the methodologies, 
procedures as well as theoretical inferences used in this research. 
 
The conclusions drawn from the data collected through the interviews and survey 
questionnaires are confirmable. Confirmability is concerned with ensuring that, while 
recognising that complete objectivity is impossible in social research, the researcher 
can be shown to have acted in good faith without overtly allowing personal values or 
theoretical inclinations to sway the conduct of the research and findings deriving from 
it.146  The main contents of questionnaires in this research are as set out and shown in 
appendix “C” and records of their responses and those of interviews are all available 
                                                 
143 See Ibid, p.275. 
144 Guba and Lincoln, supra note 115, p. 27. 
145 See Bryman, supra note 116, p.15. 
146 Ibd.p.276. 
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from the author. They all prove the confirmability of this research making it more 
valid and reliable. 
 
1.3.4 Ethical Considerations 
 
 Ethical issues play a direct and great role in assessing the integrity of any social 
research in a particular discipline.147  They arise from the kinds of problems social 
scientists investigate and the methods used to obtain valid and reliable data.148 Such 
issues tend to revolve around certain aspects that recur in different guises, which may 
be broken into four main areas: 
• Whether there is harm to participants; 
• Whether there is lack of informed consent; 
• Whether there is an invasion of privacy; 
• Whether deception is involved in a particular research.149 
Discussions aimed at observing ethical principles had been carefully conducted 
between the researcher and the research participants in this study.  Particularly for 
research participants from the DRC side, issues relating to human rights abuses, 
conflicts and the resolution of the same were perceived to be highly sensitive, 
requiring all precautions on the maintenance of confidentiality of informants’ records. 
The situation in other research areas was not exceptional either. As such, various 
measures were deliberately taken to avert the possible ethical-side-effects on the 
treatment of research participants.  
Firstly, the privacy, anonymity and confidentiality of participants was assured by 
formulating both the questionnaires and the interview instruments in such a way that 
disclosure of participants’ particulars (names, address, occupation etc) for 
identification purposes was left optional. In cases where I personally happened to 
know some of such information relating to some of my informants, I endeavoured as 
far as possible to keep them confidential, as the avoidance of engendering harm to the 
respondents is a rule of thumb in social science research.150 Add to this, and in line 
                                                 
147 Ibid. p.504. 
148 Nachmias, F. (1996). Research Methods in the Social Sciences, 5th Ed, London: St. Martin’s Press, 
p.77. 
149 Adopted as have usefully been broken down by Diener and Candall (1978) and quoted verbatim in 
Ibid, p.509. 
150 Mertens, D. (2005).  Research and Evaluation in Education and Psychology: Integrating Diversity 
with Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Methods, 2nd Ed, London: SAGE Publications, p.328. 
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with the principle of neutrality, the method of informal and semi-structured interviews 
as well as the semi-structured questionnaires gave leeway to the respondents to have 
wide options of giving only information they considered not endangering their roles 
as research participants.  
 
Although considering, as some authors contend,151 that it is not practicable to ensure 
that absolutely everyone has the opportunity for informed consent, I tried as much as I 
possibly could, to inform each participant about the nature of the research, what it is 
all about, how and why is it being undertaken and its possible implications to research 
participants. All research outcomes were reported in a way that the anonymity and 
confidentiality of all participants was assured. 
        
Furthermore, except for the few institutions mentioned on the part of Tanzania in this 
study, I deliberately omitted to make any direct reference to cities and exact locations 
of the sites in which I conducted my fieldwork. Specific reference to such places was 
considered undesirable as may somehow identify and therefore embarrass my 
respondents. Reference to some of the institutions in some research sites, such as 
refugee camps, is not intended to violate the rights of informants, but it was 
considered that it does not in itself expose the identity of informants.  
 
1.3.5. Literary Sources and Participation in Conferences  
 
In addition to field research findings, this study would have been incomplete in the 
absence of basic literary sources, author’s participation in international and regional 
conferences, workshops and post-graduate seminars, as well as reviewed literature 
that validate the outcomes of the study. The literature review and participation in 
conferences and workshops, provided an opportunity for testing and expanding the 
understanding of the research problem, and allowed exchange of research 
experiences. Some of the statements, meanings and ideas developed in this thesis 
originated from in-depth deliberations held with individuals and groups at various 
conferences and academic seminars.  
 
                                                 
151 See this fact emphasised under the British Sociological Association (BSA) Statement of Ethical 
Practice, available at <http://www.britsoc.org.uk/about /ethic.htm>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
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The literary sources used in this study included textbooks, UN documents, policy 
documents, laws and regulations from each of the countries under study, results of 
previous studies, journals and reports of international and local organizations 
operating in the region, official statements and other relevant materials on the 
research components. Most of these materials and documents were accessed in 
electronic form and through various libraries visited. These included the East African 
Library in Arusha, law libraries of Helsinki University, University of Dar es salaam, 
Joensuu University, and libraries of the Attorney General Chambers of each of the 
countries under study. 
In particular, the library of the Parliament of Finland provided excellent literature 
relevant for this study. Once they were collected, a considerable time and interpretive 
skill is often required to ascertain the meaning of the materials that have been 
uncovered, in relation to the research being undertaken.  
 
1.3.6 Bridging the Fieldwork and Academic Studies  
 
People who work in the field of human rights protection and conflict resolution often 
become frustrated by the enormous gap between the hopeless reality on the ground 
and the noble words of international law which do not seem to reduce the suffering of 
people in areas of conflicts at all. However, one who suffers from human rights 
abuses may be encouraged simply in the knowledge that what he/she is seeking is the 
implementation of his/her right. Those who taught me the value of international 
human rights law told me their experience of human rights violations. Even though 
the various UN human rights approaches to conflict resolution cannot offer immediate 
remedy to victims of human rights violations, by reaching a common understanding 
that what they suffered was against their human rights, they might gain energy to 
continue their claims for justice. Of course, there are situations where people are 
deprived of any force to resist-or even to protect their lives. Most of the contemporary 
UN approaches to conflict resolution are then unable to communicate with those 
people or to offer the best solution, but lead to a situation where such atrocities are 
only witnessed. What is required of the international community is the prevention of 
such situations by every means possible, including the development of international 
law and extension of human rights functions into conflict situations. This author 
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believes that such prevention, deterrence and institution -building can contribute 
towards establishing a society that respects human rights to a greater extent.  
 
One of the ambitious intents of this study is to bridge the gap between fieldwork and 
academia in human rights and conflict resolution discourse. It is disappointing when 
discussions on human rights and conflict resolution amongst academics make light of 
the reality on the ground. For instance, good human rights record has often been used, 
as conditionality for a particular society to deserve certain advantages.  Two instances 
explain this scenario. In the first instance, a good human rights record has often been 
used as a condition for allocating development aid to developing countries, by 
increasing the amount of foreign aid to the recipient countries with good human rights 
records and reducing economic assistance to the countries with bad or unsatisfactory 
record. In the second instance, a good human rights record is a condition for the 
acceptance of a particular country for membership in such regional integration as the 
European Community.  However, the question is not as to what is written on paper or 
to a promise of empty words, but rather to the reality on the ground. While a Western 
scholar may happily argue about the nominal development of human rights promotion 
in a political or legal sphere, people continue to suffer daily human rights violations, 
harassment and discrimination based on ethnic affiliation in the very state in which 
they live. Yet, politicians whose decisions might have possibly resulted in the deaths 
of thousands of people roundly condemn another occurrence of human rights abuse. It 
is lamentable if academics are not able to critically assess such immense effects, while 
human rights conditionality, without strong enforcement mechanisms has extremely 
weak effects. A scholar can only be happy with nominal development of human rights 
protection when he/she does not witness the pain of the victims of human rights 
abuses. Needless to say it would be impossible to change overnight a currently 
prevalent system that each day allows countless cases of human rights abuse to occur 
in the world.  
However, in discussing the development of international humanitarian law, human 
rights law or a system of human rights protection, it is a basic requirement for a 
scholar to remember that the issue involves peoples’ lives. 
Human rights workers in the field can contribute to development of international 
human rights law by reporting the reality on the ground and giving feedback on 
problems they face either in interpreting international human rights law or in trying to 
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apply it. On the other hand, the flow from academia to the field of information on the 
legal discussion will support those workers who are often isolated in the middle of an 
insecure environment and who struggle to work for human rights and justice. 
It is now time for the United Nations to study systematically the functions of human 
rights in its conflict resolution strategies so that previous mistakes are not repeated. 
For any strategy to engage effectively in resolving conflict durably, it must be 
designed from the outset to incorporate human rights norms. 
 
1.4 Research Structure and Scope of the Study 
The chapters in this thesis are organised along the notion of stages of conflicts. Such 
organisation is indicative of the fact that human rights considerations are important 
factors throughout the course of armed conflict, and every conflict can be depicted as 
passing through any number of different stages. For analytical purposes, Julie Mertus 
and Jeffrey Helsing152 identified three overlapping stages, which I adopt here: 
• The conflict intensification stage: Communal conflicts turn violent; human 
rights violations are often a root cause of conflict, and the ability of 
perpetrators to act with impunity contributes to the intensification of conflict; 
the failure to address human rights issues hinders conflict prevention efforts. 
•   The armed conflict stage: Armed conflict intensifies as competing factions 
take up arms; human rights abuses are both a common by-product of violence 
and a component of wartime strategy; international human rights norms 
inform standards for international intervention in conflicts, evaluation of the 
conduct of armed forces, and wartime protection of civilians. 
• The postconflict/postcrisis stage: Armed conflict ceases, and efforts at 
rebuilding begin; human rights considerations play a role in peace 
agreements, the treatment of refugees, civil society-building efforts, human 
rights education campaigns, and the creation of truth commissions and other 
efforts to hold perpetrators of human rights abuse accountable.  If patterns of 
destructive relationships are not transformed into healthier patterns of 
interaction, this third stage can lead to a new round of intensified conflict. 
This study examines operational issues confronting conflict prevention and 
management mechanisms and human rights concerns in responding to each of these 
                                                 
152 See Mertus and Helsing, supra note 6 p. 10. 
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stages. The following outline seeks not to summarize each chapter, but rather to 
situate the chapters of the thesis within the context of the three stages. 
 
An overview of the main features of the regional conflict as well as an inventory of 
existing regional mechanisms for conflict management is made in Chapter Two. In 
this chapter, I suggest that the main features and driving force for the conflicts in the 
region studied are colonial legacies and the role of the West in relation to the current 
trade and political relations with countries in the region, construction of ethnic 
identity and legitimacy, discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and human rights 
violations before, during and after the violence.  The chapter helps to frame the 
historical relationship between the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts and human rights 
violations. Towards the end of the chapter, we indicate that human rights violations 
by way of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity can be both the symptom and cause 
of conflict. As Ellen Lutz points out, human rights are often at the core of a conflict or 
war. Human rights or human security have often been cited in more recent examples 
of humanitarian intervention. Human rights have also been cited as one reason for 
armed intervention or pre-emptive war, including the military intervention by the U.S-
led coalition in Iraq.153 Lutz noted that the differences between human rights and 
conflict management approaches play out among the parties in actual conflict 
situations, as they have in Rwanda, Congo, Yugoslavia and many other places. There 
are many examples of human rights claims being manipulated by aggressive powers 
in order to justify intervention. But as many of the scholars emphasize, human rights 
are not only significant factors in the conduct of war or the justification for war, but 
also critical sources of conflicts that devolve into war. Often both sides of a conflict 
compete in proclaiming themselves victims of human rights violations. 
 
Chapter Three is an overview of the approaches to conflict prevention and 
management. The various conventional mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts, 
both UN Charter based and non-Charter based mechanisms are reviewed. What is 
indicated at the end of the chapter is the main argument of this thesis, namely, 
contemporary conflict resolution mechanisms are limited and full of shortcomings. 
The chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the current UN approaches to conflict 
                                                 
153 See Ibid, p. 11. 
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resolution in light of contemporary internal armed conflict situations. In view of the 
failure of the UN to effectively respond to the various conflicts with the resultant 
catastrophes, including genocide in both Rwanda and Bosnia, the chapter concludes 
with a proposal for the strengthening of a human rights approach as discussed 
throughout this study. 
 
Chapter Four, on the Role of Peacekeeping in conflict prevention and management 
with a focus on the MONUC, attempts to show, in practice, how difficult the UN 
conflict resolution mechanisms have proved to be, in the absence of human rights 
components. The chapter sets to analyse UN Peacekeeping as one of the major 
conflict resolution methods applied in resolving the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts, 
drawing from the MONUC in the DRC as a case study. The human rights components 
of UN peacekeeping and of the MONUC in particular is analysed in the light of acts 
of human rights atrocities taking place on the ground in the DRC, despite the 
deployment of the MONUC.  The chapter concludes with challenges and limitations 
of the approach, and with a proposal to strengthen the African regional peacekeeping 
and that human rights component of peacekeeping operations is vital if the root cause 
of the conflicts is to be addressed. 
 
Chapter Five presents yet another conflict resolution mechanism tested in resolving 
the Congo conflict. The chapter titled “International Adjudication and Resolution of 
Armed Conflicts in the DRC” discusses various efforts taken so far, in the form of 
international adjudication in resolving the Congo conflict. The role of the ICJ in 
armed conflict settlement is critically examined with a sober conclusion that both in 
the Case of Armed Activities in Territory of the Congo and in the parallel adjudication 
of the Bosnia-Herzegovina case, the ICJ does not prove itself to be a suitable forum 
for the resolution of internal armed conflicts. The chapter further examines the role of 
international criminal adjudication, in the light of individual criminal responsibility. 
The role of both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Rwanda (ICTR) and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in addressing post conflict issues are well 
addressed. With proposals initially mounting pressures to the international community 
to establish an international criminal tribunal for the DRC, the role of the ICTR in 
addressing the Rwandan conflict is examined.  
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The role of the ICC in the Congo conflict is examined in the light of individual 
criminal responsibility, taking reference of the Lubanga case, which was still pending 
during the writing of this thesis. Although the importance of international adjudication 
in the development of international law is reiterated, the overall conclusion of the 
chapter is that, unless a number of shortcomings are addressed, the method may not 
suit internal armed conflict situations of such a nature as the DRC conflict. 
 
Chapter Six constitutes the main thesis of this study.  The chapter, titled “Systemic 
Integration of Human Rights and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,” 
focuses on the relationship between the fields of human rights and conflict 
management as a means to prevent conflict.154  As this chapter attests, the relationship 
between conflict management and resolution on the one hand, and human rights 
promotion and protection on the other is multifaceted, intricate and fluid, evolving in 
response not only to changes in the nature of contemporary armed conflicts, but also 
to the two camps’ growing experience in working as partners instead of competitors. 
The chapter also makes it clear that to see the relationship as two-sided distorts 
reality, for there are in fact three camps involved: conflict resolution, human rights 
and international humanitarian law. The last of these--which seeks to regulate the 
conduct of war and to protect civilians during armed conflict, and which is 
championed not least by humanitarian relief agencies--can serve as a bridge between 
peace negotiations and human rights advocates because it is a human rights and legal 
tool that can strengthen a peace process or agreement by helping to reduce suffering 
and creating legitimacy for settlement. The richness of the interaction among these 
                                                 
154 Issues of human rights and conflict interact in multiple ways as discussed in Ramcharan, B. (2004).  
‘Human Rights and Conflict Resolution’, in Human Rights Law Review, vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 1-18; 
Summer, D. and Schnabel, A. (2003). Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion, Tokyo: 
UNU; Thoolen, H. ‘Early Warning and Prevention,’ in Alfredsson et al. (eds), (2001). International 
Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers., p. 301; Mahoney, L. (2003). ‘Unarmed Monitoring and Human Rights Field 
Presences: Civilian Protection and Conflict Protection,’ The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 
August 2003, available at <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a122.htm>. Last visited, September 8, 2009; 
Lutz, E., et al., (2003). ‘Human Rights and Conflict Resolution from the Practitioners’ Perspective,’ 
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 27(1) (Winter/Spring); Saunders, J. (2002). ‘Bridging Human 
Rights and Conflict Prevention: A Dialogue between Critical Communities,’ Carnegie Council on 
Ethics and International Affairs, at <http//www.cceia.org/ 
viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/1/prmID/161>. last visited, September 8, 2009.; O’Flaherty, M 
(2004). ‘Sierra Leone’s Peace Process: The Role of the Human Rights Community,’in Human Rights 
Quarterly, vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 983-1027; O’Flaherty, M. (2003). ‘Future Protection of Human Rights in 
Post-Conflict Societies: the Role of the United Nations,’ in Human Rights Law Review, vol. 3 No. 1, 
pp. 53-76. 
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approaches, the way in which they can reinforce and complement, and not just 
undercut one another’s efforts are discussed. I draw attention here to a point made 
several times in this thesis, that the relation between human rights and conflict 
resolution seems particularly important in efforts to create sustainable peace. In light 
of challenges presented by conflicts in such countries as the DRC, Afghanistan, 
Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia, substantial efforts must be devoted to the task of 
determining the critical components of a stable and sustainable peace. Many of the 
ideas in the chapter merit serious consideration in building sustainable settlements in 
societies emerging from conflicts. 
 
The last chapter, chapter seven provides some concluding remarks. The chapter brings 
forth the discussions on the possibilities and challenges of the relevance of human 
rights in conflict prevention, management and resolution discussed in the whole study 
before making some recommendations and conclusions.   
 
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter provided the conceptual and methodological framework for the study on 
the relevance of human rights in conflict prevention, management and resolution, with 
the conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes region and in the DRC in particular, as a case 
study.  There is a general consensus among scholars that conflict is sometimes 
inevitable. So is fighting. But respect for rights and fighting within the laws of war is 
what is in high demand.155 However, there is a dilemma encountered in merely 
relying on respect for human rights and laws of war in the time of conflicts. On the 
one hand, international humanitarian law is always focused on armed conflict and the 
need to mitigate the suffering of those touched by it; but it does not deal with the 
causes of war, or with the questions whether one conflicting party or the other is right. 
On the other hand, the complexity posed by contemporary non-international armed 
conflicts, accompanied with the old international law principles, such as non-
interference into states’ internal affairs, arose the need for alternative approaches to 
conflicts, other than dependency on international humanitarian law. Human rights 
law, in contrast focuses on the condition of all people under all circumstances, not just 
in wartime. Moreover, the lack of human rights is itself often a source of armed 
                                                 
155 Mertus & Helsing, supra note 6,  p.509. 
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conflicts. Thus, making efforts to ensure respect for human rights is critical to 
achieving long term conflict resolution, peace and stability. 
 
Consequently, the chapter examines the background and motivation leading to the 
argument for a human rights approach to conflict resolution mechanisms. For that 
reason, it considers the various efforts taken to resolve the conflict in the DRC and in 
the Africa’s Great Lakes region as a whole. Throughout this discussion in this 
chapter, it becomes clear that the applicability and relevance of human rights to all 
types of conflict resolution mechanisms generally and particularly those applied in 
resolving the Africa’s Great Lakes Conflicts are of critical importance. The 
contemporary critiques on human rights are highlighted with a view to justify the 
proposed human rights approach to conflict resolution. The chapter further stirs up the 
argument that international humanitarian law serves as a bridge between conflict 
resolution and human rights. It provides a vehicle to get human rights concerns on the 
table. It is a human rights and legal tool that peace negotiators can use to reduce 
suffering and build confidence among the victims. The successful implementation of 
humanitarian law can strengthen a peace process or agreement without necessarily 
disrupting the creation of a sustainable peace, by enhancing the legitimacy of that 
peace.  
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The end of the ideological Cold War viewed by some as the “ultimate triumph of 
Western liberalism,”1 created a hope among many that it signalled an end to the history of global 
hostilities and marked the beginning of peace in the world.2  
The most optimistic ironically went as far as arguing that the human race might be witnessing, not 
just the end of the Cold War but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human government.3 
 
Unfortunately this hope very soon proved to be based on a total misconception of realities, as 
triumph in political liberalism which was central to the end of the Cold War did not necessarily 
bring real peace to govern the material world in the long run. It therefore soon became clear that, 
although the end of the Cold War brought various changes in the types and nature of global 
conflicts, violence persists.4  In reality, the vacuum left by the cessation of Cold War conflicts was 
immediately filled up by different other forms of threats to international peace and security.5 
 Included in this list of new threats are civil wars, terrorism with its associated response to contain 
the “existence of weapons of mass destruction,”6 a response used disingenuously as a justification 
for the hegemonic invasion and destruction of Iraq by the US, and recent threats in the form of 
nuclear weapons.7 
 
Civil wars or internal armed conflicts are presently the major challenge to international peace and 
security.8 The outbreak of civil wars, starting from the bloody conflict in the South Balkans, 
(particularly within the former Yugoslavia), Somalia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Sudan (Darfur) 
                                                 
1 See Fukuyama, F. (1989). ‘The End of History’ in The National Interest, vol. 16, pp. 3–18. 
2 See also Airas, M (Ed.) ((1998), The Role of the International Cooperation in Conflict Prevention in Africa, Helsinki: 
KATU, p.10. 
3 Fukuyama, supra note 1. 
4 Eriksson, M (2002), ‘Armed Conflict 1946-2000: A New Dataset’ in Journal of Peace Research,  
Vol. 39 No.5, pp.615-637. 
5 Para 4 of preamble to the UNSC Res No. 48/84 of 16 December 1993, on the Maintenance of International Security, 
in which the UN expressed its serious concern over new threats to international peace and security, the persistence of 
tensions in some regions and the emergence of new conflicts. 
6 Mohan, R (2005), ‘Fractured Ideologies: Westernization, Globalization and Terrorism’ in International Journal of 
Contemporary Sociology, Vol.42 No.2 (2005), p.251 
7 The Iran and North Korea are cases in point. 
8 See UN Secretary General’s Report (2001), Prevention of Armed Conflicts, A/55/985–S/2001/574, available at 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/un-conflprev-07jun.htm,>,last visited, September 8, 2009. 
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and Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts created a level of violence and human suffering greater than any 
Cold War crises.9  
Although many factors led to the root causes of the conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes region, this 
study is concerned specifically with a few of such factors, namely colonial history with its effects 
on ethnicity, combined with the post independence global economic and political relation with the 
Western world, the 1994 Rwandan genocide and human rights violations as discussed below in this 
chapter. 
The Africa’s Great Lakes conflict has attracted international and regional attention in recent years in 
terms of news, academic analysis and humanitarian intervention concerns.10 The attention has 
resulted from the complexities of the conflicts taking place and the volatile political environment in 
the region.11 The major determinant of the recent conflict and instability in the Great Lakes region 
is the decay of the state and its instruments of rule of law in the Congo. For it is this decay that has 
made it possible for smaller states the size of Congo’s smallest province, such as Uganda, or even 
of a district, such as Rwanda, to take it upon themselves to impose rulers in Kinshasa and to invade, 
occupy and loot the territory of their giant neighbour. According to Nzongola, such a situation 
would have been unthinkable if the Congolese state institutions were functioning in a normal way 
as agencies of governance and national security, rather than as Mafia-type organizations, serving 
the selfish interests of Mobutu and his entourage, particularly his generals.12  
 
The Congo under a capable and responsible government could have stopped the genocide of 1994 
in Rwanda, the second major determinant of instability in the region, or at least prevented the 
genocidal forces from using Congolese territory to launch raids into Rwanda.  This disintegration of 
the Mobutu regime and the state decay associated with it made both possibilities academic while 
Kabila’s sponsorship by Rwanda and Uganda made it possible for these countries to feel entitled to 
determine the Congo’s destiny. The power vacuum created by the state decay reinforced 
neighbours’ determination to fish in troubled waters and to maximize their resource extraction from 
the Congo.  
 
                                                 
9Peck, C. (1998), Preventing Deadly Conflict, a Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly 
Conflict, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, New York/Oxford, p.22 
10 Hawkins, V. (2004) ‘Stealth conflicts: Africa’s World War in the DRC and International Consciousness’, The Journal 
of Humanitarian Assistance (January 5, 2004): 1 – 18. 
11 Mpangala, G (2000), Ethnic conflicts in the Region of the Great Lakes: Origins and Prospects, DUP, DSM, p.vii  
12 Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (2003) The Congo from Leopold to Kabila, London: Zed Books, p. 215. 
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The region entered the twenty-first century still embroiled in a major war unleashed in 1998 and 
involving all of the countries comprising it, except Tanzania, with some countries pretending to 
protect themselves against rebel incursions, while they were actively involved in looting the 
Congo’s natural resources. 
The primary focus of the chapter is to attempt to make both a regional and a country-by-country 
analysis of the Africa’s Great Lakes Conflicts. The importance of such an analysis cannot be 
overemphasised. A long-term resolution of conflicts will greatly depend on the clear understanding 
of the causes and nature of the conflicts.  The emphasis of the chapter is therefore to provide an 
analysis, however brief, of a number of cross-cutting issues relating to the conflict in the region, 
including its features; the historical, socio-political background; and the long-standing interests of 
external forces in plundering the region’s riches.13 The impacts of colonial legacy in the region and 
the role of the West in the intensification of conflicts are discussed. The chapter then sets out to 
analyze the extent to which human rights violations, in particular discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity, has contributed to ethnic reactions, hence violent conflicts.  
 
However, I hasten to point out here that besides the general overview of the regional nature of the 
conflict, the country-by-country analysis will concentrate in only three countries of the Africa’s 
Great Lakes region. These are Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda. As the whole study puts much 
emphasis on the Congo conflict as the regional case study, the chapter provides a much-detailed 
analysis of the Congo conflicts compared to the other two countries. The internal causes to the 
conflict in the DRC, including the nationality question for the Banyamulenge ethnic minority, 
authoritarianism, human rights abuses together with external causes, especially foreign 
interventions to the conflict situations in the DRC are all analysed.  
 
This chapter, in the context of human rights, looks closely at the citizenship question for the 
Banyamulenge ethnic minority, authoritarianism, and foreign interventions in the conflict situations 
in the DRC.  Time and space do not allow analyzing these three countries from the time of their 
independence, so the scope of the study is limited to the conflict timeline: the 1990s to the present.   
Nevertheless, the chapter contends that the countries singled out are representative of others in the 
region.  Because of its strong connections with the intensification of internal armed conflicts in the 
region, the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda will be studied. The region actually comprises six 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
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independent states, but not all have been directly involved in the civil wars, although obviously they 
are not spared by the effects of the crises in their neighbourhoods.14  
 
2.2 The Basic Features of the Africa’s Great Lakes Conflict 
 
Conflict per se is an integral part of human relations and cannot be entirely eliminated or controlled. 
The ultimate aim is to transform the violent expression of conflict into one expressed through non-
violent means.15 Conflict is part of social life and, even if one may wish to be so, no society is 
without conflict, except a dead one.16 It has, in fact been argued elsewhere that conflicts do have 
positive dimensions as they may be transformed into something creative, thereby invoking 
change.17  However, the reality remains that no matter how necessary they may be, conflicts, and 
particularly violent ones, are always evil and never good to social harmony in any society.18 
 
The Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts present a unique violent situation, leading to human suffering 
and social destruction throughout the region. There is a general observation that very little 
knowledge exists on how to deal with the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts.19 Despite great progress 
towards sustainable peace in the region, sporadic violence continues in some of the countries of the 
region.20 The complication in addressing the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts is caused by the fact 
that the origins of the war and actors in it keep changing significantly over time.21  The conflicts in 
the region have a dual character: even if most of the conflicts have a distinct local and /or national 
anchorage, they are at the same time fuelled by or fuelling regional conflicts. A regional approach is 
therefore necessary for both analysis and management of the conflicts.  Hence, the Great Lakes 
region is illustrative example of the need to abandon the artificial dichotomy between intra-and 
inter-state conflicts. It is, as well, an example of an armed conflict, in which a possible containment 
of violence has to take into account the interface between structural and direct violence. 
                                                 
14Although Tanzania has remained as an island of stability in the region, the burden of hosting hundreds and thousands 
of refugees is seriously felt. See Mpangala, supra note 11, p.120. 
15 Kumar R. (1998) Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution, London: Pluto Press, p. 3. 
16 Doom, R and Gorus, J (Eds) (2000), Politics of Identity and Economics of Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, 
Brussels: VUB University Press, p.51. 
17 See Uurtimo, Y and Väyrynen, T. (Eds.) (2000). ‘Peace-Building in the Great Lakes Region of Africa’,  
     Tampere Peace Research Institute.  Occasional Papers No.79. p.11. 
18 See Tshitereke, C.  (2003). ‘On the Origins of War in Africa’ in African Security Review, vol. 12 No. 2, pp.81-90. 
19 From Hawkins, supra note 10, p.18. 
20 Although there have been lots of efforts to resolve these conflicts, mistrust and fear of escalation reign throughout the 
region. 
21 The wars and conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes involve actors from local, national and international communities. 
   57 
Although positive developments for durable peace have taken place within the region, enormous 
challenges lie ahead, both for the creation of a sustainable peace, and for proper utilization of the 
lessons learned from the conflict, for future regional stability. It becomes more and more obvious 
that both a comprehensive conflict resolution approach and effective peace-building efforts are 
needed. Moreover, the peace-building efforts have to empower regional and local actors and have to 
be implemented as early as possible in order to prevent violent conflict escalation, human rights 
violations, and expensive post-conflict reconstruction.22  
 
Numerous writings and detailed reports on the Africa’s Great Lakes Conflicts are abounding. It is 
however necessary to make a systematic and comprehensive analysis because these conflicts have 
often been analyzed on a descriptive level, with little reference to broader structural and historical 
context within which they are situated. Furthermore, while pretending to stick to nothing but the 
truth, most of the conflict analyses in the region reveal a clear ideological bias. The bias manifests 
itself in an unwarranted and deliberate ignoring of the fact that many of the conflicts in the region 
are mostly products of the western economic and political interests, arising from colonial or neo-
colonial relations.23 
 
Since 1960 there have been 11 outright wars in the DRC, five in Burundi and two in Rwanda, not 
forgetting the constant low-intensity warfare.24 An estimated four million people have lost their 
lives as a direct result of these conflicts and a further four million have been forcibly displaced.25 
The 1994 Rwandan genocide appears to have marked a decisive moment in the history of the 
regional and international communities' approach to crimes against humanity. The involvement of 
more than eight African nations in the DRC war of 1998–2000,26 also signalled a clear breach of the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.27 
 
 
                                                 
22 See Airas, supra note 2. 
23 See Peck (1998), supra note 9, p.15. 
24Wallensteen, P and Sollenberg, M (2001), ‘Armed Conflict: 1989-2000’ in Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 5, 
pp. 629-644. 
25 Ibid 
26See Hwakins,supra note 10. 
27 Dalley, P. (2006), ‘Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa’ in Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 303–319. See also Adibe, C. ‘Do Regional Organizations Matter? Comparing the 
Conflict Management Mechanisms in West Africa and the Great Lakes Region’ in Boulden, J (ed) (2003), Dealing with 
Conflict in Africa, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, p.88. 
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2.3 Historical, Socio-Political Background as Sources of Conflicts 
 
As in many other parts of the African continent, conflicts in the Great Lakes region have a long 
history.28 It has been argued elsewhere that there have been legitimate and illegitimate conflicts in 
Africa.29 Whereas legitimate conflicts have been mainly concerned with the struggle for total 
liberation of society from oppressive and exploitative regimes,30 illegitimate conflicts have not been 
guided by such objectives. Rather, the conflicts in this category are prompted by struggles for 
political power and economic resources31 on the basis of such ideologies as ethnicity, racialism and 
religious antagonism.32  Periodic violence in the Great Lakes Region provides a typical example of 
such conflicts. It is important to note here that the Great Lakes region has been leading in the 
number conflicts going on in Africa in terms of scale and persistence, leading some to describe the 
region in terms of the notion of "conflict fatigue 33 
 
The regional nature of the Africa’s Great Lakes conflict manifests itself in the fact that, while their 
origins are internal, civil wars tend to become regional conflicts in the Great Lakes as they 
inevitably spill over into other countries in the region often reinforcing each other. There are several 
reasons for this scenario. One is the fact that blood, cultural, and linguistic ties rarely correspond to 
national borders, both because of the arbitrary manner in which political boundaries of the African 
countries were drawn in European capitals during colonization of Africa,34 and because of the 
migratory and refugee flows which occurred within the countries in the region as a result of the 
conflicts. Consequently, rebels can easily find refuge in the neighbouring countries with people 
with whom they have much in common and, at times, share a cause.35 In addition, people often see 
dynamics in neighbouring countries as a mirror of their own, reinterpreting internal events in terms 
borrowed from outside.36 
                                                 
28 Ibid 
29Mpangala, G & Mwansasu, B (Eds). (2004), Beyond Conflict in Burundi, Dar es Salaam: The Mwalimu Nyerere 
Foundation, p.2 
30 An example is given of legitimate armed conflicts in the first such struggles for national independence during 
colonial domination, and in the second phase of struggles against dictatorial and oppressive regimes in independent 
African states.  
31See Dalley,, supra note 27. 
32Mpangala and Mwansasu, supra note 29, p.3 
33 Ibid, p.4. See also Duly, G. (2000). ‘Creating a Violence-Free Society: The case of Rwanda.’ Journal of 
Humanitarian Assistance. available at <http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/c/c090.htm>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
34 The arbitrarily drawn artificial colonial boundaries in Africa disregarded ethnic ties and ethnic differences among the 
African local communities. This led to splitting a single ethnic group making it fall under two different countries, while 
grouping together different ethnic groups into one country. 
35The Interahamwe militia who had taken refuge in the DRC Congo provides a typical example. 
36 See Uvin. P et al (2005), ‘Regional Solutions to Regional Problems: The Elusive Search for the Security in the 
African Great Lakes’ in The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 29 No.2, p.70. 
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The regional nature of this conflict can also be explained by the deliberate actions of political 
leaders within the Great Lakes countries who support the rebellious groups of their ethnic ties in 
neighbouring countries in order to weaken their opposite ethnic groups in those neighbouring 
states.37  This situation is further explained by the fact that all key power holders in almost all the 
four countries in the Great Lakes region rose to power through armed violent wars launched from 
neighbouring countries,38 making them sceptical of anyone else contending for power so that they 
do all they can to prevent others from repeating their achievements.  
 
However, these are only but the results and not the causes of the conflicts themselves.  Tracing the 
causes of the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts in historical perspective, Paul Kagame, President of the 
Republic of Rwanda argued that there are many views as to the causes of the conflicts in the Great 
Lakes region. Some argue that the root cause is embedded in the pre-colonial social and political 
structures of societies in the region.39  Others argue that the starting point in any discussion on the 
origin of conflicts in the region is the imposition by the colonial powers of a system of ethnic 
identity and political/administrative structures that created deep division of societies in the Africa’s 
Great Lakes. This latter situation, it is said, was perpetuated by the Hutus regimes since 
independence in both Rwanda and Burundi, culminating to the Rwandan Genocide in 1994.40   
Although Kagame accepts that recent years have seen many regions of Africa involved in war and 
external or internal conflict, he rightly contends that conflict is not exclusively an African 
phenomenon, neither is it endemic in the Great Lakes Region, and rejects the prevailing view that 
Africa is conflict-centric. 
According to Kagame, the conflicts experienced in the region are a manifestation of serious 
structural weaknesses. Their underlying causes have internal as well as external components. The 
interactions between the legacy of colonial history and the post-independence models of 
governance, as well as the international political, social, and global economic milieu in which this 
interaction occurs, is the appropriate context in which to place the recurrent conflicts.  
                                                 
37 These same reasons prompted Rwanda and Uganda to send their troops to the DRC to assist the Tutsi Congolese in 
their fight to remove Mobutu’s regime following an ultimatum given to them to leave the country, and in the recent 
DRC and Rwanda joint military operation against Rwandan Hutu rebels in the DRC.   
38The current presidents of both Rwanda and Uganda came to power by overthrowing the existed regimes and the same 
holds true for sizable parts of the transitional governments of Burundi and the DRC.   
39 See generally Kamukama, D (1997), Rwanda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications, Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers. 
40 See Gaparayi, I (2000), ‘Justice and Social Reconstruction in the Aftermath of Genocide in Rwanda: An Evaluation 
of the Possible Role of the Gacaca Tribunals’ Paper submitted to the Center for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the LLM Degree, p.3 (On file with the Author). 
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The structural causes of the conflicts include bad governance, the politics of exclusion, and 
widespread state sponsored or state condoned human rights violations. I would, however, like to 
dwell on some of the more fundamental causes that are hardly ever subjected to analysis by so-
called experts on the region.41 
2.3.1 The Role of the West in the Intensification of Conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes 
  
The use of the term ethnicity has gained much currency in scholarship over "tribalism", a term 
coined arguably to describe the African specificity, which is being discarded because of its 
pejorative connotation. Ethnicity is the active sense of identification with some ethnic unit, whether 
or not this group has any institutional structure of its own, or whether it has any real existence in the 
pre-colonial epoch. Ethnicity is a fundamental social fact of life. Yet one needs to distinguish 
between its moral and strategic versions. When conceptualized as internal, these cognitive 
valuations engender moral ethnicity.42 
 
Nowhere is ethnicity as the defining mode of conflict more tragically evident than in the Great 
Lakes region of Africa.43 Yet, as we now realize, ethnicity as a descriptor of violence is a poor 
guide to unravel the complexities of internal armed conflict situations, their interconnectedness in 
time and space, and the manner in which they enter the consciousness of both actors and outsiders.44 
 
The analysis of the historical background to the problem of ethnic antagonism, which has been the 
major factor behind violent conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes Region, has much to do with 
colonialism. The existence of primordial forms of ethnic groups among pre-colonial African 
societies in the Great Lakes is an indisputable fact; but ethnic antagonism and ethnic conflicts of the 
sort and on the scale prevailing in the region today is a colonial creation.45  However, this fact has 
not always been welcome by many, and some analysts have simply dismissed any analyses that 
attribute the current Africa’s miseries to the legacy of colonialism.46 Be it as it may, while it is true 
as acknowledged elsewhere in this work that the recurrent and persistent conflicts in Africa and in 
                                                 
41 Kagame, P (2006, May 17-24), ‘Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region’ in The African Executive,  
availableat<http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=693&magazine=70 17/10/2006>. 
Last visited, September 8, 2009. 
42 Jua, N., & Nkwi, P. (2001). ’Leveling the playing field. Combating racism, ethnicity, and Different forms of 
Discrimination in Africa.’ Yaoundé, Cameroon: International Center for Applied Social Sciences, Research, and 
Training. 
43 See UN Secretary General’s Report, supra note 8  
44 Discussed in Kumar, supra note 15, p.15 
45 Mpangala, supra note 11, p.9. See also Doom, supra note 16, p.98 
46 Tshitereke, supra note 18, p.83 
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the Great Lakes in particular is caused by  multiple factors, attempts to dissect Africa’s current 
predicaments must revisit the complexity of the past.  
 
Thus, one of the fundamental historical questions in the Africa’s Great Lakes conflict revolves 
around whether ethnic conflicts, at least of the current scale, existed prior to colonial rule in the 
Region. The Africa’s Great Lakes region historiography provides us with a negative answer to this 
question.47 In Rwanda and Burundi, history indicates that society is made up of three social ethnic 
groups.48 The Twa who relate to the pigmies, were the first inhabitants and form a smallest 
component of the population in both countries. Then came the Hutus who belong to the Bantu 
group from Chad and Cameroon, and finally the Tutsi, who descended from Ethiopia.49  
 
 It is important to note here that even if this region was not a land of peace and bucolic harmony 
before the coming of colonialism,50 there is no trace in its pre-colonial history of a systematic ethnic 
violence as such. There was therefore no particular confrontational relation, and the three groups 
lived side-by-side, shared the same culture and customs, spoke the same language, had same clan 
names and lived together with no land distinctively being the home of any particular so called 
ethnic group.  But colonialism invented the ethnicity factor out of the only difference which was 
visible to them, namely that of division of labour, where the Hutus are crop cultivators, while the 
Tutsis are pastoralists and artisans.51 
 
Initially, colonial anthropologists associated the concept of ethnicity or tribalism52 with a primitive 
and barbarous mystique peculiar to the African, thus requiring “a colonial civilizing mission.”53 
However, through the indirect rule, or rather the divide and rule system of colonial administration, 
the colonialists realized the divisive nature of ethnic identity, and being essentially opportunistic, 
they opted to take advantage of it for their own interests.54 
                                                 
47, See Kamukama, supra note 39, p.4. 
48 Ibid 
49Ibid. 
50It is obvious that as in any other societies, there were some hostilities, but these much more frequent among 
competing dynasties of the same category than between the Hutus and the Tutsi as ethnic groups. 
51Mpangala, supra note 11, p.27. 
52Tribalism was viewed by colonial anthropologists as being associated with the lowest level of development of 
societies in their early stage, and the ethnicity was the next in the level of development; See generally Moore, S. (1994). 
Anthropology and Africa: Changing Perspectives on a Changing Scene. Va. Charlottesville/London: 
University Press. 
53 Mpangala, supra note 11, p.5. 
54 See also this view in Kamukama, supra note 39, p.20. 
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 In order to fulfil its motive of producing raw materials and providing markets for European 
industrial products, the colonial state integrated African societies in the Great Lakes Region into 
their colonial administration systems, colonial economy and colonial ideology.55  In this process, 
“racism” and “civilizing mission” became a common ideology used as an instrument to justify 
colonialism. Its direct application meant categorization of social relations into superior, less 
superior and inferior races for the Whites, Asians and Blacks respectively.56  
In order to understand the impact of colonialism on ethnic identity and ethnic conflicts in the Great 
Lakes region, two aspects have to be taken into account. One is the colonial ideology of racism, and 
the second is the establishment of political boundaries, which were arbitrarily drawn in the Berlin 
Conference in total disregard of the social, political and cultural interests of ethnic communities in 
the region.57  
  
Racism is an ideological notion or dogma that makes one racial group condemned by nature to 
congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority.58 While European 
colonialists in the Africa’s Great Lakes used the racist ideology to justify colonial domination, 
oppression and exploitation as elsewhere in the continent, the same racist ideology was used to 
divide Africans in the region into antagonistic ethnic groups on the basis of superior and inferior 
categories.59 Members of each ethnic group in the region were allocated to different roles within the 
framework of the colonial systems in their considered order of superiority and qualities. In Rwanda 
and Burundi where the Belgians took over colonial administration from the Germans,60 the system 
of indirect rule was inherited with necessary modifications.  These modifications necessitated 
various changes aimed at transforming Rwanda and Burundi into “modern” societies, and they also 
necessitated the introduction of various reform measures. These included a formal 
institutionalization of ethnicity by dividing society into three groups, which were called ethnic 
groups.61  Everyone was then issued with an identity card, stating his or her ethnicity.62 It was upon 
production of an identity card that the colonial authorities could determine the allocation of various 
opportunities in society, including schools, civil services, and the like, depending on the ethnic 
group to which one belonged. The system promoted members of Tutsi ethnic group as an elite and 
                                                 
55Ibid. 
56Mpangala, supra note 11, p.44; See further, generally, Koskenniemi, M. (2001), The Gentile Civilizer of Nations: The 
Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
57 See Doom, supra note 16, p.191 
58 Mpangala, supra note 11, p.5 
59 Ibid, p.6 
60The takeover came as the result the defeat of the Germans during the First World War in 1918. 
61The Hutus group represented 84% of the population, the Tutsi about 15% and the Twa about 1%. 
62 See this in Kamukama, supra note 39, p.6 
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educated ruling class. The colonial administration reserved ruling positions as exclusive for the 
Tutsi through a biased system of education, which regarded the Tutsi as being more superior race of 
Hamitic origin,63 and their subjects Hutus an inferior ethnic group of Bantu origin. The racial 
distinction was based on height and light skin-colour differences and may have been an attempt to 
identify and give preferences to those perceived as having a “more European” look. The shorter, 
darker Hutus were classified as Bantu, a term used analogous to the serfs of medieval European 
feudalism.64  The lighter-skinned Tutsi were earmarked for leadership positions because the 
Belgians ascribed to them a greater intelligence and ability for leadership, while the Hutus were 
denied any privileges and relegated to peasant status. This was a beginning of a formalized social 
stratification on ethnic basis, changing the once flexible class boundary between these two social 
groups into a sharp and an insurmountable ethnic barrier.  
 
In the DRC, the role of colonialism in making ethnicity the focal point of identity was not different. 
When the Belgium colonial administration assumed control over the Belgian Congo, cultural 
organizations based on ethnic identity were permitted, making ethnic membership the form of 
identification.65 Additionally, ethnic identity and ethnic conflicts in the DRC is mainly a 
continuation of the same in neighbouring states, which as we have seen above, is a colonial 
creation.  These racial distinctions later became the cornerstone for ethnic conflicts that ensued in 
the whole area of the Africa’s Great Lakes. 
 
 The second aspect is the link between the artificial nature of political borders in the Africa’s Great 
Lakes region as elsewhere in Africa and ethnic conflicts. The link is made on the basis of the 
premise that these imposed borders, which disregarded ethnic groups and natural resources 
distribution, inevitably led to internal ethnic conflicts, territorial disputes accompanied by separatist 
groups and persistent disputes over natural resources.66  In this respect, we would like to differ with 
controversial arguments by some scholars that colonial bureaucrats drew up territorial boundaries in 
Africa along cultural tribal units, and imagined them as socio-political units for action.67 These 
                                                 
63 This ideology was first invented by the Catholic White fathers. See Kamukama, Ibid,  p.6  
64 Sarkin, J (2001), ‘Towards Finding a Solution for the Problem Created by the Politics of Identity in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC); Designing Constitutional Framework for Peaceful Cooperation.’p.70 available at 
<http://www.scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=fi&lr=&q=cache:6L1EpD3zmCUJ:www.kas.org.za/Publications/Seminar
Reports/PoliticsofIdentityandExclusion/sarkin.pdf+politics+of+identity+in+the+DRC+Congo>, last visited, September 
8, 2009.  
65 Ibid, p.68  
66 Cone, C & Solomon, H (2004).‘The state and conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ South  
African Journal of Military Studies, vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 51-75. 
67 See Doom, supra note 16, p.100 
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artificial borders divided people who were under the same political organization before colonialism. 
For instance, the Hutus and Tutsi of Urwanda and Urundi, who intermingled as one society before 
the coming of colonialism, were separated; some came under the current Rwanda and Burundi, 
while others were left as minorities within Uganda and the Belgian Congo or Zaïre.68  So, as was 
rightly argued by Paul Kagame, the artificial boundaries created by former colonial masters had the 
effect of bringing together many different people within nations that were not prepared for the 
cultural and ethnic diversity (especially when a new regime was going to foster ethnic conflict) , 
and separating language, religious and ethnic communities.69  
 
In short, in order to protect, defend and prolong their interests, some of the Western actors in the 
region have fuelled the conflicts and variously obstructed the peace processes for a long time. In the 
19th and 20th centuries scramble, the brutality (of genocidal proportions) was committed in the 
plunder of ivory and rubber. In the current scramble, the loot is diamonds, gold, coltan, copper, 
cobalt, timber, wildlife reserves and fiscal resources.70 Indeed, the current role of the West in the 
intensification of conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes region can be summarized into three corners 
of inter-imperialist rivalries between the Western powers in the region. In one corner stands the US 
with its quest for global dominance and insatiable appetite for the strategic minerals of the region to 
mainly feed its military-industrial complex, including electronic, aeronautics, nuclear medicine, and 
missile technology etc. It should be noted that since the 1960s, Washington has had geo-political 
interests in the Great lakes region, and helped to install in power and strongly supported the 
autocratic regime of Mobutu Sese Seko between 1965 to 1990s.71 The US is also strategically bent 
to bringing to an end the old colonial spheres of influence as presently defined by British, French 
and Belgian interests. In the other corner lies the traditional Franco- Belgian interest seeking to 
maintain their foothold albeit in a conflict and collaboration mode with the Belgium unable to, but 
France intent on expanding its sphere of influence into traditional British areas. In the third corner, 
stands the rest of the EU and Britain in particular, seeking to dislodge the privileged position of 
                                                 
68 See Griggs, R (1994),  ‘Geostrategies in the Great Lakes Conflict and Spatial Designs for Peace’ available at 
<http://www.google.fi/search?hl=fi&q=colonial+political+boundaries+and+ethnic+conflicts+in+the+Great+Lakes+regi
on+&meta> last visited, September 8, 2009. 
69 See Kagame, supra note 41. 
70 Baregu, M. (2002) ‘The Clones of Mr. Kurtz: Violence, War and Plunder in the DRC’ African Journal of Political 
Science (2002), vol.7 No.2, pp. 11-38. 
71 See this fact clearly discussed in the Report entitled, SIDA (2004) A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes 
Region, Division for Eastern and Western Africa, Article No.SIDA3689, Stockholm, available at< 
http://www.sida.se/?d=118&a=3140&language=en_US> last visited, September 8, 2009. 
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France in particular in collaboration with the US. This struggle is what has been variously termed 
the second scramble for Africa.72   
These realities rendered many conflicts and civil wars in the Africa’s Great Lakes Region 
intractable. 
 
2.3.2 Rwandan Conflict: Introduction of violence in the Great Lakes Region 
 
At independence in Rwanda, it is technically true that within a mere three years, a Tutsi-dominated 
monarchy under colonial rule gave way to a Hutu-led independent republic.  But in practice, the 
changes mostly affected the top echelons of Rwandese society.  A small band of Hutus, mainly 
from the south-centre and, therefore, not representative even of the entire new Hutu elite, replaced 
the tiny Tutsi elite.73  They were backed with enthusiasm by the Catholic Church and their former 
Belgian colonial masters.  Accepting the racist premises of their former colonial oppressors, the 
Hutu now treated all Tutsi as untrustworthy foreign invaders who had no rights and deserved no 
consideration.74  
Having established discriminatory policies, the government mounted intensive and omnipresent 
propaganda claiming that Tutsi were foreigners who had repressed the Hutu people in serfdom for 
four centuries and the revolution and the republic were the expression of victory of the Hutu 
majority over the feudal minority Tutsi.75  This propaganda, which amounted almost to conditioning 
people to violence, led the population to internalise the racist biases of the regime founded on an 
antagonistic vision of the Tutsi.76  
The discriminatory regime increased the departure of Tutsi to neighbouring countries77 from where 
Tutsi exiles made incursions into Rwanda.78  The word Inyenzi, meaning cockroach, came to be 
used to refer to these assailants.  Each attack was followed by reprisals against the Tutsi within the 
                                                 
72 Baregu, supra note 70. 
73 Prunier, G. (1997) The Rwanda Crisis:  History of a Genocide 1959-1994, London: Hurst and Company,  p.53. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Gasana, E; et al ‘Rwanda’ in ACDESS (Eds.) (1999) Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts, The Search 
for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance, London: Zed Books, p. 153. 
76 As pointed out in the report of the OAU Panel: “Other than the change in the names and faces of the tiny ruling class, 
independence really produced only one major change for Rwanda: the introduction of violence between the two, 
increasingly divided, ethnic groups”.  OAU Panel Report (2000). 
77 See generally Guichaoua, A. (1992) Le Problème des Réfugiés Rwandais et les Populations Banyarwanda dans la 
Région des Grands Lacs Africains,  Geneve : UNHCR 
78 Exiled Tutsi became an early example of a new reality that later would convulse the entire Great Lakes Region and 
many of its neighbouring countries. Conflicts that generate refugees can easily lead to conflicts generated by refugees.   
See further Adelman, H  (1998) ‘Why Refugee Warriors are Threats’ Journal of Conflict Studies, vol. 18, No.  
1, pp. 49-69. 
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country.79   The dissensions that soon surfaced among the ruling Hutu led the regime to strengthen 
the authority of the then President Grégoire Kayibanda as well as the influence of his entourage, 
most of whom came from the same region as himself, that is the Gitarama region in the centre of the 
country.  The drift towards ethnic and regional power became obvious.  From then onwards, a rift 
took root within the Hutu political establishment, between its key figures from the Centre and those 
from the North and South who showed great frustration.80  Increasingly isolated, President 
Kayibanda could not control the ethnic and regional dissensions.  The disagreements within the 
regime resulted in anarchy, which enabled General Juvénal Habyarimana, Minister of Defence and 
Army Chief of Staff, to seize power through a coup on July 5, 1973, thus ending the First 
Republic.81  
2.3.2.1 The Second Republic – The Regime of Habyarimana 
 
Following a trend then common in Africa,82 President Habyarimana, in 1975, instituted the one-
party system with the creation of the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement 
(MRND), of which every Rwandese was a member ipso facto, including the newborn.  Since the 
party encompassed everyone, there was no room for political pluralism.  The structures of a 
totalitarian regime were put in place systematically.  The party was everywhere, from the very top 
of the government hierarchy to its very base.83 
From the beginning of 1980s, the external factors which had encouraged economic development 
were reversed, with the progressive decrease of external aid and serious deterioration of terms of 
trade.84  The losses were felt at every level of Rwandese society, causing widespread discontent.  
Growing inequality between most rural and some urban dwellers exacerbated the frustration of 
peasant farmers.85 
                                                 
79 Prunier (1997), supra note 73, pp. 56-62.  Before these incursions ceased, 20,000 Tutsi had been killed, and another 
300,000 had fled to the Congo, Burundi, Uganda, and what was then called Tanganyika.  
80 Gasana, E; et al, supra note  75, p. 157; Kakwenzire, J; et al “The Development and Consolidation of Extremist 
Forces in Rwanda 1990-1994” in Adelman, H & Suhrke, A. (1999) The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from 
Uganda to Zaire,  New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,  p. 19. 
81 Gasana et al, supra note 75, pp.  155-158. 
82See generally Decalo, S. (1990) Coups and Army rule in Africa , New Haven: Yale University Press.  
83All officials were chosen from party cadres.   Article 7 of the 1978 Constitution made Rwanda officially a one-party   
  State with the consequence that the MRND became a "State-party", as it formed one and the same entity with the   
  Government.  
84Gasana et al, supra note 75, pp. 159. 
85OAU, Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities (2000) Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide 
OAU/IPEP/PANEL also available at <http://www.oau-oua.org/Document/ipep/rwanda-e/EN.htm> last visited,  
September 8, 2009, (hereinafter referred to as “OAU Panel Report”). 
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The inability to control the rapid demographic increase exacerbated the land-shortage situation, thus 
leading to potentially explosive social disorders.86  By the end of the 1980s, the number of peasants 
who were land-poor (less than half a hectare) and those who were relatively land-rich (more than 
one hectare) both rose.  By 1990, over one-quarter of the entire rural population was entirely 
landless; in some districts, the figure reached 50 per cent.  Not only was poverty on the rise, but so 
was inequality.87 
In addition, although already dependent to an unhealthy extent on international assistance, the 
Habyarimana government reluctantly concluded that it had little choice but to accept a Structural 
Adjustment Programme from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank88 in return 
for a loan conditional on the rigid and harsh policies that characterized western economic orthodoxy 
of the time.89  
Like his predecessor, Grégoire Kayibanda, Habyarimana strengthened the policy of discrimination 
against the Tutsi by applying a similar quota system in universities and government services.  A 
policy of systematic discrimination was pursued even among the Hutu themselves, in favour of 
Hutu from Habyarimana's native region, namely Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in the north-west, to the 
detriment of Hutu from other regions.90  This last aspect of Habyarimana's policy, considerably 
weakened his power: henceforth, he faced opposition not only from the Tutsi but also from the 
Hutu, who felt discriminated against and most of whom came from the central and southern regions.   
Like Kayibanda, Habyarimana became increasingly isolated and the base of his regime narrowed 
down to a small intimate circle.  Rwandese used to call that group "akazu" (a small hut) in reference 
to the most restrictive or narrow political circle, which surrounded the mwami (King).91  This 
                                                 
86Rwanda population density was 221.9 inhabitants per Km2 in 1970, 283.5 in 1978 and 386 in 1986. J C Williams 
(1995) Cahiers africains 14.  The economic crisis led to endemic malnutrition in the country which, between 1984 and 
1989, transformed itself into food shortage and even into famine in 1989 in Gikongoro.  That social crisis proved even 
more pronounced among the rural youth.  Those youth with uncertain futures no longer adhered to the official slogans.  
Many of them went to try their luck in the informal urban sector.  Over the years, there developed a floating mass of 
unemployed young men and women.  These men were there in addition to those enrolled in the militia Interhamwe 
(Those Who Stand Together or Those Who Attack Together) who were the spearhead of genocide.  See also Gasana et 
al, supra note 75, pp. 159. 
87 DesForges, A.  (1999) Leave None to Tell the Story:  Genocide in Rwanda,  New York: Human Rights Watch. 
88In this regard, a lesson is to be learned in the analysis of the conflict in Rwanda for the international financial 
institutions.  “Even if the adjustment programme did not contribute directly to the tragic events of 1994, such a reckless 
disregard for social and political sensitivities in such a conspicuously sensitive situation would unquestionably have 
increased the risk of creating or compounding a potentially explosive situation.” See OAU Panel Report (2000). 
89Woodward, D. (1996) The IMF, the World bank and Economic Policy in Rwanda: Economic and Social Implications, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press,  p. 25; see also A Storey (1999/03) 17 Development Policy Review 1. 
90Gasana, E; et al, supra note 75,  p.  158. 
91Ibid, p. 159. 
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further radicalized the opposition whose ranks swelled more and more.92  In October 1990, an 
attack was launched from Uganda by the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), military wing of the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a political organization whose forebear, the Alliance Rwandaise 
pour l'Unité Nationale ("ARUN"), was formed in 1979 by Tutsi exiles based in neighbouring 
countries and elsewhere in the world.93   With the military assistance of France, the RPA advance 
was halted.94  After that, the RPA installed itself in the north from where it launched a guerilla war, 
under close supports from Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, who paid tribute to the RPF for the 
military assistance he received from them during his guerilla war aimed at ousting Milton Obote. 
To understand the violence of the RPF, it is necessary to go back a bit to its Ugandan origins. The 
hard core of the RPF was made up of men who were young boys in Uganda in the early 1980s. 
They grew up as refugees in the violence of Uganda civil wars.95 Their first experience of blood 
came with the Idi Amin massacres of the 1978-1979 war with Tanzania, and then later they suffered 
from the anti-Rwandese pogroms of 1982 and joined the Museveni’s guerilla forces.96 There they 
not only fought, but they also witnessed army government massacring civilians in the Luweero 
region. Once they won the war they were quickly pressed again into combat, this time in the North, 
against troops of the “prophetess” Alice Lakwena. Now the tables were turned; this time they were 
the “forces of law and order” and it was the local population who were the insurgents. They in turn 
committed massacres; to such an extent that President Museveni had to send special military judges 
to the north to curb his own army. One of these judges was Paul Kagame, and some of the men he 
had to judge were later his own subordinates in the RPF. The whole life history of these forces 
therefore, even before they set foot on Rwandese soil had been full of the sound and the furry of 
civil wars, and for them violence was not exceptional; it was a normal state of affairs.97 
                                                 
92Ibid.  
93The Rwandese Patriotic Front demanded the implementation of the rule of law, the abolition of the policy of ethnic 
and regional discrimination as well as the right for refugees to return to their motherland.  See Prunier (1997), supra 
note  73, p. 74. 
94 Ibid, pp.  101-102. 
95 There is abundant literature of varying interests on the political convulsions of Uganda between 1979 and mid-1990s. 
Among the most interesting works, one could mention Dodge, C and Raundalen, M (Eds.) (1987) War, Violence and 
Children in Uganda, Oslo: Norwegian University Press; Kasozi, A. (1994) The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda 
(1964-1985), Montreal: McGill University Press; Gersony, R. (1997) The Anguish of Northern Uganda, Kampala: 
USAID; Ondonda, A. (1998) Museveni’s Long March, Kampala: Fountain Publishers; Finnstrom, S. (2003) Living with 
Bad Surroundings:  War and Existential Uncertainty in Acholiland, Northern Uganda, Uppsala: Uppsala University 
Press, and many more. 
96 During the Uganda civil war, since Museveni was a Munyankole Muhima, also suspected to be of Tutsi origin, 
Obote’s thugs of Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) Youth Wing attacked and killed Rwandese Tutsi refugees in Ankole 
whom they assimilated to their Bahima cousins. 
97 Prunier, G. (2009). From Genocide to Continental War: The Congo Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa, 
London: Hurst & Company, p. 13. 
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2.3.2.2 From Conflict to Genocide 1990-1994 
 
The civil war launched from Northern Rwanda by the eager to return RPF on October 1, 1990, 
lasted, with long periods of cease-fire, for close to four years.  Its final three months coincided with 
the period of the genocide, which was halted only by the ultimate triumph in July 1994 of the RPA 
over the “genocidaires”.98  Throughout this period, old patterns re-emerged.   
Indeed, it was always at least possible, if not probable, that history would repeat itself and an 
opportunistic and threatened government would again awaken the sleeping dogs of ethnic division.  
There had been no punishment for those Hutus who had led the massacres of the Tutsis in the early 
1960s and 1970s, and the careers flourished of those who organized cruel repression of opponents 
throughout the first decade and a half of the Habyarimana regime.  Now, in the wake of the October 
1, 1990, invasion, impunity flourished for the demagogues who were deliberately fuelling the latent 
animosity toward those they considered perfidious outsiders, a category including not just the Tutsi 
of the RPF but every Tutsi still in Rwanda, as well as any Hutu alleged to be their sympathizer.  
Any question of class or geographical division among Hutus had to be submerged in a common 
front against the intruders.  It was not difficult for the government to exploit its own failures in 
order to rally the majority behind it.  In a country where so many had so little land, it took little 
ingenuity to convince Hutu peasants that the newcomers would reclaim lands they had left long 
before and on which Hutu farmers had settled.  From October 1, 1990, Rwanda endured three and a 
half years of violent anti-Tutsi incidents.99   
Despite the official end of the civil war between the RPF and the Government forces resulting from 
the signing of the Arusha Accords100 on August 4, 1993, extremist elements continued to push for 
less amicable solutions.101  On October 23 1993, the President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, a 
Hutu, was assassinated in the course of an attempted coup by Burundi Tutsi soldiers resulting in one 
of the worst massacres in Burundi’s bloody history.102  In Rwanda, Hutu extremists exploited this 
                                                 
98 The French word for perpetrators of genocide. 
99 Massacres of Tutsi were carried out in October 1990, January 1991, February 1991, March 1992, August 1992, 
January 1993, March 1993, and February 1994 to mention only a few.  See, e.g., Desforges, supra note 87. 
100 See Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, 4 Aug. 
1993 [hereinafter Arusha Peace Agreement].  
101 Since the beginning of the war and the democratization process, a constant barrage of virulent anti-Tutsi hate 
propaganda began to fill the air.  Clearly, the media played a prominent role in keeping passions at a fever pitch before 
and during the genocide.  See generally Chrétien, J; et al. (1995) Rwanda : Les médias du génocide, Khartala, Paris. 
102 Lemarchand, R.  (1996). Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide, 2nd Edn., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, p. xiv. 
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assassination to prove that it was impossible to agree with the Tutsi, since they would always turn 
against their Hutu partners to kill them.103  
2.3.2.3 Genocide and War 
 
On April 6 1994, under strong international pressure, President Habyarimana and other heads of 
State of the region met in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) to discuss the implementation of the peace 
accords.  The aircraft carrying President Habyarimana and the Burundian President, Ntaryamira, 
who were returning from the meeting, crashed around 8:30 pm near Kigali airport. All aboard were 
killed.  Although the responsibility of the crime has never been established, a small group of his 
close associates—who may or may not have been involved in killing him—decided to execute the 
planned extermination.  Within hours of the plane crash, the killings in Rwanda began.  Roadblocks 
were thrown up to prevent escape. Leaders viewed as moderate or "pro-Tutsis" were singled out to 
be killed first, and then the campaign of exterminating all Tutsi began.  The events unfolded in what 
seems clearly to have been a preplanned and organized manner.104   
The killings continued, day and night, for the next fifteen weeks. The international community did 
virtually nothing to intervene.  Indeed, the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which 
on April 6 had 2,500 troops in Rwanda to oversee implementation of the Arusha Accords, within 
weeks pulled out all but a token force of 450, and gave the remaining troops no mandate to 
intervene in the killing of civilians.105  The killing of Tutsi which henceforth spared neither women 
nor children, continued up to July 18 1994, when the RPF triumphantly entered Kigali.  The 
estimated total number of victims in the conflict varies from 500,000 to 1,000,000 or more 
people.106 
                                                 
103 As one analyst put it, “The movement known as “Hutu Power”, the coalition that would make the genocide possible 
was built upon the corpse of Ndadaye.”  Desforges, supra note 87 and. Gasana, E; et al, supra note 75, p. 162. 
104 Accordingly, the assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, was simply "the spark to the 
powder keg which set off the massacre of civilians" and not the root causes of the genocide as some seem to suggest.  
See, Report of the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. R. Degni-Sequi, Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, 51st Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 12, para. 
19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (1994) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (1994)];  For a detailed description of these 
events, see African Rights (1995) 35-36;  See also OAU Panel Report (2000), supra note 85.. 
105 United Nations Independent Inquiry (1999) December, 21;  See also Security Council Resolution adjusting 
UNAMIR’s mandate and authorizing a reduction in its strength S/RES/912 (1994) 21 April 1994; OAU Panel Report 
(2000). 
106 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (1994) para. 24; Establishing a reliable toll of those killed in the genocide and its 
aftermath is important to counter denials, exaggerations, and lies.  The necessary data have not been gathered but 
speculation about death tolls continues anyway, usually informed more by emotion than by fact.  Whichever might be 
the case, the overriding reality is that large numbers of innocent people suffered at the hands of their fellow citizens and 
that the outside world did nothing to stop it.  On the other hand, establishing the number of persons killed in the 
genocide will not help much in assessing the number of people involved in their execution.  The circumstances of the 
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This historical overview shows the need to avoid over-simplistic analysis and stereotyping in 
considering the history of conflict in Rwanda, which should not in any way be reduced to a basic 
conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi.107  Such ingredient, though necessary, is not sufficient.108  
It was necessary to transform those tensions into systematic mass violence, a feat which could only 
be achieved through careful planning and execution under the direction of political elites.109  The 
role (lack) of the leadership in that process especially during the Belgian colonisation and the first 
and second republic is primordial.  In addition, like in many other African countries,110 several 
distortions, corruption and racialisation were introduced in the history of Rwanda.  Accordingly, a 
lack of an objective authoritative non-controversial history must be regarded as one of the basic 
causes of the conflict.   
In 1994, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Rwanda identified 
three causes of the genocide, which were "immediately apparent.”111  The first was the "rejection of 
alternate political power" typical of the region, but which "takes on a special form in Rwanda, 
where it has strong ethnic overtones.”112  The Special Rapporteur observed that the mass killings of 
Tutsi "is not ethnic as such, but rather political, the aim being the seizure of political power, or 
rather the retention of power, by the representatives of one ethnic group, previously the underdogs, 
who are using every means, principally the elimination of the opposing ethnic group, but also the 
elimination of political opponents within their own group.”113   
The second identified cause of the genocide was the "incitement to ethnic hatred and violence.”114  
In this respect, the most significant instrument was Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines 
(RTLM), the propaganda organ of the Hutu extremists: "RTLM does not hesitate to call for the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
crimes varied enormously: there were professional soldiers armed with machine guns or grenade-launchers firing into 
crowds, each of whom may have killed dozens, if not hundreds, of people, and there were groups of assailants armed 
with clubs or sharpened pieces of bamboo who jointly killed a single person.  There can be no simple formula to assess 
how many killers murdered one victim or how many victims were slain by one killer.   
107See also Mekenkamp, M ; et al. (1999) Searching for Peace in Africa : An Overview of Conflict Prevention and 
Conflict Management Utrech : European platform for conflict prevention and transformation, p. 34; available at 
<http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/sfp> last visited, September 9, 2009. 
108 While it is true that ethnicity and conflict do interpenetrate in Africa (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi) as elsewhere (e.g. 
Bosnia), it must be reiterated that ethnicity and religion do not, of themselves, reveal why people would kill each other 
over their differences.  See Report of the Carnegie Commission (1998). 
109 “[I]t is often assumed that mass violence is an inevitable human phenomenon.  On the contrary, systematic mass 
violence and large scale atrocities necessarily require organization, planning and preparation, often accomplished under 
the authority of government”. Akhavan, P. (1997), ‘Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The  
Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 
vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 325-48. 
110 African conflicts show a number of crosscutting themes and experiences.  See U.N. Secretary-General Report 1998.  
111 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 para. 55. 
112 Ibid para 56. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
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extermination of the Tutsi and it is notorious for the decisive role that it appears to have played in 
the massacres. It is known as the 'killer radio station', and justifiably so.”115  This systematic 
campaign of incitement to ethnic hatred and violence was "made more dangerous by the fact that 
the generally illiterate Rwandese rural population listens very attentively to broadcasts in 
Kinyarwanda; they hold their radio sets in one hand and their machetes in the other, ready to go into 
action.”116   
The third cause was "impunity" which, like incitement, was "a recurrent cause of the massacres."117  
Impunity is the cumulative effect of the rejection of alternate political power and the incitement to 
ethnic hatred and violence.  Because, at the time of the genocide in 1994, "no legal steps had been 
taken against those responsible for the earlier and present massacres, although they were known to 
the public and the authorities,"118 there was no fear of punishment.  
It can thus be concluded that the tragedy of 1994 cannot be reduced to an uncontrollable 
spontaneous ethnic violence or just a cold reaction to objective or structural problems.  As a matter 
of fact, the oppressing poverty of the country,119 fear of domination and threat of war were the 
proximate causes of the events, yet these factors emerged in a predisposed psycho-cultural context 
laden with mythical-histories, fears, and misperceptions, indubitably inflamed by extremist 
propaganda, that account for the intensity of violence.  The point is merely that the genocide 
ideology was the product of a much longer and much more complex process.120 The exclusion 
policy, the lack of leadership, the lack of an objective authoritative non-controversial history, the 
lack of a constitutional culture, the incitement to ethnic hatred and violence, the culture of impunity, 
the proliferation of arms,121 the struggle for power and resources122 among Tutsi factions, among 
Hutu factions or among Hutu-Tutsi factions, the structural socio-economic situation (e.g., poverty, 
overpopulation, land pressure) but also psycho-cultural (e.g., related to identity, irrational myths, 
                                                 
115 Ibid para 59.   
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. para 60. 
118 Ibid para 61. 
119 Poverty is both a cause and a consequence of conflict.  See also U.N. Secretary-General Report (1998). 
120 See also Prunier (2009), supra note 97, p. 40; Utterwulghe, S. "Rwanda’s protacted social conflict : considering the 
subjective perspective in conflict resolution strategies" (August 1999) The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict 
Resolution available at  <http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/> last visited, September 9, 2009. 
121 See Brown, E. (Eds.) (1996) The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 247; See 
also Africa Watch A Human Rights Watch Short Report 5 (7) (June 1993) 6-10. 
122 Competition for resources typically lies at the heart of conflict. The lack of domestic capital ensured that the state 
would be an important source of resources and would become the subject of intense distributional conflicts.  See U.N. 
Secretary-General Report (1998).  Nevertheless, the Rwandese conflict should probably not be interpreted as being 
triggered by demographic pressure, as some analysts and media have suggested.  Research has shown that the 
relationship between demographic pressure and genocide is much more indirect and complex than outside observers 
tend to believe.   
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mistrust and fear) are but some of the factors that explain the conflict in Rwanda.  But most, if not 
all of these factors draw their origin from the same or similar policies cultivated long during 
colonial rule. Therefore, it is my contention that for the conflict of this nature to be genuinely 
resolved, both kinds of causes must be identified and then fully considered in conflict resolution 
strategies. 
2.3.2.4 The Impact of the Rwandan Genocide on the Great Lakes Conflicts 
 
The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 is an overwritten subject,123 and this explains the reason why it 
does not feature much in this work. Rwanda has made tremendous strides since the genocide, and 
the Rwanda of today is by and large politically stable.124 Nevertheless, it is not possible to make a 
comprehensive analysis of the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts without considering the role of the 
Rwandan Genocide. To adapt an old metaphor, when Rwanda sneezes, the Congo and Burundi 
catch a cold. Besides the role of Rwanda as a state in fuelling regional conflicts through its military 
actions in the DRC in recent years,125 most of the ongoing upheavals in the Africa’s Great Lakes 
have direct roots in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.126 Millions of its citizens fled the conflict in every 
direction: some eastwards to Tanzania, others southwards to Burundi, and most dramatically, others 
west to the eastern Kivu region of the DRC. At the same time, much of the leadership and many of 
the troops and militia of the genocide had escaped from Rwanda into eastern DRC refugee camps, 
where they had unlimited access to weapons. This has been a sure-fire formula for disaster that 
continued to rage the region to date. While Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC each have its own 
multiple challenges to meet, their interconnectedness can hardly be overestimated. Without peace, 
their futures are all jeopardized, with incalculable consequences not only for their own citizens but 
also for the neighbouring states in the region. Beyond domestic solutions to domestic problems, 
therefore, must be found regional solutions to regional problems.127 Almost every one of the 
                                                 
123 For different views relating to this subject, see generally Taylor, C. (1999) Sacrifice as Terror: Rwanda Genocide of 
1994, Oxford: Berg Publishers; Prunier (2009), supra note 97; Prunier (1997), supra note 73; Uvin, supra note 36; 
Mamdani, M. (2001) When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press; Gourevitch, P. (1999) We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our 
Families: Stories from Rwanda, London: Picador; Melvern, L. (2004) Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwanda Genocide, 
London: Verso; Dallaire, R. (2005). Shake hands with the devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, New York: Carrol 
& Graf trade paperback edition; Kamukama, supra note 39; Barnett, M. (2002) Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United 
Nations and Rwanda, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Kuperman, Alan J. (2001) The Limits of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda, Washington,DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
124See Jordaan, E (2006), ‘Inadequately Self-Critical: Rwanda’s Self-Assessment for the African Peer Review 
Mechanism’ in African Affairs, vol.105 No. 420, at p. 333   
125 Rwanda troops crossed the DRC border twice. In 1997 they assisted Laurant Kabila in ousting the Mobutu’s regime 
and in 1998, Rwanda in alliance with Burundi and Uganda tried to replace their former ally Laurent Kabila, accusing 
him of now backing the remnants of the Interahamwe forces. 
126 Griggs, supra note 68. 
127 See suggestions to that effect by Uvin, et al, supra note 39. 
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ongoing violent conflicts in the countries of the Africa’s Great Lakes region can be explained in 
connection to the Rwandan Genocide in some ways.  In the DRC for instance, the relationship 
between the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the Congo conflict, which started in August 1998, is very 
clear as explained in more details in chapter five of this work.  
 
In addition, Congolese armed forces had attacked local Tutsis (Banyamulenge) in Eastern DRC, an 
event that prompted Rwanda and Uganda in 1997, to give full support to the rebel groups in the 
DRC in their fight against former President Mobutu, as a way of neutralizing armed activities by the 
Interahamwe and other armed forces.128  The fragility of the situation in Rwanda is derived from 
today’s situation in the country. Although outwardly peace and stability has been established in the 
country under the currently mainly Tutsi dominated regime, there is a general but effective 
marginalization and at times, direct oppression of the Hutus, apparently as a retaliation for their 
active involvement in the 1994 genocide. 
 
To that extent, there are more skeptical voices outside the Rwandan community. A veteran analyst 
of the Great Lakes region, the Belgian academic Filip Reyntjens, wrote in 2004: 
“There is a striking continuity from the pre-genocide to the post-genocide regime in Rwanda. Indeed, 
the manner in which power is exercised by the RPF echoes that of the days of single-party rule in 
several respects. A small inner circle of RPF leaders takes the important decisions, while the Cabinet 
is left with the daily routine of managing the state apparatus. Under both Habyarimana and Kagame, a 
clientilistic network referred to as the akazu accumulates wealth and privileges. Both have 
manipulated ethnicity, the former by scapegoating and eventually exterminating the Tutsi, the latter by 
discriminating against the Hutu under the guise of ethnic amnesia […] a mere two years after the 
extreme human and material destruction of 1994, the state had been rebuilt.”129 
For Reyntjens, the problem is that this reaffirmation is in practice based on a restoration of Tutsi 
hegemony. He goes on to reflect on the stance of the international community, arguing that it is 
faced with a “grave dilemma”: 
“By indulging in wishful thinking, the international community is taking an enormous risk and 
assuming a grave responsibility. While it is understandable that the ‘genocide credit’ and the logic of 
‘good guys and bad guys’ should have inspired a particular understanding of a regime born out of the 
                                                 
128 This conflict later involved fighting of 8 countries in the DRC soil.  
129 Reyntjens, F. (2004)  ‘Rwanda, Ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship’, African Affairs, Vol.  
103, No. 411, pp. 208-9. He also claims that the Tutsi elite today is mainly drawn from networks “based on a 
shared past in certain refugee camps in Uganda” (pp. 188-9). 
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genocide, this complacent attitude has incrementally, step by step, contributed to a situation that may 
well be irreversible and that contains seeds for massive new violence in the medium or long run.”130 
According to his reasoning, he finds that, on the one hand, now that it is ostensibly legitimized by 
elections, the Rwandan regime will be even less inclined to engage in any form of dialogue with the 
opposition at home and abroad. On the other hand, most Rwandans, who are excluded and know 
full well that they have been robbed of their civil and political rights, are frustrated, angry and even 
more desperate. The risk that may be brought about by this state of affairs is the possibility, in 
future, for Rwanda to descend into violence once more. 
 
2.3.3 The DRC Conflict from 1990s to the Present 
 
The Congolese political history with different political regimes can be divided into six periods: 
First, is the Congo Free State under King Leopold II (1885-1908); second, is the Belgian Congo 
under the Belgian colonial administration (1908-1960); third, is the First Republic of Independent 
Congo under Patrice Lumumba and other first politicians (1960-1965); fourth is the Second Congo 
Republic (Zaire) under Mobutu dictatorship regime (1965-1997); fifth is the war period under 
Laurent Desire Kabila (1996-2003); the sixth is the transition period (2003-2006) and  the current 
regime under Joseph Kabila (2006-present).131 
 
For the purpose of this study however, which is intended to contribute to the ongoing efforts to 
bring the conflict to complete end and establish peace in the country and in the region, I shall focus 
upon the events and developments that have occurred in the post-Mobutu period, beginning in the 
1990s, immediately before and after the Mobutu regime was formally overthrown and Laurent 
Kabila came to power. 
 
Ever since its independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the DRC has represented the full range 
of African maladies, from colonial domination and exploitation through corruption, authoritarian 
rule and ethnic conflicts, to military regimes and mismanagement.132  The political and 
constitutional history of the Congo has been a vicious circle of coups and counter-coups, rebellions, 
mutinies, round tables, national conferences or dialogues and unconstitutional regimes, the whole 
                                                 
130 Ibid, p. 210. By ‘genocide credit’ he means the way in which, in his view, the genocide became “a 
source of legitimacy astutely exploited to escape condemnation… allowing the RPF to acquire and 
maintain victim status and, as a perceived form of compensation, to enjoy complete immunity” (p. 199). 
131 Throughout these periods, the DRC has moved from one crisis to another with actors  and interests changing over 
time. 
132 Mangu, A. (2003) ‘The Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Protection of Rights  
under the African Charter’ in African Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 235-263. 
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unfolding as tragedy and farce.133  Some 40 years on, the DRC has gone from one crisis to another 
crisis, with actors nearly identical to the ghosts of the past.134 In 1996, after three decades of 
authoritarian rule, Mobutu was terminally ill and unable to serve his Western patrons. Laurent-
Desire Kabila, a former Lumumba disciple turned businessman, was traced to Tanzania, 
reconverted to active politics, and was appointed to lead a rebellion against Mobutu by the US-
proclaimed ‘new breed’ of African leaders.135 On May 17, 1997, Kinshasa fell to Kabila’s Alliance 
of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour 
la Libération du Congo –Zaïre-AFDL). Kabila proclaimed himself President. On August 2, 1998, 
some of Kabila’s comrades from the Banyamulenge ethnic group rebelled against Kabila, accusing 
him of authoritarianism, corruption, mismanagement, nepotism and tribalism.136 They created a 
rebel movement named Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la 
Démocratie-RCD), with backing from some of Kabila’s former allies, notably Rwanda and Uganda. 
The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo- MLC) 
joined the rebellion against Kabila. The RCD later split into RCD-Goma, which remained the main 
rebel group, RCD-National (RCD-N) and RCD- Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML).137 But most 
of these rebel groups fighting inside Congo are largely the creation of outside interventions and 
their motives for the fight substantially differed depending on the interests of those who sent 
them.138 
 
The most recent conflict in the DRC involved several foreign rebel groups based in the DRC and 
launching attacks against their respective governments.139 At the climax of the conflict, at least 
seven other African countries had regular troops in the DRC. Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and 
Chad lent support to President Kabila, while Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda backed the rebels. This 
conflict is probably the most devastating crisis Africa has experienced in its post-colonial history, 
                                                 
133 Ibid 
134 Ibid. 
135 See this expression used in Prunier (2009), supra note 97, p. xxxi. 
136 Nzongola-Ntalaja, supra note 12,  p.227. 
137 For concise account of these guerrilla groups, see Prunier (2009), Ibid, p. 181 onwards.  
138 For an elaborate account of the motives of each rebel group in the DRC conflict, see Afoaku, O. ‘Congo’s rebels: 
Their Origins, Motivations and Strategies’ in Clark, J. (Ed.) (2002) The African Stakes of the Congo War, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 109-128.   
139The included the FDD (Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie/Forces for the Defence of Democracy), the 
Interahamwe, the ex-FAR (Forces Armees Rwandaise, former Rwandan Army of the late President Juvenal 
Habyarimana), the Ugandan ADF (Allied Democratic Forces), the LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army), UNRF II (Uganda 
National Rescue Front II), NALU (National Army for the Liberation of Uganda), FUNA (Former Uganda National 
Army), WNBF (West Bank Nile Bank Front) and the old Angola rebel movement, UNITA (National Union for the total 
Liberation of Angola). 
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and one of the most complex and perplexing events that the post-Cold War world has seen,140 with 
effects beyond the sub-region to afflict the continent of Africa as whole, according to the former 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.141 In the words of Howard Wolpe, the US Envoy to Africa’s 
Great Lakes Region, the DRC war was the most widespread interstate war in modern African 
history.142 It was also considered by some analysts the ‘African equivalent of the World War I’ and 
labelled ‘African World War.’143 
 
The conflict resulted in the violation of virtually all rights provided for by international as well as 
African human rights standards. Over four million people reportedly died in the conflict.  This 
figure is much higher than the national population of many states in Africa and elsewhere, and 
several times superior to the number of victims of the Rwandan, Yugoslav and Sierra Leonean 
conflicts that has recently attracted so much attention that the UNSC eventually resolved to set up 
three international tribunals to prosecute and punish persons responsible for the violation 
international human rights and humanitarian law in each of those countries.  
There has been a stream of scholarly works accounting for origins and causes of the Congo 
conflict.144  One general view, which has become prevalent, has been to depict the causes for the 
Congo conflict as resulting from three main factors: namely, ethnicity, state failure and greed.145  
However, much as there is some truth in some of these contentions, a close analysis of the historical 
developments as well as contemporary accounts of the conflict reveals that the causes of the 
conflicts in the DRC, as should be its solutions were both internal and external.146 
2.3.3.1 Internal Causes: Human Rights Violations, Ethnicism and the Citizenship Question 
 
To a large degree, the key to violent conflicts in the DRC as well as in the Africa’s Great Lakes 
region lies, directly or indirectly in the crisis of post-colonial citizenship147 in the Kivu provinces of 
                                                 
140 Breytenbach, W; et al. (1999) ‘Conflicts in the Congo: From Kivu to Kabila’ in African Security Review, vol. 8 No.5. 
141 ‘Extract from the Report of the UN Secretary-General on UN Deployment in the DRC’ (2000) 7 South African 
Journal of International Affairs, p. 183. 
142 Wolpe, H. (2000) ‘The Great Lakes Crisis: An American View’ in South African Journal of International Affairs, 
vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 27-42. 
143 Naidoo, S. (1999) ‘ Rebels without Pause: Diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict’ in  South 
African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 6, No.2,  pp. 217-226.  
144 See gerally Doom, supra note 16; Clark, supra note 157; Nzognola, supra note 12; Turner, T. (2007) The Congo 
Wars: Conflict Myth and Reality, New York: Zed Books; Prunier (2009), supra note 116; Mpangala, supra note 11, etc. 
145 Lunn, J. (2006) ‘The African Great Lakes Region: An End to Conflict?’ RESEARCH PAPER 06/51 25 OCTOBER 
2006. 
146 Mangu, supra note 151. 
147 Nzongola-Ntalaja, ‘The Politics of Citizenship in the DRC,’ State Borders and Nations: Negotiating Citizenship in 
Africa, Annual International Conference, Center of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, May 19-20, 2004; See 
also Mamdani, supra note 123, p. 19. 
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the Eastern DRC.148 The Belgian colonial administration implemented a policy of random transfer 
of part of the Tutsi population from the highly populated Rwanda to the lowly populated eastern 
Congo. This transfer which was done in total disregard of the historical borders between the two 
territories, together with the various crises that took place within Rwanda and Burundi since 1959 
have generated major flows of Rwandese and, to some extent, Burundian immigrants into the 
DRC.149 These migrations affected the demographics, economics, politics and security in the Great 
Lakes region and in the Kivu’s in particular.150 The consequential presence of trans-national 
identities in the Kivu province, with porous borders and contested citizenship has heightened the 
spread of conflicts in the area.151  
 
The political grievances of the Banyamulenge152 and Banyarwanda153 involve access to nationality 
rights and claims to resources such as land, based on those rights.154 These grievances developed 
from the introduction of narrow criteria for the acquisition of citizenship within the Congo-Zairean 
nationality laws,155 the effects of which were exacerbated by the influx of refugees and armed 
                                                 
148 The Kivu province of Eastern DRC, as referred to in this study, is the area between latitudes 2.0°N and 3.0°S and 
longitudes 28°E and 29°E. It is located at the junction between the well-defined Ruzizi basin to the South and the Lake 
Albert trough to the North and also borders Rwanda. This area includes the most prominent geological and geophysical 
features of the Western Rift Valley of Africa, i.e. the plains of Lake Kivu, the Ruzizi basins, the Virunga volcanics, the 
Ruwenzori horst and the Lake Albert trough. This area is also unique in the DRC as there has been little government 
and administrative control from Kinshasa since the time of Mobutu who ruled the area through indirect rule, giving 
leeway to the Banyamulenge ethnic local leaderships. 
149Mollel, A. (2007) ‘Judicial Settlement of Armed Conflicts in International Law: Reflecting the 2005 International 
Court of Justice Decision in the Democratic Republic of Congo Case,’ in Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 76, 
No. 4, pp. 407-434. 
150 See for a detailed treatment of this issue, Colliers, J & Malan, M. (2001) Peacekeeping in the DRC: MONUC and the 
Road to Peace, Monograph 66, Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria; Other Banyamulenge immigrated to the DR 
Congo from Burundi and Rwanda with the approval of Belgian colonial authorities; See Human Rights Watch, 
‘Democratic Republic of the Congo: What Kabila is Hiding-Civil Killings and Impunity in Congo,’ October 1997, 
available at <http://www.justiceinitiative.org/activities/ec/ec_noncitizens/CERD_Feb04.PDF>, last visited, September 
9, 2009. 
151 To adapt an old metaphor, one could say, when the Eastern Congo sneezes, the entire Great Lakes Region of Africa 
including the whole of Africa catch a cold. Several interconnected elements shaped conflicts in the Great Lakes region, 
including the tinderbox of ethnic tensions and clashes in the Eastern DR Congo Kivu provinces, which are de facto 
under the Banyamulenge control. Even the current conflicts going on between the Congolese renegade general Laurent 
Nkunda who is continuing attacks on government army is just but a continuation of the unrest. 
152 Rwandese and Burundian Immigrants of Tutsi origin who settled in Mulenge region, South Kivu, Eastern DRC. For 
more discussions about this ethnic group, see Vlassenroot, K. (2002). ‘Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in 
South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge’ in Review of African Political Economy: vol. 29, No. 93, pp. 499-516. 
153 Rwandese immigrants of Hutu and Tutsi origin who settled in North Kivu, Eastern DRC. 
154Sarkin, supra note 64. 
155 After various Congolese nationality legislation, an ordonnance-loi of 1971, stipulated that all Banyarwanda and 
Barundi living in the Congo on June 30, 1960 could claim citizenship rights, a policy that was reversed in 1977. 
Yielding to pressure from ‘native’ Congolese, the Legislative Council repealed the previous legislation and, in 1981, 
pushed through a nationality law which was modified by the decree-law No.197 of January 29, 1999. This  effectively 
deprived the Banyarwanda of all citizenship rights, stating that only individuals with an ancestral connection to the 
population who had been residing in Congo in 1885 would retain Congolese citizenship; See also this point discussed in 
Lemarchand, L. (2001) Exclusion, Marginalization and Political Mobilization: The Road to Hell in the Great Lakes, 
Copenhagen: CAS, p.  10. 
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militias from Rwanda and Burundi.156 In some instances, the militias used the refugee camps as 
their kraals to prepare and launch attacks on their territory of origin as well as using the receiving 
country as a means to advance their claims for citizenship and other claims.157 Incidentally, these 
immigrants were eventually to play a key role in the various guerrilla movements that continued to 
destabilize the DRC with effects felt throughout the whole of the Africa’s Great Lakes Region.158   
 
The controversy over the Banyamulenge nationality centres on both the actual date of their first 
arrival into the Kivu provinces of the DRC and on the very term “Banyamulenge.”159 
Banyamulenge advocates argue that their ancestors settled in the present-day eastern Congo during 
the seventeenth century in the hills they have named Mulenge from which their name, 
Banyamulenge, is derived.160 Indigenous Congolese, as well as the former Zairean government, on 
the other hand, claim that the Banyamulenge did not arrive in the Congo until the colonial period.161 
Furthermore, it is strongly argued that there was never any Congolese community known as the 
Banyamulenge until these Rwandan foreigners self-proclaimed themselves as such. The answers to 
these opposing views and many others are crucial for the right-based conflict resolution approaches 
that are inclusive of all sections in Congo society. 
 
The need to look at the whole issue from the nationality rights point of view comes from the fact 
that the Banyamulenge use this as the basis to claim their sense of identity to the DRC nationality, 
although many authors have avoided discussing it. In the final analysis, it is argued that an 
understanding of nationality rights is essential for anyone dealing with conflict prevention and 
resolution in such a situation as the present one relating to the DRC conflicts.  
 
 
                                                 
156 The greater the refugee influx from Burundi and Rwanda into the region, the more complicated the citizenship 
question became as indigenous Congolese continued to associate the Banyamulenge with their country of origin than 
with the Congo where they claim to belong.  
157 Rubin, B, Armstrong A, & Ntegeye, G. (eds.) (2001), Regional Conflict Formation in the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa: Structure, Dynamics and Challenges for Policy, Nairobi: Centre on International Cooperation, University and 
the African Peace Forum, New York, p.  9. 
158 Note that the 1998 “Africa’s First World War” ignited by Laurent Kabila’s move to oust Mobutu and take over 
Kinshasa was, to a large extent, backed by the guerrilla movements from the Eastern DRC. 
159 The argument is, using the name of the place where they first settled, “Mulenge region”, the Banyarwanda foreigners 
are in fact camouflaging their real identity to distance themselves from Rwanda, their origin. See further Vlassenroot, 
supra note 152. 
160 Nzongola-Ntlaja, supra note 12, p. 2. 
161 See this argument strongly advocated by one of former Mobutu’s Ministers in Sarkin, supra, note 64, p. 3. 
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2.3.3.2 The Banyamulenge Ethnogenesis and Conflicts in Eastern DRC 
 
The current conflict in east DRC has its roots in the nationality issue of the Congolese of Rwandan 
origin,162 the Banyamulenge and Banyarwandwa.163 The emergence of the two groups is mainly a 
colonial creation, traceable from the impacts of the scramble and the ultimate partition of the 
African continent into western powers’ spheres of influence.164 The Banyamulenge were 
incorporated into the DRC, (then the Congo Free State) for the first time in 1885 when its borders 
were drawn at the Berlin Conference,165 with the result that the Rwandans living in the west of the 
main Rwandan Kingdom found themselves in the Belgian Congo.166 They migrated to South Kivu 
in the 19th century in search of better pastureland and to escape the army of King Rwabugiri who 
wanted to conquer the Southern part of Rwanda, Kyaniaga, which was until then autonomous.167  
According to a similar historical view, these groups left Rwanda at the end the 19th century to 
escape political rebellion in the Court of Mwami Musinga and moved towards the Itombwe area in 
the east DRC.168 Since then, they remained quasi-homogenous, preserving their identity, mostly 
preferring intra-marriage to inter-ethnic marriages.169 
 
But the term “Banyamulenge”170 emerged in 1967 to distinguish the pastoral ethnic group living in 
the Mulenge region or Itombwe area in South Kivu from the Rwandan refugees, especially the Tutsi 
who started migrating into DRC in 1959 fleeing from the Hutu revolution, hence, they were referred 
to as “fifty-niners.”171 This new identity gave the Banyamulenge some historical legitimacy over 
their lands that was accepted and negotiated by the indigenous Congolese tribal communities.172 
 
                                                 
162 Ibid.  
163 For the description of these terms, see generally Vlassenroot, supra note 152, p. 502. 
164 For a modern and detailed analysis of this issue, see generally Pakenham, T. (1991) Scramble for Africa, New York: 
Random House.   
165 A comprehensive account of the Berlin conference and the borders delimitation in the African continent can be 
found in Förster, S; et al., (eds.) (1988) Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the 
Onset of Partition. London: Oxford University Press and German Historical Institute. 
166 See Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). (1997). ‘Report on the Situation of Human Right in Zaire’ wherein 
the United Nation’s Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Zaire, Mr. Roberto Garreton strongly argued that the 
Banyamulenge were settled in Kivu at least by the end of the eighteenth century. 
167Newbury, C. (1998) The Cohesion of the Oppression: Citizenship and Ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960, New York: 
Columbia University Press, pp. 48-49. 
168 J. Hiernauz, ‘Notes sur les Tutsi de l’Itombwe: La Position Athropolgique d’unde Population Empiree,’ Bulletins et  
     Memoires de la Sociere d’Anthropologie de Paris, Series 19, No 7, (1965), 61-379. 
169 See more in Butts, H & Brandshaw, H (Eds.), (2002), Central African Security: Conflict in the Congo, Proceedings   
    Report No. A715324 Army War College Carlisle Barracks Pa, p. 13. 
170 Since mid-1996, the term Banyamulenge has been used widely to refer to ethnic Tutsi living in eastern Congo. 
171 See, Lemarchand (1996), supra note 102, p. 3. 
172 These included the local populations such as Bafulero and Bbembe. See for more treatment of this subject, William, 
J. (1988), “Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge,” Cohiers Africains No.25 as quoted in Butts, supra note 169, p.13 
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On the other hand, the Banyarwanda were separated from Rwanda by the Convention signed on 
May 14, 1910 between the German Empire and the Belgian Kingdom that set today’s boundaries 
between Rwanda and the DRC by which several Rwandan territories were incorporated into the 
DRC.173 Banyarwanda include natives of Butshuru (or Banyabwisha) in the North Kivu province, 
Rwandan immigrants during colonial period and some 50,000 Tutsi refugees.174  
 
The second wave of Rwandan immigrants into the DRC resulted from the colonial immigration 
policies of the 1930s and 1940s, which were implemented randomly by moving people from the 
Rwandan highly overpopulated territory to the land-abundant North Kivu.175 However, this was not 
the end of the influx of Rwandans into the DRC. Tens of thousands of political refugees fleeing 
ethnic conflicts in Rwanda in 1960s and 1970s were registered by the UNHCR in various territories 
of the Kivu provinces176 of the DRC.177   
 
The current security instability in the eastern DRC, however, intensified following the massacre of 
Hutus and Tutsis triggered by the assassination of Burundian President-elect Melchior Ndadaye on 
October 21, 1993. At this time a third wave of up to 400,000 Hutu refugees from Burundi crowded 
into existing refugee camps in Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi although more than half ended up in 
DRC. The fourth and largest flow of refugees followed in the wake of the 1994 genocide and 
involved approximately two million Hutus from Rwanda fleeing into eastern Congo and 
Tanzania.178 Most had fled Rwanda when the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and 
its military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) took power in Kigali, advancing from 
Uganda under Paul Kagame with the support of the country. Up to 30 000 Hutus, who fled into 
North and South Kivu, were members of the former Rwandan army (ex-Forces armées rwandaises 
or ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe (Rwandan Hutu) militia, who had been responsible for the 
massacre of up to 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the preceding months. The 
perpetrators of the genocide subsequently rearmed in the refugee camps of eastern Congo 
(ironically under the protection of the international community and with substantial financial and 
                                                 
173 Hochschild,  A. (1998) King Leopold’s ghost. A story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa, London:   
    Macmillan, p. 141. 
174 Butts, supra note 169, p. 13. 
175 See, Gondola, D. (2002). The History of the Congo, Westport, CT: Greenwood, p. 77; On the legal problems created  
    by colonial boundaries on the African post-colonial states, see S. Smis, ‘The Legal Status of International Land  
    Boundaries in Africa’ in Doom, and Gorus, supra note 16, p. 191. 
176 Butts, supra note 169, p. 17 
177 Most of them went to Masisi, Kalehe, Fizi and Walikale and the rest were probably absorbed into the local Rwandan  
     population in the DRC. 
178 Lemarchand (2001), supra note 155,p.  6. 
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other support from the diasporas), and were able to resume the war in 1996 and again in 1998, 
bolstered by the recruitment of the Congolese Hutus and supporters from neighbouring states.179 
 
The massive influx of refugees produced by the 1994 Rwandan genocide completed the current 
estimates of the Banyamulenge population in the DRC.180 Consequently, the population of the 
Congolese of Rwandan origin became large, outnumbering that of the Congolese origin living in the 
eastern part of Congo. Thus, land scarcity became the major issue of confrontation, especially in the 
highly populated North Kivu area. The conflict over land in Kivu emerged from many causes. The 
first is an increase in the rural population due to an increased growth rate of the population. The 
second cause was an over concentration of the rural population and a massive migration from 
Rwanda. The third main reason was the quasi-absence of industrial development to absorb labour 
surplus from rural areas.181  
 
In addition, more and more Congolese of Rwandan origin emerged as political leaders of the Kivu 
provincial government and they became strongly opposed to any type of federalism in the DRC.182 
To that effect, since 1965, the Banyamulenge have been trying to put in place their own structure of 
power, especially given the fact that the Mobutu regime had no direct control over Kivu, where he 
ruled through indirect rule, making the Banyamulenge immigrants more powerful in east DRC. The 
climax of Banyamulenge high political visibility was seen in the 1970s when Mobutu appointed 
Bisengimana Rwanda to the position of Chief of State in the Office of the President. The result was 
the law of January 5, 1972 that conferred Banyarwanda Congolese (Zairean) citizenship. From 1972 
to 1980, Congolese indigenous ethnic groups for whom this influence represented domination by 
foreigners resented their influence in the political life of Kivu province.183 These groups also 
claimed that Tutsi immigrants throughout the Mobutu period marginalized them and that their land 
ownership rights in the hills were jeopardized.184  
 
                                                 
179 Including Tanzania, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon and the Central African Republic. See also International 
Crisis Group (ICG), Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an ugly war, Report 26, ICG, Brussels, December 20, 2000, p 
13. See further, Colliers & Malan, supra note 150, p. 22.  
180 Although there are divergent views on the actual estimates of the current number of the Banyamulenge ethnic group 
in the DRC, it is agreed that they account for more than 2 million people in the Kivu provinces of eastern DRC.  
181 See Butts, supra note 169. 
182Lemarchand (2001), supra note 155, p. 5.  
183 From the time of their arrival to date, the indigenous Congolese considered and still consider the Banyarwanda living 
in the DRC as foreigners. This view was strongly expressed by a Congolese citizen of the Maniema ethnic group, 
during a personal interview with the author in Bakavu town of South Kivu on June 9, 2007. 
184 Gnamo, A. (1999) ‘The Rwandan Genocide and the Collapse of Mobutu’s Kleptocracy’ in Adelman & Suhrke, 
supra note 80, pp. 321-349.  
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In 1966, the Bakajjika Law185 substituted the traditional land tenure system for a more legal 
ownership that benefited the Banyarwanda. Additionally, the nationalization of small and medium 
sized firms that occurred in November 1973 helped the Banyarwanda acquire 45 percent of arable 
land in Masisi, which they used as pasture in a region in which agriculture provided the livelihood 
for more than 70 percent of people. They also acquired 90 percent of all nationalized businesses in 
North Kivu.186 All these created a long-term tension and instability in the area. 
2.3.3.3 The Congolese Nationality Legislation and its Implications on Conflicts 
 
The right to citizenship, used here synonymously with the right to nationality is a means of 
acquiring the necessary legal status to enjoy such entitlements in life as rights to vote, to own 
property, to health care, to education, employment rights and even the right to travel outside one’s 
country of residence. It is a human’s basic right, for it is key to full enjoyment of other rights within 
a particular state.187 
 
It should be understood, therefore, that whereas most of the rights are guaranteed to “everyone”188 
within a particular territory, some of the rights are considered specific only to citizens or persons 
with the nationality of a particular state.189 Consequently, all states are continuously struggling to 
determine the precise legal boundaries of citizenship rights for persons within their territorial 
jurisdictions190 This is not different for African states born out of decolonisation such as the DRC. 
 
However, much as governments have, by virtue of the sovereignty principle, the right to put in 
place legal mechanisms governing the process by which aliens may acquire citizenship of the 
                                                 
185 The Bakajika Law, enacted in June 1966, was the first in a series of laws designed to ensure government control of 
the land and its riches. It gave ownership of all wealth above and below the ground to the state, thus ensuring that the 
government could claim all public mineral rights. 
186 Butts, supra note 169, p. 18. 
187 See the often-quoted words of Justice Earl Warren in (Trop v. Dulles, 1958) quoted in Batchelor, C. (1995). 
‘Stateless Persons: Gap in International Protection’, International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 231-59. 
188 Note that this phrase is commonly used in almost all provisions of international human rights standards and national 
constitutions, except for those rights considered particular to citizens only. 
189 See this fact as stressed in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
(1) “Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives”, and in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966 
thus: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 
and without unreasonable restrictions:  
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;  
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall 
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;  
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.” 
190 H. Batiffol, & P. Lagarde, Droit international prive’, (6th edn), LGDJ, Paris Vol. 1, (1974), 66  
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country,191 Congolese nationality legislation has been very chaotic and inconsistent since colonial 
times. Such an inconsistency has been one of the main sources of continued unrest in east DRC. 
Since the attribution of nationality is inherently part of a state’s sovereignty, legal conflicts are 
likely to emerge as soon as citizens from one country develop a relationship with either the territory 
of another country or its citizens.192 Sometimes, these relations lead to an intermingling of laws as 
seen in the growing recognition of dual citizenship, and sometimes they lead to the disappearance of 
one’s legal link to a state, statelessness.  
 
The Congolese of Rwandan origin (Banyamulenge) have been victims of the complexities of the 
Congolese nationality laws. To understand their nationality status as far as Congolese nationality 
laws are concerned, one has to understand the general principles of nationality law. However, as it 
is stated elsewhere, nationality law can be compared to different “colours” which are subsequently 
mixed so as to achieve a desired effect. Two of these ‘colours’ have already been mentioned above as 
nationality based on birthplace–or jus sol: the fact of being born in a territory over which the state 
maintains, has maintained, or wishes to extend its sovereignty; and bloodline–or jus sanguinis: 
citizenship resulting from the nationality of one parent or other more distant ancestors. However, two 
other “colours” are often forgotten or neglected. These are, marital status, as marriage to a citizen of 
another country can, in some legal jurisdictions, lead to the acquisition of the spouse’s citizenship; 
and past, present or future residence in the country’s past, future or intended borders (including 
colonial borders).193  
 
Nevertheless, the traditional African notion of citizenship is such that, no matter where one is born, 
one belongs to the soil or homeland of the parent through whom one traces his or her descent. Ethnic 
citizenship is therefore the foundation for national citizenship in Africa, although it is also possible to 
acquire citizenship by naturalization.194 
 
                                                 
   191 This right was elaborated long ago under the Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of     
      Nationality Laws, The Hague - 12 April 1930 which states: 
 Article 1:“It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by 
other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of 
law generally recognised with regard to nationality.” 
Article 2: “Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be determined in 
accordance with the law of that State.” 
192 See the example of the Kurds of Iraqi origin in Turkey. 
193 Weil, P ‘Access to Citizenship: A comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws’ in Aleinikoff, T & Klusmeyer, D.  
(Eds.). (2001) Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, pp. 17-35. 
194 See this point stressed in Nzongola-Ntalaja, supra note 12. 
   85 
Right from the creation of the Independent State of the Congo (ISC) on May 29, 1885, King 
Leopold II came up with legislation on nationality through the Royal Decrees of December 27, 
1892 and June 21, 1904.  For obvious reasons, this legislation had been influenced by the Belgian 
colonial policies in its inspiration by a particular humanism.  Hence, nationality regulated by the 
Royal Decree of 1892, was concerned with the integration of foreigners in grouping the individuals 
called Congolese nationals.  Everything seems to indicate that the government in power at the time 
was above all preoccupied with a demographic concern in exercising this attribution of 
sovereignty,195 with little concerns for the original Congolese nationality. This argument is 
substantiated by the chaotic status of Congolese nationality as consolidated in colonial nationality 
legislation. The Royal Decree of June 21, 1904 explained the conditions under which a person 
could change his nationality through emigration, stating:   
“Every native Congolese, as far as he resides on the territory of the state, preserves his Congolese 
nationality, is submitted to the laws of the State and will be treated as a subject of the state; this 
notably goes as far as competence of criminal law, extradition and expulsion, even if he pretends to 
have become resident abroad through naturalization, or otherwise of foreign nationality, if he has put 
himself in dependence of a foreign power. The individual who, in the case of the former precedent, 
leaves the territory of the state, without the mind to return, must officially notify the general 
governor, and when he fails to do this, he is confined to the legal obligations of the Congolese 
subject.”196   
 
Thus, not much regard was paid to the origin of the Congolese nationals both during the 
Independent Free State and later during the Belgian Congo.  
Following the horrific abuses of natives’ rights under King Leopold,197 the Belgium government 
annexed the Independent State of the Congo in 1908.198 As a result, the latter disappeared and the 
Congolese lost their nationality and acquired that of Belgium through the application of rules of 
international law on state succession.199 This acquisition, however, did not provide them with the 
status of Belgian citizens.  From Congolese they became Belgian subjects, a status they shared 
without any distinction with other Belgian subjects in the other Belgian colonies of Rwanda and 
                                                 
195 See Doom, supra note 16, p. 290. 
196 See Sections 1 and 2 of the Royal Decree of 1904. 
197 King Leopold’s abuse of natives’ rights went beyond the obligations imposed under the terms of The Act of Berlin 
which states under Article IV thus: “All the Powers exercising sovereign rights, or having influence in the said 
territories undertake to watch over the preservation of the native races, and the amelioration of the moral and material 
conditions of their existence” See Hochschild, supra note 173, p. 117. 
198 This came out because of the public outcry following reports on King Leopold's grave abuses against natives’ rights 
in the Congo. For details on the annexation of the Independent State of the Congo by the Belgian Government, See 
‘Supplement: Official Documents,’ in The American Journal of International Law, (3) 1(1909), 89-94.  
199 These rules are more clearly explained in Evans, M. (Ed.) (2003), International Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p.213. 
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Burundi that were governed by Belgium as a single colonial entity.  In other words, from a formal 
point of view, “in international law, the Congolese nationality and the Congolese as far as they 
represented the nationality of a state, had disappeared with the Independent State of the Congo”.200 
Nevertheless, the expression of Congolese nationality had been preserved in texts, which regulated 
the Belgian nationality with colonial status. The colonial Charter (1908) puts the principle of the 
differentiation of legal statuses among the residents of Congo in these terms: 
 “The Belgians, the Congolese registered in the Colonies and the foreigners enjoying all the civil 
rights recognized by the legislation of Belgian Congo.  Their personal status is ruled by their national 
laws as far as they are not contrary to the public order.  The natives who were not registered in 
Belgian Congo enjoy civil rights which were admitted to them by the legislation of the colony and 
by their customs as far as these were contrary to neither the legislation nor the public order.”201 
 
However, it must be understood that nationality is the quality by which a group of men, women and 
children identify themselves with a political community that is constituted in a sovereign state.202 
Moreover, unlike their neighbours in (then) Ruanda-Urundi and in spite of the term ‘tutelage’, the 
Congolese have always had a nationality by birth. The establishment of the international mandate 
and henceforth being put under the tutelage of the former German colonies in Central Africa has 
cost their inhabitants citizenship in a state. The Congolese nationality was, in a way, decapitated, 
deprived of the enjoyment of civic and political rights.203 
 
Unfortunately, even preparations for independence in the DRC failed to agree on which indigenous 
people would legitimately inherit independent Congo, although it was at least agreed basically that 
the Banyarwanda should be included among the independence beneficiaries and also given the right 
to vote upon proof of ten years residence in the Congo.204 When the Congo attained independent 
statehood,205 these colonial texts on Congolese nationality remained applicable, even though the 
nationality they regulated had legally changed very significantly.  
 
The nationality question for the Banyarwanda-speaking minority in the DRC remained tense and 
sensitive until 1964, when the Luluabourg Constitution for the DRC was adopted. Article 6 of the 
Constitution stated, “Congolese citizenship is recognized for every person, one of whose parents 
                                                 
200 G. Kerken, ‘La nationalite de Congolais ou sujets belges du Congo’, Revue Belge de Droit compare’ No.4, (1937), 
70. 
201 See Section 4 of the Colonial Charter. More specifically, see Doom, supra, note 16. 
202 See the Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), Judgment of April 6, 1955, ICJ Rep. 1955, 4, 23. 
203 Doom, supra, note 16, p. 67. 
204 The 1920 round table Conference held in Brussels to discuss the independence of the Congo. 
205 Congo attained its independent statehood from Belgium on June 30, 1960. 
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was or had been a member of one of the tribes established within the territory of the Republic of the 
Congo in its borders as defined on October 18, 1908.206  This provision, though promising, did not 
solve the problem and it, in fact, automatically excluded most Congolese of Rwandan origin who 
migrated into the DRC between 1937 and 1955, unless they made a special request within 12 
months to change their nationality of origin.207 Just the following year, that is 1965, local authorities 
in Kivu denied the Banyarwanda the right to run for office because they were foreigners. In 
addition, many Banyarwanda who had positions in the local administration during the colonial 
period were, as of 1960, dismissed and replaced by members of indigenous ethnic groups.208 
 
In subsequent years this issue continued to be contested. In 1971, President Mobutu Sese Seko 
signed a decree-law that stated, “All persons of Ruanda-Urundi origins established in the Congo by 
June 30, 1960, are Zairean from this date.”209 In 1972, the nationality act, required under the 
constitution promulgated as Law 002 repeated the provisions of Article 6 of the 1964 constitution, 
but added that “persons originating from Ruanda-Urundi who had taken up residence in the 
province of Kivu before January 1, 1950, and had henceforth continued to reside in Zaire until the 
entry into force of the law, acquired Zairean nationality as of June 30, 1960”.210 This law, which in 
effect granted collective nationality to the Congolese of Rwandan origin, was an attempt to dispel a 
sense of insecurity among the Banyarwanda who were experiencing increased hostility from the 
indigenous groups in eastern Congo.  
 
The 1972 Law, however, proved to be counterproductive, and in 1981, Mobutu agreed to sign a new 
law on nationality, invalidating the 1971 decree.  The new law, resulting from the need to address 
the situation whereby the indigenous groups now became minorities in the Kivu province, provided 
that only persons who could demonstrate an ancestral connection to the population residing in the 
territory in 1885, then demarcated as the Congo, would qualify to be citizens of the Congo. 
 
                                                 
206 See this Constitutional provision discussed in Cyubahiro, N. (1989), Heritage Colonial, Hestoire des Ethnies    
      frontiales du Zaire: Le cas des Hutu et des Tutsi du Kivu, Kinshasa: Depot legal No. 093/89, 2e trimestre, June 27. 
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208 See Makombo, A (1997). ‘Civil Conflict in the Great Lakes Region: The Issue of Nationality of the Banyarwanda in    
       the Democratic Republic of Congo,’ African Yearbook on International Law, Vol. 5, pp. 49-62. 
209 Cyubahiro, Supra, note 206, p. 63.  
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In practice, the 1981 law deprived both those Banyarwanda who were descendants of pre-1885 
settlers and those who were not, of their right to Zairean citizenship.211 It is to be noted that some 
permanency on the current Congolese Nationality Legislation is found in the 1999 Nationality Law, 
which completed that of 1981. It brings about no substantial modifications to the former regime. 
Indeed, it was destined to give a facelift to the 1981 law. One can especially discern an agenda to 
adapt the designations of the country and its institutions to the change of political regimes that 
intervened in May 1997. The only important modification linked, for that matter, with the political 
evolution, concerns the procedure of definitive naturalization, especially where the law demanded 
the advice of the Central Committee. As this institution disappeared with the ‘Mouvement Populaire 
de la Revolution’, a single party, the reunited legislative organ in congress gave this advice.212   
 
Thus, I can summarise the characteristics of the present nationality law in Congo as follows: First, 
the exclusivity of Congolese nationality; second, the predominance of the consanguinity tie (ius 
sanguinis) in order to determine the nationality of origin.213 In this respect, the nationality of origin 
is determined from a connection with an ascendant member of a Congolese tribe settled in Congo as 
of August 1, 1885. Thirdly, the acquisition of the nationality on individual demand, whether it is a 
matter of option or naturalization by the President of the Republic; and fourth, restrictions inherent 
in the quality of Congolese nationality by acquisition. 
 
The means of acquiring nationality permits us to say whether legislation could be qualified as 
‘open’ or ‘closed’. Of the candidate for Congolese nationality, this legislation demands, not only 
long-time residence in Congo, but also a high degree of assimilation; knowledge of the languages of 
the country and the carrying of a name drawn from Congolese cultural patrimony.214  Partial and 
definitive naturalization are separated by a 15 years interval; whereby the plaintiff should have 
established his or her principal centre of activities in Congo for at least the last ten years before this 
demand.215 
The option for the naturalization may be refused.  When they are obtained, the newly Congolese 
person is submitted to strong restrictions concerning the exercise of civic and political rights. He 
only has the right to vote and not of eligibility; he only has access to subordinate functions in the 
                                                 
 211 See Lemarchand, R.  (1997), ‘Patterns of state collapse and reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on the 
crisis in the Great Lakes region,’ Afrika Spectrum, vol. 32, pp. 173-193, where she argues that the boundaries of Zaire 
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212 Article 15. 
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army and in the public administration.216 These restrictions are permanent since the law of 1981. 
Definitive naturalization, which makes the individual a real citizen, requires the advice in 
conformity with the united legislative organ in congress. Finally, the constitution or the law may 
exclude the naturalized person from the exercise of some public functions. 
 
Under these conditions, it is possible to indicate a particular internal contradiction between the 
Congolese nationality law and the international law provisions that compete to fight statelessness. 
Articles 14 and 18 of the Congolese law of 1981 or the actual law-decree have been conceived with 
the purpose of granting nationality ipso jure to the minor, whose father, or whose mother if the 
father has died, are unknown or without nationality. This child may renounce the Congolese 
nationality when it comes of age, on the condition that it can prove possession of a foreign 
nationality. However, if the mother or father appears later they still have a right to recognize the 
interests of the child in engaging in a procedure of naturalization and fulfil all the legal 
requirements.  
 
As such, the application of the 1892 Decree has disappeared, for the child who was born from an 
unknown or stateless father became a Congolese national through naturalization or option.  The fact 
that these persons, who are considered to be of “doubtful nationality” have no recourse to these 
ways of acquisition, leaves again the shadow of statelessness hanging over them and their 
descendants. 
 
As a direct consequence, fear and mistrust have made their domicile in the eastern Congo. One 
explanation could easily be found for this general mood, in the question of nationality, but this can 
be no more than a side issue.  Indeed, here reality and fantasy have come together and have lead the 
populations into conflicts involving bloodshed. What kind of relationships should be established 
between the populations? Investigation will lead to research on the causal connections with all the 
dangers of extrapolation and error along with it. The important thing remains to be the identification 
of the citizenship rights of everyone in Kivu if the volatile element is to be avoided in the area.217   
 
                                                 
216 Article 13, 16 and 22.   
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The specialists on the region of the Great Lakes underline above all, the problem of indeterminate 
nationality status of the Kinyarwanda speaking populations in the area.218 It is complicated by 
difficulties of coexistence with autochthonous populations. Indeed, there is first the question of land 
and submission to traditional authority.219 For a long time, Kinyarwanda speakers have demanded 
civic and political rights, 220 leading to the ethnic conflicts of 1962-1966. These immigrants have 
subsequently been called the Banyamulenge.221 
 
2.3.4 External Causes of the Conflict: Foreign Interventions 
 
The external factors that contributed to the Congolese conflict can be viewed in two main aspects. 
As already emphasised, the conflict in the Congo was externally driven and involved troops from 
several other African countries, siding with either the rebels or the DRC government, all providing 
official justifications for their interventions, but acting on different hidden agenda. Besides African 
States whose interventions was visible, the invisible and real force behind the Congo war came 
from Western States, led by America, France and their multinational corporations with the main aim 
to preserving both economic and political interests, at the expense of losses of million lives in the 
DRC. 
2.3.4.1 Justification for Interventions of African Foreign Troops 
 
In September 1996, the Banyamulenge, many of whom had served with their kinsmen in the 
Rwanda army, were prompted by Zairean persecution and the (Tutsi-led) Rwandan government’s 
anticipation of an increase in attacks by Hutu militias from their bases in the refugee camps of 
Eastern DRC, to launch counter-strike, partly retaliatory but in the main pre-emptive, against the 
Mobutu and thereafter the Kabila regime that reportedly backed them.222 It is the repeated failure of 
the international community to take action against the genocidaires of 1994 that provided the major 
justification for the Rwandan unilateral interventions in the DRC.223  Uganda also made it clear that 
its army was in the Congo to fight against Uganda rebels allegedly based in Eastern DRC. Rwanda 
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and Uganda referred to international law and justified their cross-border raids and interventions in 
the DRC as ‘hot pursuit.’ This was however an unfortunate misuse of the term, as the right to hot 
pursuit can only be exercised in relation to the law of the sea.224 According to Dugard, if a state 
wishes to justify cross-border raids, it must do so in terms of the right of self-defence or, possibly 
reasonable reprisal action.225 
 
Dugard noted that, unlike self-defence, which is authorized in modern international law,226 reprisals 
remain illegal de jure in view of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter.227 Even if the 
argument of hot pursuit and self-defence or anticipatory self-defence could stand by default, it 
would not hold. Hot pursuit or self-defence cannot be invoked to acquire title to the territory of a 
foreign state. Nor can it be used to justify the occupation of the Congolese territory, the exploitation 
of the Congolese natural resources, the commission of gross human rights violations and the 
establishment of puppet government in Kinshasa under the false pretence of helping Congolese 
people establish democracy. 
 
Uganda and Rwanda leaders also justified their campaign in the DRC on the basis that they wanted 
to help the Congolese people to get rid of Kabila and establish an all-inclusive democratic regime in 
the DRC. Such a justification was really surprising and made a mockery of democracy. At no time 
did the people of DRC call upon Rwanda and Uganda for assistance in ousting their “dictator” and 
establish the genuine democratic regime. Rwanda and Uganda, who pretended to help ‘free’ or 
‘liberate’ the Congolese people from dictatorship and establish a more human-rights friendly regime 
in the Congo, are not known as fully-fledge democratic countries respectful of these rights. 
Such arguments, recently advanced by the Bush and Blair administrations to wage war on Iraq, are 
unjustifiable in modern international law. It is inconsistent with the principles of non-aggression, 
non-interference in the internal affairs of another state, development of friendly relations among 
nations, equality of states, self-determination of peoples and respect for the political independence 
of foreign states that should govern the civilized world.228 
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Just weeks after the outbreak of the rebellion initiated by Banyamulenge dominated regiment in 
Kivu on August 2 1998, the rebel troops had already advanced across the country from the east to 
the western seaboard. They had captured the Kitona and Mbanza Ngungu military bases in the Bas-
Congo, where they recruited a number of solders of Mobutu’s past army and were heading for 
Kinshasa. Faced with this rapidly deteriorating military situation, Kabila denounced the rebellion as 
an invasion by Uganda and Rwanda in an effort-in which he ultimately succeeded-to mobilize the 
Congolese people around an anti-Tutsi banner and to secure his own political survival. 
 
Kabila also appealed to other SADC members for assistance to a fellow SADC member state under 
external aggression.229 Following a meeting of their defence ministers in Harare on 17 to 18 August 
1998, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe agreed that the government of Laurent-Desire Kabila 
required the full support of the SADC to guarantee its survival. Speaking in his capacity as head of 
the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and security, President Mugabe announced that the meeting 
had agreed that military aid should be sent to secure Kabila’s position. 
 
Although former South African President Mandela, who was the chairperson of SADC disagreed 
that it was a proper SADC decision, since he was not consulted and all SADC members did not 
attend the meeting, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe later sent troops to the DRC. Chad also joined 
them. 
 
In line with the principle of political independence or sovereignty, people are free to choose their 
own political system or government.230  This is an internal affair, an exercise of self-determination, 
which allows no interference by any foreign state. However, there are circumstances where 
interventions by foreign governments to support a friendly incumbent government are permissible 
under international law. This is the case, for instance, when the rebels are supported by another or 
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2.3.4.2 Hidden Agenda for Foreign Interventions 
 
With the end of the Cold war, President Mobutu who had served the American and Western 
interests in Africa, was no longer of use and was regarded a man of the past.232 America had now to 
bank on new generation of leaders represented by President Museveni and Kagame in the Great 
Lakes region, and these new allies were asked or just too willing to assume leadership in the region. 
To better serve their interests, the Rwanda and Uganda leaders realized that they had to maintain 
control over the exercise of power in the DRC. By dismissing the Rwanda and Uganda officers who 
commanded the Congolese army and who were accredited with him to look after the interests of 
their governments, Kabila’s days were numbered, and according to the logic of his former patrons 
he no longer qualified to remain in power in the DRC.  Rwanda and Uganda sought to replace him 
with a more pliant client. Angola, Chad, Libya, Namibia and Zimbabwe reacted by sending troops 
or providing some kind of assistance to President Kabila in an attempt to restore the regional 
balance of power and help maintain their own influence in the region. 
 
As Howard Wolpe stressed, the interests at stake in the Congolese crisis were enormous.233  They 
were political, military but also, and even mostly, economic ones. The UN report on the plundering 
of the resources of the DRC in which the Congolese warring parties and their respective allies were 
involved, bears testimony to this.234 Foreign countries involved in the Congolese conflict became 
exporters of diamonds, gold, copper, timber and other natural resources from DRC. The fighting 
between Rwanda and Uganda armies on the Congolese territory at Kisangani, for instance, may 
only be understood as a fight for leadership and control over diamonds, the gold mining industries 
and other natural resources.235 On the other hand, the Zimbabwean battle for Mbuji-Mayi was 
mostly a war over the control of diamonds. Economic interests were important for the rebels’ allies 
and Kabila’s supporters as well.236        
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Similarly, the real reason of the war in the DRC has much to do with foreign interventions directly 
involving Western superpowers led by America. This source of intervention and counter 
intervention in African international relations, and for that matter the DRC, has been salient in both 
the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods.237    Classical realists had no difficulty understanding 
the hostility of the rulers of fragile states toward their neighbours who have wished them ill for any 
number of reasons. Rene Lemarchand has unconsciously deployed precisely this variety of old-
fashioned power political analysis to the foreign policies of the states of the Great Lakes region 
recently with great success.238 That the goals and ambitions of Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame 
were not generally shared by their countrymen was of no particular relevance to Lemarchand. All 
he suggests in his analysis was that the security of regimes remains of paramount concern, and a 
motive force behind foreign policy when regimes are really threatened. Although this language is 
not explicitly used, the analysis broadly supports this view. 
 
The increasing US role and influence in the Great Lakes region has generated tensions with France. 
France has not concealed its distaste for what it considers a growing Anglo-Saxon sphere of 
influence (Britain has also mediated between Uganda and Rwanda and is a major donor to both 
countries) in a region that was traditionally part of France’s chasse gardée (private hunting 
grounds). The fall of the Hutu government in Rwanda in 1994, and the subsequent demise of 
Mobutu in the Congo in 1997 significantly reduced French influence in Central Africa. The US is a 
close ally of Rwanda and Uganda, the two countries with significant influence in this region, whose 
leaders greatly mistrust France’s role. The current Rwandan government has never forgiven France 
for its assistance to the genocidal Hutu regime in 1994. The rivalry between Paris and Washington 
has implications for a durable peace in the Great Lakes region.  
The EU as well has recently taken a more active role in the peacemaking efforts in the region. In 
2003, France deployed the first soldiers of a 1,400-strong largely European force mandated to 
protect civilians in Bunia until the expected arrival of 3,000 Bangladeshi peacekeepers by 
September 2003. Belgium, with its long and complicated relation to the region, as well plays an 
active role. 
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In terms of resolving the DRC conflict, various diplomatic efforts within the SADC, AU/OAU and 
the UN culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Agreement of 1999, and the holding of the Inter-
Congolese political negotiations that ended with the adoption of the Global Inclusive Agreement, 
Signed in Pretoria on December 16, 2002. 
On the UN side the MONUC, which together with other forms of conflict resolution approaches to 
the DRC conflict, forms part of subsequent discussion, was created. Suffice it to point out here that 
the Congolese conflict was both an internal rebellion against an authoritarian regime that did not 
care for the rights of the people and also a foreign aggression of the DRC by some African states, 
with complicity of or direct support from the most powerful actors on the international scene, the 
Western powers. 
 
2.3.5 The Burundi Conflict from 1993 to the Present 
 
 Burundi is leading in the Great Lakes Region in terms of the number of periodic violent conflicts 
since independence.239 Political conflicts in Burundi have been among the conflicts in the Great 
Lakes region and Africa since independence.240 Discussions on the common and differing positions 
as to the causes of conflicts among the parties to the conflicts often brought out the implications on 
the common and differing positions in terms of suggested solutions to the conflicts.241  
It is however commonly agreed that the civil wars in Burundi, in which almost half a million people 
have died since October 1993,242 stem from underlying causes of conflicts over political 
participation and resource scarcity, compounded by imbalances and militarization of society.243 Yet, 
the Burundi conflicts, like many other conflicts in the Great Lakes region have normally taken the 
form of ethnicity, racialism and regionalism, all previously implanted by colonialism as was 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter. It all started as a tragedy to the country’s attempt transition to 
democracy. After decades of Tutsi military and political dominance, President Buyoya and his 
Union for National Progress Party (UPRONA), under the international pressure for 
democratization, launched constitutional reforms that led in June 1993 to presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Melcheor Ndadaye, the leader of the opposition party, FRODEBU emerged 
                                                 
239Mpangala and Mwansau, supra note 29, p.390 
240 Ibid, p.119 
241 Ibid 
242 Reyntjens, P. (2006), ‘Briefing Burundi: A Peaceful Transition after Decades of War’ in African  
      Affairs, Vol.105 No.418, p.117. 
243 Boulden , supra note 27, p.216. 
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victorious in the said elections, becoming both the first democratically elected and first Hutu 
president in the history of Burundi.244   
 
Discontented with the loss of power, the Tutsi-dominated army staged a coup and killed a number 
of FRODEBU leaders, including the President, Ndadaye, shortly after he assumed power. This 
assassination plunged the country into a brutal wave of deadly violence, displacing about 150,000 
people,245 and making the neighbouring countries of Rwanda, Tanzania and the DRC bear the brunt 
of refugees fleeing the conflict.246   As the coup collapsed in the face of its rejection in the 
international community and at home, the conspirators decided to devise other strategies by forming 
different armed rebellious movements which handicapped the search for peace in Burundi and in 
the Africa’s Great Lakes region in general. This was then the beginning of a decade-long armed 
conflict, which caused deaths, internal displacements or exile abroad over a million people.247  An 
international accommodation agreed between the FRODEBU and UPRONA in September 1994 
rapidly broke down: the president and the national assembly were impotent, the cabinet was divided 
and unable to formulate, leave alone implement coherent policies, and the army effectively 
controlled what little state power remained. When, on July 25, 1996 the army staged a new coup 
which restored former President Buyoya to power, this in effect confirmed the existing situation in 
the country.248  From there, real peace has never returned, and the political transformation in 
Burundi has taken place in difficult circumstances. Only the future will tell whether democracy, 
human rights and peaceful resolution of continuing intricate problems will return Burundi to 
political stability.  
 
Although the situation remained very fragile and stalemate constantly loomed in Burundi political 
life, various conflict resolution and prevention initiatives, have been undertaken. Popular among 
these was the Burundi Peace Process which had been carried out in Arusha Tanzania under the 
former Presidents, the late Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela of Tanzania and South Africa 
respectively, since 1998 to 2000. These peace negotiations which ended up with the signing of the 
Arusha Peace Accord were an historic event not only for Burundi but also for the Great Lakes 
Region and Africa as whole.   
                                                 
244 Reyntjens ,supra  note 242, p. 110 
245 Boulden, supra note 27, p.217 
246 For details of the event following the coup, see Press, “Military Coup in Burundi Dissolves New Democracy”, in The 
Christian Science Monitor, November 22, 1993, p. 6: Ezekiel Pajibo, “Burundi Analysis: Burundi, A Democracy Gone 
Awry: Is Power in Burundi Rally about Tribalism?” in African Faith and Justice, November 4 1993. 
247 Reyntjens ,supra note 242, p. 110. 
248 The longing for power by the Tutsi ethnic group proved to the international community of its unwillingness to 
respect any transition through democratic means.  
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2.4 The Human Rights Impact of the Conflict and Ethnic Reactions 
 
Human rights violations are both the cause and consequence of conflict. First, there are numbers of 
ways in which human rights violations can generate conflict. In the most general sense, grievances 
over the denial or perceived denial of rights can generate social conflict. This may be the case 
where there is systematic discrimination, differential access to education or health care, limit on 
freedom of expression or religion, denial of rights to political participation, etc. These violations 
may seem relatively minor, in comparison to some of the grave crimes we are familiar with, such as 
war crimes and genocide, but they still generate grievances and social unrest.   
 
Discrimination, intolerance and other violations of human rights based on ethnicity and other 
prejudices have acted as immediate causes of violent conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes Region. 
All human beings are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination (emphasis 
supplied), to equal protection of the law.249 Discrimination is the very negation of the principle of 
equality and an affront to human dignity. The Charter of the United Nations speaks three times 
about respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction (emphasis 
supplied) as to race, sex, language or religion.250 The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1966251 obliges states parties to ensure the rights of all individuals ‘without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, religion, language, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.’252 Although none of these instruments define what 
discrimination means,253 a working definition of the term was once developed by the Human Rights 
Committee, which defined discrimination as: 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status, and which has the purpose of or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.254 
                                                 
249 Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
250 See Articles 1, 55 and 75 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
251 GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UNGA OR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 
(1967) (hereafter referred to as ICCPR). 
252 Article 2 of the ICCPR. 
253 Neither the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, nor the ICCPR define ‘discrimination’. A definition of this term 
can only be found in conventions and declarations dealing with types or forms of discrimination. See Symonides, J. 
(Ed.)  (1998). Human Rights: New Dimensions and Challenges, Ushgate Dartmouth: UNESCO Publishing, p.11 
254 The General Comment of the Human Rights Committee in its 37th Session in 1989. See also this quotation in Farer, 
J.T & Gaer, F. ‘The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning’ in Roberts, A & Kingsbury, B (Eds.) (1993), 
United Nations Divided World, 2nd Edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 240-44 and further discussion on the same in 
Symonides, Ibid, p.12 
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The prohibition of discrimination is formulated at present not only in the Charter of the United 
Nations and the International Bill of Rights but also in the impressive number of instruments 
dealing with discrimination on specific grounds or directed against persons belonging to vulnerable 
groups, adopted by the United Nations, the International Labour Organization (ILO)255 and 
UNESCO.256 Standards concerning non-discrimination can also be found in a series of instruments 
adopted by regional organizations.257   
 
Implementation of conventional provisions imposing obligations on states is subject to control and 
verification procedures based on the periodic states reports and also providing, as the case with the 
ICCPR and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination,258 the possibility of individual communications. Some of the treaties monitoring 
bodies are authorized not only to consider state reports but also to receive individual 
communications and formulate general recommendations.259 The need for the elimination of all 
forms of discrimination and intolerance formulated under the United Nations system from the 
moment of its creation is a very important element in the efforts of the international community to 
ensure full implementation and observance of human rights for all. Discrimination and violation of 
rights of persons belonging to vulnerable groups (women, children, minorities, refugees, aliens and 
migrant workers) should be seen as a cause of serious conflicts and danger of international peace 
and stability in the Africa’s Great Lakes Region.260 
Effective prevention of human rights violations must address their root causes. And if armed 
conflicts lie in the root of human rights violations, it follows that such conflicts must be scaled 
down and prevented. After all, human rights protection and securing peace go hand in hand.261 
A catalogue of persistent, widespread and gross human rights abuses is the everyday reality in the 
Great Lakes region of Africa for quite sometimes now, with impunity acting as a catalyst for 
                                                 
255 Article 5 of the ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention No. 181 1997, ILO Convention Concerning the 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour No. 182 1999, ILO Equal 
Remuneration Convention No. 100 1951, ILO Protection of Wages Convention No. 95 1949 and the ILO 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Recommendation No. 111 1958 
256 See for instance the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education 1960. 
257 See for instance Article 14 of the ECHR; Article 1 of the ACHR; Article 2 of the ACHPR. 
258 660 UNTS 195; G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966) 
(hereinafter referred to as the CERD). 
259 These include, the Human Rights Committee for the ICCPR, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, Committee Against Torture and the Committee on the Protection of All Migrant 
Workers and their Families. 
260 See Symonides, supra note 253, p.13 
261 Nowak, M (2003), Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime, London: Martinus Nijhoff  
     Publishers, p.281. 
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renewed cycles of violence. In a vicious cycle, the human rights abuses are committed throughout 
the region and beyond. 
 
In this context, large scale massacres of unarmed civilians, deliberate and arbitrary killings, and 
extrajudicial executions, disappearance, torture-including rape and other forms of sexual abuse and 
ill-treatment have been constantly committed by the warring parties in the region. Also, arbitrary 
arrests, incommunicado detention, detention conditions amounting to torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment and punishment, denial of due process in the administration of justice, the use 
of child soldiers and the use of the death penalty seem to be the norm.262 In addition to abuses 
perpetrated in the context of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations, numerous human rights 
violations occur in the context of law enforcement and the administration of justice. Many arrests 
appear to be arbitrary without substantive evidence resulting in unlawful detentions. Others are 
apparently politically motivated and result in prolonged detention without charge or trial. There are 
widespread reports of detainees suffering beatings and other forms of ill treatment. In the context of 
fair trial procedures, serious concerns arise in all three countries. In Burundi, for instance, most of 
the trials, which have taken place, continue to fall far short of international standards for fair trial, 




Devastations resulting from the conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes region are very immense. 
There are several very strong regional dynamics, as well as direct and indirect interactions between 
the conflicts in the region. It is thus necessary to have a clear regional analysis as a basis for actions 
in the different countries in the region. This does not necessarily mean that implementation must be 
on a regional level. However, it is necessary to analyse how the situation or intervention in one 
country affects the neighbours. 
 
It may be asked why the Great Lakes region is more prone to violent conflicts than the other areas 
of the African continent. Part of the answer lies in the complex history of the post-1885 relations 
between the peoples of the Great Lakes, which has been marked by the construction of ethnic 
identity in Burundi and Rwanda, and its manipulation by the colonialists; the deeper penetration of 
the economic and political life by immigrants from Burundi and Rwanda in 1970s; and the trauma 
                                                 
262 Amnesty International’s recommendations to the Commission are featured in the main document: ‘1999 Commission 
on Human Rights- Making Human Rights Work: Time to Strengthen the Special Procedures’ (AI Index: IOR41/01/99). 
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of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and its repercussions for the Rwanda’s two main “ethnic” groups, 
the Tutsi and Hutus in the area.  
 
An analysis of the evolution of the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts and attempts to end them, lead me 
to conclude that when an entire region is deeply divided by violent conflicts as the case with the 
Great Lakes region, it is not possible to enforce peace, even if there have been successful 
negotiations reached for settlement. In other words, combatants cannot enforce peace against 
themselves. They can participate in peacemaking, and ultimately must do so, but if there is to be 
peace enforcement, then others will have to do it.  It has further been suggested that in an interstate 
conflict of magnitude and complexity like that of the DRC, building the peace capacity of regional 
organizations is unlikely to lead to successful peace enforcement.263 
The region’s recognition of its limited capacity in conflict management has led to a number of 
capacity building efforts over the years. Virtually all of them, however, are focused on traditional 
peacekeeping- they do not build capacity for enforcement missions. It is my contention that these 
efforts may contribute to the region’s capacity to mediate peace agreements, and perhaps even 
monitor them, but add little to the region’s ability to enforce those agreements. In any case, it is 
doubtful that such capacity building efforts can overcome the fundamental problem of broad 
regional ethnic antagonisms.264  
 
It remains clear that although the discourse of conflict resolution in recent years has shifted to the 
idea of regional solutions for regional problems,265 the UN retains the paramount responsibility, 
according to the Charter, to maintain international peace and security. This includes in this case 
assisting in resolving conflicts, especially region-wide wars like those in the Great Lakes region.  
With the UN inaction in the Rwandan genocide266 as well as its sluggish pace in resolving the 
Congo conflicts, it remains that something of alternative have to be done, as can be seen with the 
current efforts in each of the countries of the Africa’s Great Lakes region. 
 
Justice and reconstruction processes in Rwanda, including the role of the Gacaca tribunals and that 
of the ICTR, the Burundi Peace Process culminating in the signing of ceasefire agreements and the 
recent political elections in the DRC, are only but the signs for future hope. The overall conclusion 
is that although a number of peace processes have taken place with regards to the Africa’s Great 
                                                 
263 Boulden ,Ibid, p.27. 
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265 See this idea being advocated by Uvin, P et al, supra note 36. 
266 See the confession to that effect by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan in Boulden , supra note 27, p.253 
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Lakes conflicts, this situation cannot be taken for granted. There are still challenges and risks for 
reversals. The ongoing conflicts within different countries at the time of writing this thesis bear 
witness to these realities. The ongoing conflict in eastern Congo, the political tensions in Burundi, 
the strained relation between some of the countries in the region are some of the challenges that 
need to be addressed in order to pave the way for building sustainable peace and stability.  
Other challenges include lack of coordination of the ongoing interventions, and the inability to 
evaluate the impact of the other interventions, both from top-down and bottom-up perspectives.  
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3 APPROACHES TO CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT:  
         AN OVERVIEW  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Conflict prevention and management have become the sine qua non of the post-cold war period.1 
The destructive effects of internal armed conflicts in the 1990s, such as the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda and the 1995 massacres in Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina, spurred a range of initiatives 
to examine more closely the capacity of the United Nations to prevent violent conflicts.2 Thus, 
making peace is now pursued by a veritable industry of international, regional, state and non-state 
actors. Efforts to bring about peace and reconstruction have been fashioned by universalistic 
conflict resolution models that have a standard formula of peacemaking, with a trajectory of 
ceasefire agreements, transitional governments, demilitarization, constitutional reforms, 
“democratic” elections and the recent power-sharing negotiations in the aftermath of post-election 
crisis.3 Indeed, deadly violence that visits upon humanity on an almost daily basis is not because 
there is lack of proper tools to prevent or resolve conflict; rather, the challenge is to properly 
calculate the appropriate approach or mixture of approaches to utilize along the war to peace 
continuum (tactic), when to apply certain techniques (timing), and in what measures (intensity).4 
 
But the underlying concern is that many conflict prevention/resolution approaches in the region, 
most of which have failed;5 have been focusing on post-conflict, short-term providing fast result, 
and using military force. This approach is not only costly and risky, but it also does not address the 
root causes of conflicts.  Therefore, in order to achieve sustainable peace, it is argued in this chapter 
that alternative strategies are imperative; that is pre-conflict, long-term, and using people-oriented 
and rights-based approach, based on the full analysis of root causes of the conflicts.6   
  
                                                 
1 Lund, M. (1997), Preventing Violent Conflicts, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, p.61 See also Daley, P. 
(2006), ‘Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa’ in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 
27, No. 2, pp. 303–319. See further Oloka-Onyango,J. ‘Constitutionalism, Community and Prevention of Conflict in 
Contemporary East Africa’ in Oloka-Onyango,J. (Ed) (2003), Constitutionalism Development in East Africa for Year 
2001, Kituo Cha Katiba, Series No.3, p.6. 
2 United Nations, Prevention of Armed Conflict Report of the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/55/985–S/2001/574, 
June 7, 2001. See the report in <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/un-conflprev-07jun.html> last 
visited, September 9, 2009.                                
3 Daley, supra note 1; The concept of power-sharing is slowly replacing the will of the people in democratic elections, 
such as those in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2007 and 2008 respectively, where ridged elections resulted in post-election 
crisis, leading to violent conflicts which claimed lives of many. 
4 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict: Preventing Deadly Conflicts: Final Report, Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Commission of New York, December 1997. 
5 Nowhere have the current conflict resolution strategies failed than in the Africa’s Great Lakes region where conflicts 
left a scar of volatile situations for potential recurrence of conflicts at anytime. 
6Carnegie Commission, supra note 4.  
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In view of the heavy human, material and financial cost of the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts and 
their negative impacts on the national and regional development, it has now become necessary to 
shift emphasis from conflict resolution to conflict prevention.7  Kofi Annan8 cemented this 
argument when he pledged to move from a “culture of reaction” to a “culture of prevention.”9  This 
is an approach that accords utmost importance to preventing problems before they happen and 
thereby minimizing consequent damage, rather than reacting to conflicts after they have taken 
place.10  Indeed, prevention is better than cure.11 Thus, as Michael Brown posits, ‘conflict 
prevention should be the international community’s top priority because keeping disputes from 
transforming into violence in the first place is key to sustainable peace’.12  
 
Experience over the past years has clearly pointed out the dangers of ignoring prevention and the 
problem of trying to intervene at the point where conflicts are locked into a process of escalation. 
But conflict prevention is not a discrete technique or method in itself. It is an orientation that can be 
applied with a variety of techniques, programs and projects in many fields, from development, 
human rights protection and promotion, humanitarian affairs and democracy building to military 
affairs and diplomacy. These activities prevent or mitigate conflicts when they are consciously 
designed and operated with attention to conflicts’ sources and manifestations.13 
 
After identifying the nature and classification of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region, an 
appropriate approach for conflict prevention and management has to be sought. Consequently, this 
chapter explores a variety of the major conflict management approaches, currently applicable in the 
resolution or management of conflicts, including those that are not expressly provided for under the 
Charter of the United Nations.14  The chapter starts by tracing the development of the concept of 
conflict prevention within the UN dispute settlement systems, followed by a comprehensive account 
                                                 
7 The former may be referred to as a reactive approach which presupposes that the conflict has already erupted; while 
the latter refers to proactive measures which presuppose that the conditions for the eruption of conflicts have emerged 
or have been created. See also Mpangala, G and Mwansasu, B (Eds.) (2004), Beyond Conflict in Burundi, Dar es 
Salaam: The Mwalimu   Nyerere Foundation, p.1. 
8 The outgoing United Nations (UN) Secretary-General 1992 –2006. 
9 He made the remarks in his keynote address to the Stockholm International Forum on Preventing Genocide on 
January 26, 2004. See also UN Press Release, SG/SM/9126: See this originally discussed in United Nations, Prevention 
of armed conflict, supra note 2. 
10 Peck, Connie. (1996), The United Nation as a Dispute Settlement System: Improving Mechanisms for the Prevention 
and Resolution of Conflicts, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. iii. See also United Nations, Prevention of Armed 
Conflict, supra note 2. 
11See Nowak, M (2003), Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
p.277. 
12 Brown, M. (Ed), (1996), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p.605. 
13 See Lund, et. al., (1998), Preventing and Mitigating Conflict: A Guide for Practitioners, Washington, DC: Creative 
Associates International Inc, p.23. 
14 Charter of the United Nations, 1945 (hereafter referred to as the “UN Charter”). 
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of the varieties of methods of conflict prevention and management. In this section, I make a brief 
discussion of collective security systems from the inter-war period (during the League of Nations) 
through the UN period. Thereafter, the UN Charter-based mechanisms are discussed with an 
overview of the various preventive diplomacy dispute settlement methods provided for under the 
UN Charter.  The other conflict prevention and management mechanisms that developed outside, 
though closely connected to the UN Charter have also been discussed. In the final analysis, the 
effectiveness of the approaches in preventing and resolving contemporary intra-state conflicts is 
evaluated, followed by the conclusion. 
 
3.2 Development of the Concept of Conflict Prevention within the UN 
 
Conflict prevention is explicitly enshrined in the UN Charter, which refers to the need for “effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.”15 But during the Cold War rivalry period, little 
attention was paid to conflict prevention by the Security Council, the UN body charged with the 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace.16 As the Organization’s security mandate dealt only 
with threats to international peace and security, civil wars that did not threaten international peace 
and security were off the limits of the UN.17  Thus, not until the end the Cold War and the UN’s 
liberation from the debilitating ideological constraints of superpowers rivalry did the concept of 
conflict prevention begin to be taken seriously. Conflict prevention as a concept intensified in the 
1990s with the publication of an Agenda for Peace,18 whose approach was, however, far more 
limited in that it presented prevention as a policy largely restricted to preventive diplomacy.19 This 
remained as a package of measures to create confidence that required early warning based on 
information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding.20  Conflict prevention is now prevalent 
and relatively uncontested within the United Nations system.21 Its acceptance as a term of art comes 
after decades of debate after the end of the Cold War within the UN secretariat and among UN 
member states over appropriate international responses to civil wars and internal conflicts. The 
general result of this debate in the 1990s has been to shift conflict prevention from association with 
                                                 
15 Paragraph 1, Article 1 of the UN Charter. 
16 Price, R & Zacher, M (Eds.), (2004). The United Nations and Global Security, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 12. 
17 Ibid, p. 60. 
18 United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, New York, United 
Nations, para.23; Available also as UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111, June 17, 1992, available at  <http://www.un.org>, last 
visited, September 9, 2009. 
19 Preventive diplomacy is defined here as a range of peaceful dispute resolution methods mentioned in Article 33 of the 
UN Charter when applied before a dispute crosses its threshold to an armed conflict.  
20 See Price and Zacher, supra note 16, p. 60. 
21 United Nations, Prevention of Armed Conflict, supra note 2. 
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outside intervention (of the developed North in the global South) to emphasis on the responsibility 
of member states to manage potential conflict within their own borders.22  
   
Conflict prevention activities may range from diplomatic initiatives, through efforts designed to 
reform a country’s security sector and make it more accountable to democratic control, to 
preventive deployments of forces designed to prevent or contain disputes from escalating to armed 
conflicts. Other conflict prevention activities may include military operations, fact-finding missions, 
consultations, early warning, inspections and monitoring.23 
 
A further argument in this chapter is however not related to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
any of the conflict prevention activities; rather on the appropriateness of a particular approach for a 
particular conflict. For instance, Western model of conflict resolution promoted in the Africa’s 
Great lakes region is fundamentally flawed. It is inadequate in both its analysis of the causes and 
dynamics of contemporary armed conflicts in the region and in the prescription that follows this 
analysis. The emphasis in such models is placed in the assumption that the full imposition of liberal 
democracies and neo-liberal economic reforms offers the best chances for durable peace. Reviewing 
the peace processes in the Africa’s Great Lakes conflict, as exemplified by the situation in the DRC, 
it becomes clear that standard peace formula pushed by these models fail to address the complexity 
of politics in the Africa’s Great Lakes. The conduct of peace negotiations reinforces the view that 
the space of African politics is the preserve of the international actors, the domestic political elite 
and armed movements to the total exclusion of civil society.24  
Using examples of the conflicts and peace processes in the DRC, the chapter contends that 
contemporary global frameworks for conflict resolution that rest on the acceptance of neo-liberal 
political and economic models cannot lay the foundations for the conditions necessary for 
sustainable peace in the region. This necessitates the utilization of a more inclusive concept of 




                                                 
22 Cousens , E. ‘Conflict Prevention’ in Malone, D. M. (Ed.), (2004). The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to 
the 21st Century, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 101. 
23 Boutros-Ghali, B. (1995) An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General, New York: United Nations. 
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General. 
24 Daley, supra note 1. 
25 Ibid. 
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3.3 Methods of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
 
Throughout history, human communities have devised rules, customs and laws to serve as standards 
of conduct for their members, to keep their societies running smoothly and prevent conflicts. By 
complying with these rules, community members have been better able to anticipate and predict the 
conduct of other members. Thus, laws provided security for the community. As community evolved 
into states, so they too created rules to govern their relations with one another. These rules became 
the basis of international law.26  
 
3.3.1 Collective Security Systems 
 
The UN war-prevention role has often been called “collective security” although in practice the 
United Nations has been largely an adjunct to the operation of local and global balances of power. 
Before the United Nations, the most common security arrangement among independent political 
entities has been through alliances and balance of power.27 The balance of power system had 
weaknesses as a peacekeeping mechanism and did not always deter aggressors. In the years 
preceding 1914, moreover, the system had developed a rigidity of alignments that robbed it of the 
fluidity that theory–and apparently practice–require for the effective operation of the balance-of-
power mechanism.  
The task of finding a workable substitute for the balance of power went through tedious efforts,28 
culminating in the world’s first major attempt at a collective security through the League of Nations in 
1919. But the League’s collective security system was not any effective either. During the interwar 
period, no country was strong enough to defy all the others if the others were united. But the League 
members and the United States (as the major non-member) were not sufficiently convinced that every 
war anywhere was a threat to them. And certainly, they lacked commitment to use their combined 
force against any and every case of aggression, regardless of who the aggressor might be. The League 
Covenant did not require such a commitment.  
In short, the League collective security system did not work well because the disposition of members 
to view their own security as separable from that of others was reinforced by weak legal commitments 
and ineffective decision-making procedures. 
                                                 
26 Peck, supra note 10, p.164. 
27 Balance of power is the term usually applied to a system in which states relies on international alliances to promote 
their individual security interests. See further Riggs, R and Plano, J. (1988) The United Nations: International 
Organization and World Politics, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co, p. 123. 
28 On the various options tried in finding a workable universal security system, see Rigs and Plano, Ibid, p. 124. 
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An example given of the failure of the League of Nations to adhere to collective security is the 
Manchurian Crisis, when Japan occupied part of China (which was a League member). After two 
years of deliberation, the League passed a resolution condemning the invasion without committing 
the League's members to any action against it. The Japanese replied by quitting the League of 
Nations. This inaction by the League subjected it to criticisms that it was weak and concerned more 
with European issues (most leading members were European), and is considered by many to have 
encouraged, or at least to have not deterred, the aggression shown by the Axis powers leading to 
World War Two. 
The framers of the UN Charter retained the Collective Security concept of peace enforced by the 
community of nations. On paper, the Charter seemed a reasonable approach to collective security. It 
commits all its members to “avail to the Security Council armed forces, assistance and facilities, 
including rights of passage, necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.”29  
The capacity of the Security Council to take military action on its own initiative was dependent on 
the subsequent negotiation of the special agreement with member states to make standby military 
forces and facilities available at its call. Each such agreement required ratification by the states 
concerned according to their respective constitutional processes. 
However, no Article 43 agreement ever reached the ratification stage, because the major powers 
could not agree on the size and character of their respective national contributions or on where the 
units should be based. Hence, the broad Charter commitment to collective security under Article 43 
was never translated into a specific commitment to supply troops and material. Even in the only two 
instances (North Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1991) where collective security action under the UN 
auspices was taken; the actions were more voluntary than being Charter sanctioned.30 Despite the 
intent of the Charter, members retained the right to decide for themselves, according to the 
circumstances of each case, how their military forces should be used. If collective military action 
were to be taken at all, it would be on voluntary basis. Furthermore, during the Cold War era, 
collective security had little relevance to the dramatically worsening relations between the East and 
the West, to the extent that both sides resorted to military pacts–NATO and Warsaw Pact–as their 
first line of defence against each other. This was regarded by many as crushing defeat for the 
principles of the UN Charter and the concept of collective security in particular. 
A major lesson of more than sixty years of UN efforts to provide collective security and enforcement 
is that while international military action (in contrast to sanctions) should be authorized by the United 
                                                 
29 Article 43 (1) of the UN Charter. 
30 See discussions on the different speculations in Gray, C (2000), International Law Governing the Use of Force, 2nded, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 199. 
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Nations, the actual work of applying force is now subcontracted through alternative forms of global 
security systems. These include what has become known as “coalition of the willing” led by one or 
more major powers and resort to UN peacekeeping operations which is the subject of the next chapter. 
  
3.3.2 Types of Dispute Settlement 
 
In state practice in the 19th Century, war was often represented as a last resort as a method of 
resolving conflicts.31 Some might say that the prevailing view before the 2nd World War, and 
therefore before the UN Charter regime was that resort to war by states was permissible as a way of 
acquiring title to statehood through conquest.32 But this trend was denunciated even as early before 
the 2nd World War, as in the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War33 in which states 
condemned recourse to war for the resolution of international controversies.34 
Modern rules for the settlement of international disputes were developed from long ago. In 1899, 
rules on settlement of international disputes were codified at the Hague Peace Conference (on the 
basis of draft documents prepared by the International Law Institute in 1875 and the International 
Law Association in 1895).35 At the Second Hague Peace Conference (1907), the revised text of the 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was approved.36 Currently, 71 states 
are still bound by the 1899 or the 1907 Conventions.37  In 1928, the League of Nations adopted the 
Geneva General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,38 which was acceded to by 
19 States. In recent years, however, several states have revoked their acceptance. In 1949, the 
United Nations revised the formal clauses of the Act, but only eight states have acceded to this 
version of the document and its precise legal status remains unclear until today.39 
 
Additionally, there are a number of regional treaties related to the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
The American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes (1948) binds the members of the 
                                                 
31 Brownlie, I. (2003) Principles of Public International Law, oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 697. 
32 Thus, for instance, the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine by German Empire in 1871-1918 was not the object of a policy of 
non-recognition either by France or by third states; See further Brownlie, Ibid. 
33 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand Pact), Paris, 27 August 1928. 
34 See Article I of the General Treaty, Ibid, as quoted in Brownlie, supra note 31, p. 698. 
35 See the First Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 1 Bevans 
230, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 720, 187 Consol. T.S. 410, entered into force Sept. 4, 1900. 
36 Bevans 577; 2 AJIL Supp. 43 (1908). 
37 Ibid, p. 166. 
38 League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIII p. 343; for subsequent actions published in the League of 
Nations Treaty Series, see references in General Indexes Nos. 4 to 7 and 9, and for those published in the 
United Nations Treaty Series, see annex C in volumes 907 and 915. 
39 Vicuna, F. ‘The Settlement of Disputes and Conflict Resolution in a Revitalized Role for the United Nations Security 
Council. In Dupuy, R.J. (Ed.) (1993) The Development of the Role of the Security Council, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, p. 41-49. 
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Organization of American States. The 1957 European Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes binds members of the European Union. Likewise, the 1964 Protocol of the Commission of 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration became part of the Charter of the OAU and is therefore 
binding on all OAU (currently AU) members.40 There are also a myriad of multilateral and bilateral 
treaties with clauses for the settlement of any dispute arising under those treaties. 
Finally, the UN Charter regime on peaceful settlement of disputes was strengthened further when 
the General Assembly passed the 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of 
International Disputes41 and approved the 1988 Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of 
Disputes and Situations which May Threaten International Peace and Security and the Role of the 
United Nations in this Field.42 Nonetheless, most of these documents relating to the settlement of 
disputes were drafted at the time when international disputes, or rather inter-states disputes, were 
the most common types of disputes. It is therefore argued that there is a dire need for a new dispute 
settlement regime, which also clearly address internal or intra-states conflicts, which are prevalent 
today. 
 
The processes of solving problems relating to conflicts, whether in traditional inter-state disputes or 
in the nowadays far more common situations of intra-state conflicts, have invariably been referred 
to with different names depending on the contextual origin and scholarly disciplines. In any case, 
the language of the UN Charter does not embrace the term “conflict resolution” or “conflict 
prevention.” Except for the implied analogue of “the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace” under Article 1, such concepts seem alien to the Charter. Instead, the Charter refers to such 
terms as peaceful or pacific settlement of international disputes.43 With such a categorical reference 
to “international disputes,” one may be tempted to pose a question whether the drafters of the 
Charter had ever envisioned the application of the Charter-based conflict resolution methods to 
internal armed conflicts situations. By necessary implication, the answer is no since there are other 
provisions in the UN Charter prohibiting intervening in matters which are essentially within the 
                                                 
40 One of the principles of the OAU enshrined under Article 3 (4) of its Charter was the ‘peaceful settlement of disputes 
by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration. For that purpose, the Declaration on the establishment, within the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, adopted 
by the 29th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the OAU, held in Cairo, Egypt, 
from 28 to 30 June 1993.  See further the African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union, July 9, 2002, Durban South Africa, Available at <http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf>, last visited July 11, 2009. 
41 UN Doc A/RES/37/10  of November 15, 1982 
42 UN Doc. A/RES/43/51 of December 5, 1988. 
43 The whole Chapter VI of the UN Charter is devoted to this purpose of peaceful Settlement of international disputes. 
See also Articles III and XIX of the OAU Charter, 1963. 
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domestic jurisdiction of any state.44 Perhaps this explains the reasons for the invention of such 
modern peace-support terms as “preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding, peace 
enforcement and peacekeeping.”45 
Just as the sources and manifestations of conflicts are immensely varied,46 so too are the 
approaches to understanding, preventing and resolving them. Some scholars talk of reactive 
approaches, which presuppose that a conflict has already erupted and is going on, be it violent or 
non-violent, and a proactive approach, which is intended to resolve the conflict in a long term.47 
Included in this latter approach for instance is conflict prevention methods and peace building. Yet 
others distinguish conflict resolution approaches utilized by states from those utilized by non-state 
actors.48  Whereas states actions may include diplomacy, military or legal methods, non-state 
measures include the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary 
organizations in the fields of human rights, humanitarian assistance and economic and social 
development, among others.  
When analyzing the UN as a dispute settlement system, Peck discusses three general approaches to 
disputes identified in the conflict resolution literature: 1) a power-based approach; 2) a rights-based 
approach and 3) an interest-based approach.49 In the first approach, disputing parties attempt to 
determine who is most powerful through a power contest. In the worst scenario, this approach 
manifests itself in the form of war as its most obvious and extreme version, although less intense 
forms are also possible. The rights-based approach to conflict resolution (settlement) involves 
resolution based on a standard or normative principle commonly recognized by the parties 
concerned. Often, the legal system is used as a source of those norms. Rights-based approaches to 
conflict settlement may be found in both formal adjudication in courts and informal law (arbitration, 
                                                 
44 Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter states:  
“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter Vll.” 
45 See detailed description and distinction of and between each of these terms is to be found in United Nations, An 
Agenda For Peace, supra note 18.  See further discussions of these terms in Galtung, J. (Ed.), (1976), Peace, War and 
Defense: Essays in Peace Research, Vol.II, Copenhagen: Ejlers, p. 282. 
46Conflicts may be categorized as intrapersonal conflicts, interpersonal conflicts, group conflicts, organizational 
conflicts, community conflicts, intra-state or internal armed conflicts (for example civil war like the case of the DRC-
which is the subject of this study) and international conflicts. 
47 Mpangala, G and Mwansasu, B (Eds.) (2004), Beyond Conflict in Burundi, Dar es Salaam: The Mwalimu Nyerere 
Foundation, p.1. 
48 See this categorization in Creative Associates International. Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Guide for 
Practitioners. Washington, DC: Greater Horn of Africa Initiative and United States Agency for International 
Development, 1996. 
49 Peck, supra note 10, p.10. 
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and alternate dispute resolution). The International Court of Justice (ICJ/World Court, The Hague) 
and the newly created International Criminal Court (ICC) have been considered as fora for 
adjudication in conflicts related issues. The jurisdiction of the former deals with state disputes 
whereas the latter is the domain of individual indictments for human rights violations in the time of 
conflicts. In a rights-based approach, the parties try to determine who is right according to 
international law. Arguments and evidence are presented to prove that the other party was in breach 
of some agreed upon rules of international law, such as a treaty, convention or other accepted 
customary rules of international law. In an interest-based approach, parties attempt to reconcile their 
underlying interests by discovering solutions which will bridge their different needs, aspirations, 
fears or concerns in a manner that is satisfactory to both.  
Different organs of the UN focus roughly on each of the different approaches of dispute settlement 
referred to above. Good offices and mediation by the UN Secretary-General and his representatives 
appear to offer the most scope for the interest-based dispute settlement approach. The International 
Court of Justice has the most important role to play in the rights-based dispute settlement and the 
Security Council has a wide range of power-based procedures at its disposal. Figure 2 below shows 
these three approaches and other options open to disputing parties for the resolution of their 
disputes.  
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Figure 2: Major UN approaches to conflict resolution. (Adopted from Peck, p.14) 
 
 In most cases however, the three approaches above are related and interdependent. The 
reconciliation of interests takes place within the context of the parties’ rights and power.  Thus in 
the process of resolving a dispute, the focus may shift from interest, to right, to power and back 
again.50 
In summing up, figure 3 shows the full range of dispute settlement approaches. As the figure 
demonstrates, even though the UN is using a wider range of its dispute settlement repertoire, certain 
approaches, especially preventive diplomacy and pre-conflict peace-building, remain highly 
underdeveloped. A full spectrum of the activities in the peace and security area has been 
categorized as: 1) building peace (within states and by international organizations); 2) maintaining 
peace (preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment); 3) restoring peace (peacemaking and 
peacekeeping) and enforcing peace (sanctions and peace enforcement).51   Figure 4 makes the point 
that even now, the UN focuses most of its efforts on power-based methods in resolving conflicts. 
As it is suggested elsewhere in this work, a truly effective conflict prevention and management 
                                                 
50 Ibid, p. 11. 
51 See  Evans, G (1993), Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s, and Beyond, Allan and Unwind, 
Sydney. Evans in this book also provides a comprehensive analysis of each strategy, suggesting the circumstances 
under which each should be used and offers some extremely useful suggestions about how each could be improved. 
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mechanism would look like a pyramid to the right of this figure, focusing more on the rights-based 
methods of preventing and managing conflicts. It is thus argued that only when this approach fails, 
would efforts be spent on restoring peace, and as a means of last resort, on enforcing peace.52 
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Figure 4: Changing the emphasis of UN’s role in conflict resolution. (Adopted from Peck, p.18) 
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 Be that as it may, the mandate of the United Nations to engage in conflict prevention has 
been strongly established by the drafters of its Charter long ago. The cardinal mission of the 
organisation therefore remains “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”53 
To that end, Member States have committed themselves “to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace …”54 
 
3.3.2.1 The UN Charter-Based Mechanisms 
 
The Charter-based procedures for settling international disputes are catalogued in Article 33 
of the UN Charter, which states: 
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.55 
 As can be noted, the above Charter provision acknowledges the fact that the conflict 
resolution approaches mentioned therein are not exhaustive. Room is therefore left to “other 
peaceful means of their (states’) own choice.”56 It is not surprising therefore that other 
conflict settlement mechanisms, such as peacekeeping and good offices to be discussed later 
in this chapter have been developed over time and are currently in full use. But one of the 
conflict resolution theory states that to resolve any conflict, the set of available approaches that can 
be applied include coercion, mediation, arbitration, negotiation and adjudication.57 
 
Merrills58 has grouped the UN Charter-based means of dispute settlement into Diplomacy Methods 
(i.e. negotiation, inquiry, mediation and conciliation) on the one hand and Legal Methods (i.e. 
arbitration and judicial settlement of conflicts) on the other.  
Negotiation among parties to a dispute is as old as the state system and is the most common 
method of dispute settlement. It involves direct discussion by diplomatic representatives of 
                                                 
53 A pledge that was inserted in the Charter as a direct reaction to the effects of the 2nd World War. See the same issue 
stressed further in the Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the United Nations, Prevention of Armed 
Conflict, supra note 2 
54 See Article 1(1) of the UN Charter. 
55 All these techniques of dispute resolution were embodied in international law and practices well before the advent of 
the United Nations, and the Charter merely recognized their existence and encouraged their use.  
56 UN Charter, Article 33. 
57 Schellenberg, J. (1996) Conflict Resolution Theory, Research, and Practice, Albany: State University of New York 
Press, p. 9. 
58 Merrills, J. ‘The Means of Dispute Settlement, in Evans, M. (Ed.)(2003), International Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 531; See further Peck, supra note 10.  
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the parties to the dispute, for purposes of reaching an agreement on matters at issue. But 
negation is only possible if the parties to the dispute are ready and willing to deal with each 
other. In situations of serious conflicts where no possibilities exist to make the parties 
negotiate, other methods may be the best option. 
    
Inquiry, as a term of art, is used in two distinct, but related senses. In the broader sense it refers to 
the process that is performed whenever a court or other body endeavours to resolve a disputed issue 
of fact. In another sense, which is our present concern, inquiry refers to a specific institutional 
arrangement, which disputing parties may select in preference to arbitration or other techniques, 
because they desire to have some disputed issue independently investigated. In its institutional sense 
then, inquiry refers to a particular type of international tribunal known as the commission of inquiry 
and introduced by the 1899 Hague Convention.59 Although it is not mandatory that the parties 
accept the findings of the inquiry, they usually do. The inquiry is limited to findings of fact 
and does not include proposed terms of settlement.60  
 
Good offices (not mentioned in Article 33) is the name given to friendly assistance rendered 
by a third-party for the purpose of bringing disputants together so that they may seek to reach 
a settlement. Good offices may be rendered by a state, a group of states, or even an individual 
of international standing such as the UN Secretary-General. The third-party representative 
meets each disputant separately but may, with consent convey messages between them. 
Technically, good offices are limited to facilitating negotiation by the states directly 
concerned and do not include discussion of substantive issues. The method is particularly 
useful where the disputing parties have broken off diplomatic relations or where negotiations 
have been interrupted and neither side takes the initiative to resume them, out of pride or out 
of fear that such action would be an indication of weakness. 
 
Mediation occurs when a third party actively participates in the discussion of substantive 
issues and offers proposals for settlement. If the disputants are not speaking, the mediator 
may also render good offices as a prelude to mediation. A mediator may meet with the parties 
                                                 
59 See Article 9 of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes 1899, which states: “In differences of an 
international nature involving neither honor nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on points of 
fact, the Signatory Powers recommend that the parties, who have not been able to come to an agreement by means of 
diplomacy, should as far as circumstances allow, institute an International Commission of Inquiry, to facilitate a 
solution of these differences by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation.” 
60 As most disputes hinge on disputed questions of fact, inquiry may be means of lowering tensions as well as reducing 
the area of disagreement between the disputants.  
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either separately or jointly and is expected to maintain an attitude of impartiality throughout. 
He can expect little success unless he enjoys the confidence of all parties. His proposals are 
suggestions only, with no binding force on any party. Disputants are of course free to reject 
an offer to mediate.61 The most important elements of a successful mediation are neutrality and 
legitimacy on the part of the mediator. And it has been argued that; “the assurance of neutrality in 
mediation creates the necessary perception of mediator legitimacy, professionalism, and fairness… 
the third party is not connected to either disputant, is not biased towards either side, has no 
investment in any outcome except settlement, and does not expect any special reward from either 
side.”62 
Conciliation63 is a procedure for settling a dispute by referring it to a commission, or occasionally a 
single conciliator, charged to examine the facts and recommend a solution that the parties are free to 
accept or reject.  Conciliation is more formal and less flexible than mediation. Whereas mediation is 
a continuing process of assisting negotiations among parties to a dispute, conciliation involves 
formal submission of the dispute to a conciliation body in anticipation of a final report containing 
the conciliator’s findings and recommendations for settlement. The boundaries between the two 
tend to be blurring in practice because the conciliator usually confers informally with the parties, 
hoping to find an area of agreement. Moreover, in the United Nations parlance, the terminology of 
mediation, conciliation and good offices is frequently used without careful reference to the legal 
distinctions among them. Thus the UN conciliator may in reality be a mediator who also finds it 
necessary to render good offices and never has occasion to publish a formal recommendation for a 
settlement.  
Another view is that conciliation is closer to inquiry in many senses. Conciliation puts third-party 
intervention on a formal legal footing and institutionalizes it in a way comparable, but not identical 
to inquiry. The function of the conciliation commission is to provide information and advice as to 
the merits of the parties’ positions and to suggest a settlement that corresponds to what they 
deserve, not what they claim. This approach reflects the historical link between conciliation and the 
procedure for enlarged inquiry. 
                                                 
61 Riggs, R and Plano, J. (1988) The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics, California: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Co, p.187. 
62Bercovitch, J. (Ed.,) (1996), Resolving International Conflicts–The Theory and Practice of Mediation, London: Lynne 
Reimer, p.57. 
63 It has also been defined as an intervention to resolve an international dispute by a body without  
political  authority  that  has  the  trust  of  the  parties  involved  and  is 
responsible for examining all aspects of the dispute and proposing a solution that is not binding for the Parties. See 
Mollel, A. (2007).  ‘Judicial Settlement of Armed Conflicts in International Law: Reflecting the 2005 International 
Court of Justice Decision in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ in Nordic Journal of international Law, 76(4), pp. 407-
434. 
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Arbitration64 is a procedure by which disputants agree to submit a controversy to judges of their 
own choice, who render a legally binding decision based on the principles of international law. 
Commonly each side names one or two arbitrators, and those two or four designate one additional 
arbitrator to complete the panel. The essential characteristics of arbitration are (1) free choice of 
judges (arbitrators), (2) respect for international law, and (3) obligation to comply with the award. 
The parties frequently stipulate in the arbitral agreement (compromis) the particular rules of law or 
equity, or even special rules, that are to be applied. The parties are relieved of their obligations to 
accept or carry out the award only if the arbitrator disregarded instructions in the compromis. 
Arbitration is at least as old as the Greek city-states, and within the modern state systems it enjoyed 
a substantial renaissance during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Since 1994, arbitration 
has been used extensively in resolving trade and investment disputes but less frequently in resolving 
political disputes between states. One notable recent example is the U.S-Iran agreement to arbitrate 
claims arising out of the hostage crisis.65 Many modern treaties include a provision that 
controversies arising out of the interpretation or application of the treaty shall be resolved by 
arbitration.66  The other most notable modern example is under the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention, which relies more on arbitration as the dispute settlement mechanism. 
Judicial Settlement or Adjudication, like arbitration produces a legally binding award or judgment 
based on rules of international law. Unlike arbitration, however, the parties for their particular case 
do not choose the judges, but are members of the pre-constituted international tribunal. Settlement 
of disputes by international courts based on voluntary acceptance by the parties is made possible 
either through advance agreement to accept the jurisdiction of the court in special types of cases or 
through agreement at the time the dispute is submitted.67 The same is generally true of arbitration. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its predecessor the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) are principal examples of judicial bodies for the settlement of disputes at the global 
level. The role of adjudication in the resolution of disputes is limited in several ways.68 Decisions 
have generally been carried out, but no effective means have been available to enforce Court 
decisions against a few recalcitrants that have ignored their obligation to comply. Noncompliance is 
most common in cases involving controversies over the Court’s jurisdiction.  
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
65 Iran-US Settlement of the Hostage Crisis: Jan. 1981, US-Iran. 20 I.L.M. 223 (hereinafter referred to as the Iran-
United States): Background Information: Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, IRAN-US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, 
available at <http://www.iusct.org/background-english.html> last visited, September 8, 2009. 
66 Such arbitration clauses, as are famously referred to, are worded thus: “any dispute, controversy or claim arising out 
of or relating this contract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration.” 
67 See Article 36 of the ICJ Statute. 
68 Mollel, supra note 63, p. 415. 
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However, the weaknesses and limitations of the international adjudicatory system as a whole, and 
its jurisdictional limitations in armed conflicts situations in particular have been pointed as main 
shortcomings of the legal approach to dispute settlement.69 These matters, and many others relating 
to adjudication as a conflict resolution mechanism, will be dealt with in more details under chapter 
five of this study. 
Although in theory the UN Charter provides for a range of dispute settlement procedures, in 
practice it has never been able to fully develop an effective dispute settlement mechanism. Many 
disputes, both international and internal, have gone unresolved and others have only been addressed 
when it was too late to stop their escalation into fully- blown conflicts.70 Arguably, the weaknesses 
and limitations of each of the above methods and the UN in general in resolving contemporary 
internal armed conflicts make it imperative to resort to other non-Charter based approaches to 
conflict resolution.71 
 
3.3.2.2 Non-Charter-Based Mechanisms 
 
The non-Charter-based conflict resolution mechanisms presuppose a number of alternative conflict 
settlement actions which are not expressly provided for under the UN Charter. The actions and 
activities considered here are not necessarily totally outside the indirect Charter mandates, but they 
are referred so only for academic analysis on the basis that they are not expressly provided for 
under the UN Charter. Some of these actions and activities have, by all indications, led to 
multilateralism being besieged in the recent years. Other choices have then developed in the form of 
unilateralism, bilateralism, regionalism or such disguised devises as ‘coalitions of the willing.’ It is 
nobody’s argument that these choices are exclusive or that they cannot be used together. The 
argument rather is on the legality and appropriateness. And even where such actions may be 
considered legal, as argued by some scholars,72 the other concern is which one will prevail in the 
situation of a conflict between them.  The obvious answer, if one goes by the letter and spirit of the 
UN Charter, is multilateralism.  Moreover, multilateralism is not an option, but an inevitable 
product of evolutionary process, which represents a high level of organising human society into an 
international world community. Any retreat from it amounts to chaos wherever hegemony of power 
prevails, as with such cases in the recent past, as the Iraqi one.  Unilateralism is a blatant form of 
such a retreat, and so is the long discredited concept of ‘coalition of the willing.’ 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
70 See the cases of Somalia (1992 / 93), Bosnia (1992 / 93) and even the recent Israeli-Palestine conflict. 
71 Ibid  
72 Wilson, J. (2007).  ‘The Legal, Military and Political Consequences of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ Approach to UN 
Military Enforcement Action’ Journal of Conflict and Security Law, vol. 12, No.2, pp. 295–330. 
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However, with the clearly diminishing efficacy of the UN as a principal world legitimiser,73 as 
viewed in the aftermath of its debacles in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda,74 non-Charter based 
approaches to conflict prevention and management have emerged. The UN Charter envisaged a 
centralized system of collective security in which the UN Security Council would have readily 
available forces of its own for the purpose of taking military enforcement action under its own 
authority and control.75 These forces were never created, and the Security Council has had to rely 
heavily upon authorising willing coalitions of states to take action on its behalf. Although such an 
approach to military enforcement action is said to be legally permissible, it gives rise to a series of 
consequences of a legal, military and political nature that call into question the extent to which it 
provides the Council with an effective means of exercising its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.  
 
Thus, besides unilateralism and other illegitimate means of resolving disputes, various other 
approaches to conflict resolution and management have been favoured. Included are the approaches 
to peace as early proposed by Galtung,76 namely, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement 
and peace-building.   
 
Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves 
diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. The United Nations Secretary-
General, upon the request of the Security Council or the General Assembly or at his own initiative, 
may exercise “good offices” to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be 
envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations. Peacemaking 
efforts may also be under-taken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by a prominent 
personality working independently. 
 
                                                 
73 Term preferred in Martin, A. (2005). ‘The Contribution of Critical Theory to the New Thinking of Peacekeeping: 
Some Lessons from MINURSO’ Working Paper No.15, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, 
University of Bradford. 
74Peck, supra note 10, p. vii.  
75 Article 43 (1) of the UN Charter states: 
All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, 
undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or 
agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security. 
76 Galtung, supra note 45, pp. 282–304. 
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Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has 
been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. The concept of 
peacekeeping, which is the subject of the next chapter, is not one of the Charter-based-based 
approaches to conflict prevention and management. However, Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN 
Secretary-General, referred to it as belonging to "Chapter Six and a Half" of the Charter, placing it 
between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as negotiation and mediation 
under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under Chapter VII. Over the years, 
peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the 
separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – 
military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace, in 
the aftermath of intra-state conflicts. 
 
Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into 
conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the 
foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peace-building is a complex, long-term process 
of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, 
structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peace-building measures address 
core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of 
the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions. 
As peace-building has become and is likely to remain one of the primary challenges facing the 
United Nations membership,77 a more detailed discussion of the mechanism is worthwhile. Coined 
in the 1970s by Johan Galtung,78 peace-building gained significant currency in the 1990s, when UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined post-conflict peace-building as “action to identify 
and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse 
into conflict”.79 The United Nations continues to situate peace-building squarely in the realm of 
post-conflict recovery,80 contrary to the view of many scholars and practitioners, who assert that 
peace-building has as much to do with prevention as recovery.81 
                                                 
77 See this elaborated in the United Nations System in the New Millennium: Fostering Substantive and Operational 
Linkages in the Implementation of Peace, UN Doc. S/2001/1054 of November 7, 2001, p. 3 
78 Galtung, supra note 45, pp. 284–302. 
79 United Nations, An Agenda for Peace, supra note 18, para. 21. For a comprehensive review of how 24 governmental 
and intergovernmental bodies conceptualize peacebuilding, see Barnett, M., Kim, H., O’Donnell, M., and Sitea, L. 
(2007), ‘Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?’, Global Governance, vol. 13, no. 1, January–March, pp. 35–58. 
80 See this assertion in Price and Zacher, supra note 16, p. 153. 
81 Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis view peacebuilding as fostering the “social, economic, and political 
institutions and attitudes that will prevent … conflicts from turning violent. In effect, peacebuilding is the front line of 
preventive action.”  Doyle, M and Sambanis, N.  (2000), ‘International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative 
Analysis’, American Political Science Review, vol. 94, no. 4, p. 779; Charles Call and Susan Cook refer to 
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Despite the daunting and largely unmet challenges of the post conflict state-building project, the 
concept of peace-building has been expanded further to include a wide variety of projects aimed 
more at host populations and ‘civil society’ than at the organs of state. Peace-building is now seen 
to include activities such as the facilitation of interaction among former enemies, the inculcation of 
respect for human rights and political pluralism, and the accommodation of ethnic and cultural 
diversity.  
Though a non-Charter based Mechanism for conflict resolution, the peace-building norm in the UN 
system was crowned by the UNSC when it established its definition in February 2001:  
…peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of 
armed conflict and therefore encompass a wide range of political, developmental, 
humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms.82  
This requires short and long term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding 
into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable institutions 
and processes in areas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, 
transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and 
the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence. 
 
Problems arise because peace-building as a post-conflict management mechanism is faced with a 
number of conceptual criticisms and practical limitations. First, peace-building may have a serious 
conceptual flaw as it is built on the premise that political and economic liberalization will promote 
stability and consolidate peace.83 As Roland Paris has argued, peace-building is in effect an 
enormous experiment in social engineering--an experiment that involves transplanting Western 
models of social, political and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control 
civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization.84 Ironically, 
the liberal economic model can widen inequalities, create economic dislocation, and consolidate the 
power of those who benefited from black market activities during the conflict. At the same time, 
political liberalization can reinforce and entrench political differences and divide peoples, as is the 
case in the DRC, Bosnia and Kosovo where nationalist parties gained office in UN-supervised 
elections.85  
                                                                                                                                                                  
peacebuilding as “efforts to transform potentially violent social relations into sustainable peaceful relations and 
outcomes.” Call, C and Cook, S.  (2003), ‘On Democratisation and Peacebuilding’, Global Governance, vol. 9, No. 2, 
p. 240. 
82 UN Doc. S/PRST/2001/5 February 20, 2001. 
83 Price and Zacher, supra note 16, p. 147. 
84Paris, R. (1997). ‘Peacebuilding and Limits of Liberal Internationalism’ International Security, vol. 22, No. 2, p. 56. 
85 Price and Zacher, supra note 16. 
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A second challenge confronting peace-building is its own legitimacy.86 In the first place, there is 
concern that peace-building can entail the imposition of foreign ways. Local economic patterns, 
local civil society, and traditional mechanisms of conflict management and the leadership may be 
overshadowed or disrupted by peace-building activities. In Somalia for instance, UN efforts largely 
ignored local conflict management mechanisms in favour of a more formal diplomatic model. The 
process was only marginally successful and served to undermine pre-existing instruments of 
mediation and negotiation. A second legitimacy question relates to the general marginalization of 
the developing world. Peace-building is viewed by some as a component of a larger agenda of 
western political and economic supremacy: “Peace-building in this context becomes an inherently 
conservative understanding, seeking managerial solutions to fundamental conflicts over resources 
and power, seeking to modernize and re-legitimize a fundamental status quo respectful, reinforcing, 
and reflective of national and international market-oriented political economy.87 Developing 
countries are frequently suspicious of peace-building, regarding it as another manifestation of 
western interventionism and cultural imperialism. Opposition also stems from the view that peace-
building will draw resources away from development efforts and marginalize the role of local 
societies in establishing a peace free from external interference by Western states, international 
organizations, and multinational corporations. 
 
A third challenge facing peace-building efforts is the sheer magnitude of the task. Post-conflict 
societies often lack effective institutions of governance, have massive human security problems, 
and face enormous development challenges. In many cases, conflicts are frozen by external 
intervention and are prone to resumption if one or more parties believe military victory is possible. 
This problem is exacerbated if there is a fragmented political authority in the society, if there is 
social opposition to peace-building activities, or if there are significant social elements or local 
leaders with an economic or political stake in the continuation of conflicts. 
 
A fourth challenge facing peace-building efforts is presented by the divergent interests and agendas 
of participating states. At a political level, peace-building missions are subject to UNSC approval 
and mandate renewal and are therefore vulnerable to bargaining and shifting political alignments 
among the members of the Council. This can lead to vague or unsuitable mandates, which provide 
                                                 
86 Sens, A. (2004). ‘From Peacekeeping to Peace-building: The United Nations and the Challenges of Intrastate War’ in 
Price and Zacher, supra note 16, p. 147. 
87 See Alejandro, B. (2003). ‘What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Critical Assessment from the South’ in What Kind of  
Peace is Being Built? Reflections on the State of Peace-building Ten Years After the Agenda for Peace, Working Paper 
No. 7, The Peace-building and Reconstruction Program Initiative, Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 
p.5.   
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poor guidance for operational tasks, a problem that plagued UN missions in Somalia, the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
 
The fifth challenge is the nature of the UN system itself. Just as the case with peacekeeping, there is 
no clear institutional home for peace-building in the UN, and because the activities of peace-
building cut across the mandates and activities of so many parts of the UN system, there is a 
pressing need for coordination among secretariat departments, UN agencies, and non-UN actors. 
The responsibilities for peace-building therefore remain scattered on such autonomous UN 
organisations as the UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNDP etc, over which the UN secretariat has little or 
no control.88 Following recommendations from the Brahimi Report,89 leading to a review of peace-
building support offices in 2001, a Plan of Action on Peace-building was developed to establish 
general guidelines on ways to coordinate peace-building efforts more effectively within the UN 
system. 
 
A sixth challenge facing the implementation of peace-building efforts is the fact that in many 
contingencies, the UN is not the only or even the primary external actor. The proliferation of NGOs 
and the increasing relevance of regional organizations and the international financial institutions 
exacerbate this challenge.  
Summing up on the obstacles and practical limitations to peace-building, Allen Sens concludes that 
peace-building remains a work in progress, and although formidable obstacles must be overcome, it 
will endure as long as responses to intrastate conflicts demand the restoration of civil order and the 
prospects for a peaceful future.90 
 
3.4 Evaluating the Effectiveness of the UN Approaches to Conflict Resolution 
 
The United Nations was formed in 1945 with the mandate to “save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”91 The 
organization was thus structured by its designers to avoid the pitfalls that led to the demise of its 
predecessor, the League of Nations. Hence, under the UN Charter, the primary purpose of the 
United Nations is described: 
                                                 
88 Sens, supra note 86. 
89 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, popularly called the Brahimi Report, UN Doc. A/55/305-
S/2000/809, August 17,2000. Available at <http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations >, last visited, 
September 8, 2009. 
90 Sens, supra note 86, p. 153.  
91 Para 1 of Preamble to the UN Charter. 
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To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for 
the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.92 
By assessing its past performance, however, it is difficult to conclude that the UN is successfully 
meeting these expectations. Initially, the breakout of the Cold War made it virtually impossible for 
the UN to be effectively engaged in its core task of maintaining international peace and security. 
The end of the Cold War was therefore to have introduced an era of peace with an emphasis on a 
stronger multilateralism towards global security.93 However, these expectations were soon found to 
have been misplaced. Despite a new thrust on multilateralism heralded by the United Nations, the 
organisation is often accused of being ineffective in settling conflicts, preventing genocide, and 
other crimes against humanity. The failure of the UN to prevent human suffering in both the 
relatively old cases of Somalia (1992 / 93), Bosnia (1992 / 93), Rwanda (1994), the Iraqi war on 
weapons of mass destruction (2003) as well as in those considered as recent events like the UN’s 
delayed response to Darfur crisis, its impotence in South-Ossetia and its failure to stop the recent 
invasion of Israel into Gaza Palestine, have demonstrated the limits of the UN’s ability to prevent 
and manage violent conflicts wherever they occur.  Ineffective performance of the UN, especially in 
crisis prevention, has caused great frustration, contributing to the growing image of an impotent UN 
among its opponents. As David Kopel criticizes: “waiting for the United Nations to act is often just 
as futile as waiting for Godot, and hundreds of thousands or millions of people die while waiting”94 
Both in Rwanda and in Bosnia, the UN failed to prevent genocide from taking place. In each case 
there was plenty of warning of the forthcoming mass killings, but the UN mishandled both of them. 
Two reports examining these cases assume a high profile and could have a big impact on future 
policy-making in conflict prevention and conflict management within the UN.95 
 
In the case of Rwanda, the inadequate resources and the major countries’ absence of political will 
were the underlying causes of failure. The report sums up that the UN presence in Rwanda was not 
                                                 
92 Article 1 of the UN Charter. 
93 See O’Neill, J & Rees, N. (2005), United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, New York, Routledge, p. 
1. 
94 Kopel, D, Gallant, Paul & Eisen, J. (2006). ‘Is Resisting Genocide a Human Right?’ The Nortre Dame Law Review 
vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 101-169 at p. 162. 
95 United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into United Nations actions during the 1994 Rwanda Genocide, 
UN Doc. S/1999/1257,December 16, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rwanda Report”), and United Nations, 
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica (hereinafter 
referred to as “the Srebrenica Report”), UN Doc. A/54/549, November 15 1999. 
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planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed in a way that provided for a proactive and assertive 
role in dealing with a peace process in serious trouble.96 The mission lacked well-trained troops, 
functioning material and military capacity. The seriousness of strong political commitments was 
made worse by the unilateral withdrawal of the national contingents during crucial moments of the 
unfolding crisis.97  In the case of Srebrenica, with the lack of commitments by outside powers to an 
effective resolution of the war in Bosnia, a consensus absent in the Council, lacking a strategy, and 
burdened by an unclear mandate, UNPROFOR was forced to chart its own course.98 
 
It becomes clear that the peace implementers should be able to continually adjust mission mandates, 
rules of engagement, troop strength and military capacities of peace missions to changing realities 
on the ground. The Rwanda mandate changed in nature from Chapter VI to Chapter VII of the 
Charter at a stage of the conflict when it would still have been possible to stop the genocide. But 
UNAMIR II failed, in the final analysis, because of the unwillingness of UN member States to 
provide troops for it. Two months after the Security Council agreed to the mission, UNAMIR II still 
only had 550 troops instead of 5,500. In the case of Srebrenica, after the Security Council had 
established the safe areas, the force commander requested 34,000 troops, but finally had to settle for 
a light option with a minimal troop reinforcement of around 7,600 that was to be defended, if 
necessary, by NATO air strikes.99 
 
In its recommendations, the Rwanda Report points prominently to the need to improve the early 
warning capacity. It argues that it is essential to improve the ability of the UN Secretariat to analyse 
and respond to information about possible conflicts, and its operational capability for preventive 
action. In this context, the report suggests that further enhancement of the cooperation between 
different Secretariat departments, agencies and outside actors, including regional and sub regional 
organizations, NGOs and the academic world, is essential.100 The Report presented to the 
Millennium Summit of the General Assembly in September 2000 internalizes the lessons from 
                                                 
96 Rwanda Report, Ibid, p. 21. 
97 By its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 the UNSC adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR, Expressing its deep 
concern also for the safety and security of UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel. Parallel to that, the UN cut its 
forces in the UNAMIR from 2,500 to 250 following murder of ten Belgian soldiers assigned to guard the moderate 
Hutu Prime Minister, Agathe Uwiliyingimana.  
98 Srebrenica Report, supra note 4, p. 17. 
99United Nations Protection Force, UN Department of Public Information, September 1996, see 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
100  Rwanda Report, supra note 90 p. 41. 
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Rwanda, Srebrenica and other conflicts where the UN has missed opportunities for conflict 
prevention and management.101 
 
Furthermore, several problems currently exist related to the UN's preventive capacity.  First, the 
Security Council is already overwhelmed by armed conflicts, and is largely unable to deal with 
potential new crises.   As Peck points out, although both the UN Charter and the 1988 Declaration 
on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International 
Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field,102 urge the UN to become 
involved ‘early in a dispute or situation’ or ‘at any stage of a dispute or situation,’ the fact is that 
most disputes do not reach the Security Council’s agenda until they have escalated into armed 
conflict.103  
A second problem, common to all multilateral organizations, is that ultimately the decision for 
action rests with member states that act in accordance–or at least not contrary to their national 
interests. Security Council decisions to intervene are often more dependent upon the domestic 
imperatives of the dominant powers, particularly members of the permanent five, rather than on 
agreed upon normative criteria.104   The unwillingness of these states to support action, whether 
directly or indirectly through authorization for regional organizations limits the ability of the UN 
and other actors to undertake collective action.  
  
A third problem is that some of these weaknesses are natural and inevitable. In almost 64 years 
since the UN was formed, the nature and location of armed conflicts has changed. It is no longer 
wars of the type envisaged in the Charter that occupy the attention of diplomats and militaries; 
rather than wars between states, we are seeing more and more violent conflicts located within state 
borders. The UN was not set up to deal with the complexities and controversies associated with 
maintaining peace and security within the borders of nation states.105 
 
Thus the UN Secretary General has noted that perhaps the most delicate kind of preventive 
diplomacy is that which seeks to bring about reconciliation between antagonistic political forces 
                                                 
101United Nations, Millennium Assembly’s Challenge: Put Summit Commitments into Action, 
Says General Assembly President, as General Debate Concludes, UN Doc. UNIS/GA/1701 September 25, 2000. 
102 UN Doc. A/RES/43/51 of December 5, 1988.                               
103 Peck, supra note 10, p.70. 
104 Weiss, G. (1996). ‘Collective Spinelessness: UN Actions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,’ in Ullman, R. 
((Ed.), The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, p. 62. 
105One of the Principles of the UN as listed under Article 2 (3) requires Member states …to settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means… Reference to “International disputes” is, by necessary implication exclusion of non-
international disputes, including civil wars. Refer also to Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. 
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within a country, in the hope of preventing or resolving conflicts, which, if left to escalate, might in 
time become a direct threat to international peace and security.106 Due to the prohibition on 
intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, any outside initiative to assist in the 
resolution of disputes between parties must be invited by the state party, and accepted by both 
parties.107 This is often complicated by unwillingness on the part of the state to recognize opposition 
forces in a particular conflict.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the various approaches to conflict prevention, 
management and resolution; and to determine their effectiveness or otherwise, in preventing and 
resolving the currently prevailing intra-state conflicts like those in the DRC. The chapter examined 
the historical perspective of the concept of conflict prevention within the UN and various methods 
of conflict prevention and management. A wide range of dispute settlement options, both the UN 
Charter-based and non- Charter-based mechanisms were highlighted.  
The evaluation of the effectiveness of these approaches reveals that both at the time of the Cold 
War and even thereafter, only a very limited part of their potential is used. The approaches to 
conflict resolution under the UN dispute settlement system were drastically curtailed by the all-
consuming bipolar power-struggle, which developed between the East and the West; and the reign 
of terror, which was brought on by the production and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The UN’s 
major organs with dispute settlement potential were all constrained in what was perfectly within the 
capacity and mandates.    
 
Following the end of the Cold War, the UN began to utilize a wider range of alternative disputes 
settlement mechanisms and strategies not necessarily provided for under the UN Charter. Thus there 
is a significant increase in the use of peacemaking, peacekeeping, sanctions and peace-building. 
Preventive diplomacy however, continued to be largely neglected, despite the fact that it was more 
frequently mentioned as central to the UN dispute settlement system. 
                                                 
106 Annual Report, 1998. p.39. 
107Vogt points out that sovereign authority over purely internal political and social situations is increasingly challenged:  
“The pressure for the review of the constraint in intervening by regional and international organizations in internal 
security situations will likely increase in importance and urgency as it is becoming apparent that internal conflicts will 
likely increase…” See Vogt, M ‘Alternative Strategies for Conflict Resolution’ in Vogt, M and Ekoko, E. (Eds.), 
(1992). Nigeria in International Peacekeeping 1960-1992. Lagos: Malthouse Press, Ltd., p. 320. Although at present 
this challenge is occurring primarily in the realm of Chapter VIII enforcement mechanisms, it seems more logical that 
non-forcible intervention would be more acceptable and in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter than 
military action.  This may ultimately require orienting the entire framework of peace-related activities in the 
international system towards the cultivation of democratic systems of governance, arms reduction, and sustainable 
development. 
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The discussion in this chapter indicates that even long after the end of the Cold War, institutional, 
practical and many other limitations continue to hamper the effectiveness of the UN as world’s 
dispute settlement system as demonstrated by failure to prevent or resolve a number of ongoing 
intra-state conflicts. Indeed, success and failure of the UN in conflict resolution determine the 
different conflict resolution approaches to be adopted by the international community. The 
weakness in dealing effectively with conflict within the UN has created a loophole for lawlessness 
within the international community, with the current prevailing unilateralism, including the concept 
of coalitions of the willing which is slowly replacing the requirement that actions relating to 
international peace and security be done with authorization of the UN. Of course, my argument 
does not imply that the UN is completely inactive to resolve full-blown conflict or to ameliorate 
suffering of victims, but the fact that this is the least opportune moment for intervention means that 
there has been a major flaw in the system.    
 
Various conflict resolution researches have come up with a number of proposals for the 
improvement of the UN conflict prevention and management systems.108  Besides the emphasis on 
resort to less confrontational non-charter based mechanisms, some of the proposed changes involve 
the development of new mechanisms. In Figure 3 above, for instance, parts of the existing system 
which have a role to play in international and intra-state disputes are shown.  
 
Some of the new mechanisms, which might be created to augment the system, are presented in 
Figure 4.  The strengthening of a human rights approach to conflict prevention and management, 
which is indicative of figure 4 above, is discussed in details in Chapter 6 of this work. It should be 
noted however, that some of the proposals require sound financial basis and dramatic increase in the 
UN budget. 
Throughout this discussion, it is also noted that the UN Charter-based conflict resolution methods 
were designed to deal with international conflicts and not internal armed conflicts situations. It 
might be opportune time to think of a new conflict resolution regime that takes into account the 
latter situation.  In the mean time, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, and other peaceful 
means including a human rights approach to conflict resolution as discussed in subsequent chapters 
of this work, is ideal. 
 
                                                 
108 One more strongly emphasized proposal relates to the establishment of UN Conflict Prevention and Resolution 
Centers. For a detailed discussion on this proposal, see Peck, supra note 10, pp. 150–163. 
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4 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT 
AND RESOLUTION: A FOCUS ON THE MONUC  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Peacekeeping has long been treated as an instrument of conflict management, and it has played a 
critical role in managing conflicts in Africa, Asia, Central America, and Europe.1 Despite the 
dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping operations deployed in efforts to resolve the 
outstanding conflicts around the world, the method is fundamentally flawed in that it usually fails to 
address the underlying causes of conflicts.2 
This chapter analyses peacekeeping as one of the major conflict resolution methods applied in 
resolving the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts.3 I will focus on its capacity as a tool for conflict 
resolution, paying particular attention to the dual goal of containing violence on the one hand and 
furthering peace-building efforts on the other. While it is recognize, of course, that peacekeeping 
                                                 
1 Since 1945, the UN has undertaken 61 field missions, participated in the implementation of 172 peaceful settlements 
that have ended regional conflicts, and enabled people in more than 45 countries to take part in free and fair elections. 
See also Thakur, R. and Schnabel, A. (Eds.). (2001). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad hoc Missions, 
Permanent Engagement, New York/Tokyo: The United Nations University, p. 3. Though with different approaches, 
peacekeeping as an ad hoc method of managing various conflicts was applied long ago, (e.g. the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization (UNTSO) which has served in supervising the observe of the truce in Palestine since 1948; 
the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) which has been deployed in the border 
between India and Pakistan since 1949, when Kashmir became a battlefield after the independence of India and 
Pakistan from Britain in August 1947). The Security Council resolved on 20 January 1948 (Resolution 39) to establish a 
United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP), consisting of member states mainly for the purpose of 
mediating between the two parties. Seven new missions were established later, with four of them being observer 
missions. First was the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL, 1958). In response to complaint by 
Lebanon that the United Arab Republic was instigating a revolt in Lebanon, UNOGIL was established by the Security 
Council under Resolution 128 of 11 June 1958 with a mandate to ensure that there be no illegal infiltration of personnel 
or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders. Although the concept of peacekeeping was not yet 
used then, this trend continued later with actual and more robust UN peacekeeping operations that followed, including 
the 1963 ONUC for Congo, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM, 1963-64) which was 
established by Security Council Resolution 179 of 11 June 1963, its mandate being, in accordance with the 
disengagement agreement between the United Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, to verify Egyptian withdrawals 
and cessation of Saudi arms aid to the Royalists of Yemen, to the most current ones like the MONUC in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.  
2 See the challenges leveled against peacekeeping and its failure as a conflict resolution method in the following works: 
Price, R. and Zacher, M. (Eds.) (2004). United Nations and Global Security, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 147; 
Charters, A. (1994). Peacekeeping and the Challenges of the Civil Conflict Resolution, Frederiction: University of New 
Brunswick, Center for Conflict Resolution; Fortna, V. (2004). ‘Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International 
Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War’. International Studies Quarterly, vol. 48, No.2, pp.  269–292.; 
Wainhouse, D. (1973). International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 
122; Bratt, D. (1996).‘Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations,’ in International Peacekeeping, vol.3 
No. 4, pp. 64-81, among others. 
3 Although in May 2004, the Security Council created the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) under Security Council 
Res. 1545, U.N. SCOR, 4975th, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 (2004); and in October 1993 by Security Council Res. 
872/1993 it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), peacekeeping mission as 
conflict resolution method, per se, has been used in the DRC through the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Mission de l' Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo, 
(hereinafter to be referred to as “the MONUC”). 
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has over the years been performed by various organizations,4 this chapter will mainly centre on 
United Nations peacekeeping operations, reasoning that many of the aspects explored here are 
obviously relevant to the peacekeeping efforts of other organizations as well. Given the question of 
legitimacy that has quite often arisen, the legal status of UN peacekeeping forces is briefly 
discussed. In addition, the whole argument for and against the appropriateness, efficacy or 
otherwise of peacekeeping as a conflict prevention and management mechanism will be addressed. 
 
The Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo 
(hereafter, MONUC) is treated as a case study.  Its history will be traced from its development as 
the ONUC 5 to the current MONUC. The nature, organization, role, and mandates, as well as the 
successes and failures of the operation in resolving the Congo conflicts are analyzed. The chapter 
further addresses the core argument in the main study: namely, the human rights approach to 
conflict prevention, management and resolution. Thus, the chapter gives some insights into how UN 
missions of today6 address human rights abuses by looking at the human rights components of UN 
peacekeeping operations generally and those of the MONUC in the DRC7 in particular. However, 
strictly speaking, this chapter does not go into details of such human rights issues as gender or child 
soldiers, which are considered to be beyond the scope of the chapter. Rather, a synopsis of some of 
the most salient short- to medium-term human rights challenges, especially those outlined in the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1493 (2003) mandate in the areas of impunity 
and the rule of law, is given. The chapter then concludes with an examination of the challenges and 
limitations that attend to peacekeeping as a method of conflict prevention and management. As a 
response to these challenges, regional peacekeeping operations (in this case, those operating under 
the AU Peace and Security Council) are highly recommended. 
 
This chapter basically seeks to answer the question whether peacekeeping is a suitable instrument or 
approach to conflict resolution and management. A related question to be answered is when does 
                                                 
4 Hawks and Doves. (2004). ‘Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution’, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive 
Conflict Management-Edited Version, August 2004. 
5 Initialled from the French words ‘Opération des Nations Unies au Congo.’ 
6See  Major General Patrick C. Cammaert,  ‘UN Peacekeeping and Human Rights Abuse,’ Lecture held at the occasion 
of the presentation of the Max van der Stoel Human Rights Award 2006, Tilburg University, 14 December 2006. (On 
file with the author).  Major General Patrick is General Officer Commanding the Eastern Division of MONUC.  
7 In order to avoid any confusion with the other Congo, we use  “the DRC” here to refer to Congo-Kinshasa as opposed 
to Congo-Brazzaville.  The DRC was formerly called the Congo Free State under King Leopold II (1885-1908) and 
called the Belgian Congo under the Belgian colonial administration (1908-1960).  It was later known also as Zaire 
(from 1972 to 1997), and finally renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo by Laurent Kibila when he overthrew 
Mobutu Seseseko who misruled the country for 32 years. 
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peacekeeping work and when does it not? The purpose of such an inquiry is to help develop a list of 
factors that enhance the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations, and also a list of factors that, 
based on lessons learned, are not conducive to effective peacekeeping operations. The answers are 
sought through an analysis of UN peacekeeping operations in the DRC. The MONUC’s role in 
tackling the Congo conflict is assessed. Inevitably, lessons learned from the ONUC, one of the 
UN’s earliest and largest peacekeeping operations in the Congo are used in assessing the current 
and future prospects of the MONUC. It must be stated at the outset, however, that by looking at the 
various UN peacekeeping case studies, success or failure of a particular peacekeeping mission is not 
an appropriate factor to be used in judging whether peacekeeping is, or is not, an effective conflict 
resolution approach.  
After all, as pointed out by Williams Durch,8 success and failure in peacekeeping are not readily 
definable in black and white terms. For instance, is a mission that keeps key protagonists apart for 
ten years, but whose departure is immediately followed by a new outbreak of war a success for what 
it sustained for ten years or a failure for what happened afterward? Or, is a mission whose 
continuous presence in a conflict area paralyses local state functions by creating indefinite 
dependency on its presence a success or failure?  It is by looking at the present peacekeeping 
operations that such questions can be addressed.  
 
4.2 Defining Peacekeeping 
Despite the lack of a universally agreed-upon definition, peacekeeping as it is usually understood 
rests on certain principles which derive from those previously listed by the former United Nations 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in regard to UNEF I.9 They include consent of the parties to 
the dispute for the establishment of the mission; non-use of force except in self defence; voluntary 
contributions of the contingents from small, neutral countries to participate in the force; impartiality 
and non-intervention; and day-to-day control of peacekeeping operations by the Secretary-General. 
 Peacekeeping refers to the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the 
consent of all the parties concerned,10 normally involving United Nations military and/or police 
                                                 
8 Durch, W. (Ed), (1993), The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, New York: St. 
Martin's Press, p.12. 
9 The United Nations Emergency Force I; This was the first armed UN mission explicitly labeled “peacekeeping” and it 
was dispatched to the Sinai Peninsula in response to the 1956 Suez Crisis to observe the cease-fire and withdrawal of 
the British, French and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. 
10 Peacekeeping operations are undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter although in most cases also Chapter VII 
authorization is added. See for instance the 1993 UNOSOM II in Somalia, the 1999-2005 UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, 
the 1999 MONUC in the DRC, the 2003 UNMIL in Liberia, etc. But on the issue of consent, see the Darfu Conflict 
where the Sudanese Government initially refused peacekeeping forces deployment in their country. Finally, with 
concerted negotiation efforts, a hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force has now been deployed in Darfur since May 2007. 
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personnel and frequently civilians as well.11 It has been referred to elsewhere as “preventive 
deployment,”12 and is meant to be a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention 
of conflict and the making of peace.13 This definition shows the flexibility of “peacekeeping as a 
concept that can even be described as ambiguous. The word “hitherto” implies the possibility that 
the condition of obtaining the consent of all the parties may be dispensed with.14 The definition 
proposed by the Peacekeepers Handbook compiled by the International Peace Academy has been 
used by the UN for many years. It defines peacekeeping as,“…the prevention, containment, 
moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a 
peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multi-national forces, 
police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.”15 The question of consent, the difficulties in 
obtaining it and consequences of deployment of peacekeeping without the consent of all parties to a 
dispute needs more treatment in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
         
Although the evolution and historical developments of UN peacekeeping operations date way back 
to the nascent period,16 there had been no consensus on a particular definitional context or on the 
principles of peacekeeping. In general, the definitions provided in textbooks and elsewhere are so 
vague that it is best to understand the nature of any single mission by examining its mandate and 
how it sets about achieving the mission. According to the Handbook on UN Multidimensional 
Peacekeeping Operations,17 depending on its mandate and with a significant civilian component, a 
multidimensional peacekeeping operation18 may be required to: 
• Assist in implementing a comprehensive peace agreement 
                                                 
11 See proposals for reforms under Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, popularly called the 
Brahimi Report, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 17,2000, found in (2000) 39 ILM 1432, also Available at 
<http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations > last visited September 8, 2009. 
12 Preventive deployment consists of dispatching non-armed and impartial support personnel into a zone of crisis in 
order to enhance the vitality of diplomatic processes. For more on this description, see generally Levitt, J. (2001) 
‘Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution: Africa -Regional Strategies for the Prevention of Displacement and 
Protection of Displaced Persons: The Cases of the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD’, Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law. Vol.11, No.  39, p.5-34. See further Katayanagi, M. (2002).  Human Rights Functions of United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p.20. 
13 See Report of the UN Secretary-General (Boutros Boutros-Ghali), No. A/47/277 - S/24111, An Agenda for Peace: 
Preventive diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, New York: United Nations, 1992, para.47. 
14 Katayanagi, supra note 12, p.49. 
15 International Peace Academy (1984). Peacekeepers’ Handbook, New York: Pergamon Press, p.31. 
16 The period between 1946 to 1956 when several observer Missions and Commissions, such as the UNTSO and the 
UNMOGIP were set up. According to some scholars, the history of peacekeeping is divided further into an Assertive 
period (1956-67); a Dormant Period (1967-73); a Resurgent Period (1973-78); and a Maintenance Period (1978-85). 
See further descriptions of these periods in Katayanagi, supra note 12, p.37.  
17 United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. (2003). Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional 
Peacekeeping Operations. New York: United Nations, p.1-2 
18 Also referred to as “peace operations.” 
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• Monitor a cease-fire or cessation of hostilities to allow space for political negotiations and a 
peaceful settlement of disputes 
• Provide a secure environment encouraging a return to normal life 
• Prevent an outbreak or spill over of conflict across borders 
• Lead territories or states through a transition to stable government based on the democratic 
principles, good governance and economic development and  
• Administer a territory for a transition period, thereby carrying out all functions that are the normal 
responsibility of government.19 
 The proliferation of peacekeeping at the end of the Cold War brought with it a generational 
approach to the definition of peacekeeping operations. This approach does not give a correct 
account of peacekeeping operations since features of one generation may overlap with those of the 
other; however, to avoid confusion and keep in perspective the complexity of its evolution, it has 
been common to analyze the theories of peacekeeping by using divisions into three generations.  
The first generation is characterized as a situation where a political organ of the UN deploys a 
military force between two or more armies, with their consent, pending and in the absence of a 
particular political settlement. The second generation, or “new peacekeeping” are best defined as 
UN operations authorized by political organs or the Secretary-General, responsible for overseeing 
or executing the political solution of an interstate or internal conflict, with the consent of the parties. 
Third-generation peacekeeping operations20 are those deployed with the expectation that they will 
employ more coercive measures beyond self-defence, linking the type of peacekeeping with peace 
enforcement measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
 
As one can see from this “generational shift” from classical peacekeeping operations originally 
conducted during the Cold War, contemporary peace operations are increasingly complex. 
According to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada, they are: 
• deployed into both inter-state and intra-state conflicts; 
• conducted in every phase of the conflict spectrum, from prevention through to post-war 
reconstruction; 
• dependent on close cooperation among civilian, police and the military organizations from the 
international community , with parties to the conflict and war affected populations; 
                                                 
19 United Nations, supra note 17. 
20 Katayanagi, supra note 12. 
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• opening in new areas of international activity with conflict-affected countries such as reforms to the 
security sector.21 
Because of the paradigm shift, “peace support operations” (PSO)22 is now an umbrella term used to 
cover a multiplicity of UN field activities in support of peace, ranging from essentially preventive 
deployments to long-term state-building missions. They include conflict prevention, conflict 
mitigation, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peace building.23 
The position of peacekeeping in a framework of Multifunctional Peace Support Operations and war 
is illustrated below (Figure 5).  For a peace enforcement force, which finds on deployment that it is 
able to lower its operational profile to one more akin to peacekeeping, the consent divide is of little 
immediate significance. For a peace enforcement force with robust rules of engagement (ROE),24 
the transition to a peacekeeping profile or the exercise of coercion can be left to the judgment of the 




Figure 5 - Framework of peace support operations25 
 
 
                                                 
21 Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada, available at <http://www.peaceoperations.org/en/peace_operations.asp.> last 
visited, September 8, 2009. 
22 The term is used widely to describe activities in complex humanitarian emergencies. When used in relation to 
military activities, it refers to multifunctional operations in which impartial military activities are designated to create a 
secure environment and facilitate the efforts of the civilian elements of the mission to create a self sustaining peace. See 
further definitions in Peace Support Operations: A Working Draft Manual for African Military Practitioners, DWM 1-
2000 (February 2000), available at <http//www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Other/PeaceSupportManualMM,> produced as a result of 
a workshop held at the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe, 24-26 August 1999; last 
visited, September 8, 2009. 
23 Murphy, Ray. (2007). UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in Practice, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1. 
24 The ROEs are instructions of when and how to use force-the Bible/Koran of the military components of peacekeeping 
operations. 
25 See supra note, 22 above. 
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There is currently a great deal of semantic and conceptual confusion surrounding peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement.  For this reason, Figure 6 below tries to clarify the distinction between the two 
operations on the basis of consent and capability of each operation. 
The horizontal dotted line indicates a minimum level of consent necessary for the conduct of 
peacekeeping—‘you cannot keep peace unless there is a peace to keep’—and the vertical dotted line 
indicates the minimum force level, in comparison with any potential opposition, below which peace 
enforcement is not feasible—‘you cannot fight wars from white-painted vehicles’. In the top left 
quadrant, consent is high, thus a force can successfully conduct a peacekeeping operation with low 
combat capability. This is traditional, classic peacekeeping, e.g. UNFICYP.26 In the top right 
quadrant, consent may appear high, but is assessed as uncertain or fragile and there is an 
expectation that it might be withdrawn. In such circumstances, the judicious option is to deploy, 
prepare for peace enforcement, with the expectation that the deployment of such a force will deter 
hostile acts and ensure compliance from the outset. However, the deployment of a peace 
enforcement force may not always be the most prudent option. If, for example, all the parties 
perceive themselves to be responsible and trustworthy partners in any peace process, the 
deployment of a peace enforcement force may be regarded as indicating a lack of trust and thus 
prove counterproductive. In the bottom right quadrant, the anticipation is that the PSO will be 
opposed and that the use of force will be necessary to ensure compliance with the mandate. In the 
bottom left quadrant, consent for the operation is below the critical level necessary to conduct 
peacekeeping, yet the force does not have the combat capability necessary to enforce compliance 
against opposition. A peacekeeping force deployed in this quadrant will eventually lose credibility 
and the operation may become untenable. This quadrant should be avoided. 
 
While decisions concerning the PSO posture are stark, as indicated by the choice of quadrant, the 
multidimensional nature of PSOs requires that commanders are allowed maximum flexibility to 
develop the operation towards the attainment of military objectives and the political endstate. PSOs 
concern the management of change and transition and co-ordination with a great number of civilian 
elements. The arrow marked ‘strategic direction’ indicates the direction that a PSO should aim to 
progress as compliance is enforced and built into consent and the PSF is able to switch its efforts to 




                                                 
26 United Nations Force in Cyprus. 
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Figure 6 - The relationship between consent and capability 




4.3 The Legal Status of UN Peacekeeping Operations 
 
The concept of “peacekeeping operations” has generated a number of questions under international 
law within and outside the United Nations. In the first place, the legal basis for the establishment of 
UN peacekeeping operations has remained a debatable issue for quite some time now. The main 
question has been, “under which article of the UN Charter can peacekeeping operations be 
established and implemented?”  Although Chapters VI and VII of the Charter provide for pacific 
settlement measures and actions which may be taken with respect to threats to the peace or breaches 
of the peace or acts of aggression, the deployment of peacekeeping is not expressly provided for 
anywhere within the UN Charter.27 Arguably, however, certain operations may be linked to pacific 
settlement measures, thus invoking Article 36(1) of the UN Charter,28 whereas, supervision of 
cease-fires or the withdrawal of troops may fall under the provisional measures in accordance with 
Article 4029 or even measures under Article 41.30 Despite this possibility, these provisions hardly 
                                                 
27 The UN Charter does not make any express provision for peace keeping, and the precise legal basis of the concept 
remains unclear to date. See further Nowak, M (2003), Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime, 
London:  Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p.319. 
28 Article 36(1) provides: “The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or 
of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.” 
29 The relevant provision states: 
“In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the 
recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to 
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be 
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provide for an obvious legal basis of UN peacekeeping operations within the Charter. While it may 
be argued that agreement on the basic principles would lessen the opportunity for conflicting 
interpretations of the Charter and the divisive controversies, there is merit in maintaining a flexible 
and adaptive approach to peacekeeping operations. Indeed, the lack of express mention of 
peacekeeping in the Charter has not inhibited its development. In fact, this may have helped 
establish peacekeeping as a flexible response to international crisis, while at the same time 
contributing to a misunderstanding of its true nature.31  Given this lack of clear legal origin, 
traditional peacekeeping operations were sometimes said to be based on ‘Chapter VI½’ and 
required, in principle, invitation or consent on behalf of the recipient state.32 
 
It may be safely argued therefore, that the concept developed over time,33 as an invention of the 
United Nations through practice.34 The concept gained momentum during the time of the Cold War 
as a partial reaction to the natural demise of the collective security concept envisioned by Article 
43, which reminds us of the sweeping ambitions of the founding of the Charter of the United 
Nations.35 The consequence of such failure, which is attributable to lack of unanimity resulting from 
the then sharp divide between the Western and Eastern blocs during the cold war era,36 meant also 
serious inability of the UNSC to develop preventive diplomacy,37 response to breaches of the peace, 
threats to the peace and acts of aggression.  As a result, and in the absence of such collective 
                                                                                                                                                                  
without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take 
account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.” 
30 Article 41 of the Charter states:  
“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give 
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may 
include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” 
31 See Murphy (2007), supra note 23, p. 5. 
32  Ibid, p.7. 
33 Armed military peacekeeping mission was utilized for the first time in the Sinai Conflict between Israel and Egypt in 
1956, with the deployment by the United Nation General Assembly, of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I, 
1956-1967). UNEF II was deployed six years later following the October 1973 war and it remained in place until Israel 
and Egypt signed their historic Peace Treaty in 1979. The two operations are what most refer to as “classical 
peacekeeping force”.  Subsequently though, the United Nations undertook dozens of such missions with varying scope, 
duration, and degree of success, most of them involving conflicts whose origins can be traced to the end of colonial 
empires in various parts of the world. See also Durch, supra note 8, p.1. 
34 Gray, C “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order” in Evans, M. (Ed.) (2003), International Law, New 
York: Oxford University Press, p.610. 
35 The said Article 43 provides for member states to make available “armed forces, assistance and facilities …for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security” 
36 During the cold war, global collective security under the United Nations was impossible due to the use of veto from 
either of the parties, in a world divided into hostile blocs, USSR being on the one part and the US on the other with 
allied states in each side. 
37 See Peck, C. (1996), The United Nation as a Dispute Settlement System: Improving Mechanisms for the Prevention 
and Resolution of Conflicts, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, p. iii. 
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security measures, “peacekeeping” was invented.38 The subsequent discussions on the 
contemporary roles and mandates of the UN peacekeeping missions will bear witness to this 
assertion.39   
 
In the absence of a clear legal basis through the Charter and bearing in mind that there is no single 
procedure for establishing peacekeeping operations, another question that arises is whose 
responsibility it is to create peacekeeping forces—the UNSC or the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) as the two principal organs of the UN?  The ICJ addressed this question in the 
Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion Case.40  The case was referred to the “World Court” in 
accordance to the UNGA resolution asking for an advisory opinion concerning the issue: whether 
certain expenditures authorized by the UNGA constituted expenses of the Organization within the 
meaning of Article 17(2) of the UN Charter.41 The expenditures in question were for UNEF and 
ONUC. The ICJ held that, although the primary responsibility of the maintenance of international 
peace and security lies with the UNSC,42 it was open to the UNGA to recommend peacekeeping, 
but not to decide on enforcement action, which remains an exclusive province of the UNSC.43 
However, there is currently no practical and clear distinction between peacekeeping and Chapter 
VII enforcement action since the UNSC and not the UNGA exercises the main responsibility for 
peacekeeping. Furthermore, the distinction is blurred when one takes into account the actual role 
currently played by the deployed missions on the ground. From the first major UN peacekeeping 
force, the UNEF I,44 to the present day forces, their role and mandate have expanded 
tremendously.45  
      
                                                 
38 The General Assembly took an alternative role under the Uniting for Peace Resolution to make recommendations to 
member states on the use of force. See also UNGA Res. 377 (v), (3 November 1950) 
39 Riggs, R and Plano, J. (1988) The United Nations: International Organisation and World Politics, Brooks/Cole 
Publishing Co. California, p.128. 
40Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1962, p.151 
41 The UNGA resolution 1731(XVI), 20 December 1961. Article 17(2) reads: 
             “The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.”  
42 See for instance Article 24 of UN Charter 
43See Gray, supra note 34,p.611. See further discussions on the doctrine of inherent powers of the UN and its organs in 
the Decision of the ICJ in two cases: The Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Services of the United Nations, ICJ 
Rep.1949, p. 174 at 182; and Legal Consequences for the States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 
ICJ Rep.1971, p.50. 
44 See Durch, supra note 8. 
45 See further discussion on the issue in Slim, H. (1995), ‘Military Humanitarianism and the New Peacekeeping: An 
Agenda for Peace?’ Institute of Development Studies Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.64-72 
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It is acknowledged that each peacekeeping operation is ordinarily deployed with specified roles and 
mandates as may be spelt out under the UNSC resolution deploying the particular mission.46 
Nonetheless, the traditional roles of peacekeeping missions involved, in ascending order of 
complexity and intrusiveness: uncovering the facts of the conflict, monitoring of border or buffer 
zones after armistice agreements have been signed, verification of agreed-upon force 
disengagements or withdrawals, supervision of the disarming and demobilizing of local forces, 
maintaining the security conditions essential to the conduct of elections, and even the temporary, or 
transitional administration of countries.47  
 
Principles governing peacekeeping operations are distinct from enforcement actions under Chapter 
VII in that they are, (at least traditionally), to be impartial, lightly armed, not to use force except in 
self-defence, and they are to operate with the consent of the host state.48  Although, as it can be 
noted, the function of peacekeeping forces is not to settle disputes but to curb disorder and prevent 
the spread of violent conflicts, ideally, the return of peace and stability will permit a negotiated 
settlement of political differences. Thus, it becomes one tool in the toolbox for conflict resolution, 
though the Charter separates its prescriptions for pacific settlement of disputes from enforcement 
actions.49 However, new developments have often created a situation where peacekeeping engaged 
more in the range of activities which are much more assertive and interventionist in nature than they 
might have been in the past.50 The new peacekeeping missions are shown to be much more 
militarily and politically active with operations ranging from war-fighting to being the political 
midwife to the birth of new democratic governments.51 
 
In matters of principle, peacekeeping operations frequently struggle to maintain or even deliberately 
overstep the three key principles of consent, impartiality and minimum force. The consent of the 
host state to the presence of a peacekeeping force is said to confer the legitimacy required for a 
lawful presence in its territory against the state’s sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction principles.  
However, the issue of consent has raised difficult questions in the mainly intra-state civil wars of 
today's humanitarian emergencies, where the consent of all parties concerned to UN operations has 
                                                 
46 See for instance the UNSC resolution No. 143(1960) on the ONUC, resolution 749(1992) on UNPROFOR in 
Yugoslavia, resoution 946 (1994) on UNOSOM II in Somalia, resolution 1706 (2006) UNMIS in Darfur, resolution 
(S/RES/1325) (2000) on UNFPA, for Women, Peace and Security, etc 
47 Durch, supra note 8. See also Holst, J. ‘Enhancing Peacekeeping operations’ Survival (May-June 1990): 265-266 
48 See Gray, supra note 34, p.612 
49 See Riggs and Plano, supra note 39, p.135   
50 See for instance UNOSOM II whose mandate included “to prevent any resumption of violence, and if necessary, take 
appropriate action against any faction that violates or threatens to violate the cessation of hostility” 
51 Such examples could be seen in the cases of Somalia, Mozambique and Cambodia 
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been extremely difficult to achieve and maintain.52 Likewise, with judgements about UN 
impartiality being so much a matter of the perception and vested interest of the different parties 
concerned, most UN peacekeeping actions are perceived as at best ambiguous and at worst as 
downright partisan in wars which are still "live".53 
 
The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, attempted to revitalize UN peacekeeping operations 
when, in 1999, he convened an independent panel to assess the shortcomings of the existing system 
and to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change. In 2000, ‘The Panel on UN 
Peace Operations’ gave its recommendations on politics, strategy, and operational and 
organisational issues in a report popularly known as the Brahimi Report.54 In its over fifty 
recommendations the report is designed to remedy a serious problem in strategic direction, 
decision-making, rapid deployment, operational planning and support, and the use of modern 
information technology within UN peace operations. It thus calls for more effective conflict 
prevention strategies, pointing out that prevention is necessary for those who would otherwise 
suffer the consequences of war. It is reiterated that prevention is a less costly option for the 
international community than military action, emergency humanitarian relief, or reconstruction after 
a war has run its course. Specifically on peacekeeping, the Brahimi report maintains that 
peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be 
capable of defending themselves. They must also have, ‘robust rules of engagement,’ against those 
who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by 
violence.55 Overall, the report also warns that force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the 
space in which peace may be built.56 
 
More crucial, is the discussion of the legal status and safety of peacekeeping troops. Peacekeepers 
operating under Chapter VI of the UN Charter are normally protected by Article 104 and 105 of the 
UN Charter, giving them a status comparable with the diplomatic immunity of the United Nations 
officials.57 In December 1994 the UNGA passed the ‘UN Convention on the Safety of UN 
                                                 
52 In complex conflict situations, (such as those in the, the DRC, Somalia and Darfur), the opposing parties, for different 
interests, may have conflicting views as far as the deployment of UN Peacekeeping forces is concerned.  At one time or 
another, every political faction in the Congo was hostile to the UN presence in the country. See also Durch, supra note, 
8, p. 333 
53 See Slim, supra note 45. 
54Brahimi Report, supra note 11 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, para 55. 
57 Article 104 “The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be 
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.” See also Article 105 
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personnel’58 in order to strengthen the position and protection of UN peacekeepers.59 Under this 
Convention and other existing law, a UN peacekeeping force is considered a subsidiary organ of the 
UN, established pursuant to a resolution of the Security Council or General Assembly. However, 
the Convention does not apply to the UN troops operating as combatants in enforcement action 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, whose operations are thus governed by international 
humanitarian law.60 Furthermore, the legal status of peacekeeping forces is normally established in 
concrete terms through a legal instrument known as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).61  
Individual forces possess their own distinct characteristics depending on the peculiarity of the 
mission. However, in a nutshell, the legal framework of UN peacekeeping forces is usually made up 
of the following: 
• The resolution of the UN Security Council or General Assembly authorizing the deployment of a 
peacekeeping force, 
•  The SOFA or the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) between the UN and the host state, 
• The agreement through exchange of letters between each participating state and the UN and, 
• The regulations for the force issued by the Secretary-General.62 
 
The need for a clear legal basis upon which the force relies is advisable given the difficulties that 
can be encountered in the field. Whereas the mandate establishing a force defines its purpose, a 
SOFA provides the more detailed principles under which the force functions and specifies its 
relationship with the host government and parties to the conflict.  The obvious difficulties in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are 
necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.  
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy 
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection 
with the Organization. (…) 
58 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, New York, December 1994,United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 2051, p. 363 (hereinafter referred to as “the Safety Convention”). On a detailed discussion on the 
protection afforded by the convention to members of peacekeeping operations, see further Månsson, K. (2008).  
‘Protection of Personnel in Peace Operations: The Role of the 'Safety Convention' Against the Background of General 
International Law’ in Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 77, Nos. 1-2, pp. 175-179. 
59 The General Assembly: 
(…) urges States to take all  appropriate measures to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and Associated 
personnel within their territory (…). 
60 Wolfgang B & Martin V. (Eds.) (1998). UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia-
Peacekeepers’ Views on the Limits and Possibilities of the United Nations in a Civil War-Like Conflict, Aldershot UK: 
Ashgate, p.19; See also Article 2 of the UN Convention on the Safety of UN personnel which states:(…) 
“This Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement 
action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants 
against organized armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies.” 
61 SOFAs are International Agreements developed for the express purpose of defining the legal rights and 
responsibilities of military forces stationed on foreign soils. 
62 Murphy (2007), supra note 23, p.108. See further Murphy, R. (2004). ‘United Nations Military Operations and 
International Humanitarian Law: What Rules Apply to Peacekeepers?,’ in Criminal Law Forum, vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 
127-224.. 
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relation to SOFAs, just as in the requirement of consent, arise in situations where an effective 
government with which to negotiate does not exist. This was the case in relation to UNOSOM in 
Somalia, where all semblance of normality had disintegrated. In these circumstances, even if agreed 
to, the SOFA would be worthless on the ground. 
 
There are two more quite different but related legal questions that are generated by the concept of 
peacekeeping, that need to be mentioned here: namely; the applicability of IHL law in the context 
of peacekeeping forces as well as the accountability of members of the force. The first issue is 
easier to address than the second. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that IHL applies in any 
armed conflict or occupation, even those arising or occurring in the context of peacekeeping 
operations deployed under the auspices of the United Nations.63 Any remaining doubts were 
resolved in August 1999, when the UN Secretary-General promulgated a code of “Principles and 
Rules of International Humanitarian law applicable to the United Nations forces conducting 
operations under United Nations command and control.”64 The code essentially sets forth, in 
summary fashion, the main provisions of IHL and holds that they are applicable to the United 
Nations forces situations of armed conflict; they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the 
extent and for the duration of their engagement.65 It further provides that IHL provisions are 
accordingly applicable in enforcement actions or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force 
is permitted in self-defence .66  
 
This acknowledgement that the UN peacekeepers may become combatants under the rules of IHL is 
also reflected in the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Attacks against peacekeepers 
constitute crimes under the ICC Statute—but only in situations where the peacekeepers are entitled 
                                                 
63 See Cerone, J. ‘Holding Military and Paramilitary Forces Accountable’ in Mertus, J & Helsing, J. (2006). Human 
Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Links Between Rights, Law and Peacebuilding, Washington DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, p. 217. 
64 “Observance by the United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law,” ST/SGB/1999/13, August 6, 1999. 
As the scope of the code is limited to regulating the conduct of UN forces under UN command and control, it would be 
inapplicable to peacekeeping forces under the command and control of regional organizations, such NATO, even in 
situations where such forces are deployed under the UN auspices. For example under Resolution 1244, the UNSC 
authorized Member States and relevant international organizations to establish KFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping 
force in Kosovo. Although KFOR was mandated to coordinate closely with the work of the UN Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo, it remained under NATO command and control. 
65 Ibid, at Section 1.1. 
66 Ibid. See also Article 2 of the Safety Convention, which, while requiring states parties to criminalize attacks against 
peacekeepers, also stipulates that the Convention “shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by the 
UNSC as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in which any of the personnel are engaged as 
combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies.” 
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to the protection given to the civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict,67 clearly implying that there would be times when they would be so entitled. 
On the second issue, that of accountability, given the complex configuration of most peacekeeping 
missions, an IHL violation committed by a peacekeeper could possibly entail the responsibility of a 
number of entities: the peacekeepers’ sending or seconding state, the territorial state,68 the United 
Nations, the regional intergovernmental organization (if any) deploying the mission or 
peacekeeping force, member states or the intergovernmental organisations under the auspices of 
which the peacekeeping mission was deployed, and, finally, the mission or peacekeeping force itself 
(to the extent it may be deemed to have limited international legal personality as a subsidiary body 
of an intergovernmental organization). In addition, as noted above, certain violations will entail 
individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator. 
 
In order to ascertain which of these legal subjects may be held to account, it must be determined 
whether the particular subject is bound by IHL and whether that subject may be held responsible for 
the act committed by the individual peacekeeper. Each determination requires a complex analysis 
involving such considerations as the scope of each entity’s international legal personality, whether 
such personality extends into the field of IHL,69 and whether the conduct of the perpetrator may be 
attributed to the entity under the relevant rules of international law governing responsibility for the 
commission of internationally wrongful acts.70   
 
4.4 The Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations in Conflict Management 
Another important question insofar as the concept of peacekeeping is concerned, is one of merits. 
Does peacekeeping keep peace? In other words, do international interventions to help maintain 
peace in the aftermath of civil wars actually produce durable peace? The essence of the question is 
whether peace lasts, not whether it was achieved in the first place. It is not meant to compare wars 
in which peacekeepers were deployed during the fighting (such as Somalia) to other wars to see if 
the presence of peacekeepers establishes cease-fires (that is, whether they make peace) but rather, 
whether they keep peace.  
 
                                                 
67 See Article 8 (2) (b) (iii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 UNTS. 90; 37 I.L.M. 
999 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter “the Rome Statute”] 
68 I.e. the state within which the violation occurs. 
69 For example, even following the promulgation of the IHL Code by the UN Secretary-General, it remains unclear 
whether the UN itself is bound by IHL. 
70 See part 1, chapter 2 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on States Responsibility (2001).  
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Since the end the cold war, the international community and the UN have moved beyond 
“traditional peacekeeping” between states and have become much more involved in internal armed 
conflicts (civil wars), monitoring and often even managing or administering various aspects of 
transition to peace within states.71 Michael O’Connor suggests that especially in the case of internal 
conflicts, traditional peacekeeping should be abandoned in favour of peace enforcement where the 
military component acts as a law enforcement constabulary under a dominant and impartial political 
authority, rather than as a force interposed between warring factions and monitoring unstable peace 
agreements.72 The clashes that such a suggestion and similar ones bring with old principles of the 
United Nations will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Suffice it to say here that many of the discussions on the subject reveal lack of enough knowledge 
on whether peacekeeping really works. On the one hand, opponents of peacekeeping often point to 
dramatic failures that dominate news coverage of peacekeeping as judgements of their failures 
without acknowledging the success stories that make less exciting news. On the other hand, 
proponents are also guilty of selection bias. The vast literature on peacekeeping compares cases and 
missions, but generally examines only cases in which the international community intervenes, not 
cases in which belligerents are left to their own devices. Surprisingly, very little work has been done 
to examine empirically whether peace is more likely to last in cases where peacekeepers are present 
than when they are absent.73 Case studies of peacekeeping effects in particular missions either do 
not address this issue or rarely, usually implicitly, do so on counterfactual assessments.  
Thus, the few studies that addressed this empirical question, at least in passing, come to 
contradictory conclusions from which it is not at all clear whether peacekeeping works. A closer 
look at both the UN Peacekeeping operations in the Congo and peacekeeping under the African 
regional context may shed light to these contradicting views.  
 
4.5 UN Peace Keeping Operations in Congo: The ONUC and the MONUC 
 
This section is partly based on interviews and questionnaire investigation of the participants in UN 
peacekeeping in Congo (MONUC) and the local population in the DRC. Some of the data were 
gathered through field research conducted in June 2007 in eastern DRC at three MONUC camps, 
including the headquarters of the force.  Members of the local population in the eastern DRC also 
                                                 
71 Fortna, supra note 2, p. 292. 
72 O’Connor, M. (2001). ‘Policing the Peace’ in Thakur, R and Schnabel, supra note 1, p. 58. 
73 For a good example of comparative work on peacekeeping success and failures that take peacekeeping as a universe 
of cases, see Howard, L. (2001). ‘Learning to Keep the Peace? United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping in Civil 
Wars’. Unpublished  PhD.diss., Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. (On file with the Author). 
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provided some information.74 In the said research, participants in this peacekeeping force took part 
in the interview and the questionnaire (see Appendix “C”) was administered to a sample of 
respondents, including soldiers who served in the force, civilian members of the force and 
humanitarian aid workers. The sample was stratified.  Since it was a mailed questionnaire, one 
should not claim that the answers are entirely representative, but on the other hand, the tendencies 
are often very clear and found in most of the literature relating to the subject, so I would be inclined 
to rely on them, particularly where they are consistent. These interviews and answers to the 
questionnaire, together with historical research, form the basis of this section of the chapter. 
 
The general practical problem explored can be formulated as a very simple question: what is the 
role of the MONUC in resolving the Congo conflict as seen by both the participating solders and by 
the general public in the DRC? More particularly, was the deployment of a UN peacekeeping 
mission an effective mechanism for conflict prevention in the Africa’s Great Lakes? A third 
formulation of the question would be, “Where do we locate the MONUC in so far as its success or 
failure in resolving the Congo conflict is concerned?” A brief overview of the nature of the mandate 
and deployment of the MONUC as presented later in this section will assist in answering these 
questions. 
The organization, functions and assessment of the current UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, 
the MONUC75 cannot be understood without some knowledge of its predecessor, the ONUC.76  The 
latter became the second major UN peacekeeping operation to be deployed since the inception of 
the concept.77 There are substantial parallels between the situations under which the two operations 
have been deployed, save for the Cold War paradigm: a divided country, a variety of internal and 
external actors in the conflicts, a formal request by the Congolese government for UN support to 
restore territorial integrity and to remove foreign troops from the country and ambiguity over the 
UN’s role as third party. Thus, it is appropriate to examine, albeit briefly, the ONUC operation to 
see whether it provides any relevant conflict resolution lessons to be learned that will help 
determine whether to call the present UN mission MONUC in resolving the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo conflict a success or a failure. 
 
                                                 
74 The main Headquarters of MONUC is in Kinshasa with 6 other Sector Headquarters in Mbandaka, Eastern Division 
Headquarters in Kisangani, Kananga, Kalemie, Kindu and Bunia. 
75 See supra note 3. 
76See supra note 5. 
77 ONUC was second after UNEF. See supra note 9. 
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The ONUC operated within the Congo, which had descended into chaos on the withdrawal of the 
Belgian colonial power in 1960. The original mandate of the force was to supervise the withdrawal 
of Belgian forces from the Republic of the Congo, to assist the Government in maintaining law and 
order and to provide technical assistance.78  But this mandate was subsequently modified and 
expanded to allow the use of force beyond self-defence when the UNSC used the language of 
Chapter VII authorizing the force to prevent the occurrence of civil war and secession of the 
province of Katanga.79 In essence, it could be argued that the operation shifted its role from that of a 
traditional peacekeeping operation to enforcement action, although this view did not receive support 
from the ICJ.80  
In a further UNSC resolution, the policies and purposes of the UN with respect to the Congo were 
reaffirmed thus:  
a) To maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo; 
b) To assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order; 
c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo; 
d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all foreign military, 
paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries; 
and  
e) To render technical assistance.81 
It must be admitted however that, in practice, the actual mission of the ONUC was more complex 
and demanding than viewed legally and theoretically. It was not only required to deal with the 
Congolese internal civil war situation, but it also had to prevent, in interim, a direct clash of 
superpower military forces in a country which became both an open and covert Cold War 
battleground.82 For the first eight months, ONUC found itself in an impossible situation: reluctant to 
withdraw, for the sake of the civilian populace; reluctant to take sides, to preserve a semi-balance of 
impartiality; and unable to take significant military initiatives because the mandate was interpreted 
                                                 
78 By its resolution No.143 of July 14, 1960, the UNSC “decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the 
necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with 
such military assistance as might be necessary until, through that Government's efforts with United Nations technical 
assistance, the national security forces might be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks.” See 
also United Nations Document S/4387 of July 14, 1960 quoted in Durch, supra note 8. 
79 By its resolution No.161 of February 21, 1961, the UNSC:  
1. “Urges the United Nations to take immediately all the appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil 
wars in the Congo including arrangements for the ceasefires, the halting of all military operations, the 
prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort; (Emphasis added). 
2. Urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and 
other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisors not under the United Nations 
command;”(United Nations Document S/4741 of February 21, 1961). See also Evans, supra note 34, p.223. 
80 See the Court’s decision in the Certain Expenses Case, supra note 40. 
81 UNSC resolution 169 of November 24, 1961. UN Doc. S/5002. 9 votes to none, with 2 abstentions by France and the 
UK. 
82 Durch, supra note 8, p.315. 
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to forbid such actions, particularly by Hammarskjöld, who was strongly averse of violence.83 
Furthermore, although Congo and its bordering lands were gaining their independence from 
different colonial powers at the time the UN deployed the ONUC, colonial interests added to 
UNOC’s initial political complexity.  In addition, a colonial “ghost” still lingered in the minds of 
local Congolese who misidentified any western foreigner, including the UN officers, as just other 
“Belgians” with dangerous and occasionally fatal consequences. 
 
ONUC was an important model of peacekeeping with several outstanding features.  At the peak, the 
force involved some 20,000 troops; it was the first UN peacekeeping force which was composed of 
both civilian and military components, and its mandate arguably crossed the threshold of 
enforcement action.84 However, the ONUC in the minds of many was a regrettable UN 
peacekeeping operation that a generation of UN officials wanted to forget—or at least never 
repeat.85 Although its four-year presence in the Congo86 arguably prevented worse disintegration of 
civil order,87 UNOC did not by any means put an end to civil and political unrest in the country.88 
The current conflict and humanitarian crisis upon which MONUC has been deployed borrows much 
of its origins from the failure of ONUC to move towards a long-term resolution that would have 
involved the establishment of appropriate state structures and forms of governance in the DRC. 
ONUC officially terminated its operations from the Congo at the end of June 1964. 
 
In short, the final assessment of the ONUC indicates that the operation lacked almost every element 
that history says is necessary for a successful peacekeeping mission, including lack of effective 
support from the Great Powers, lack of support from all parties to the conflict, a clear and 
transparent mandate, sufficient and good command, control, communication and logistics.  It also 
(notoriously) became partial in its dealings with the conflict parties, especially in the crisis leading 
to the arrest and the assassination of Lumumba.  Its legitimacy was challenged repeatedly and 
therefore its role as an effective third party in conflict resolution was highly compromised, and it 
fell into financial crisis leading to its premature withdrawal from the Congo.89 
                                                 
83 Ibid. 
84 Katayanagi, supra note 12, p.27. 
85 Durch, Supra note 8, p.316. 
86 It was deployed in July 1960 and it withdrew its operations from the Congo officially at the end of June 1964. See 
also Durch, supra note 8, p.333 
87 Whatever its shortcomings under extreme circumstances, UNOC had its accomplishments to its credit. See for more 
analysis on this point, Riggs and Plano, supra note 39, p.138 
88Durch, supra note 8, p.244 
89 See Riggs and Plano, supra note 39, p.138. 
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Despite all these shortcomings, the ONUC provided some important lessons that could or should 
have been applied in subsequent UN peacekeeping operations, including the current MONUC. 
Besides financial lessons, which have led to the current missions being funded as “expenses of the 
organisation”, ONUC also showed the need for better training and cooperation-- from planning and 
deployment through logistics and communications. 
 
In efforts to address the conflict in the current DRC,90 the UN joined the various regional 
peacemaking initiatives undertaken within the African Great Lakes region framework. The 
initiatives included the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which was signed on July 10, 1999 by the six 
states that were party to the conflict,91 and the subsequent Inter-Congolese Dialogue Process which 
culminated in the Sun City II Agreement of April 2003.92 It sought to place a heavy burden of 
responsibility on a UN peacekeeping force, whose presence was deemed an essential component, 
not only providing for standard monitoring and verification tasks, but also for carrying out a number 
of peace enforcement tasks. The latter included the tracking down and disarming of armed groups;93 
the screening for mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals; and 
the handing over of suspected genocidaires to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.94 It 
was assumed that these tasks would have to be carried out by the UN peacekeepers.95 Consequently, 
the UNSC decided that the previously authorized UN personnel in the DRC would constitute the 
MONUC and expressed its intention to expand MONUC based on assessed conditions of security, 
                                                 
90 The origins, nature and parties to this conflict are as discussed early under chapter Two of this Thesis. 
91 The six parties to the Congo conflict, which signed the ceasefire agreement for a cessation of hostilities, were the 
DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The main provisions of the agreement included: 
• the immediate cessation of hostilities; 
• the establishment of the JMC, comprising the belligerent parties under a neutral chairperson appointed by the OAU, to 
investigate ceasefire violations, work out mechanisms to disarm identified militias and monitor the withdrawal of 
foreign troops according to an agreed schedule; 
• the deployment of an ‘appropriate’ (peacekeeping and peace enforcement) UN mission tasked with disarming the 
armed groups, collecting weapons from civilians and providing humanitarian assistance and protection to vulnerable 
populations; and 
• initiating an ‘inter-Congolese dialogue’ intended to lead to ‘a new political dispensation in the DRC’. 
92 For a fairly detailed treatment of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue Process, see Apuuli, P. (2004). ‘The Politics of 
Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Inter-Congolese Dialogue Process’ in African Journal of 
Conflict Resolution: 4(1), pp.65-84. 
93 The identified ‘armed groups’ included Rwandan Interahamwe militia and the former Rwandan government forces 
(FAR); Congolese Mai Mai militias; the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), the Uganda National Rescue Front II, the 
West Nile Bank Front and Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda; UNITA; and the Burundian Forces pour la défense de la 
démocratie (FDD). 
94 With its Seat in Arusha Tanzania, this is an ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal established in 1994 as a response 
to the conflict in Rwanda which to the 1994 Genocide. However, this latter task was later discarded by the UNSC aas it 
was considered too costly given the reluctance of troop contributing countries. See UNSC Res.955 of November 1994. 
95 Malan, M, and Colliers, J. (2001). ‘Peacekeeping in the DRC, MONUC and the Road to Peace’, Pretoria, South 
Africa: Institute for Security Studies, p. 2. 
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access and freedom of movement as well as cooperation on the part of the signatories to the Peace 
Agreement.96  
 
Initially established as a small military liaison team in 1999, the MONUC was turned incrementally 
into a multidimensional peacekeeping mission with a broad mandate. Comprehensive assessments 
of it have been rare.97 This is surprising because the MONUC-with 18,434 uniformed personnel in 
2008 is one of the biggest and more expensive missions ever deployed by the UN. Moreover, 
although general criticism of UN peacekeeping is not unusual, condemnation of MONUC’s 
performance has been exceptionally fierce. For example, international opinion has labelled it as the 
world’s least effective peacekeeping force,98 while the Congolese citizens repeatedly assaulted 
peacekeepers to vent their angers at the mission and its alleged failures.99 An internal UN report 
even observed that the mission was tainted by a perception of “impotence and cowardice.”100  It is 
from these realities that a more scholarly assessment of the MONUC’s role in the peace process is 
imperative. 
The original mandate of the MONUC was simply based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter and 
constituted the following:  
a) To monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and to investigate its violations by 
parties; 
b) To establish and maintain continuous liaison with the headquarters of all the parties military forces; 
c) To develop an action plan for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement; 
d) To work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war, military captives and cooperate 
with international humanitarian agencies; 
e) To supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties’ forces; 
f) To facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular attention to 
vulnerable groups; 
g) To cooperate closely with the Facilitator of the National Dialogue, provide support and technical 
assistance and coordinate other UN agencies’ activities to this effect; and  
                                                 
96 See UNSC res.1279 of November 30, 1999 by which the UNSC decided that personnel authorized under its previous 
resolutions:  S/RES/1273 of November 5, 1999; S/RES/1258 of August 6, 1999 and S/RES/1273 of April 9, 1999. 
would constitute the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). 
97 Roessler, P and Prendergast, J. ‘Democratic Republic of Congo’ in Durch, W. (Ed.) (2006) Twenty First-Century 
Peace Operations, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace and the Henry L. Simpson Center. 
98 Is this the World’s Least Effective Peacekeeping Force?,’ The Economist, Dec.4, 2005, pp. 43ff. 
99 Grignon, F and Kroslak, D. (April 2008) ‘The Problem with Peacekeepers’ in Current History, vol. 107, No. 70, pp. 
186-7. 
100 ‘UN Report Accuses Peacekeepers of Failing the Congolese People’, Financial Times (London), March 23, 2005, p. 
3. 
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h) To deploy mine action experts to assess the scope of the mine and unexploded ordinance problems, 
coordinate the initiation of the mine action activities, develop a mine action plan, and carry out 
emergency mine action activities as required in support of this mandate. 
The peace enforcement tasks required of the UN peacekeeping force envisioned under the Lusaka 
Agreement, obviously required a Chapter VII mandate and not a Chapter VI one as indicated 
above.101 The relevant part of the Agreement reads:   
“The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in 
collaboration with the OAU which provides ceasefire monitors to the DRC, shall be 
requested to constitute, facilitate and deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force in the DRC 
to ensure implementation of this agreement; and taking into account the peculiar situation of 
the DRC, mandate the peacekeeping force to track down all armed groups in the DRC. In 
this respect, the UN Security Council shall provide the requisite mandate for the 
peacekeeping force.”102 
 
However, contrary to the above-contemplated mandate of the envisaged peacekeeping force, 
MONUC was flawed from its conception within the UN, being a Chapter VI operation with only 
one Chapter VII component that allowed it self-defense and limited protection for the civilian 
population. It is hard to find an explanation for such a departure in the approach, but, according to 
one senior DPKO103 officer who is a representative of the Mission to the United Nations, “the 
Congo file started in Africa, not in the United Nations. The Lusaka Agreement called for the UN 
forces, but they did not know what they were writing. As the UN was not there, it came in with the 
framework which was not theirs.”104  Ultimately, what the Lusaka parties asked for was a force to 
restore and enforce peace; what they got was what the UN was willing and able to provide. One 
would then conclude that the mandate of UN peacekeeping operations is a function of what member 
states are likely to be willing to bear and what troop-donating countries are willing to commit to. Or 
as another member of the MONUC puts it, there is no such a thing as bad mandate. The mandate is 
what the Security Council makes it. Simply put, there was no willingness among the UN member 
states to commit combat troops to a Chapter VII mission in the DRC--not in the initial stage. 
 
                                                 
101 A Chapter VI peacekeeping operation is normally deployed to help keep peace, and the peacekeepers are not 
authorized to use force other than for self-defence. In contrast, a Chapter VII peacekeeping operation also referred to as 
“Peace Enforcement” operations, authorize UN peacekeepers to use military force if necessary to restore peace and 
security. 
102 See Article III (11) of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of July 10, 1999. 
103 DPKO is the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which is responsible for the planning, preparing, 
conducting and directing UN peacekeeping operations. 
104 From interviews with the UN Representative in the MONUC in Congo, June 10, 2007.  
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The involvement of MONUC in the DRC conflict over a decade now can be broken into four broad 
phases:  
The first phase began with the creation of the MONUC in 1999 and ended with the Pretoria accord 
and on the formation of a government of national unity in late 2002. Shortly after the signing of the 
Lusaka Accord, the UNSC authorized the deployment of 90 military personnel to establish liaison 
with the signatories.105 In late 1999 the mission formally renamed MONUC and was subsequently 
expanded to 500 observers and a protection force of 5,037 soldiers to monitor the implementation of 
the ceasefire agreement.106 Following agreements between the DRC on the one side and Uganda 
and Rwanda on the other, on the withdrawal of the latters’ forces from the DRC, MONUC troops 
ceiling was boosted to 8,700 soldiers in late 2002. The mission was mandated to support, ‘on 
voluntary basis’, the DDRRR (disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and 
reintegration) of foreign armed groups.107 During its first three years, MONUC’s role was limited 
but effective. Its thinly spread personnel, 455 military observers and 3,595 soldiers (as of October 
2002), verified ceasefire violations and the eventual withdrawal of foreign armies. 
The second phase of MONUC’s deployment (2003-04) began in the wake of the Pretoria accord in 
2002. During this period the mission’s efforts were to be geared towards supporting the transition 
and the government of national unity in Kinshasa.108  The transition government moved to the 
centre of political attention because it was to become the backbone of the implementation of the 
peace agreements that had been concluded in Lusaka and Pretoria. Key to MONUC’s concept for 
this phase was the provision of security for the members of the transitional government. To this 
effect, the UNSC authorized MONUC to deploy nearly 10 percent of its troops (some 1,000 blue 
helmets) to the capital.109  It also chaired the International Committee in Support of the Transition 
(CIAT), a body of international representatives that was to accompany the transition. Hence, this 
phase was described by William Swing, the head of MONUC, as the ‘Kinshasa phase’, where the 
transitional government was expected to lead the peace process.110   
      
However, the most disrupting events during this phase occurred in the DRC’s eastern part. The first 
major crisis occurred in Bunia (Ituri District) in May 2003, when ethnic militias fought over control 
of the city after the withdrawal of the Ugandan army. The 700 blue helmets in Bunia were 
                                                 
105 UNSC Res.1254, August 6, 1999. 
106 UNSC Res.1279, November 30, 1999 and 1291 of February 24, 1999. 
107 UNSC Res.1355, June 15, 2001, para.32. 
108 UNSC Res.1493, July 28, 2003, paras 1-6. 
109 Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, UN Doc.S/2003/566, May 27, 2003, paras 35-8. 
110 Cited in Rogier, E. ‘MONUC and the Challenges of Peace Implementation in the DRC’ in Malan, M and Gomes 
Porto, J. (Eds.) (2004) Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, p. 22.  
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bystanders to the massacres of 400 civilians. The crisis triggered the deployment of a 1,400 strong 
Interim Emergency Multinational Force (Operation Artemis) by the European Union.111  Equipped 
with Chapter VII mandate, the force stayed for three months and re-established basic order in 
Bunia. Subsequently, the UNSC increased the MONUC’s troop numbers to 10,800 and provided it 
with a Chapter VII mandate for Ituri and the two Kivu provinces.112  Barely a year later, another 
crisis erupted in Bukavu, when forces led by renegade commander Laurent Nkunda, a former RCD 
general occupied the provincial capital of South Kivu. Again, MONUC failed to prevent killings 
and human rights abuses.113  The Bukavu crisis in particular was a major blow to MONUC’s 
credibility in the DRC. In response, the UNSC expanded MONUC’s Chapter VII mandate to 
include the entire Congolese territory and authorized the deployment of additional 5,900 
peacekeepers, less than half the number that the mission had requested.114  
  
The third phase, from October 2004 to December 2006, mainly revolved around the organization of 
presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections. As in other war-torn countries, the UN 
regarded the elections in the DRC as ‘a key element in the transition from a post-conflict to a truly 
democratic, unified and stable state.115 MONUC organized a large logistical operation to prepare 
the registration of voters and the organization of a constitutional referendum and the elections. It 
also trained Congolese police officers to provide security for the elections. During the polls, 
MONUC was backed by an EU interim force (EUFOR DRC) of 1,500 troops.116 The mission was 
deployed after the UNSC had declined a request by the Secretary-General for an additional 2,590 
troops to enable MONUC to deal with security contingencies during the polls.  
 
MONUC’s fourth phase started in the wake the 2006 elections.117 Daunting core tasks remained to 
be completed. These included the creation of a stable security environment, the planning of security 
sector reform, strengthening the rule of law and protecting civilians.118 MONUC was also mandated 
to provide assistance to the Congolese government in the preparation for local elections.119 
Recurrent violence attested to the precarious post-election environment, especially in North Kivu, 
                                                 
111 Ulriksen, S, et al, (2004). ’Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come’ in International Peacekeeping, vol. 
11, No.3, pp. 508-525. 
112 UNSC Res.1493, supra note 108, para 26. 
113 UNSC Res.1291, February 24, 2000. 
114 UNSC Res.1565, October 1, 2004. 
115 UN, ‘Special Rapporteur of the Secretary-General on Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo,’ UN 
Doc.S/2005/320, May 26, 2005, para 3. 
116  UNSC Res.1671, April 25, 2006. 
117 See UNSC Res.1756, May 15, 2007. 
118 UN, ‘Twenty-Third Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC,’ UN Doc. S/2007/156, March 20, 2007, para 43ff. 
119 UNSC Res.1797, January 30, 2008. 
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where renewed fighting between rebels and the army displaced tens of thousands of civilians. 
Insecurity was widespread as thousands of Congolese combatants remained outside of the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (DDR) for nationals. The formation of the 
security sector remained insignificant.120 MONUC reported physical violence against civilians and 
serious human rights abuses, wherever the army was deployed.121  
 
4.6 Assessing Success and Failure 
 
The literature on peacekeeping missions offers a variety of determinants of success and failure, 
ranging from mandate implementation to more demanding criteria (whether a self-sustaining peace 
exists after peacekeepers withdraw) to even more exacting standards (whether root causes of 
conflict have been resolved and whether institution building has been successful).122 These 
ambitious standards reflect unrealistic expectations about the impact that a mission can have within 
a limited time. This is essentially true in countries that present a very difficult environment. In the 
DRC, MONUC is also an ongoing mission, and it is thus impossible to determine the long-term 
viability of peace. Therefore two relatively modest criteria are used here: whether the mission 
mandate has been implemented and whether human suffering and human rights violations have 
been reduced. 
The mandate implementation is the most widely used criterion to assess success and failure. It is 
also the most equitable one because it examines standards that the UN has set itself.123 It is also the 
politically most relevant one since decisions of the UNSC about ongoing peacekeeping missions 
take into account the extent to which mandates are being implemented. The second yardstick is used 
because it directly relates to the reduction of large-scale violence, which is the overall goal of every 
peacekeeping mission. But because violence is difficult to measure in civil wars, I refer here to 
human suffering as a consequence of violence, which can be roughly assessed by considering the 
level of human rights abuses and internal displacement. 
                                                 
120 Refugees International, DR Congo: Transition Without Military Transformation, Washington DC, December 13, 
2007. 
121 MONUC Human Rights Division, ‘The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo January to 
June, 2006,’ Kinshasa, July 27, 2006, para 42. 
122 For overview of these criteria, see Howard, M. (2008). UN peacekeeping in civil wars, Cambridge /New York: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 6-8; Durch, W and Berkman, T. ‘Restoring and Maintaining Peace: What We Know so 
Far’ in Durch, (2006), supra note 97, pp. 15-16; See also Fortuna, supra note 2, pp. 269-92. 
123 See Howard, Ibid, p. 7. 
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Mandate Implementation 
In the following paragraph, I examine whether MONUC succeeded in implementing the core tasks 
of its mandate.124 
Facilitating the DDRRR of foreign combatants. 
The presence of foreign-armed groups in the eastern DRC has been central to the regional 
dimension of the war. Of particular concern was the security threats posed by the continued 
presence of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an offshoot of the 
forces responsible for the Rwandan genocide in 1994. To address this issue, MONUC was 
mandated to facilitate the DDRRR of foreign combatants.125 
 
Repatriation of the insurgents was agonizingly slow. In 2007, it was estimated that 6,000 rebels 
remained in the DRC. The Rwandan government did not play a constructive role, as it did not 
publish a list of the FDLR members it sought on charges of genocide, a clarification that may have 
encouraged lesser members of the movement to return home. Moreover, the FDLR leaders held 
their fighters hostage, killing those who attempted to defect. But the most important reason for the 
slowness was that MONUC’s mandate rested on the principle of voluntary repatriation. As early as 
2004, MONUC had warned that the continued pursuit of its voluntary repatriation would not 
succeed in resolving the problem within an acceptable time.126 The UNSC never seriously 
considered a mandate to forcefully repatriate the FDLR. This left the mission with a few other 
means than seeking to persuade foreign fighters to return to their countries.127 In late 2005 and since 
2006, MONUC also gave logistical support to Forces Armees de la Republic Démocratique du 
Congo (FARDC) operation against the FDLR. Considering the mandate, the slow repatriation was 
the best result that the MONUC could realistically achieve. It fulfilled its mandate but was unable to 
sufficiently speed up the return of the FDLR fighters. 
 
Military Tasks 
Deterring violence and Protecting Civilians. MONUC was authorized to use all necessary means to 
contribute to the improvement of the security conditions and discourage violence and spoilers.128 
Regarding this element of its mandate, MONUC’s record has sometimes been one of dramatic 
                                                 
124 I omit here the monitoring of the arms embargo: it was inconsequential because MONUC did not have the mandate 
to enforce it. 
125 UNSC Res.1355, June 15, 2001, para 32. 
126 UN, ‘Twenty-Third Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, supra note 118, para 74. 
127 For a revealing example, see Second-Special Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, UN Doc.S/2003/566, 
May 27, 2003, para 21.  
128 UNSC Res.1565, October 1, 2004, para 6. 
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failure. It performed abysmally during crises in Bunia and Bukavu and not much better during other 
emergencies.129 The resumption of fighting in North Kivu since November 2006, which escalated in 
later in 2008 and triggered massive civilian displacement, did not galvanize a determined response 
by MONUC. The same was true during early episodes of fighting in Kinshasa in 2006 and 2007, 
which resulted in the deaths of some 400 people. MONUC’s inaction in preventing the violence has 
been accompanied by a poor record in protecting civilians, a notable failure in the light of the 
UNSC’s emphasis on this task.130 Although MONUC received ‘the most assertive mandate yet 
regarding the protection of civilians,’ protecting civilians largely remained a written ambition.131 
In analysing further the strength and weaknesses of the MONUC in this aspect, the perception on 
the operation’s role on the ground in the DRC, from MONUC personnel, local and international 
NGOs and the Congolese citizens has been sought. The difficulty of such an analysis in terms of 
what is working, what is not working and what can be learned to help future operations succeed is 
that the definition of “success” and “failure” depends on who and where you are. Opinion is highly 
divided. On the part of the UN headquarters, the operation is basically doing according to the plan. 
If you are talking to local NGOs and Congolese, they are wondering why armed soldiers either sit 
around their bases or drive their UN vehicles on the country’s dirty roads without protecting 
civilians or stopping the fight between conflicting parties.132 Yet MONUC personnel feel frustrated 
for lack of both sufficient mandate and adequate resources they require in fulfilling their mission.133  
A senior MONUC official in Bukavu summarized that frustration. “Look, people should not have 
thrown stones at MONUC if they have given us the mandate and people to do the job. Where is the 
P-5? Where are the Western troops”? MONUC officials therefore point out that despite many 
skirmishes, and some regrettable massacres, the ceasefire between the signatories to the Lusaka 
Agreement is holding. They however find that the DPKO needs to take MONUC more seriously by 
providing more personnel, finances and mandate. In their view, DPKO does not think the Congo is 
a priority. Although the world is aware of what is happening in the Congo, no one takes it seriously. 
 
The head of a Congolese Human Rights NGO in Bukavu represented the often-expressed view of 
the Congolese people about the MONUC: “The mandate has never been understood by the people. 
We thought they were here to restore peace. Now we learn they are only here for themselves-not to 
                                                 
129 On Bukavu, see Turner, T. (2007) The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth & Reality, New York: Zed Books, pp. 96-105; 
On Bunia, see Ulriksen, S, et al, supra note, 111. 
130 See Månsson, K. (2005). ‘Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the Congo,’ International 
Peacekeeping, vol. 12, No.4, pp.  503–519. 
131 Holt, V and Berkman, T. (2006) The Impossible Mandate? Military Operations, the Responsibility to Protect and 
Modern Peace Operations, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, p. 91.  
132 From interviews with Congolese locals, residents of Bukavu town on June 12, 2007. 
133 Many of the Senior MONUC personnel interviewed voiced their frustrations. 
   158 
intervene.” It becomes important therefore, that the local population understands the mandate of a 
particular UN peacekeeping operation. When the MONUC first came, everybody in the DRC 
celebrated, but as time went by, there is disappointment. 
 
Reducing Human Suffering 
The second yardstick to assess MONUC-reducing human suffering-was chosen for methodological 
reasons over other criteria. Examining alternative indicators, for example, whether large-scale 
violence was brought to an end, raises significant challenges in terms of the availability and quality 
of data, particularly in war-torn countries like the DRC.  While the day-to-day peacekeeping 
activities of MONUC soldiers have probably done little to alleviate insecurity in the DRC, their 
presence may have prevented more atrocities. 
 
Many Congolese acknowledge that their country is better off with MONUC than without it. They 
acknowledge the value of observing violations of human rights and reporting them to the rest of the 
world. Many also acknowledge that MONUC’s presence is a source of revenue for local business 
communities. But they usually come back to what they see as the fundamental issue, namely: its 
perceived inability or reluctance to intervene and contain the ongoing conflict in the country, and 
this has sometimes led to serious negative sentiments from members of the local population, against 
the force.134  The MONUC operation is perceived by many Congolese as being too passive, 
especially when massacres are reported to it without any action being taken by them. As such, either 
out of ignorance or given the reality on the ground, they would like to see the MONUC mandate 
changed to make it a force for peace.135 Furthermore, there is the impression that MONUC is 
operating with an unspoken slogan: “How soon can we get out”?  
Despite the clear gap between the official MONUC opinion and the voice from the field, in the 
opinion of the locals the presence of the MONUC has had a very positive effect, and if it were to be 




                                                 
134 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports “Demonstrators Stone MONUC Headquarters” 
(June 2004); “Anti-MONUC Protest in Rutshuru turns Violent” (September 2008). 
135 This is based on views from another Congolese NGO leader in Goma. 
136 Butts, H & Brandshaw, H. (Eds.), (2002), ‘Central African Security: Conflict in the Congo’, Proceedings Report No. 
A715324 Army War College Carlisle Barracks Pa. 
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4.7 Human Rights Components of Peacekeeping Operations 
 
The question that arises is what a UN force should do when it becomes aware that parties to the 
conflict in which the force is deployed are violating applicable principles of human rights. The 
importance of this question derives from the fact that respect for human rights is essential for 
genuine peace. Violations of human rights provoke conflict, while improving their protection is 
often one of the conditions for moving towards peaceful settlement of conflicts. In all conflict 
management approaches, therefore, human rights must be honoured so that man is not to be 
compelled as a last resort to rebel against tyranny and repression.137 
 
International human rights law is an integral part of the normative framework for United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.138 The UDHRs, which sets the cornerstone of international human rights 
standards, emphasizes that human rights and fundamental freedoms are universal and guaranteed to 
everybody. United Nations peacekeeping operations are therefore to be conducted in full respect of 
human rights and should seek to advance human rights through the implementation of their 
mandates. 
However, unless the mandate of the force clearly states, there is currently no implicit legal duty for 
peacekeeping forces to protect civilians from human rights violations.139  Thus, from their early 
times, UN peacekeeping operations activities have mainly focused on monitoring cease-fires, peace 
agreements and controlling buffer zones between conflicting parties; but human rights were not a 
consideration in their operations.140 Review of the various UN peacekeeping operations 
demonstrates that ending or preventing deliberate and systematic human rights violations have 
hardly been the core or fundamental objective of peacekeeping operations.141 Consequently, UN 
peacekeeping forces failed to protect civilians from massacres in Rwanda and in Srebrenica, 
                                                 
137 Para 3 of the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA resolution 217 A (III), UN Doc A/810 
/1948 of 10 December 1948.    
138 UN (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, Field Support, p.14. 
139 Murphy (2007), supra note 23, p.289. 
140 Henkin, H (Ed.) (2000), Honouring Human Rights, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, p.5. 
141 See detailed account of the role of peacekeeping missions in the protection of human rights in Katanayagi, supra 
note 12, p.235; See also for similar discussions Steele, D. (1998). ‘Securing Peace for Humanitarian Aid’ in 
International Peacekeeping 5(1), Spring 1998: 66-88, p. 70. “The process of intervention starts with a call to end 
massive human rights violations and is then frequently limited to mandate to enforce humanitarian objectives.”  Also 
Knudsen, T. (1996).‘Humanitarian Intervention Revised: Post-Cold War Responses to Classical Problems’ in 
International Peacekeeping 3(4), Winter 1996: 146-165, p. 147. “What we seen in cases like Croatia and Somalia has 
not been a whole-hearted attempt to stop or prevent genocide by full-scale use of force as prescribed by the Groatian 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Instead, outside interference has on most occasions attempted to limit it and 
provide relief after the damage has been done.” 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of their specific mandates limitations.142 Certainly this scenario 
does not make any common sense if one considers that most of the peacekeeping operations are 
deployed in situations where human rights are seriously undermined.143   
Another question therefore arises: If UN peacekeeping forces are unable to stop large-scale human 
rights abuses who will have the capacity to do so? At the present time, protection of human rights is 
considered as an essential element of UN peacekeeping operations.144 Protection of non-
combatant’s basic rights to life and dignity is a fundamental element of all military operations. The 
Brahimi Report suggests a more assertive and interventionist approach in such cases and states that 
‘UN Peacekeepers--troops or police--who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to 
be authorised to stop it, within their means.145  Should members of a peacekeeping operation who 
are designated as combatants witness war crimes but take no action to stop them, they themselves 
become parties to those war crimes. The prevention of abuses of basic human rights and the 
imposition of justice will however, require a peace operations force that is appropriately trained and 
equipped for such tasks.  
 
As such, increasingly, peacekeeping requires that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, 
electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police play as central a role as the 
military.146 Peacekeepers are now expected to undertake particular activities for the protection of 
civilians. Hence, in November 2002, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with DPKO to clarify their respective 
roles.147 The memorandum recognizes that protection and promotion of human rights have become 
essential elements of conflict prevention, peace maintenance, and post-conflict reconstruction.148 
According to the memorandum, human rights components of peacekeeping operations are to be 
based upon international human rights standards. An innovation is that the operations will be 
charged with promoting an integrated approach to human rights including civil, political, cultural, 
economic, and social rights. Also included are the rights to development, and particularly the rights 
                                                 
142 Both the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) were presented but could not stop the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the 1995 ethnic cleansing in Former 
Yugoslavia respectively. 
143 See for instance the Unified Task Force in Somalia, the French-led Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, and the US-led 
Multinational Force in Haiti. 
144 Krasno, Jean (Ed.). (2004). The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society, Bouder/London: 
Lynner Rienner Publishers, p. 100 
145 See Executive Summary, Brahimi Report, supra note 11 , p. 3. 
146 Boutros-Ghali, supra note 13. 
147 Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, concluded at Geneva, November 22, 2002.; See detailed discussion on this 
development in Krasno, supra note 144. 
148 Ibid. 
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of women, children, minorities, internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups.149  The 
memorandum introduces an important human rights mechanism into peacekeeping by 
institutionalising timely information alerts and exchanges.150 As stated further in the memorandum, 
human rights components should normally combine promotion and protection functions so as to 
ensure a comprehensive approach to human rights in accordance with international human rights 
standards.151  Accordingly, in extraordinary case of human rights abuse, there is nothing legally 
wrong if the UNSC takes measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
And when Chapter VII mandate is invoked, the restriction under Article 2 (7), non-interference in 
matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction, is no longer applicable to the particular 
UN peacekeeping operation.152 
 
The need to ensure that human rights are protected in the design and operation of peacekeeping 
missions came to be addressed within the context of a general move to operationalize the notion of 
human rights as a crosscutting responsibility in all the work areas of the United Nations—a concept 
that was articulated by the Secretary-General in his 1997 UN Reform Programme.153  
 
The first specifically human rights mandated mission, established in 1991, was tasked with 
monitoring the implementation of the San Jose Peace Agreement in El Salvador (ONUSAL).154 
 In 1992 the UN established a mission to oversee the political transition in Cambodia (UNTAC), 
again with a human rights component. The following year saw the establishment, jointly by the UN 
and the Organization of American States (OAS), of the first exclusively human rights-focused 
mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). It was in this same context that human rights programmes were 
located in other UN missions such as those for Georgia (UNOMIG),155 Liberia (UNOMIL), Angola 
(UNAVEM III and MONUA), Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL), Guinea-Bissau 
(UNOGBIS), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), and Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). 
Those UN missions that assumed transitional authority, such as in Kosovo (UNMIK) and East 
Timor (UNTAET), also included human rights components. 
 
                                                 
149 Ibid. 
150 See Section 18, Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
152A caveat is placed in the last part of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter thus: “… but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”. 
153 Annan, K.  Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, UN documents A/51/950 of 14 July 1997. 
154 A description of this and all other UN peacekeeping missions can be found at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ 
home.shtml>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
155 The human rights component of this mission is jointly staffed by UN and OSCE human rights officers. 
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4.8 Human Rights Components of MONUC 
During the entirety of the MONUC deployment, there has been evidence of human rights abuse 
throughout the DRC. Most of the human rights abuses are committed by the armed forces of the 
warring parties.156 They include arbitrary killings, arbitrary arrests, mass rape, illegal detentions, 
harassment and extortion, ill- treatment and torture of prison detainees.157 
The importance of a human rights component within the MONUC was first highlighted by the 
UNSC in 2000.158  In March 2003, a resolution was adopted, by which the Secretary-General was 
requested to increase the number of personnel in the MONUC’s human rights component to assist 
and enhance the capacity of the Congolese parties to investigate all the serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights.159 The MONUC Human Rights Division 
developed its mandate in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1565 (2004), as 
confirmed by Resolution 1628 (2005). MONUC is mandated "to assist the Government of National 
Unity and Transition in the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to 
women, children and vulnerable persons. MONUC provides advice and assistance concerning the 
essential legislation of human rights and fundamental freedoms." The Human Rights Division 
(HRD) is to assist the authorities to put an end to impunity and to ensure that those responsible for 
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice. The 
HRD monitors and documents human rights violations across the country. Special attention is paid 
to violations of the rights to life, liberty and physical integrity; to elections-related human rights 
violations; and to the link between the exploitation of natural resources and human rights abuses. 
The Division is to protect individuals under imminent threat of physical violence, notably 
witnesses, victims and human rights defenders. 
 
Within the MONUC,160 human rights work is done by a number of divisions, including Child 
Protection, Humanitarian, Civilian Police (CIVPOL) and Military observers. MONUC’s human 
right section is presently composed of 50 personnel, inclusive of both administrative and 
substantive staff, possibly to be increased to 90 with the approval of the new budget.161 At the time 
                                                 
156 Thirteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
S/2003/211, February 21, 2003; See also Annan K. (1994) ‘Peace-Keeping in Situations of Civil War,’ in New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 26, No 4, pp. 623-644. 
157 MONUC Human Rights Division, ‘DR Congo: Monthly Human Rights Assessment-October 2006,’ Africafiles, 
November 23, 2006. 
158 See UNSC RES/1291/200 in which the Security Council, among other things, authorized the expansion of MONUC 
in the area of human rights. 
159 See S/RES/1468, March 20, 2003. 
160 Part of the information on this section emanates from the interviews conducted on June 11, 2007 to the Head of 
MONUC Human Rights section in MONUC headquarters in Bukavu, eastern DRC.  
161 The budget was to be approved during the time of field research. 
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of the current research, MONUC had 12 field offices in the DRC, with a further two anticipated to 
be operational soon. This may seem like a sizable presence in the field, but the number of human 
rights officers and offices is miniscule, when one considers the size of the country.  
 
The Human rights section of MONUC has the following basic tools at its disposal to join forces in 
the fight against impunity for human rights violators: 
• Monitoring 
• Special investigations and 
• Thematic reports. 
Each of the tools is considered in more details below: 
Monitoring involves the following elements: 
• Pro-active observation.  This entails learning about the environment to be worked in. To be 
at the service of a community, one must be able to understand its dynamics and keep abreast 
of current events.  One must know who is who and know the geography of the region.  
Above all, one must be accessible. All of this requires a non-bureaucratic approach to 
human rights work. 
• Interventions/interactions with local authorities.  Local authorities are responsible for the 
protection and promotion of human rights. It is therefore of paramount importance to engage 
with them in a respectful but frank dialogue. It is always preferable to address issues locally. 
Only in exceptional cases should matters be brought to the attention of the central 
authorities. 
• Protection of civilians. This entails preventive actions and re-settlement initiatives to reduce 
the threat caused by proximity.  Protection of civilians is normally done through 
intervention with the authorities.  A classical example is interventions with prosecutors, the 
police or the military hierarchy in the event of illegal arrests and detentions. At times, 
threats against civilians may mean the civilians themselves demand re-settlement. Luckily, 
since the DRC is so vast, the option of re-settlement does not usually entail more refuge 
abroad. It must be stressed; nevertheless, that resettlement is considered an extreme measure 
that is seldom resorted to. 
• Reporting.  Reports can be made to the UNSC or to the MONUC Headquarters or shared 
with pressure groups such as concerned members of the diplomatic corps.  The ultimate goal 
of monitoring is to establish a historical record, so that the truth is available to the persons it 
belongs to.  It can possibly also be used for justice and compensation purposes. Due to 
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limited resources, the Human Rights section has had to prioritize its monitoring activities, 
focusing essentially on gross violations of human rights: summary execution/extra-judicial 
killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and illegal arrests or detention. Sexual violence, 
including that visited upon men, has been singled out as an area deserving particular 
attention. The need to limit the breadth of monitoring tasks and to prioritize springs from the 
conviction that it is better to do little, but do it well, than to be spread too thin and thus have 
little or no impact at all. 
• Special investigations.  Such investigations by the Human Rights Section are spearheaded 
by a two-person team, which concentrates on gross violations of human rights. In the DRC, 
the latter are normally associated with massacres, in which case the section organises a 
larger multi-disciplinary investigation team. Besides limited resources, a major challenge to 
special investigations is in the fact that it is virtually impossible to conduct follow-up on an 
initial investigation. This limit imposes the use of particular stringent caution in terms of 
exposure of witnesses and other sources of information. “Do no harm” is a basic tenet of 
human rights work. There may be times when a special investigation team will have to 
decide whether to gather information and by so doing risk jeopardizing the sources of 
information, or to go home empty handed. This dilemma unfortunately becomes even more 
acute in situations where the team knows that it may never be able to go back and check that 
those sources are, in fact, safe and sound and, if they are not, intervene for their protection. 
Somewhat linked to the issue of special investigation, is the sad realization that the 
systematic and effective use of modern forensic techniques to ascertain causes of death, as 
well as for the purpose of identification, is a distant dream in the DRC.  The issue of 
identifying the many missing persons and their families, which so far does not appear to be a 
priority on the agenda of civil society, is therefore likely to remain an unfortunately 
neglected aspect of investigation. Both in fact-finding activities of a monitoring nature, and 
in special investigations, a major and necessary challenge is to adopt a methodology that 
renders human rights work fully compatible with the requirements of criminal justice 
(including meeting the burden of proof), if these activities are to support the fight against 
impunity.    
o Thematic Reporting. This type of reporting aims at collecting and analysing data on the 
areas that deserve particular attention. The challenge is to point to the root causes of 
problems, and to identify recommendations that can lead to a concrete improvement in the 
human rights situation.  
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On the rule of law, the story is not that much different.  After years of dictatorship and war, the 
DRC is a state with limited police, and no judicial and correctional capacity in the territory that has 
remained under government control, and little or no capacity at all elsewhere. The task of 
reconstruction is therefore immense. Here, in a situation totally void of any form of legality, 
MONUC operates under Chapter VII. According to its Rules of Engagement, MONUC’s military 
can and do arrest and detain civilians and militia elements that are caught red-handed engaging in 
obviously criminal acts.  The lack of a national/judicial/detention capacity results in such suspects 
being released after short periods of detention. At times, persons may be arrested for contravening 
orders imposed under MONUC’s Chapter VII authority –for instance, refusal to disarm in the town 
of Bunia. This raises a number of questions relating to the legal framework for these arrests and the 
position of MONUC as a peacekeeping mission, as opposed to being considered as an occupying 
power subject to humanitarian law rules under the four Geneva Conventions 162 and their Protocols. 
 
Another major challenge, which is of a general nature but also impacts on human rights and the rule 
of law, is co-ordination. How does one ensure co-ordination of the different actors involving in 
human rights functions? How does one ensure that donor money, however well intended, does not 
generate conflict and jealousies among NGOs, and result in the distribution of existing networks 
and grass-root initiatives? For example, in Bukavu, eastern Congo an initial spontaneous and 
successful co-ordination around the issue of sexual violence suffered a major setback the moment 
donors and other external players began to show an interest in it. Somewhat understandably, the 
focus of many actors shifted from helping the victims to fund-raising and power grabbing. As a 
result, co-ordination came to a virtual standstill for a number of months during which the debate 
revolved around rather fictitious items of a purely formal nature. Eventually, after much struggling, 
the co-ordination picked up again. However, it would appear that not much progress in addressing 
violence occurred during that unfortunate interlude.   
 
Despite the presence of the Human Rights Section and all these human rights functions, the 
MONUC’s human rights mandate has been unnecessarily weak and not well-defined. The 
implementation of MONUC’s humanitarian assistance and human rights mandate appears to rest on 
                                                 
162 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 
1949 (‘Geneva I’); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea 1949 (‘Geneva II’); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War 1949 (‘Geneva III’); and Geneva Convention Relative to the protection of Civilian Person in Time of War 1949 
(‘Geneva IV’). 
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the “as MONUC deems within its capabilities and under acceptable security conditions” portion of 
the mandate.  
Success in these efforts in the overall prevention and management of the Congo conflict remains to 
be seen. 
 
4.9 African Regional Peacekeeping  
 
The United Nations pacific dispute settlement system is supposed to be supplemented by 
coordination with regional agencies or arrangements.163 Although the Charter does not define these, 
they have been understood as including the AU.164 Since its overtaking of the OAU in 2002, the AU 
has given emphasis and priorities to the transformation of its conflict resolution mechanisms 
towards more protection of human rights of civilian populations within the context of the African 
region.165 
 
Many reasons explain the need to embark on African regional peace and conflict resolution 
initiatives. In the first place, conflict prevention and management in Africa is the responsibility of 
Africans. African states and governments must take a leading role in bringing peace and managing 
conflicts in determined ways, without sole dependence on the West or the UN.166 But other reasons 
relate to the current trend of responses to conflicts and security crises in Africa. In general, there is 
non-equal treatment, which is a consequence of ongoing marginalization of Africa and political 
scepticism arising from Western stereotypes. Africa is still perceived in the West as backward, 
primitive, brutal and tribal. As can be seen from Soyinka-Airewele Western discourse analysis in 
the former Yugoslavia, people were killed in ethnic conflict, in Rwanda; they were massacred in 
tribal violence.167  The International community was spending 1.50 USD per day per refugee in 
Kosovo, while at the same period in Rwanda and Sierra Leone the amount was 0.11 USD.168 
                                                 
163 See Article 33(1) and 52(2) of the UN Charter; the Manila Declaration on the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes of 1982 A/RES/37/10; See further Evans, supra note 34, p.547. 
164 See this clarification in Evans, Ibid, p .614. 
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When any politician from almost any country mentions the holocaust, the following sentence says 
usually something as “never again”. However, the International community, represented by 
members of the UN Security Council, was for a long time immersed in a debate whether the 
situation in Rwanda should be called genocide or not. Bleak immediate testimony that it comes 
from an article by the former Czech delegate at the Security Council, Karel Kovanda.169  Because it 
was still debating what to call the events in Rwanda instead of addressing them as genocide, the 
result has been that these events have destabilized the GLR up to the present moment.170  
    
Subsequent reviews by the United Nations, the Organisation of African Union Unity (OAU) and 
national legislatures of some troop-contributing states have all agreed that there was ample early 
warning and opportunity for response to the preventable genocide of April 1994 in Rwanda. 
Estimates by the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) force commander at the time, 
General Romeo Dllaire that a deployment of approximately 5,000 troops to Rwanda a few days 
before the genocide would have been sufficient to halt the genocide have been borne out in 
subsequent investigations.171  United Nations actions during the 1994 Rwandan genocide create an 
almost criminal blame on the Organization, both for its failure to prevent the Genocide and for its 
double standards. The UN Security Council as well as UN staff sent a directive from the 
Headquarters in New York to General Dallaire indicating that the UN forces could, if necessary, 
exceed their mandate in one solitary circumstance, namely: the evacuation of foreign nationals. 
Such a directive was not only viewed with incredulity, but it was also a shocking double standard as 
there was no such a similar directive issued to rescue the Rwandans.172 This is not surprising, as 
permanent members of the UNSC usually have no particular interest in rapid, flexible and effective 
steps leading to manage conflicts in Africa.  
Admitting some of these realities, the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan states: 
 
"The United Nations does not have, at this point in its history, the institutional capacity to conduct 
military enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Under present conditions, ad hoc 
                                                 
169 Vladimír, K.(2004) ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa’ Jan Masaryk Centre of International Studies, 
University of Economics, Prague, available at <http://www.ceeisaconf.ut.ee>, last visited, September 8, 2009.  
170 Almost all of the conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes Region have some close connections to the 1994 Rwanda 
genocide. See further Mollel, A. (2007).  ‘Judicial Settlement of Armed Conflicts in International Law: Reflecting the 
2005 International Court of Justice Decision in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ in Nordic Journal of international 
Law, vol. 76, No. 4, pp. 407-434. 
171 See Report of the Secretary-General on Prevention of Armed Conflict, United Nations, A/55/985–S/2001/574, 
available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/un-conflprev-07jun.htm>, last visited, 
September 8, 2009. 
172 See more elaborate discussion on this issue in the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United 
Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, New York: United Nations, December 15, 1999. 
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Member States coalitions of the willing offer the most effective deterrent to aggression or to the 
escalation or spread of an ongoing conflict ... The Organization still lacks the capacity to implement 
rapidly and effectively decisions of the Security Council calling for the dispatch of peacekeeping 
operations in crisis situations. Troops for peacekeeping missions are in some cases not made available 
by Member States or made available under conditions, which constrain effective response. 
Peacemaking and human rights operations, as well as peacekeeping operations, also lack a secure 
financial footing, which has a serious impact on the viability of such operations."173 
 
In view of the above reasons, and with the apparent UNSC double standards with regards to 
peacekeeping deployment in African conflicts situations,174coupled with the unwillingness of 
developed states to provide troops, the only viable solution is to avail a standby African regional 
peacekeeping force. The failure of the UNAMIR to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the 
sluggishness that overshadowed the establishment of a peacekeeping force to intervene the conflicts 
in Somalia (the UNISOM I)175 and the premature withdrawal of UNISOM II176 amidst high tensions 
and continuous deadly conflicts in Somalia in 1991 to 1993 support this line of argument. 
Furthermore, the long delays in the deployment of the MONUC and the UN Assistance Mission to 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in the DRC and Sierra Leone respectively in 1999 with consequential 
serious loss of human lives and property in the said countries add more to the reasons why the AU 
should and must develop its own regional peacekeeping and peace building capabilities.    
 
The development of regional peacekeeping operations capabilities in Africa would play a central 
role as it reflects the different political and security environment of Africa. Since its inception, the 
AU has taken important steps in developing peacekeeping, human rights and security on the 
continent. The most significant AU organ when it comes to peacekeeping capabilities is the Peace 
and Security Council (PSC), established in 2003.177  The establishment of the PSC, which becomes 
a higher authority mandated to intervene in internal conflicts,178comes as a response to the need for 
the coordination of the African Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution, which was previously incorporated as one of the Central Organs of the of the former 
                                                 
173 UN Report on Reform, 16 July 1997. 
174 See this argument emphasised by Evans, supra note 34, p.613. 
175 UN Operation in Somalia I. 
176 UN Operation in Somalia II. 
177 Established under Article 2 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union of 2003, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constituting Act of the African Union (CA), 2002.  
178 See Article 7, of the PSC Protocol, reaffirming the AU’ right to intervene as already stated under Article 4(h) of the 
CA, that the PSC can recommend to the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments intervention on behalf of the 
Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments.  
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OAU.179 The PSC is composed of an African Standby Force, a body of multidisciplinary military 
and civilian ready for rapid deployment.  
 
So far, the AU has mandated and fielded two missions: the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in 
Burundi (AMIB)180 and the African Union Peace Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The two cases are 
pivotal in terms of reflecting how human rights are more centrally placed in the African Peace and 
Security agenda in the present organization. Although full success of the two missions cannot be 
asserted here, AMIB was able to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, 
contributing to the creation of conditions suitable for the deployment of UNOB on June 1, 2004. 
Similarly, despites the crisis faced by AMIS as the situation in Darfur continued to escalate, its 
deployment and its repeatedly extended mandate, paved way to the establishment of a joint African 
Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which was authorized by Security 
Council resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007. 
 
Additionally, the possibility of establishing peacekeeping operations on a regional level is not a 
novel phenomenon in the African continent. One example of Africa’s regional peacekeeping 
operation under Chapter VII before the birth of the AU was under the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), a sub-regional organisation of the OAU. It established the 
ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone in (1990-1997) 
and (1997-2000) respectively.181 Although this peacekeeping operation has been criticized on its 
legitimacy, impartiality and for going beyond the generally accepted spheres of peacekeeping 
operations,182 its achievement for paving way for peace in the region cannot be totally dismissed. Its 
intervention in Sierra Leone saved thousands of lives by providing a buffer between the combatants 
and hundreds of thousands of forcibly displaced persons.183 
 
Although there might be some disadvantages in the larger involvement of regional organizations in 
keeping the peace, the advantages are immense. The proximity of the AU to conflicts areas in the 
African continent gives it knowledge of the genesis of African conflicts and of the players involved. 
The shared culture and history can support conflict resolution as well.  
                                                 
179 See Decision AHG/Dec.160 (XXXVII) adopted by the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads and 
Governments of the OAU in Lusaka Zambia in 2001. 
180 The deployment of AMIB in 2003 aimed to achieve synergy in peace efforts within the Great Lakes 
181In cases, ECOMOG successfully undertaken humanitarian intervention and restored democracy in the two countries. 
182 It is claimed that the force involved itself in enforcement actions without the authorization of the UNSC. See more 
critics on the force in Katayanagi, supra note 12, p.33. 
183 See further discussions on the success of ECOMOG in Rotberg, R et al, supra note 166, p.169. 
   170 
 
However, although the AU and some of its sub-regional organizations are now capable of deploying 
military forces, they generally lack the staying power and multidimensional capability of forces like 
the UN’s. Many of the new structures are yet to be fully operational. One of the most significant 
shortcomings of the AU is the lack of institutional capacity, especially the human resources, to 
adequately develop policy, and plan and manage peace operations.  The AU has only a handful of 
staff dedicated to managing peace operations, significantly less than its UN and EU counterparts. 
Investing in African peacekeeping capacity through training and equipping peacekeepers is a 
worthwhile thing for the rest of the world to consider. 
 
One of the critical challenges for an African regional peacekeeping force is financing. As can be 
seen from the first two AU peace operations, the AMIB and the AMIS, which were mainly donor 
funded, it is clear that, for the foreseeable future, the AU will be dependent on donor support for its 
peace operations. This is problematic because it denies the AU the independence to make decisions 
about some of the strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of peace operations it may wish to 
undertake.  
 
As we shall see later, the performance of any peacekeeping that is deployed is dependent on, among 
other things, the resources at its disposal in the course of its operations. One comment is worth 
making at this juncture about the lessons learned from some of the AU regional peacekeeping 
operations, particularly the AMIB, which stands so far as the AU’s first fully-fledged peacekeeping 
operation. Despite the need for regional peacekeeping initiatives, the UN should still retain its 
primary role of maintenance of international peace and security by involving itself in the planning 
and close consultation with regional peace initiatives. 
 
4.10 Conclusion: Challenges and Limitations of the Approach 
 
In an attempt to explore the conflict prevention and management strategies applied in resolving the 
Africa’s Great Lakes conflict, the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC, the MONUC, 
have been taken as a case study. While all peacekeeping operations could be said to have a 
preventive function in that they are intended to avert the outbreak or recurrence of conflict, 
their preventive role has been particularly hampered by the various shortcomings as 
discussed in this chapter. If one notes that conflicts are either still ongoing or have recurred in 
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most of the places where peacekeeping operations have been deployed, then the challenges and 
limitations of peacekeeping as a conflict prevention and management approach is evident. 
 
This chapter has attempted to analyze the concept of peacekeeping and to explain the inadequacies 
and shortcomings of this method as a conflict-resolution strategy. There are numerous legal, 
political, financial, organisational and operational reasons for the UN’s inability to put up effective 
peacekeeping on the ground whenever and wherever needed. Surely, the UN’s failure to solve 
ongoing conflicts does not mean a failure of UN peacekeeping per se. But the United Nations (and 
the international community) failed when it introduced military conflict management as a core 
component of broadly defined peacekeeping strategies without backing up these expanded 
peacekeeping mandates with necessary moral and material support. 
 
Beyond financial constraints, another significant challenge results from difficulties in reconciling 
the UN foundational principles of non-interference into states’ internal affairs184 and the 
inviolability of state sovereignty on the one hand, and its noble role of the maintenance of 
international peace and security on the other. The proscription on interference in State’s internal 
affairs could be lifted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for collective enforcement,185 but unless 
the situation is determined unanimously by the Security Council to be a threat to international 
peace, these criteria continue to pose doctrinal dilemmas. This inhibits deployment of more 
vigorous peace operations where intervention is required, especially in the currently common 
internal armed conflicts situations, which typically result in massive human rights violations.  
 
Another concern is that, unless the currently prevailing nature and mandate with which 
peacekeeping operations are deployed is changed, such forces will find their freedom of action 
considerably more constrained and endangered.186 The deployment of unarmed or lightly armed 
troops in peace support operations in circumstances where no true peace exists, and the risk to life 
that this entails, discourages states that perceive no vital interest in the outcome from making units 
                                                 
184 Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter prohibits the intervention of States’ internal affairs. See also the 1965 Declaration on 
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of the Independence and 
Sovereignty, UNGA Res.2131 (XX) of December 21, 1965. 
185 Thakur and Schnabel, Albrecht, supra note 1, p. 238; Article 2(7) of the UN Charter puts a caveat to the principle of 
non interference into internal affairs thus: “this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII”. 
186 The Somalia situation is a good case in point. 
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available to the UN. Therefore, only peace enforcement forces prepared for combat and capable of 
effective coercion should be deployed into a potentially hostile environment like that in the DRC.187 
Although UN peacekeeping may not necessarily be the best instrument for the task at hand in every 
instance, it has always been one of the visible symbols of the UN role in international peace and 
security. But one major deficiency of the UN when it comes to peacekeeping operations is the fact 
that there is no military branch within the organisation. Despite the establishment of the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the conduct of peacekeeping operations remained to be on ad 
hoc basis to-date, and due to the inability of members to agree on a comprehensive set of guidelines 
to govern all UN operations; this is likely to remain the status quo.188        
 
There are also impediments internal to peacekeepers themselves. Despite the existence of a 
comprehensive set of guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations, it is outrageous that UN 
peacekeepers’ abuse of their role and mission is widespread.189 A report by the UN Secretary-
General’s Special Envoy on Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse makes it clear that some of the 
UN peacekeepers engage in acts of sexual misconduct and sexual exploitation in the course of their 
peacekeeping roles.190  In the aftermath of these abuses, 2005 saw members of the UN 
peacekeeping mission in the DRC, MONUC facing 150 charges of sexual exploitation and abuse, 
including rape, and trafficking of persons.191 
 
Unless clear and severe actions are taken against UN personnel who infringe upon their codes of 
conduct, the UN may in fact be fuelling more scepticism on the part of the receiving populations 
against peacekeeping operations. In order to ensure those who are mandated do not become 
perpetrators of abuse, the UN must take a stronger stand against those who commit acts of sexual 
misconduct, and must ensure that victims see the abuser brought to justice and that fair and 
reasonable reparation is offered.  
 
Given the enormous problems that peacekeepers from developed states have had in Africa, and 
considering the demonstrably high degree of reluctance of western governments to take part in 
                                                 
187 It is understood that as the original Chapter VI mandate of the MONUC could not work to enable the force fulfil its 
objectives, it has now been mandated to operate under Chapter VII meaning that it is allowed to use all necessary means 
including pre-emptive force within its capacity, to carry out its tasks.  
188Murphy, supra note 24, p.97. 
189 Complaints emerged against Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Mozambique, West Africa, 
Eritrea, Kosovo and currently the DRC. See also Murphy (2007), supra note 23, p. 230. 
190 Report of the UN Secretary-General: A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc.A/59/10, 24 March 2005 (‘Zeid Report), para 66. 
191 Ibid. 
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future peacekeeping activities on the continent, African governments must take the leadership role 
in dealing with the brutal realities of African conflicts.192  Therefore, perhaps more so than at any 
other time in the past, African governments need to be committed to establishing and enhancing 
local, sub-regional, and regional mechanisms to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts in Africa.193 
This is not to diminish the role of the UN in maintaining peace and security in the world since the 
UN will still need to provide technical, financial and other logistical supports to regional 
peacekeeping operations, like those developing in the African continent. 
 
As the analysis of the MONUC portrays, the human rights component of peacekeeping operations is 
vital if the root cause of the conflicts is to be addressed. In essence, both UN forces and other 
peacekeeping forces deployed under regional or sub-regional arrangements can only be effective as 
a conflict management strategy if their activities include the protection and promotion of human 
rights in the areas they are deployed. This entails not only stopping human rights abuse as 
perpetrated by the parties to the conflict in question but also abstinence by members of the 









                                                 
192 See Recommendations of the Brookings Institution/UNHCR/OAU Workshop on Internal Displacement in Africa, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Oct. 19-20, 1998; see generally UNHCR, “The State of the World's Refugees: A Humanitarian 
Agenda” (1997) <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pub/state/97/toc.htm> last visited, September 8, 2009. The Security 
Council has repeatedly been accused of double standards with its treatment of Africa and there is a great concern about 
the unwillingness of developed states to provide peacekeeping forces in difficult situations in Africa, even if such 
situations led to serious catastrophes like the genocide in Rwanda. Again, there were long delays in deployment of 
MONUC in the DRC despite several urges from the Secretary-General on the urgency of deploying such a force. See 
further discussion on this issue in Gray, supra note 24, p.615  
193 Levitt, supra note 12, p.3 
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5 INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND RESOLUTION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 
IN THE DRC. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Adjudication or judicial settlement of disputes is one among a range of existing UN-Charter based 
mechanisms to resolve conflicts,1 recognized and practiced by states in international law from 
classical times.2 It is a general term referring to settlement of disputes by all sorts of national and 
international judicial bodies known as courts or tribunals, and in particular permanent global and 
regional courts of general or specialized jurisdictions established pursuant to a treaty in which 
independent judges render legally binding decisions on the basis of International Law.3 
 
Adjudication generally refers to processes of decision making that involve a neutral third party with 
the authority to determine a binding resolution through some form of judgment or award.4 
Adjudication is carried out in various forms, but most commonly occurs in the court system. It can 
also take place outside the court system in the form of alternative dispute resolution processes such 
as arbitration, private judging, and mini-trials. However, court-based adjudication is usually 
significantly more formal than arbitration and other ADR processes. The development of the field 
of alternative dispute resolution has led many people to use the term adjudication to refer 
specifically to litigation or conflicts addressed in court.5 Therefore, court-based adjudication will be 
the main focus of this chapter. 
 
 Various approaches have been used to resolve the DRC conflicts, including adjudication. This 
chapter examines the role of adjudication in the resolution of armed conflicts. It therefore addresses 
all judicial means of dispute settlements that have relevance in the conflict resolution processes in 
the DRC. So, attention will be centered on the role of such international judicial bodies as the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ),6 the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals [the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY)7 or the International Criminal Tribunal for 
                                                 
1 See Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, 1945 (hereafter referred to as the “UN Charter”). 
2  The other is arbitration in which states themselves set up a tribunal to decide their dispute (s). 
3 See this definition in Boczek, B. (2005). International Law: A Dictionary, Oxford: The Scarecrow Press Inc., p. 365. 
4 Douglas, Y. (1999), The Dictionary of Conflict Resolution, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, p. 5. 
5 Heidi and Burgess, G. (1997). Encyclopedia of Conflict Resolution, Denver: ABC-CLIO, p. 2. This excerpt of the 
Burgess' book includes a helpful discussion of the key differences between court-based adjudication and alternative 
dispute resolution processes. 
6 Established as one of the Six Principal Organs of the United Nations. See Article 7 (1) of the UN Charter. 
7 The Unite Nations Security Council (hereinafter referred to as “the UNSC”), acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, and by Security Council resolution No. 827 & 808 (1993) established the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia for the sole purpose of prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of International 
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Rwanda (ICTR)8], and the International Criminal Court (ICC).9  Mention will also be made of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal10 and other judicial bodies involved in settling disputes on the international 
level.11   In relation to the ICJ, the chapter makes a critical examination of the role of this Court in 
the light of the 2005 ICJ Judgment on the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo.12 The discussion in the initial part of the chapter will therefore mainly focus on the decision 
of the ICJ in that case, as a lesson on the role of the ICJ in settling armed conflicts in international 
law that could be learned and applied to the future. The main argument is that, although the 
adjudicatory role of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN is a crucial method in pacific 
settlement of international disputes, it is unlikely to suit armed conflicts situations. 
 
Jurisdictional limitations of the ICJ in adjudication of armed conflicts situations are pointed out. 
Specifically, this chapter points to the preclusion of the Court from adjudicating the other cases 
brought by the DRC against Rwanda and Burundi as an illustration of one such limitation. It 
stresses, however, that the very outcome of the 2005 ICJ decision in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo v Uganda case is, in fact, really another example of its limitations. 
 
Without getting into detailed discussions of theories of compliance with international law, which is 
considered to be beyond the scope of this chapter, the chapter further discusses the question of 
compliance with the current ICJ decision in the light of previous state practices. Since there are no 
established enforcement mechanisms in the international system akin to those in national legal 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. See preamble to the Statute for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1993. 
8 Having been established by the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other 
such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. See 
UNSC resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994 as amended by Security Council resolutions 1165 (1998) of 30 April 
1998, 1329 (2000) of 30 November 2000, 1411 (2002) of 17 May 2002 and 1431 (2002) of 14 August 2002. 
9 The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent, permanent court that tries persons accused of the most 
serious crimes of international concern, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. See Article 1 of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 UNTS. 90; 37 I.L.M. 999 (entered into force July 1, 
2002) [hereinafter “the Rome Statute”] 
10 Was an International Military Tribunal established for the trial and punishment of major war criminals of the 
European Axis. The trials were held in the city in the city of Nuremberg In Germany, from 1945 to 1949. See Article 1 
of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, August 1945. 
11 Although not all judicial bodies are discussed here, it is understood that such other international judicial bodies may 
also include the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea (ITLOS), etc. 
12 Application instituting proceedings filed in the registry of the Court on 23 June 1999, General list No. 116. See also 
order on request for indication of provisional measures: I.C.J Press Communique 2000/24 (1 July 2000). On this, see 
also Kristiotis, D Case Note (2001) 50 ICLQ, pp.662−9; For further discussion on this case, see Alexander, O. (2006) 
‘Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) in 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 753-763(11). 
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systems, the question of whether decisions of international judicial bodies (the ICJ in this case) are 
complied with remains at the mercy of the losing states. In the final analysis, I point to the current 
weaknesses and limitations—with regard to the administration of justice--of the international legal 
system as a whole. 
 
More importantly, even if the Ugandan government, in this case, were to comply with the current 
ICJ's decision, one may still pose a question: Is that all? Couldn't we think of more justice for 
remedies to the DRC and its people through further responsibility in international law? Does the 
2005 ICJ's judgment provide an effective remedy for the human rights atrocities, war crimes, war of 
aggression and crimes against humanity committed by the military and paramilitary forces 
organised by Uganda and its allies in the territory of the DRC from 1998 to early 2003? These 
questions and many others, leads to the discussion of the desperate jurisdictional limitation faced in 
international adjudication of armed conflicts by the ICJ under its Statute, particularly in dealing 
with states’ responsibility for crimes and wars crimes generally under international law. 
    
To discuss these issues, the present chapter will be divided into six parts. Part 1 will introduce the 
subject under discussion and point out the aim and structure of the chapter. Part 2 will dwell on the 
historical development of the concept of adjudication in international law, tracing this development 
from the time of the PCIJ to the current ICJ, looking at the mandate of the Court, the nature and 
legal effects of its decisions generally, and the enforcement mechanisms for such decisions under its 
Statute and general international law. Part 3 will be devoted to the background of the armed 
activities in the territory of the Congo by Uganda and its allies with the resultant serious negative 
effects on the population and property of the DRC. Part 4 will be devoted to the role of the ICJ in 
the DRC Conflict. This entails an assessment of the history of the proceedings leading to the 2005 
ICJ decision, of the jurisdictional limitations of the Court and of compliance with its decisions by 
the losing states, in the light of past experience of states’ practices. Part 5 is concerned with 
international criminal adjudication where I examine the concepts of “State’s criminality” and 
individual criminal liability. While I use the Bosnia-Herzegovina case to elaborate on the role of the 
ICJ in the former, I take reference of the Lubanga case to examine the role of ICC in the latter. The 
last part, Part 6, will bring forth some conclusions, pointing out the main argument of this chapter, 
namely the inefficacy of international adjudication in dealing with armed conflict situations in 
international law. This part will also provide for some recommendations about possible ways to 
move forward. 
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5.2 Development of Adjudication in International Law 
 Before the twentieth century, international disputes were usually resolved by diplomatic 
negotiation, occasionally by arbitration, and often by war. Negotiations did not always substitute for 
the use of force, which unfortunately remained the ultimate instrument of diplomacy.13 While this 
trend continued until recent days, with the concept of humanitarian intervention gaining momentum 
as a sort of legitimizer, the basic presumption of international law according to Articles 2 (4) and 2 
(7) of the UN Charter is that the use of force is illegal, except for self-defence and/or collective 
security. Thus, diplomatic means of settling conflicts, including adjudication, are today considered 
central to the maintenance of global security. 
 Historically, judicial settlement of disputes developed from arbitration, the latter being the oldest of 
all known legal methods of disputes settlement in international law.14 With time, though, many 
pacifists perceived the limitations and weaknesses of arbitration and sought to fill in other ways the 
gap through which nations could still plunge to war. They emerged with another plan—conciliation. 
Those issues which governments were not willing to submit to arbitration should be referred to 
another kind of third party whose recommendations would not be binding. This principle, however, 
like arbitration, had its limitations.  It signaled the failure to avert the First World War. 
 
Because both arbitration and conciliation possessed some limitations15, it became necessary to 
devise other ideas to resolve disputes peacefully or to stop wars after they began. These involved 
mediation, good offices16 and inquiry. Another proposal which seemed most attractive was that 
associated with the creation of an international court of justice. A permanent legal tribunal could 
operate under commonly accepted practices and perhaps even statutes; it could be distinctive in its 
procedures and authority. The main idea was that if nations could agree to establish rules of 
behaviour and a genuine judicial court, they would then willingly bring their disputes to the bar of 
justice.17   
 
                                                 
13 Slomanson, W (2004), ‘Historical Development of Arbitration and Adjudication,’ Miskolc Journal of International 
Law, Vol.1, No.2, pp. 238-241. 
14 The origin of arbitration can be traced back to the 1794 Jay Treaty between Great Britain and the          
     United States. See also Boczek, supra note 3. 
15 Due to the consensual and non-binding nature of these methods, states could still engage in war as no formal 
adjudicator supervised the outcome of the settlement processes. 
16 The provision of good offices has often been referred to as “quiet diplomacy” since the process often involves 
entrusting the dispute to personalities with special qualification on whom both parties agree. This might involve, for 
example, heads of states or the Secretary-General of the United Nations, or their designees. 
17 Mangone, G. (1954) A Short History of International Organizations, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, p.12. 
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Unlike other previous methods, judicial settlement of disputes involves the reference of disputes to 
permanent tribunals for a legally binding decision. Serious legal scholarship on the possibility of 
establishing a recognized tribunal culminated in the establishment of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (the PCIJ)18 under the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1921. This 
tribunal, authorized under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, functioned until 
April 1946.  
 
The history of the PCIJ during the inter-war period was generally a satisfactory one.19 In twenty-
five years, it heard sixty-five cases and rendered thirty-two decisions and twenty-seven advisory 
opinions.20 Nonetheless, while the court contributed immensely to the rule of law in international 
affairs by its existence, operation, and decisions, it faced problems similar to those experienced by 
arbitral bodies. It never developed a code to be used in the judging of cases, and nations did not 
entrust major problems to it for settlement. These weaknesses were compounded by its lack of 
authority to uphold decisions and by attitudes about states’ sovereignty which kept issues involving 
vital interests, national honour, and independence outside of the realm of this form of justice.21 
 
The demise of the League of Nations at the aftermath of the Second World War and the subsequent 
establishment of the United Nations went hand in hand with the disappearance of the PCIJ and the 
establishment of the International Court of Justice22, (hereinafter referred to as ICJ or the Court). 
The Court, which is composed of fifteen judges who are elected for nine-years terms23 came into 
existence with the election of the first members in February 1946, inheriting not only the premises 
and archives of the pre-war Permanent Court, but also, so far as possible, its jurisdiction.24  
The ICJ was established, not as an independent body from the United Nations, as the case was with 
its predecessor with the League of Nations, but as an integral part--the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations.25 Its seat is in the Peace Palace at the Hague in the Netherlands. 
                                                 
18 The first standing International Judicial body established in 1922 to decide disputes between states.  
19Hugh, T (2003), ‘The International Court of Justice’ in Evans, M. (Ed.), International Law, New York: Oxford 
University Press, p. 561. 
20Riggs, R and Plano, J. (1998) The United Nations: International Organisation and World Politics, California: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., p.194. 
21For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, less and less states seemed inclined to bring their disputes before the ICJ. 
22 Established under Chapter XIV (Articles 92−96) of the UN Charter and the Statute of the Court, which although it is 
not incorporated into it forms an integral part of the Charter and elaborates certain general principles laid down in 
Chapter XIV of the Charter on the operation of the Court. 
23 See Article 3 of the Statute of International Court of Justice, 1945 (hereafter referred to the ICJ Statute). See also 
Hugh, supra note 19, p.562. 
24See Article 59 and 60 of the ICJ Statute. 
25 The ICJ is one of the six principal organs of the UN listed under Article 7 of the UN Charter; Others are the General 
Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social    
     Council, the Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat. 
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Under its mandate, the Court serves a dual role: first to resolve legal disputes submitted to it in 
accordance with international law;26 second, to provide advisory opinions on questions of 
international law referred to it by other international bodies.27 The first function is, however, limited 
to only those disputes submitted by states, excluding non-state entities such as individuals, 
intergovernmental organisations, multilateral organisations or non-governmental organisations.28 
This is one among the Court’s significant jurisdictional limits. 
 
According to Article 93 of the UN Charter, all United Nations member states are automatically 
parties to the Court’s Statute, and even non-UN members may also become parties under Article 
93(2) of the Charter of the United Nations.  However, being a party does not automatically give the 
Court jurisdiction over disputes involving those parties. The key principle is that the ICJ exercises 
jurisdiction only on the basis of consent. Article 36 outlines four bases on which the Court's 
jurisdiction may be founded.29 First, parties to a dispute may refer cases to the Court on their 
specific consent in that particular dispute (jurisdiction founded on "special agreement" or 
"compromis"). This method is based on explicit consent rather than true compulsory jurisdiction. It 
is, perhaps, the most effective basis for the Court's jurisdiction because the parties concerned have a 
desire for the dispute to be resolved by the Court and are thus more likely to comply with the 
Court's judgment.  
Second, the Court has jurisdiction over "matters specifically provided for in the UN Charter or in 
treaties and conventions in force".30 Some of the treaties contain compromisory clauses, providing 
for dispute resolution by the ICJ. Cases founded on compromissory clauses have not been as 
effective as cases founded on special agreement, since a state may have no interest in having the 
matter examined by the Court and may refuse to comply with a judgment. For example, during the 
Iran hostage crisis, Iran refused to participate in a case brought by the USA based on a 
compromissory clause contained in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,31 nor did it 
comply with the judgment.  Since the 1970s, the use of such clauses has declined substantially. 
Many modern treaties set out their own dispute resolution regime, often based on forms for 
arbitration. 
                                                 
26 See Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. 
27 See Article 96 of the UN Charter; See also Ibid, Article 36. 
28 See Ibid., Article 38. 
29 See elaborations on compromisory clauses and jurisdiction of the Court in Article 36 of the ICJ Statute. 
30 See Article 36(1) of ICJ Statute. 
31 Done at Vienna on April 18, 1961. Entered into force on April 24, 1964. See United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500,   
    p. 95. 
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Thirdly, Article 36(2) allows states to make optional clause declarations accepting the Court's 
jurisdiction. The tag of "compulsory" which is sometimes placed on Article 36(2) jurisdiction is 
misleading since declarations by states are voluntary. Therefore, the provision applies only between 
states that have made the optional declaration, but for them it extends the Court’s jurisdiction to all 
legal disputes concerning: 
a. The interpretation of a treaty; 
b. Any question of international law; 
c. The existence of any fact, which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation; 
d. The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation.32 
Furthermore, many declarations contain reservations, such as excluding from jurisdiction certain 
types of dispute ("ratione materiae").  
 
The principle of reciprocity may further limit jurisdiction. As of April 2008, sixty-six states had 
declarations in force.33 Out of the five permanent members of Security Council, only the United 
Kingdom has made such a declaration.34  In the Court's early years, most declarations were made by 
developed countries. However, since the Nicaragua case, declarations made by developing 
countries have increased, reflecting a growing confidence in the Court since the 1980s. Developed 
countries, however, have sometimes increased exclusions or removed their declarations in recent 
years. Examples include the USA, as will be further explained later, and Australia, which modified 
its declaration in 2002 to exclude disputes on maritime boundaries, most likely to prevent an 
impending challenge from East Timor which gained its independence two months later.  
 
Finally, Article 36(5) provides for jurisdiction on the basis of declarations made under the Statute of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice. Article 37 of the ICJ Statute similarly transfers 
jurisdiction under any compromissory clause in a treaty that gave jurisdiction to the PCIJ. In 
addition, the Court may have jurisdiction on the basis of tacit consent (forum prorogatum). In the 
absence of clear jurisdiction under Article 36, jurisdiction will be established if the respondent 
accepts its jurisdiction explicitly or simply pleads to the merits. This latter situation arose in the 
                                                 
32 See Article 36 (2) of the ICJ Statute and also Riggs & Plano, supra note 20, p.196. 
33 Available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3>, last visited, September 9, 2009. 
34 Alexandrov, S. (2006) ‘The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: How Compulsory’, 
Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 29−38. 
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Corfu Channel Case35 in which it was held that the letter from Albania stating that it submitted to 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ was sufficient to found jurisdiction. 
 
As can clearly be seen from the foregoing, the Court's jurisdiction is usually compromisory, 
consensual and in most cases, optional.  This consensual nature of the Court’s jurisdiction has led, 
at times, to some significant failures of justice. This issue will be revisited later with more details in 
this chapter. Suffice it to say here, that the creation of the Court represented the culmination of a 
long development of methods for the pacific settlement of international disputes, the origins of 
which can be said to go back to classical times.  
 
Despite its shortcomings, the role of the Court in the peaceful settlement of international disputes 
has generally been greatly significant over the period of its operation. After an initial period of 
uncertainty that led to a resolution by the General Assembly in 1947 concerning the need to make 
greater use of the Court, the Court's work at first assumed a tempo comparable to that of the PCIJ. 
Then, starting in 1962, all the signs were that the States which had created the ICJ were now 
reluctant to submit their disputes to it. The number of cases submitted each year, which had 
averaged two or three during the fifties, in the sixties fell to none or one.36   
 
In the 1970s, at a time when the level of the Court's activity was in a marked decline, the United 
Nations Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report, felt obliged to recall the 
importance of judicial settlement and 12 States suggested that a study should be undertaken of the 
then current obstacles to the satisfactory functioning of the International Court of Justice, and ways 
and means of removing them, including additional possibilities for use of the Court that had not yet 
been adequately explored. The General Assembly placed on its agenda an examination of the 
Court's role and, after several rounds of discussions and written observations, it adopted a fresh 
resolution concerning the ICJ on 12 November 1974.37  
 
Since 1986, the Court has experienced a significant increase in the number of cases referred to it. 
Over a period of some ten years, it has been asked to deal with 19 contentious cases and four 
requests for advisory opinions. At the end of July 1996, nine contentious cases were pending before 
                                                 
35 Corfu Channel Case, (United Kingdom v Albania), I.C.J Reports, 1949, p. 459−60. 
36 From July 1962 to January 1967 no new case was brought, and the situation was the same from February 1967 until 
August 1971. 
37 See UNGA Res 3232 (XXIX) of November 12, 1974; Positive changes were then witnessed soon as from 1972 the 
number of new cases brought to the Court increased, and between 1972 and 1985 cases averaged from one to three each 
year. 
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the Court. In its resolution, the General Assembly declared the period 1990−1999 as the United 
Nations Decade of International Law, and considered that one of the main purposes of the decade 
should be “to promote means and methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes between States, 
including resort to and full respect for the International Court of Justice."38  
Thus, beginning in 1999, the number of cases coming before the Court has risen dramatically. 
Between 1990 and 1997 they averaged eleven cases and the number continued to grow to twenty-
three cases which were pending before the Court in the year 2000. Generally, from May 1947 to 
November 2009, 144 cases were entered in the General List.39 Their subject-matter is varied, 
ranging from land and maritime boundaries disputes between neighbouring countries, territorial 
sovereignty, diplomatic relations, the right of asylum, to nationality and economic rights.  
 
Legally speaking, once a state has consented to the jurisdiction of the Court, it must accept and 
comply with its judgment, which is also final and without appeal.40 As clearly stipulated, each 
member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case to 
which it is a party.41 
 
The very essence of adjudication in any legal system, international legal system inclusive, is the 
capacity of the system to ensure compliance with the final decision of the judicial organ in question: 
hence, enforcement mechanisms. Under normal circumstances, drawing from national legal 
systems, there is a complete system of judicial settlement of disputes, including compliance and 
enforcement systems. In criminal cases for example, the executive branch has the inherent and 
exclusive power to enforce Court judgments in national legal systems. Similarly in civil litigation, 
unless compliance is voluntary by the losing party, the domestic court has power to issue an 
execution order which can be enforced by the court’s approved agents with the assistance of the 
executive in some instances.42 Judicial settlement of disputes in this instance therefore, creates some 
degree of certainty so far as the outcome of the court's decision is concerned. 
 
At the international system of adjudication however, there is no clearly established enforcement 
system analogous to that of domestic judicial systems. This has led some international legal 
                                                 
38 General Assembly resolution No.44/23 of November 17, 1989. 
39 Available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
40 See Article 59 and 60 of the ICJ Statute. 
41 Article 94(1) of the UN Charter. 
42 Warioba, J (2001) ‘Monitoring Compliance with and Enforcement of Binding Decisions of International Courts,’ 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 5, pp. 41−52. 
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scholars to go as far as arguing that as there are no clearly established enforcement mechanisms for 
binding decisions in international adjudication; international law is not law at all.43  Others counter 
this contention by arguing that non-compliance with decisions of judicial bodies alone does not 
make a particular legal system non-existent. 
       
The hoped-for results of the ICJ's decisions therefore, though clearly binding, are jeopardized by the 
absence of clearly established enforcement mechanisms. In the same way that jurisdiction is 
consensual and compromisory, so is compliance.    
Under the framework of the UN Charter, responsibility for ensuring compliance is not within the 
ICJ’s mandate, but rather, with the principal political organ for maintaining peace and security–the 
UN Security Council. Article 94(2) provides: 
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered 
by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems 
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the 
judgment. 
 
This clearly manifests the strong link between the ICJ and the Security Council as institutions with 
related but decidedly different competencies in the settlement of international disputes; the ICJ is 
tasked with allocating rights and responsibilities and assessing competing legal claims among 
willing member states while the Security Council is tasked, upon judgment, to give effect to that 
decision, should the debtor state refuse to comply. 
A number of subtle points are discernible from the text quoted above: first, only ‘judgments’ of the 
ICJ are subject to Article 94 enforcement. Secondly, only the judgment creditor state has the right to 
seek recourse from the Security Council.  (Note that this was not the case with the League of 
Nations and Permanent Court).44 Thirdly, the Security Council appears to retain discretion both as 
to whether it shall act to enforce at all and, if so, what concrete measures it decides to take. Clearly, 
therefore, the enforcement of ICJ judgments involves quintessentially political acts by both parties 
and the Security Council, in which the Court itself has little involvement and over which it has no 
power. Furthermore, this provision does not confer any additional power to the Security Council, 
and as such, the judgments of the Court have mostly been considered as principally declaratory of 
rights and duties of the parties and no more.45 
                                                 
43 O'Connel, M. (1995) ‘Enforcement and the Success of International Environmental Law’, Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies, vol. 5, No.1, pp. 47-64. 
44 Art. 13(4) of the League of Nations Covenant suggested that ‘ proceedings were to be automatically 
launched irrespective of any formal complaint by the judgment creditor ’ : This difference has no practical relevance, 
however, for the League of Nations Council never took action on its own initiative on the basis of Art. 13(4), whereas 
the Security Council can take action propio motu if there is a threat to the peace. 
45 O'Connel, supra note 43. 
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That is why, the fact that the judgment is binding on the parties does not mean that they may not, by 
agreement between themselves depart from it, unless the decision is founded on one of the rules of 
jus cogens.46 These are some of the challenges that one must be aware of when examining the 
outcome of the 2005 ICJ decision against Uganda. 
 
5.3 Background to the Armed Activities on the Territory of the DRC 
 
The DRC conflict, which has occasionally been described as Africa's World War,47 and which led 
to the armed activities undertaken by Uganda and its allies in the territory of the DRC, is an 
extremely complex one. It is in fact an intertwined convergence of several conflicts on local, 
national and regional levels, which are focused primarily on the eastern half of the country, and it is 
one of the situations in which the international community has witnessed the internationalisation of 
an internal warfare.  
 
The complexity of this conflict is highly illustrative of justice issues faced today by the international 
community in the aftermath of human rights atrocities. Domestic and state actors were entangled in 
a web of interests, which must be addressed fully to lay the foundations of sustainable peace. 
Interestingly, the present discussion about justice for the DRC revolves around the usual 
combination of trials and truth commissions.48 Although the Congolese government has taken steps 
to hold its neighbouring states responsible before the International Court of Justice, much is yet 
needed if justice is to be seen to have been done. 
 
This chapter argues that the attribution of crimes to state actors is vital for reconciliation on a 
regional level and for long-term stability in the Africa's Great Lakes Region. Although it is evident 
that the mechanisms for holding states responsible for crimes under international law are still 
evolving and that they do not at present provide very effective tools,49 something beyond the 2005 
ICJ's decision has to be done that will help fill the gaps in the international justice system.  
                                                 
46  Hugh, supra note 23, p. 580. 
47 Hawkins, V (2004) “Stealth Conflicts: Africa’s World War in the DRC and International  
Consciousness.” in The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a126.htm> last visited, 
September 8, 2009. 
48Huls, V. (2006) ‘State Responsibility for Crimes under International law: Filling the Justice Gap in the   
      Congo’, available at <http://www.lawanddevelopment.org>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
49 Ibid. 
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In reality, the DRC conflict was and still is a humanitarian catastrophe of virtually unfathomable 
proportions, which has raged across more than half of a country almost the size of the whole 
Western Europe, and has seen eight African countries50 being directly involved in military activities 
in the DRC. Not only is it the deadliest war in the world today, it is the deadliest since World War 
II, having resulted in an estimated 4 million conflict-related deaths since fighting broke out in 
August 1998.51 
 
It all started as the direct effect of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide52, to which it is closely connected. 
But it also has its origins in the colonial and post colonial legacy (in terms of citizenship rights and 
land ownership) of forced migrations of Rwandan-speaking people under Belgian colonialism,53 in 
internal divisions exacerbated by decades of misrule under the US-backed Mobutu54, in decades of 
ethnic conflict and refugee flows culminating in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and in the spillover of 
four years of civil wars deep into the DRC territory.  
 
The relationship between the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the DRC conflict is clearly visible. 
Some of the remnant forces of the ex Hutu-led government which was defeated in 1994 (The Forces 
Armees Rwandaise, FAR), now called ex-FAR and members of the genocidal Interahamwe militias, 
responsible for killing some 800,000 ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus during the Genocide, fled 
across the border to the DRC and continued occasional launching of attacks on Rwanda from the 
DRC territory.55 
 
Rwanda wanted the Congolese Government, then under Mobutu Seseko, himself a notorious 
dictator of his time, to stop these Interahamwe militia’s activities. (Later, there was suspicion that 
the militia received full support from the Congolese Government).56  
At the same time, the then rebels Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire 
(AFDL) led by Laurent Kabila, taking advantage of the complex situation in the DRC, invaded the 
Eastern DRC in 1996 in a bid to fulfilling his long time desire of seizing power from Mobutu. 
                                                 
50 Notably the DRC itself, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Chad. 
51  Hawkins, supra note 48. 
52 Mpangala,  G. (2000) Ethnic conflicts in the Region of the Great Lakes: Origins and  Prospects, , Dar Es Salaam: Dar 
Es Salaam University Press, p.90. 
53 Hochschild, A. (1998)  King Leopold’s ghost. A story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa, London: 
Macmillan, p. 141. 
54 Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Ngbendu wa Za Banga was the president of Zaire (now the DRC) for 32 years 
(1965−1997). 
55 Mpangala, supra note 52. 
56 Kamukama, D. (1997) Rwanda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, p.63. 
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When Mobutu fled, Laurent Kabila assumed presidential power in the DRC with the support of 
Rwanda and Uganda, but the new government of Laurent Kabila soon fell out with Rwanda and 
Uganda’s interests. A year later, in August 1998, they (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi), allying with 
new sets of domestic groups opposed to the Kabila regime tried to replace their former ally and new 
leader, Laurent Kabila, accusing him of now backing the remnants of the Interahamwe forces.57 In 
this new development, Rwandese forces occupied large parts of the territory of the eastern Congo 
while Ugandan forces occupied the territory in the Northeast of the country. They all had the same 
mission, another attempt to remove their former ally, Laurent Kabila, from power. But this time, 
they were blocked by troops from other neighbouring countries of Angola, Zimbabwe, Chad and 
Namibia and a four-year stand-off ensued in a conflict which then developed a highly international 
and very complex character.58  
 
The DRC was effectively split into three parts, the government with its supporters held the West, 
while East was divided between Rwanda forces on the one part, and Uganda and Burundi forces on 
the other. Each of the players in the conflict – the DRC government, the numerous rebel groups 
(and their often opposing factions), the local militias, and the foreign countries which have 
intervened militarily – has or has had different objectives and agenda.  
The hostile operations of rebel movements from bases in the DRC provided much of the initial 
rationale for intervention by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. The DRC’s relations with rebel 
movements from Angola and the Sudan also weighed heavily on their decision to intervene. Later 
on however, access to resources in the DRC became the key factor in foreign involvement on both 
sides, with deals between the DRC and Zimbabwe and Namibia in particular proving critical in 
securing their intervention. 
 
Various Peace Agreements have been signed since 1999 for the withdrawal of foreign military 
forces involved in the hostility and by the main Rwandan and Ugandan proxies – the Rally for 
Congolese Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), but were 
never implemented.59 The UN Security Council established an observer mission, which was later 
transformed into a peacekeeping mission (known by its French acronym as MONUC)60. The full 
deployment of the MONUC was repeatedly delayed, and its role remains relatively negligible 
against the backdrop of the conflict on the ground. 
                                                 
57 Ibid, p.65. 
58 Mpangala, supra note 52, p.93. 
59These agreements were the Lusaka, Kampala and Harare  Peace Accords of 1999. 
60 Mission de l' Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo. 
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In January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated and succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila,61 under 
whom peace negotiations successfully enabled the withdrawal of foreign forces and the signing of 
peace agreements with all major rebel groups.62  This move has stabilized the present situation to 
some degrees.  
 
All in all, the DRC war has intensified and worsened the Africa’s Great Lakes region conflict 
generally.  More particularly, it had serious negative impacts on the people and property of the 
DRC. Competing armed groups violated international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law by carrying out large scale ethnic massacres of unarmed civilians, deliberate and 
arbitrary killings, extra-judicial executions, torture including rape and other forms of sexual abuse, 
incommunicado detentions, and the use of child soldiers. All of these seem to be the norm during 
the war in this mineral-rich corner of Congo.63 For instance, a local conflict between Hema and 
Lendu ethnic groups allied with national rebel groups and foreign backers, particularly Uganda and 
Rwanda, has claimed over 60,000 lives since 1999, according to the United Nations estimates.64  
 
The DRC war in many ways is more reminiscent of organized crime and gang warfare than 
conventional armed conflict.65 Security reasons claimed by the initiators of the conflict, Uganda and 
Rwanda, initially may have been just but provided cover for other real intentions. The actual 
reasons for the involvement of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi in the Congo war have been divided 
in three main areas of concerns. The first actual concern was the intention to overthrow Laurent 
Kabila and install a puppet regime that would serve their security as well as their economic interests 
including the exploitation of mineral resources.66  The second area constitutes the concept of 
“Hima-Tutsi Empire” according to which Uganda and Rwanda have a long term strategic plan of 
‘conquering’ the whole Great Lakes Region and establishing the “Hima-Tutsi Empire” or at least 
installing leaders of Hima-Tutsi origin or blood in all the countries of the Africa’s Great Lakes 
Region.67 In addition to the two missions above, the third area of concern has been the protection of 
                                                 
61 Talbot, C. (2001) ‘Congo Peace talks Revived after Kabila's assassination’ in World Socialist Website, February 23, 
2001, published by the International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI). 
62 The ''Sun City Agreement’’ signed in South Africa in December 2002 formed an ''all    
     Inclusive’’ interim government which has so far maintained some degree of stability.  
63 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Making Human Rights Work: Time to Strengthen the Special Procedure’ See 
<http://www.hrw.org>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
64United Nation Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
and other Forms of Wealth in the DRC in 2002 (S/2001/357), 12 April 2001. 
65Huls, supra note 49. 
66 Mpangala, supra note 52, p.96. 
67 Ibid. 
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economic, financial and geostrategic interests of neo-colonial powers particularly the US.68  
Whatever the actual reasons, the ultimate results were commission of war crimes, genocide, crimes 
against humanity and all other sorts of infliction of suffering to the Congolese population,69 issues 
which, far beyond the scope of this study, need to be investigated further for judicial purposes. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, which joined the war in support of Kabila, their 
main argument was that they were acting collectively under Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations in self-defense against an armed attack on their neighbour and fellow member of the United 
Nations and SADC. It has, however, been argued that these countries also have had some economic 
interests in joining the war.70 
 
5.4 The Role of the ICJ in the DRC Conflict  
 
The history of the proceedings leading to the 2005 ICJ Judgment on the Case Concerning Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo portrays a long struggle towards accessing the international 
justice system. 
On June 23 1999 the DRC filed in the Registry of the Court three Applications instituting 
proceedings against Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda, respectively, for acts of armed aggression 
perpetrated in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU). In its Applications, the DRC contended that the invasion of 
Congolese territory by Burundian, Ugandan and Rwandan troops on August 2, 1998 (an invasion 
claimed to have involved fighting in seven of the DRC provinces) constituted a violation of its 
sovereignty and of its territorial integrity, as well as a threat to peace and security in central Africa 
in general and in the Great Lakes region in particular. The DRC accused the three States of having 
attempted to capture Kinshasa through Bas-Congo, in order to overthrow the Government of 
National Salvation and assassinate President Laurent Desire Kabila, with the object of establishing a 
Tutsi regime or a regime under Tutsi control. The DRC also accused these States of violations of 
international humanitarian law and massive human rights violations, and of the looting of large 
numbers of public and private institutions. It further claimed that the assistance given to the 
Congolese rebellious groups and the issue of frontier security were mere pretexts designed to enable 
the aggressors to secure for themselves the assets of the territory invaded and to hold to ransom the 
civilian population.  
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
69 Numerous Human Rights Watch Reports available at <http://www.hrw.org> last visited, September 8, 2009. 
70 See generally Huls, supra note 48. 
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 The Democratic Republic of Congo accordingly asked the Court to declare that Burundi, Uganda 
and Rwanda are guilty of acts of aggression; that they had violated and continued to violate the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols; that, by taking forcible possession 
of the Inga hydroelectric dam and deliberately and regularly causing massive electric power cuts, 
they made themselves responsible for very heavy losses of life in the city of Kinshasa and the 
surrounding areas; and that, in shooting down a Boeing 727 aircraft on 9 October 1998, the property 
of the DRC Airlines, and thus causing the death of 40 civilians, they violated certain international 
treaties relating to civil aviation. 
 
 The DRC further requested the Court to declare that the armed forces of Burundi, Uganda and 
Rwanda must forthwith vacate the territory of the Congo; that the said States should secure the 
immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Congolese territory of their nationals, both natural 
and legal persons; and that the DRC is entitled to compensation in respect of all acts of looting, 
destruction, removal of property and persons and other unlawful acts attributable to the States 
concerned. In its Application instituting proceedings against Uganda, the DRC invoked as a basis 
for the jurisdiction of the Court the declarations by which both States have accepted the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation.71 
 
 For the proceedings against Burundi and Rwanda, the DRC invoked Article 36(1), of the ICJ 
Statute72 the UN Convention against Torture73 and the Civil Aviation Convention,74 as well as the 
Rules of the Court.75   
                                                 
71 Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. Uganda, October 3, 1963: 
“I hereby declare on behalf of the Government of Uganda that Uganda recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without 
special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, and on condition of reciprocity, the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the 
Court.” 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, February 8, 1989: 
“...in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: 
The Executive Council of the Republic of Zaire recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in 
relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of a treaty; 
(b) any question of international law; 
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; 
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 
It is understood further that this declaration will remain in force until notice of its revocation is given.” 
72 The relevant provision states that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases, which the parties refer to it, and all 
matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. 
73 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of   
   December 10, 1984. 
74 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation of   
    September 23, 1971. 
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At this juncture the parties were in a situation which this chapter seeks to elucidate.  One state had 
filed an application against another state which did not accept the jurisdiction of the Court.76 
 In the two cases: Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v Burundi) and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v Rwanda), the respondent States (Burundi and Rwanda) informed the Court at the outset of 
their intention to raise preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of 
the Applications. When the position of Burundi and Rwanda was made clear, the DRC withdrew 
the cases against the two states, on jurisdictional limitations of the ICJ against them, but 
resubmitted a case against Uganda later in 2002.  
 On purely justice reasons, an assessment of the discontinuation of the cases against the two states is 
worth looking at, before embarking on a discussion of the final decision against Uganda. This is 
because the preliminary proceedings in this case reveal the shortfalls of the ICJ structure and the 
mandate it has when dealing with the responsibility addressing, under international law, crimes 
committed by states.77 
 
 As often happens in the ICJ cases, the grounds for the discontinuation of the cases against the two 
states were purely jurisdictional. As pointed out early in this chapter, the ICJ’s authority to render 
judgments in contentious cases depends on the consent of the parties, and to adjudicate upon a 
dispute without such consent would run counter to this well-established principle of international 
law as embodied in the Court's Statute.78 Whereas the DRC, then Zaire, accepted the ICJ 
jurisdiction without condition in 1989, and Uganda did so at independence in 1962 with the 
condition of reciprocity,79 the two states (Rwanda and Burundi) had neither accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction in all cases, nor acceded to a treaty providing for jurisdiction in specified 
circumstances. Therefore, the case against them was inadmissible. 
 
To make things more complex, when the DRC, applying the procedure provided for under the 
Court’s Statute requested for the indication of provisional measures against the presence of 
Rwandase forces in its territory, the question of jurisdiction was also invoked. The DRC’s desperate 
efforts to establish the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of treaty provisions also proved futile. The 
                                                                                                                                                                  
75 Article 38(5) of the ICJ Rules of the Court. 
76 See this comment available at <http://www.icj-cij.org>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
77Huls, supra note 48. 
78 See also Monetary Gold Removal from Rome Case in 1943, I.C.J Reports 1954, p.32. 
79 A list of the commitments by states parties to the ICJ Statutes is available at 
<http://www.212.153.43.18/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm>, last visited, September 8, 
2009.  
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DRC invoked several treaties,80 particularly the Genocide Convention81 which under its Article IX 
provides for recourse to the ICJ as a dispute settlement mechanism. Unfortunately, as Rwanda had 
filed a reservation to Article IX of the Convention when it acceded to it, the Court denied 
jurisdiction under the Convention. Congo then went as far as pointing out the violation of erga 
omnes obligation by Rwanda, an argument that any legal counsel struggling to establish the Court's 
jurisdiction, especially when none is clear, would have raised. But the Court also rejected this line 
of argument, stating that there is a difference between the erga omnes character of a norm and the 
rule of consent to jurisdiction.82 In the final analysis therefore, the Judges decided that the Court 
lacked the necessary prima facie jurisdiction.  However, denial of jurisdiction as was observed by 
the Court in this case raises a number of international law issues, which require some consideration. 
The most significant of these issues relate to the law on unilateral act of reservations to Article IX 
of the Genocide Convention. The DRC made submissions that Rwanda’s reservations were 
incompatible with rules of jus cogens and with the purpose and object of the Genocide Convention.  
However, without examining in detail whether the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention 
actually allows such a reservation, the Court simply, in one sentence, submitted that because the 
Court’s jurisdiction is consensual and because Article IX is a procedural provision, the reservation 
to it does not contradict with the object and purpose of the Convention. Without further 
qualifications, such a legal position would open the door for unpredictable situations.83 
  
This case is a graphic example of the international legal system’s inability to do justice in ordinary 
cases. Except in those cases where special tribunals are created by the UN Security Council or by 
mutual agreement, international disputes-resolution through judicial bodies are impeded with 
restrictions and limitations that prevent them from addressing the full scope of the disputes brought 
before them. 
 
One of the Judges in the case, Judge Nabil Elaraby, shared the same view in the separate opinion. 
Although voted with the majority on jurisdictional issues, the Judge argued that the case highlighted 
a major weakness in the contemporary international legal system: 
                                                 
80 Including the Genocide Convention, 1948 etc. Although the Court may have no jurisdiction over a state under its 
statute, it can still be a dispute settlement body if it is so defined by a treaty signed.  
81 General Assembly resolution No.260 (III) A of December 9, 1948. 
82 Monetary Gold Removal case, supra note 78, para 46. 
83 Ibid. See also the ICJ Advisory Opinion in Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, ICJ Rep 1951 at p. 15, where compatibility with the object and purpose of the Convention was 
considered as the condition precedent to acceptance of a reservation. 
 
   193 
“[In the instant case, the Court was precluded, by virtue of the nature and limitations of the 
international legal system as it exist today, from the appropriate administration of justice. As a 
result, the Court has not been able to examine the merits of the claims of the DRC. This inability 
is compounded by the fact that the case forms part of a series of cases brought before the Court 
by the DRC relating to armed activities of neighbouring states on its territory. Although these 
cases are related and, to a considerable extent, the facts, circumstances and situations at issue 
overlap, they are nonetheless distinct cases, each brought upon its own grounds for jurisdiction 
and giving rise to its own legal considerations. 
The promise and possibilities of the Court, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations 
entrusted with the responsibility of settling disputes, requires that states submit their disputes to 
the Court and accept its jurisdiction. The duty of states to settle their disputes peacefully and in 
accordance with international law is emphasized in a number of important provisions enshrined 
in the Charter of the United Nations. Some built-in limitations of the Statute, resonant of 
limitations of the international legal system generally, are relics of the past era which need to be 
revisited. The case before the Court today represents a clear reflection of these limitations. It 
serves as a reminder to the international community in the twenty-first century of the imperative 
of actively seeking to overcome hurdles in establishing jurisdiction. The Court may thereby play 
a stronger role in the peaceful settlement of international disputes and in enhancing respect for 
international law among states]” 84       
Such a proposal for universal acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction which the Judge seems to 
advocate in the above passage is unlikely to come into existence any time soon. In the meantime, 
the final outcome of the collapsed DRC cases against Rwanda and Burundi makes it critical for the 
international community to step into the reconstruction process. 
 
With the DRC’s withdrawal of the two cases, the case against Uganda proceeded alone, leaving the 
other alleged perpetrators of the war crimes and property looting to go untouched. In its detailed 
application against Uganda, the DRC contended that the armed aggression committed by Uganda in 
its territory had involved inter alia violation of the principles of non-use of force, including the 
prohibition of aggression, the obligation to settle international disputes exclusively by peaceful 
means, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, violations of international humanitarian law 
and massive human rights violations. The DRC then sought to secure the cessation of the acts of 
aggression directed against it, and compensation from Uganda in respect of all acts of looting, 
destruction, removal of property and persons and other unlawful acts attributable to it.  The DRC 
sought to reserve the right to determine at a later date the precise amount of the damage suffered, in 
addition to its claim for the restitution of all property removed. 
                                                 
84 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda), see also 
<http://www.worldlii.org/int/case/ICJ>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
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The case went to full hearing stage and on December 19, 2005; the Court issued its final judgment 
in what came to be known as the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda). The Court held that the armed activities of Uganda 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo between August 1998 and June 2003 violated the 
international prohibition against aggressive use of force as well as international human rights and 
humanitarian law, among others. It stated: 
The Court thus concludes that Uganda is internationally responsible for violations of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law committed by the UPDF and by its members in 
the territory of the DRC and for failing to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri 
in respect of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the 
occupied territory.85  
The Court ordered Uganda to pay reparations to the DRC, noting under prior precedent it is “well 
established in general international law that a State which bears responsibility for an internationally 
wrongful act is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by that act”.86 
 
The ICJ did not however, device the amount of reparation. Rather, the amount to be paid in 
reparation was to be determined through bilateral negotiations between Uganda and the DRC.87  In 
the Court's own words, it is not for the court to determine the final result of these negotiations, 
although in the event the parties fail to reach a settlement, the amount of reparations will be 
determined by the Court and such determination will be final and binding on all parties.88  
 
Initially Ugandan government top officials contested the case, consistently denying the claims 
saying Uganda only acted to protect national security.89  
The question still is open about what should be done should Uganda refuse or fail to pay the amount 
assessed by the ICJ.  Although in its decision the Court left the door open for the parties to refer the 
matter to the Court in case they fail to agree on the amount of reparation, it is likely that the matter 
would end up before the United Nations Security Council which is authorized to make 
recommendations aimed at ensuring compliance with the ICJ's decisions.90 The UN Security 
                                                 
85 Para 220 of the Court Judgment. 
86 Para. 259 of the Court Judgment. 
87 Paras. 260 and 261 of the Court judgment. 
88 See General Assembly resolution No.260 (III) A of December 9, 1948. 
89 Joram, J. (2006, April 11). ‘Uganda to explain Killing and Invasion of the DRC Congo in The Hague’ in The 
Monitor, p.8. 
90  See Montreal Convention, supra note 74. 
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Council's powers in this respect as pointed out early in this study have been equated with its broader 
powers in the enforcement of international peace and security.  
 
While coercion is unlikely, possible measures may include a resolution calling on Uganda to pay 
such reparation, or one imposing economic sanctions and/or calling on other UN member states to 
freeze Uganda's assets in their territories. 
 Two crucial points need be considered at this stage, however. First, the UN Security Council is 
merely authorized, and not obligated, to make any such recommendations aimed at enforcing the 
ICJ's decisions. Secondly, the Council is a political, not a judicial, organ, meaning that the ultimate 
enforcement is therefore a political rather than a legal matter.91 These two factors imply that not 
only may the UN Security Council ignore decisions of the ICJ, but that it will (assuming it chooses 
to act) be motivated by political, and not legal, considerations. In other words, while there is no 
room for judicial appeal against ICJ decisions, there may be an option of a "political" appeal before 
the UN Security Council. In the latter case however, a decision by the Security Council to enforce 
compliance with a judgment rendered by the court is a procedural matter, subject to the veto power 
of permanent members and thus depends on the members' willingness not only to resort to 
enforcement measures but also to support the original judgment.  Enforcement may therefore be 
unlikely if, for instance, Uganda decides to look for one member of the Security Council to veto 
(object to) any recommendations aimed at enforcing the ICJ's decision.92 
 
In the absence of such enforcement measures by the Security Council, if Uganda, for whatever 
reasons, decides not to comply with the current ICJ's decision, it will not be setting its own 
precedent as several instances of non-compliance with the Court's binding decisions already exist. 
States’ practices with regards to compliance with ICJ judgments, starting from the Corfu Channel 
case in the late 1940s to the Arrest Warrant Case93 decided in 2002, indicate particular trends. A 
perception developed during the 19th century that binding decisions of international judicial bodies 
were something for small countries. In that respect, the “major powers” tend to accept international 
adjudication only when their interests are not threatened.94 A few examples of cases where the 
Court issued a final order and the debtor state defaulted to comply with such orders will substantiate 
                                                 
91 Brack, D. ‘International forums for no-compliance and dispute settlement in environment-related                
      Cases’,  <http://www.riiw.org/Research/eep/eep.html>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
92 Bagenda, E ‘There is a Catch in Enforcing the ICJ’s Recommendations’, Africa Files: available at 
<http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp>; last visited, September 8, 2009. 
93 Arrest Warrant (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium), I.C.J Reports 2002. 
94 Warioba, supra note 42, p. 45. 
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this argument. To start with, the 1946 Corfu Channel Case 95 itself arose from incidents that 
occurred in October 22, 1946, in the Corfu Strait, where two British destroyers struck mines in 
Albanian waters and suffered damage, including serious loss of life. The United Kingdom 
submitted an application to the ICJ, accusing Albania of being responsible for the explosions, and 
claimed compensation for the losses sustained therefrom.   In its final Judgment the Court decided 
that Albania was responsible and ordered compensation to be paid. Albania refused to comply with 
the Court's decision, and the case was unresolved for more than forty years. It was only in 1992, 
after the fall of its communist regime that Albania agreed to terms, eventually resolving the case in 
1996. With the legal principle that justice delayed is justice denied, a settlement agreement which 
came 47 years late raises a question whether the decision in this case should really be considered 
one which was ever complied with.  
 
In the 1974 Nuclear Test Case,96 both Australia and New Zealand instituted proceedings against 
France over its atmospheric nuclear tests in the Pacific. France refused to appear or abide by the 
Court's interim orders of cessation of the tests, and in its letter of January 10, 1974 to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, the French Government withdrew France's acceptance of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36 (2) of the ICJ Statute. Although France 
initially made a unilateral declaration that it will stop its tests, making the ICJ to interpret such a 
declaration as a legally binding commitment, it was only after it had completed its nuclear tests and 
had no more interests with the project that France ceased to ignore the Court’s decision. 
 
The United States' rejection of the ICJ decision in the Nicaragua Case97 is also relevant in the case 
at hand. Nicaragua instituted proceedings against the United States before the ICJ accusing that the 
US financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized military operations launched by the contra 
force against the Nicaragua government for purposes of overthrowing the latter.  
On June 27, 1986 the Court delivered its judgment on the merits of the case. It found the United 
States to have breached a number of its obligations under customary international law and its 1956 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Nicaragua. It also held that “the United States 
of America is under a duty immediately to cease and to refrain from all such acts as may constitute 
breaches of the foregoing legal obligations, is under an obligation to make reparation to the 
                                                 
95 Corfu Channel Case, supra note 35. 
96 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1974, p.253 
97  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), I.C.J 
Reports 1986, p.14 (hereafter referred to as Nicaragua Case). 
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Republic of Nicaragua for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations under 
customary international law and of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.”98 
 
Although the United States, like any other party to the Statute, is bound by the decisions taken by 
the Court, it refused to participate in the proceedings, and it subsequently withdrew its consent to be 
bound by the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. This case went even a step further as Nicaragua 
sought to explicitly invoke the provisions of Article 94(2), to seek considerations of the Security 
Council to enforce compliance by the United States of its obligations stemming from the judgment 
of the Court. Although other members of the Council voted in favour, the adoption of the resolution 
against the United States failed because of the obvious veto of the US as a permanent member. 
 
This brief history of states’ reactions to adverse ICJ decisions indicates that non-compliance does 
not necessarily justify the Security Council's sanctions as envisaged under the UN Charter and 
general international law. Worse than all is the fact that the actions of non-compliance with the 
Court's final decisions by such major powers as the United States and France, which claim 
leadership in international affairs, is a big blow to the confidence in the Court. 
All along, the author has been trying to reflect the possibilities that are apparent with regard to the 
2005 ICJ Judgment in the Case Concerning the Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo.  
 
The foregoing analysis makes it clear that three methods have been applied by losing parties as 
tools in avoiding compliance with the Court's final decision; namely, deliberately avoiding being 
involved in litigation, delaying techniques and direct non-compliance, especially in highly 
politically sensitive cases. 
Nonetheless, perhaps the question of compliance, non-compliance or even enforcement of the 
current ICJ decision might not have any important relevance if one asks oneself the question, “Is 
that all?”  Even though ICJ judgments ordering reparations to be made to the injured states (the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo in this case) may carry some weight, it is clear that the ICJ is 
incapable of fully holding states responsible for crimes under international law.  And even if 
Uganda ultimately complies with the current judgment, a fact that remains to be seen, can the 
judgment be said to have remedied the injustices committed in the territory of the Congo? 
An answer in the negative means that other ways to ensure that states act responsibly need to be 
explored. 
                                                 
98 Ibid. 
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5.5 International Criminal Adjudication 
 
Over the last few decades, a new trend in international criminal justice has emerged.99 Increasingly, 
international courts and tribunals are resorted to in establishing the guilt or innocence of individuals 
charged with serious international crimes. The main reasons for the current blossoming of 
international criminal justice reside in various convergent factors: the spread of human rights 
doctrines and the increasing feeling that the most effective means of enforcing respect for such 
rights lies in prosecuting and punishing their violators; the failure of national courts to bring to trial 
the alleged authors of egregious breaches amounting to international crimes; and the objective 
merits of international judicial mechanisms, as compared to national courts.100  
 
Furthermore, as universal jurisdiction of national courts is only proving workable to a limited 
extent, the other alternative avenue, that is, resort to international criminal adjudication remains the 
relatively more effective way out.  International criminal adjudication or international judicial 
intervention is a third and new dimension in international relations, following diplomacy and the 
use of force as organising principles of international action by states. It has taken the recognition of 
individuals as subjects, not as objects, of international law to new heights by establishing as a new 
reality of our time, the accountability of individuals for crimes in which humanity itself is the 
victim. These crimes are genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the Geneva 
Conventions and the laws and customs of war.101 
 
What is the aim of this new endeavour? It is not solely individualistic, the punishment of violations 
of individual victims of mass crime. Its ultimate aim is to heal fractured societies and help establish 
peace and reconciliation by addressing the root cause of such destabilization- impunity since 
international criminal adjudication addresses mass crimes which inevitably dislocate societies. 
 
Impunity may be defined as the absence of accountability and of the rule of law within states or 
other formal organizational structures; a situation in which coercive power, not rules, regulations or 
law, is the organizing principle. But if impunity is absence of accountability, then it follows that the 
establishment of a culture of accountability is necessary to eradicate it. Thus, it is necessary to 
introduce an element of accountability in order to secure a long-term resolution and reconciliation 
                                                 
99 Cassese, A. (2009) The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
123. 
100 Ibid. 
101 For a thorough discussion of these crimes and the elements, see generally Mettraux, G. (2005). International Crimes 
and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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of the conflicts that are inevitably generated by situations of impunity. Accountability in a complete 
sense is not, and should not be subject to subjective definitions. It means legal responsibility and 
punishment for criminal illegal acts or omissions. It does not mean “truth telling” for mass atrocities 
without the consequences of responsibility, which is what justice is all about. This is so, although 
other goals, including establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions, may be conceived as 
the end result of that process. 
 
The question is: What is the best way to reach peace and reconciliation? Is it truth commissions 
aiming at uncovering the past by, sometimes, promising amnesty to individuals prepared to confess 
their crimes, or is it courts and tribunals whose task is criminal prosecution and that therefore may 
dissuade some involved in the subject of inquiry from cooperating to create a complete picture of 
the events in question? It is argued here that justice for mass atrocities, as dispensed by international 
criminal justice bodies, is a fundamental, though not the only, component of reconciliation, and that 
these choices are not mutually exclusive. The general merits of international criminal adjudication 
are many. 
 
Firstly, international courts proper may be more impartial than domestic bodies for they are made 
up of judges having no link with the territory or the state where the crimes have been perpetrated. 
When national territorial tribunals, including truth commissions conduct proceedings, national 
feelings may impede the administration of justice. Secondly, international judges, being selected on 
account of their competence in the area of international humanitarian law and international criminal 
law, are better suited to pass judgements over crimes that markedly differ from ordinary criminal 
offences within national jurisdictions, such as theft, murder, assaults etc. Thirdly, they also are 
better equipped to deal with crimes that may involve nationals or territories of more than one state 
and in a better position to benefit from the cooperation of the various states involved. Fourthly, 
international judicial bodies have greater visibility than national judges. They may thus have a 
greater impact on the world public opinion and better contribute to international efforts against 
impunity. Fifthly, international crimes are gross offences against universal values. They do not only 
break moral and legal values prevailing in the local community directly affected by such crimes. 
They also infringe values that are transnational and of concern for the whole world community. 
Hence, only international judicial bodies, expression of the whole international community, can 
appropriately pronounce on such crimes. 
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Finally, such judicial bodies apply international principles and rules, and are thus unbound by 
national approaches and traditions. They thus ensure greater uniformity than national courts in 
adjudicating international crimes.102 
 
5.5.1 State ‘Criminality’ and International Criminal Adjudication 
 
One obvious result of conflicts is gross human rights violations– massacres, persecutions, killings, 
rapes, genocides.  The responses to these violations have varied throughout history: (i) revenge, (ii) 
forgiving and forgetting, or (iii) bringing perpetrators to justice through international judicial or 
quasi-judicial bodies. International criminal adjudication deals with the last option: bringing the 
perpetrators before international judicial bodies, facing them with charges, deciding upon their 
responsibility and eventually punishing them.103  This approach was first introduced by an 
(unsuccessful) attempt to try Kaiser Wilhelm II after World War I, then continued after World War 
II in Nuremberg and Tokyo trials concerning war criminals responsible for most heinous atrocities 
committed during that war, through the various recent judicial forms–ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and international Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), as well as the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) at the Hague. 
 
Enthusiasm for international criminal adjudication steadily rose over the latter half of the twentieth 
century, culminating in the entry into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Rome Statute), which created the International Criminal Court (ICC) in July 2002.104 It is, 
however, unfortunate that the current legal regime on international criminal adjudication does not 
precisely attribute criminal responsibility to states, rather to individuals. A quick look at the recent 
practice is sufficient to realize that state responsibility and individual criminal liability are 
considered as distinct in international law.105 The ICJ has recently observed that the duality of state 
and individual responsibility continues to be a constant feature of international law.106 
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The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,107 which have been 
developed by the International Law Commission (ILC) may be worthy of mention. The Articles do 
not specifically deal with states’ criminal responsibility and therefore not much can be drawn from 
them, yet they are the first step towards codification for this area of international law.  Although the 
notion of states’ responsibility for crimes under international law was initially sought to be 
introduced in the ILC Draft Articles in the first reading, it was later rejected and set aside 
altogether.108  Likewise, the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
adopted by the ILC in 1996109 (hereinafter referred to as the “ILC Draft Code”) bears clauses 
similar to those found in the Draft Articles,110 exempting states from criminal responsibility under 
international law.111 Such clauses are fairly illustrative of the way in which the two forms of 
responsibility have evolved lately. The long codification process of state responsibility attests to the 
difficulties of adjusting the old fashioned and rather rudimentary responsibility schemes--as they 
have emerged particularly as regards the treatment of aliens--to the evolving realities of 
international law.112 
 
It has been argued however that this does not prevent international law from responding to different 
kinds of breaches and their different impacts on other states, on people and on international order.113  
According to Article 19 of the Draft Articles and its commentary, the concept of crimes of states 
hinges on three basic elements: first, the existence of a special class of rules that are designed to 
protect fundamental values and consequently lay down obligations erga omnes;114 second, the 
granting of the right to claim respect for those rules not only to the state that may suffer damage 
from a breach, but also to other international subjects; third, the existence of special regime of 
responsibility for violations of those obligations,115 in other words, the fact that the legal response to 
breaches is not merely a request for reparation but may embrace a wide range of sanctions, or 
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remedies.116  As regards the first two elements underlying the concept of crimes of states, there has 
undisputedly been a departure from the traditional approach to state responsibility; under the old 
law the consequences of international delinquencies were only a private business between the 
tortfeasor and the claimant and no distinction was made as regards the importance of the primary 
rule breached. Today, however, many customary and treaty rules lay down obligations that states 
regard as being of fundamental importance; in addition those rules confer on broad categories of 
international subjects the right to demand their observance. Thus, the breach of one of them has 
become a public affair involving not only the two parties directly concerned, but also the world 
community at large.117   
International responsibility of a state under the Articles arises from the commission by that state of 
a wrongful act. An internationally wrongful act presupposes that there is a conduct consisting of an 
act or omission that (a) is attributable to a state under international law and (b) constitutes a breach 
of international obligation of the state. In principle, the fulfillment of these conditions is a sufficient 
basis for international responsibility as has been consistently affirmed by international courts and 
tribunals.118  
 
International law then distinguishes between states’ responsibility arising out of the context of 
direct state-to-state wrongdoing, and responsibility arising in the context of diplomatic protection, 
with the conclusion that in the former case, responsibility is prima facie engaged. Aggression is one 
among the international crimes currently envisaged by customary international law. Aggression was 
first regarded as an international crime involving individual criminal liability in the London 
Agreement that established the International Military Tribunal for the Major War Crimes 
(hereinafter “the IMT Charter”), Nuremberg.119 According to the IMT Charter, Crimes Against the 
Peace, namely planning, preparation, initiation or waging war of aggression or war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy 
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing, are crimes for which there shall be individual 
responsibility.120  It is important to note that wars of aggression were only one of the subcategories 
of the broad category of ‘crimes against the peace’.  
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However, for various reasons, no state has been held criminally responsible for the crime of 
aggression since 1940s although States have engaged in acts of aggression, and in some few cases, 
the UNSC have confirmed so.121  Although there have been controversies on the definitional aspect 
as to jurisdiction of international judicial bodies since 1946 to the present, the crime of aggression 
has so far developed as customary rule of international law122 entailing states’ criminal 
responsibility under international law. 
 
There is now precedent that human rights atrocities including genocide and war crimes have been 
extensively addressed in the international level from the Nuremberg tribunal, the Yugoslav and 
Rwanda Tribunals to the current International Criminal Court. However, the structural impediments 
in the international judicial system makes it difficult to directly hold states criminally responsible in 
international law, and as such, responsibility of states for such crimes has so far not been addressed 
sufficiently to establish legal custom.123  It is not surprising therefore that the DRC Government 
opted for a more traditional judicial method recognized in international law in holding states 
responsible for their internationally wrongful acts, the ICJ without exploring any other possibilities 
for more effective remedies for the injustices committed in its territory. 
      
The Bosnia-Herzegovina case,124 which has recently ended before the ICJ125 presents a novel 
development in this area of international law. On March 20, 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina initiated 
proceedings before the ICJ against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (later Serbia and 
Montenegro) for, inter alia, crimes committed by the latter (and their antecedent state, Yugoslavia) 
during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, particularly genocide of Bosnian Muslims. The main 
allegation in the case was therefore violation of the Genocide Convention. It seemed clear, 
however, that attempting to prove that Yugoslavia, at a state level, intended to destroy at least part 
of the non-Serb population in Bosnia was a challenge for the Sarajevo lawyers. 
 
                                                 
121 The UNSC has defined as acts of aggression certain actions or raids by South Africa and Israel; see for instance 
resolution 573 of October 1985 on Israeli attacks on PLO targets and resolution 577 of December 1985 on South 
Africa’s attack on Angola; and many more recent resolutions.   
122 See for instance the same argument by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. 
123See Huls, supra note 48, p. 9 
124 Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), General List No.91 February 26,2007; first filed as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia in 1993. 
125 In its verdict issued on February 26, 2007, the Court found by 13 votes to 2 that Serbia had not committed or 
conspired to commit genocide. See ICJ Press Release 2007/8. 
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The ICJ judgment of February 26, 2007 noted that, genocide is a crime under international law, and 
reaffirmed the norm prohibiting genocide as jus cogens. It held that genocide requires intent to 
destroy at least a “substantial part” of a protected group, and that the intent may be to destroy a 
group within a geographically limited area. The Court finally held that, while the respondents 
(Serbia and Montenegro) were not responsible for the genocide committed,126 they were in violation 
of the Genocide Convention127 in that they did nothing to prevent the genocide from occurring and 
afterwards did not punish the perpetrators.  
 
This was the first time that a state has been found in violation of the Genocide Convention. As a 
landmark case, this case serves to probe the applicability, capacity and validity of the ICJ to enforce 
the Genocide Convention in this case and in the future ones. The case also raises several 
philosophical issues, one of which is the concept of whether the whole state can be held criminally 
responsible, in this case, for genocide.  
  
Be it as it may, it is in fact possible to establish state responsibility for a crime like genocide 
precisely by looking at the actions and mindsets of senior officials, irrespective of whether these 
actions were supported or even known about by the population as a whole.128   
 
5.5.2 Individual Criminal Liability and International Criminal Adjudication 
 
Although development of rules on individual criminal responsibility was in process in the 1990s,129 
the concept of attribution of criminal responsibility to individuals is not a completely novel issue in 
international law.130 Some international crimes such as piracy and slavery have been regulated since 
the 1800s, with these regulations developing later into customary international law.  
       
The first serious attempt to establish individual criminal responsibility in international law was 
undertaken after the First World War, where the ex-German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II was to be 
held responsible for crimes termed “the supreme offence against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties and war crimes”.131 He was, in fact, not tried.  Historically, the turning point for 
                                                 
126 See para 180 of the Court judgment. 
127 General Assembly resolution No.260 (III) A of December 9, 1948 
128Cobban, H. (2006)‘Bosnia vs. Serbia/Montenegro at the ICJ’ in Transitional Justice Forum,   
February 2006, available at <http://www.tj-forum.org/archives/001761.html>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
129 The seriousness came with the setting-up of the two ad hoc Tribunals for the prosecution of crimes committed, 
respectively, in the former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) and in Rwanda (ICTR). 
130 See Cassese, A (2003). ‘International Criminal Law’ in Evans, supra note 19, p. 735. 
131 See Article 227 and 228 of the Versailles Treaty of 1919.   
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the development of individual criminal responsibility came with the establishment of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 132 and Tokyo133 after the Second World War. The 
prosecutions in these early ad hoc criminal tribunals established an important precedent to the effect 
that individuals, regardless of their ranks, could be held responsible for offences amounting to war 
crimes, crimes against the peace, and crimes against humanity, and that individual responsibility 
was enforceable at the international level. 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals, together with the adoption of the Genocide 
Convention in 1948,134 provided an inspiration for the subsequent establishment of the two ad hoc 
tribunals for the prosecution of crimes committed respectively, in the former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)135 and in Rwanda, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).136 The former held its seat in The Hague, 
Netherlands, while the latter was located in the northern town of Tanzania, Arusha.  
While there have been various criticisms (and at times genuine ones) against the work of these 
tribunals, it is argued that the two tribunals represent major progress towards institutionalized 
international criminal adjudication. They have marked the first time the modern international 
community has sanctioned broadly international criminal bodies to hold individuals responsible for 
the alleged perpetration of three core categories of international crimes: war crimes, genocide, and 
crimes against humanity. Moreover, they represented at the time and still represent an adept legal 
response to the changing nature of warfare, insofar as they also dealt with non-international armed 
conflicts rather than solely the traditional legal and political paradigm of interstate conflicts.  At the 
same time, the tribunals have also provided clarification as regards the substance of what is 
becoming a sort of international criminal code, in the sense envisaged by the UNGA resolution 95 
(1) of 1946.137  
                                                 
132 Established under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279; 59 Stat. 1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39 
AJILs 258 (1945). See further Shattuck, J. (2006), ‘The Legacy of Nuremberg: Confronting Genocide and Terrorism 
through the Rule of Law’ Gonzaga Journal of International Law, vol. 10, No 1, pp 6-16. ‘Who would have thought that 
the city most often associated with Nazi Germany would later become the birthplace of the modern human rights 
movement?’ 
133 See The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, proclaimed at Tokyo, January 19, 1946. 
134 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, 78 UNTS. 277, entered into force 
Jan. 12, 1951. 
135 Established under the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN. 
Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council on 25 May 1993, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827 (1993). 
136 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1994, adopted by SC. Res. 955, UN. SCOR, 49th Sess., 
3453d mtg. at 3, UN. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1600 (1994). 
137 In resolution 95 (1), the UNGA affirmed Principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal (“The Nuremberg Principles”). See text in Schindle, T (1998).  The Laws of 
Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and other Documents, 3rd Edn., Dordrecht/Geneva: Martinus 
Nijhoff/Henry Dunant Institute, p. 5. 
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Although these two tribunals have, in addition, responded to the traditional criticism of lack of 
international enforcement mechanism for the laws of war, other serious second-hand criticisms soon 
emerged about their likely effectiveness and consequences. 138 Critics of the efficacy of the 
tribunals point to the fact that they were politicised and selective, in the sense that they were 
established for Bosnia and Rwanda but not for the numerous other similar situations. For example, 
following the gravity of human rights atrocities and war crimes in the DRC conflict, there have 
been frequent calls for the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.139 Accordingly, one solution proposed for bringing the perpetrators of crimes 
against international humanitarian law to book in the DRC would be for the UNSC to establish a 
new ad hoc tribunal, modelled after the ICTY and ICTR. However, none of the resolutions on the 
DRC thus far have even hinted in this direction. Instead, the UNSC has consistently stressed the 
responsibility of the parties to the conflict to bring the violators to book. No new ad hoc tribunal has 
been established after the ICTR despite calls for such measures, for example, by Burundi. The 
prospects for a new ad hoc tribunal for the DRC must therefore be considered to be very bleak. 
There is an obvious nexus between the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the more recent conflict in the 
DRC. Thus, another hypothetical solution for addressing crimes against international humanitarian 
law in the DRC conflict could be to extend the present mandate of the ICTR to include war crimes 
and crimes against humanity committed in the DRC.140 For various reasons, however, this would 
also not be a feasible way forward. Besides the political and legal difficulties involved in amending 
the mandate, the ICTR would need enhanced capacity to tackle such a task.141 
 
Irrespective of this, however, it is crucial to make an assessment of the efficacy or otherwise of the 
ICTR as a post-conflict criminal adjudication model, before one can put too much hope in the 





                                                 
138 Price, R & Zacher, M (Eds.), (2004). The United Nations and Global Security, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 
125. 
139 See Ratner, S., Abrams, J. & Bischoff, J. (2009), Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: 
Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 3rd Ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.107. 
140 In fact, this solution has been suggested by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Decision 
1 (52) of 19 March 1998, UN Doc. A/53/18, paragraph IIA1. 
141 See this discussion in Friman, H. (2001). ‘The Democratic Republic of Congo: Justice in the Aftermath of Peace?’ in 
African Security Review, Vol.10 No.3, p. 221-302. 
   207 
5.5.3 Assessing the efficacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
 
In the circumstances that befell Rwanda, an International tribunal was required because the crime of 
genocide appealed for a collective response from the international community.142  On November 8, 
1994, having determined that “genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda constitute a threat to international peace and 
security,”143 the UNSC adopted resolution 955 whereby it formally established the ICTR. The 
tribunal is perhaps the best well-known international adjudicatory effort in resolving conflict in one 
of the Africa’s Great Lakes country, Rwanda.144 However, unlike the resolution on the ICTY which 
was passed unanimously, the November 1994 resolution passed with Rwanda voting against it and 
China abstaining.145  The Rwandan government (made up of members of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF), the Tutsi rebel group that defeated the government forces and ended the genocide in 
July 1994) initially objected to the ICTR principally because of its inability to order the death 
penalty to those who would be convicted of genocide, its limited jurisdiction and concerns that its 
seat would be far from Rwanda. The decision to locate the trial chambers’ seat in Arusha Tanzania, 
and the Tribunal’s intended focus allayed some of these concerns.  
 
The ICTR’s mandate is the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between January 
1 to December 31, 1994.146 It may also deal with the prosecution of Rwandan citizens responsible 
for genocide and other such violations of international law committed in the territories of 
neighbouring states during the same period.147 Furthermore, it is to judge persons accused of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and 
                                                 
142 See UNGA Resolution 260 of December 9, 1948: “Having considered the declaration made by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (1) dated December 11, 1946 that genocide is crime under 
international law; contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized nations world; 
Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and Being convinced that, in 
order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required; Hereby agree as 
hereinafter provided.”  
143 UNSC Res.955, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
144 The ICTR is the international community’s attempt, given its scandalously passivity (and even complicity according 
to more radical observers), during the 1994 Genocide, to (1) help in the process of national reconciliation in Rwanda, 
(2) bring the (high-ranking) architect of the genocide to justice and (3) contribute to preventing such atrocities from 
happening again. 
145 See this discussed in details in Ratner, et al, supra note 139, p.224. 
146 Article 1 of the ICTR Statute. It is instructive to note that, it was not the massive of and systematic scale of the 
human rights violations as such which triggered the UNSC to action, but rather, the determination that such violations, 
constituted a “threat to international peace and security” as required by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See Article 39 
of the UN Charter. For an overview of the establishment of the Rwanda Tribunal, see Akhavan, P. (1996), ‘The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment’ in American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 90, No.3, pp. 501-510. 
147 Ibid 
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Protocol II additional to the Conventions.148  It is accorded jurisdiction over persons of whatever 
nationality accused of committing such crimes in Rwanda and over Rwandese charged with such 
crimes in neighbouring states as well.149   
 
The challenge of the tribunal is to prove that international criminal justice can contribute to the 
creation of lasting peace in the aftermath of social breakdown resulting from armed conflicts. In 
other words, the question is whether and to what extent can an ad hoc international criminal tribunal 
contribute to the reconciliation process in the wake of conflict.150 Supporters of the tribunal tend to 
argue that its fundamental contribution to reconciliation lies in the notion of individualizing guilt. 
As judge Richard Goldstone explained with respect to the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg:  
“The trials of war criminals ensured that guilt was personalized – when one looks at the emotive 
photographs of the accused in the dock at Nuremberg, one sees a group of criminals. One does 
not see a group representative of the German people –the people who produced Goethe or Heine 
or Beethoven. The Nuremberg trials were a meaningful instrument for avoiding the guilt of the 
Nazis being ascribed to the whole German people. Then too, the Nuremberg trials played an 
important role in enabling the victims of the Holocaust to obtain official acknowledgement of 
what befell them.”151 
As far as this goes, it is an attractive and plausible idea. But the argument is more ambiguous than it 
may at first appear. Although the tribunal has had great contributions in the development of 
international law rules, especially those relating to international criminal law, the same has been the 
object of stinging criticism, which has come mainly from two sources: the current RPF-led 
government of Rwanda and the Western countries, led by the United States. The Rwandan 
government opposed the very creation of the Tribunal in the first place, citing two main reasons. To 
begin with, the most severe punishment to be meted out by the Tribunal would be imprisonment 
and not death (for the government, those proved to have been involved in the genocide deserved the 
death penalty, which still existed in Rwanda at the time of the establishment of the Tribunal). 
Secondly, the Rwandan government argued, it was unrealistic to limit the Tribunal’s temporal 
jurisdiction to the period 1 January to 31 December 1994 since equally serious crimes had been 
committed before then and these crimes were related to the ones perpetrated in 1994. Other reasons 
included the likelihood that judges from countries which had been in some way or another involved 
                                                 
148 Articles 2, 3 & 4 of the ICTR Statute. 
149 Article 5 of the ICTR Statute. 
150 See also Preamble to the ICTR Statute. 
151 See this in Goldstone, R ’50 Years after the Nuremberg: A New International Criminal Tribunal for Human Rights 
Criminals’ in Jongman, A. (Ed.) (1996) Contemporary Genocides: Causes, Cases, Consequences, Leiden: 
PIOOM/University of Leiden. 
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in the war would show bias, and the fact that those found guilty would serve their sentences in 
countries offering prison facilities and not in Rwandan jails.152 In the eyes of the Rwandan 
government, therefore, the Tribunal would be ineffective. Moreover, it would serve no useful 
purpose since it would not meet the expectations of the Rwandan people. 
At most, it would be used to appease the conscience of the international community, which had 
stood by while the genocide took place and had made no effort to stop it. The government has 
continued to take a very hostile attitude towards the Tribunal, whose personnel in Kigali have 
reportedly been subjected to harassment and even manhandled in the course of their work.153 
 
Further criticism has been directed at the Tribunal as part of the broader criticism of the United 
Nations system as a whole in handling conflicts. Among other things, it is alleged that it is not 
making any headway and that it is generally dysfunctional. As a result, Dr Adede, the Tribunal’s 
Registrar, and Deputy Prosecutor Honoré Rakotomanana, a retired Chief Justice from Madagascar, 
have been dismissed.154  Prunier makes it worse: his disdain towards the Tribunal brings him to the 
conclusion that it managed to combine the worst aspects of the UN bureaucratic inefficiency with 
mere political manoeuvring involving nepotism and corrupt practices.155  The ICTR has spun out its 
procedures, hired suspected genocidaires as investigators, taken on personnel from non-
Francophone countries when 80% of all the documentation it dealt with was in French. It has been 
criticized of having been confused, incompetent, and has lost files. The tribunal has gone for years 
without simultaneous translation even though most witnesses could not speak the languages of the 
judges. Compared with the Nuremberg trials, which judged 24 Nazis in one year, hanging 10 of 
them,156 as of late 2008, (about 15 years since it was created), the ICTR has convicted only twenty-
nine persons, five were acquitted and  two were referred to national courts while majority of 
suspects are still waiting their trials.157 Thirteen indictees remain at large, including an important 
businessman accused of bankrolling the genocide. The Tribunal’s annual budget exceeds $ 127 
                                                 
152 At present six countries have indicated their willingness to provide prison facilities for persons convicted by the 
Rwanda Tribunal: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
153 See Peter, C.M (1997), ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Bringing the Killers to Book’ in 
International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 321, pp. 695-704. 
154 Agwu Ukiwe Okali (Nigeria) was appointed as the new head of the Registry, and Bernard Acho Muna (Cameroon) 
as the new Deputy Prosecutor 
155 Prunier, G. (2009). From Genocide to Continental War: The Congo Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa, 
London: Hurst & Company, p. 349. 
156 See Cassese (2009), supra note 99, p. 16. 
157 See UN, Report on the completion strategy of the International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. S/2008/726, 
Annex A. 
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million and its staff exceeds 1,000.158 Hence, the prosecutors appointed by the UN simply failed to 
carry out their mandate, and the ICTR was allowed to fall into the hands of the vengeful Rwandan 
government. The whole enterprise was, as Prunier believes, a farce: how could a court staffed with 
87 nationalities, using modern legal practice, deal with a genocide organised largely by word-of-
mouth - particularly when the ICTR staff were so corrupt that they made every effort to go slowly 
so as to be able to steal more? The ICTR continues to meander expensively along. According to the 
Completion Strategy submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United 
Nations, the ICTR would complete hearing cases at first instance by 31 December 2008 and the 
Appeals Chamber will complete hearing Appeals by 31 December 2010.159 
 
Other problems are the ineffectiveness of investigations in Rwanda itself and the limited nature of 
the mandate. Some crimes have been committed by those now in power in Rwanda and the attempts 
for the Prosecutor to investigate RPF crimes led in 2002 to a sour relationship between the Tribunal 
and the Rwandan government where the latter refused to grant documents for witnesses to travel to 
Arusha and withheld investigators’ access to evidence and crime cites. The non-indictment of the 
RPF leaders who might have been involved in the genocide leaves the Tribunal open for criticism 
and the danger of this “selective justice” poses a serious obstacle to reconciliation and 
reconstruction. The defeat of the Hutu regime, resulted in something like victors’ justice,160 and the 
ICTR remained as accidental implementer of the Tutsi revenge and retaliation against the Hutus 
who outnumber the latter as genocidaires before the tribunal. 
With these realities in mind, the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for the DRC 
does not promise much either. 
 
5.5.4 International Criminal Adjudication and the Congo Conflict 
 
The two tribunals discussed above (the ICTY and the ICTR) are widely accredited with giving the 
necessary impetus to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in July 1998.161 
The ICC remains the only avenue available for individual criminal responsibility for the Congo 
conflict. After all, the ICC was established as an independent, permanent court that tries persons 
                                                 
158 See <http://www.ictr.org> (containing various lists of statistics); see further Rapp, S. (2007) ‘Achieving 
Accountability for the Greatest Crimes: The Legacy of the International Tribunals,’ in  Drake Law Review, vol. 55, pp. 
269-70.  
159 UNSC Res 1824 (2008) of July 18, 2008. 
160 See Reydams, L. (2005). ‘The ICTR Ten Years On: Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm?’ in Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, No.  4, pp. 977-988. 
161 Established under the Rome Statute.  
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accused of the most serious crimes of international concern, namely genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.162 
 
Unlike the two ad hoc tribunals, whose jurisdiction was generally limited, both temporarily and 
geographically, the ICC is an organ of global jurisdictional reach and thus potentially able to 
respond to violations occurring anywhere.163 Issues of jurisdiction under the ICC take several 
forms, each of which must be considered separately. They are temporary (ratione temporis) 
jurisdiction, personal (ratione personae) jurisdiction, territorial (or ratione loci) jurisdiction, and 
subject-matter (ratione materiae) jurisdiction.164 
 
Although the establishment of the ICC comes as an ultimate success in international criminal 
adjudication, criticisms by its opponents are as plentiful as laudatory praises of its proponents.165 
Among the controversies that have arisen are: (1) the accusation that the Court represents an undue 
usurpation of state sovereignty because of its jurisdictional reach; (2) whether domestic amnesties 
will be take into account by the ICC; (3) fears that the ICC will provide an opportunity for the 
developed world to dominate developing countries whose national legal systems are more likely to 
be unable or unwilling to undertake successful prosecutions; (4) and also the opposite view that 
weaker countries will try and use it for political motivated prosecutions against the powerful. Yet, 
besides the adamant reluctance of the US to date, many countries around the world have ratified the 
Rome Statute,166 an indication of a decisive seriousness of the international community to create a 
permanent international criminal adjudication mechanism. 
However, even if the ICC achieves its full potential, it faces a number of challenges. Firstly, it is 
realistically not able to address all situations in which national courts are unwilling or unable to 
prosecute perpetrators. Secondly, there are temporal and other jurisdictional limitations on what 
types of cases the ICC can hear. Accordingly, the ICC will only have the power to try people 
accused of the gravest human rights violations committed after 1 July 2002; the date the Rome 
Statute which established the ICC took effect. As a result, only a small number of individuals 
responsible for the atrocities committed will be tried by this Court. Thirdly, is the establishment of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), one of the civilian institutions that emerged from 
                                                 
162 See Article 1 of the Rome Statute.  
163 Cassese, A. (2003). International Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 341. 
164 For a thorough discussion of each of these forms of jurisdiction, see Schabas, W. (2007). An Introduction to the 
International Criminal Court, 3rd Ed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 65-82. 
165 Price and Zacher, supra note 138, p. 131. 
166 Status of ratification as on February 2009 indicates that signatories are 139 and parties are 108 
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the peace talks, meant to end impunity or to cover up gross violations of human rights committed in 
the DRC? It remains to be seen how it will function and interact with the local courts. 
 
5.5.5 Lubanga case 
 
The DRC ratified the Rome Statute on April 11, 2002, enabling the sixtieth ratification to be 
achieved and the Statute to enter into force.167 As a result, the Court has jurisdiction over the 
territory of the DRC from the beginning of its operations, that is, over the acts taking place 
subsequent to July 1st 2002. As early as July 2003, the ICC chief Prosecutor had indicated that the 
Ituri Region of the DRC was his first priority. His initial analysis was founded on the potential use 
of his proprio motu powers, in accordance to the Rome Statute.168 This changed in March 3, 2004, 
when the DRC followed Uganda’s example and referred the situation in Ituri region to the ICC.169 
On February 10, 2006 the Prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant directed at Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, filed before the ICC a month earlier on January 13, 2006, was granted. This 
followed an exparte hearing on February 2, 2006. Lubanga had apparently been in custody in 
Kinshasa in the DRC for nearly a year prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Mr. Lubanga, a 
native of the DRC,170 is alleged founder of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), a political 
party, and its military wing, Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo.171 He was arrested on 
March 17, 2006172 for charges of war crimes of conscripting children into armed groups, enlisting 
children into armed groups and using children to participate actively in hostilities. Each of these 
charges constitutes a crime under the Rome Statute.173  
 
The fact remains that Lubanga was being brought to justice by the courts of the country where his 
alleged crimes had been committed, and the International Criminal Court might well have been 
more cautious before intervening. It is certainly not obvious that when an individual is held for 
nearly a year in pre-trial detention that there is a serious problem of impunity. Both the Prosecutor 
and the Pre-Trial Chamber seem to have been a bit impetuous in this case, perhaps anxious to have 
                                                 
167 According to Article 126 (1) of the Rome Statute, the Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the month after 
the 60th day following the date of the deposit of 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
168 See Article 15 of the Rome Statute. 
169 Authorization of self-referral flows from a creative interpretation of Article 14 of the Rome Statute. See further 
Schabas, supra note 164, p. 42.  
170 The Chronology of the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Case, ICC NEWSLETTER (The Hague, Neth.), Nov.2006 at p. 1. 
Available at <http://www.icc.cpi.int/libarary/about/newsletter/10/en_01.html> last visited, September 8, 2009. 
171 Forces patriotiques pour la liberation du Congo (hereinafter referred to as “the FPLC).  See further Kritz, N (1996), 
‘Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights,’ 
Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 59, No.4 (1996), pp. 127-152. 
172 ICC NEWSLETTER (The Hague, Neth.), Nov.2006 at p. 2 
173 See Article 25 (3) (a) and Article 8 (2) (e) of the Rome Statute. 
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a real defendant before the Court. But in so doing, they have offered an interpretation of the Statute 
which is arguably more intrusive with respect to the criminal justice of States than was ever 
intended. This may well have an impact on future ratifications of the Rome Statute. Many States are 
carefully studying the first cases at the Court, to see whether its promise to defer to national 
prosecutions will be respected. 
 
In Lubanga, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not indicate the crimes with which the accused was charged 
in the DRC, but they were presumably serious enough to warrant his preventive detention for nearly 
a year. They might well have been more serious than those with which he was being charged by the 
Court. In such a context, where an accused person is also being prosecuted by national authorities, 
the determination of admissibility cannot be reduced to a mechanistic comparison of charges in the 
national and the international jurisdiction, in order to see whether a crime contemplated by the 
Rome Statute is being prosecuted directly or even indirectly. It must involve an assessment of the 
relative gravity of the offences tried by the national jurisdiction put alongside those of the 
international jurisdiction. Recruitment of child soldiers is serious enough, but maybe Lubanga was 
being prosecuted in Congo for large-scale rape and murder. We are simply not given this 
information. 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber considered the issue of gravity of the Lubanga case, but in isolation, and not 
with regard to the pending charges within Congo. The Rome Statute requires the Court to declare a 
case inadmissible when it is ‘not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.’174 The 
Pre-Trial Chamber set out its perspective on its assessment of this aspect of admissibility. First, the 
conduct which is the subject of a case must be either systematic (pattern of incidents) or large-scale. 
If isolated instances of criminal activity were sufficient, there would be no need to establish an 
additional gravity threshold beyond the gravity-driven selection of the crimes (which are defined by 
both contextual and specific elements) included within the material jurisdiction of the Court. 
Second, in assessing the gravity of the relevant conduct, due consideration must be given to the 
social alarm such conduct may have caused in the international community. In the Chamber’s view, 
this factor is particularly relevant to the Prosecution’s Application due to the social alarm in the 
international community caused by the extent of the practice of enlisting into armed groups, 
conscripting into armed groups and using to participate actively in hostilities children under the age 
of fifteen.175 
                                                 
174 Article 17 (1) (d) of the Rome Statute. 
175 Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-8). 
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The Pre-Trial chamber added that the gravity threshold at the admissibility stage was ‘intended to 
ensure that the Court initiates cases only against the most senior leaders suspected of being the most 
responsible for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed in any given 
situation under investigation.’176 Focusing on the leaders would enable the Court to play a deterrent 
role.177 In this context, the Court referred to recent changes to the law of the ad hoc tribunals as part 
of their ‘completion strategies.’178  It bears mentioning that these provisions owe their provenance 
to initiatives of Judge Jorda, President of Pre-Trial Chamber I, who in an earlier incarnation was 
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The ICTY provisions 
were intended to tame the Prosecutor, who initially resisted attempts by the judiciary to encroach 
upon her discretion in selecting cases.179 
 
The decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I to issue the arrest warrant was challenged by duty counsel Jean 
Flamme, in a notice dated March 24 2006. In the notice of appeal, he argued that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber erroneously applied article 17 of the Rome Statute, and that it should have ruled the case 
inadmissible.180 However, there was a procedural problem with the notice of appeal. Article 19(6) 
of the Rome Statute, which is invoked in the notice of appeal, says that ‘decisions with respect to 
jurisdiction or admissibility may be appealed to the Appeals Chamber in accordance with article 
82’. But the context indicates that the provision refers to appeals from challenges to admissibility 
which have been submitted under article 19, which an accused is entitled to file under article 19(2). 
In other words, the proper recourse for Lubanga is probably to challenge admissibility, and not to 
appeal the issuance of the arrest warrant. 
While the Prosecutor worked with the authorities of DRC in order to ensure the accused person’s 
transfer to The Hague, the Lubanga arrest warrant remained under seal.181 The Registrar formally 
transmitted the request for arrest and surrender of Lubanga on March 14, 2006. Lubanga was 
apparently brought before a Congolese judicial authority, which authorised his surrender and 
transfer to the International Criminal Court. Lubanga was promptly brought to The Hague by 
                                                 
176 Ibid, para 50. 
177 Ibid, para 54 
178 Ibid, paras 55-60. For example, the Court noted UNSC resolution No.1134 (2004), and Rules 11 bis and 28 (A) of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. On the completion strategies, of the ad hoc tribunals, see Schabas, W (2006). The 
UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p. 57. 
179 On the situation at the ad hoc tribunals, see for instance, Brubacher, M. (2004). ‘Prosecutorial Discretion within the 
International Criminal Court’ in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 71-95. 
180 Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-57-Corr). 
181 It was made public once Lubanga was in the Court’s custody: Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-37), 
decision to unseal the warrant of arrest against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and related documents, March 17, 2006. 
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French military aircraft. On March 20, 2006, Lubanga appeared before the Pre-Trial Chamber, for 
the purpose of establishing that he had been informed of the crimes he was alleged to have 
committed, and that he knew of his rights under the Statute, including the right to apply for interim 
release. A hearing to confirm the charges must be held within a reasonable time, in accordance with 
article 61 of the Rome Statute. The Pre-Trial Chamber set June 17, 2006 for the hearing. On January 
29, 2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed charges against Lubanga, as brought by the Prosecutor, 
allowing the case to be set for trial.182 In accordance with the Rome Statute, and Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence of ICC,183 certain victims, represented by Counsel, played an active role in this 
hearing.184 
 
Besides suggesting that there are problems with the admissibility of the case, the fact that Lubanga 
was detained for a prolonged period in the DRC before issuance of the arrest warrant raises 
questions of arbitrary detention for which the Court itself may be responsible. Lubanga had been in 
detention for approximately one year, and possibly longer. His detention was well-known to 
international NGOs so it seems reasonable to presume that the Prosecutor was also aware of the 
situation. The Prosecutor only proceeded to seek an arrest warrant when it appeared that the 
detention was coming to an end, and that there was the possibility Lubanga would be released. This 
was specifically invoked in the application for the arrest warrant, and helped to persuade the Pre 
Trial Chamber.185 While subject to procedural restrictions, such as the inability to call their own 
witnesses,186 the legal representatives of the victims made their presence known through forceful 
opening187 and closing188 remarks, as well as numerous document requests and even a question 
posed to the witness.189  This hearing set the precedent for victims to play an important role in 
international criminal proceedings as they seek closure for the harms committed against them.190 
 
                                                 
182 Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Hearing: Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber Following the Confirmation 
of Charge Hearing, available at <http://www.icc.cpi.int/cases/RDC/c0106/c0106_hs.html> last visited, September 8, 
2009. 
183 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 89, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1, Nov.2, 2000 (hereinafter referred 
to as the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence), available at 
<http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/1stsession/report/english/part_ii_a_e.pdf>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
184 Nov.9, 2007. Confirmation of Charges Hearing, supra note 178. 
185 Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-8). Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 
February 10, 2006, paras 98-102.  
186 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 18, at Article 89. The inability of victims to call their own 
witnesses is a reflection of the administrative and logistical constraints of the ICC as well as deference to the procedural 
rights of the defendant. 
187 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra note 182.  
188Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Will, M. (2007). ‘A Balancing Act: The Introduction of Restorative Justice in the International Criminal Court’s 
Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’ in Journal of International Law and Policy, vol. 17, No.1 pp. 85-120. 
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It would appear that the Prosecutor might have been content, for a protracted period, to let Lubanga 
remain in the Congolese prison while he proceeded to prepare his case, and that implies a degree of 
complicity with the detention within the DRC prior to issuance of the arrest warrant. Similar issues 
have been raised before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, where the Appeals 
Chamber has manifested considerable unease when suspects have been held in prisons in different 
African countries, under dubious legal pretexts while the Prosecutor continued to investigate.191 
         
On January 29, 2009 the trial of Thomas Lubanga commenced before the ICC. As the Prosecutor 
has repeatedly charged, Mr. Lubanga is allegedly responsible, as co-perpetrator, of War crimes 
consisting of: 
• Enlisting and conscripting of children under the age of 15 years into the FPLC and using them to 
participate actively in hostilities in the context of an international armed conflict from early 
September 2002 to 2 June 2003;192 
• Enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years into the FPLC and using them to 
participate actively in hostilities in the context of an armed conflict not of an international character 
from 2 June 2003 to 13 August 2003.193 
As this case proceeds before the ICC, I am of the view that the ICC ought to have charged Lubanga 
of more serious international crimes (mass killings, rape, torture etc) as widely committed in the 
Ituri Region of the DRC by forces under Lubanga’s direct command. 
The case may not provide the true justice required by the Congolese in the aftermath of the conflict. 
First, Lubanga is just one among the many culprits ought to be brought before the ICC or before 
any other effective justice forum. Second, more victims, including those of rape, and those whose 
relatives and beloved ones were murdered in the course of the conflicts, may not see the types of 
charges levelled against Lubanga as restoring their grievances.  
Nevertheless, the uniqueness of this case in international criminal justice cannot be over 
emphasised. It stems not only from being the first case before the permanent international criminal 
court, the ICC, but also from being the first case where an international criminal tribunal, the ICC in 
this matter has recognised the importance of granting the victims of mass atrocities a forum in 
which to be heard and perhaps healed. More importantly it has provided for the international 
criminal adjudication of the Congo conflict, eradicating the culture of impunity, which has reigned 
for too long in this complex and deadly conflict. 
                                                 
191 See for instance, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, (Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72), Decision, November 3, 1999. 
192 Punishable under article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) of the Rome Statute. 
193 Punishable under article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to analyze international adjudication as a method in resolving armed 
conflicts alongside its general role of disputes settlement in international law. 
In this analysis, the 2005 ICJ Judgment in the Case Concerning the Armed Activities in the 
Territory of the Congo and the ongoing case of Lubanga before the ICC were taken as case studies. 
The historical development of adjudication has been examined, with particular reference to the ICJ. 
The mandates of the Court as well as compliance and enforcement of its final binding decisions 
against condemned states have been re-examined.  
 
In the final analysis, I join hands with Merrill’s194 who sees clear limits to the role of international 
adjudication or rather judicial dispute settlement. In his view, international adjudication has been 
most effective in resolving strictly bilateral disputes. In actual practice, it has proved less suited for 
the satisfactory settlement of international armed conflicts or highly politicized disputes, for which 
other appropriate paths and forums remain to be explored. Even as international criminal 
adjudication is examined, it is realized that it has likewise missed the main point, namely to respond 
to the actual roots of the conflicts.  
The overall conclusion from this discussion is therefore a rather cautious note, epitomized in the 
statement that, while there is positive view of the role of judicial bodies in ensuring respect for 
international law, it is difficult to apply this role in armed conflicts situation where there are a 
number of justice issues to be addressed.  
The most important point to be remembered however is that judicial settlement of international 
disputes is but a tiny aspect of the process of disputes settlement systems in international relations. 
Most disputes are resolved on the basis of agreements which contain provisions to the effect that 
binding adjudication is a method of last resort when diplomatic means have failed.  
The legal approach to international dispute settlement will become more effective only if the 
weaknesses in the international legal system are remedied. The main shortcomings in the current 
system may be summarized thus: 
a. The law is often uncertain, and in some areas it reflects earlier power relationships that have 
become anachronistic in a world no longer centered on the West; 
b. The system has no effective contemporary lawmaking body; 
                                                 
194  Merrills, J. (1998) International Dispute Settlement, 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 296. 
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c. Although international judicial bodies are the main interpreters of international law, there is 
no general compulsory jurisdiction to ensure legal settlement of disputes that evade a 
negotiated solution; 
d. The system lacks effective procedures to bring offenders to justice and to ensure compliance 
with judgments.195 
The importance of adjudication cannot however be overemphasized here. It lies in the development 
and strengthening of international law. In other words, the decisions of international judicial bodies 
contribute enormously to the development of new global values, which will make it easier to accept 
rules without the need for enforcement. 
 
To address today’s limits and more difficult environment, the development of a system of 
international justice to limit impunity for serious human rights crimes must be seriously worked out. 
It is therefore stressed that it is critical to refine the international justice system so that perpetrators 
of the most serious crimes such as those committed in the DRC are increasingly held to account. 
This may entail revisiting the general jurisdictional limitations of such important international 
judicial bodies with a view to strengthen their role in international adjudication. More specifically, 
filling the gap that stands in the way of justice in holding states as such criminally responsible for 
crimes committed in their organised and directed command structures may provide a long lasting 
solution. The effects that such a gap has created in the case of human rights atrocities committed in 
the Congo may not wait for such long-lasting solutions, since this is an urgent matter which needs 
an immediate attention of the international community. 
                                                 
195 See Riggs and Plano, supra note 20, p.199. 
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6 SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT PREVENTION, 




This chapter assesses the extent to which incorporation of human rights in dealing with conflict 
situations may create an alternative conflict prevention mechanism.1 Traditionally, state 
responsibilities during times of conflict have fallen within the domain of humanitarian law, with 
states being able to derogate from certain human rights norms under human rights treaties during 
times of war or other public emergency.2 This dichotomy between humanitarian and human rights 
law,3 which also characterizes regional setups, is often apparent in trying to manage or resolve 
conflicts, when steps to prevent them have failed.4  The United Nations discussed for the first time 
the issue of human rights in regard to armed conflicts during the International Conference on 
Human Rights in Teheran in 1968. This was the very first step of taking into consideration 
Humanitarian Law within the Human Rights system.  It was at this conference that a brand new 
term, human rights in armed conflict, was introduced. In the first period, scholars did not generally 
accept this new development.5 Nevertheless, the title of the resolution adopted on May 12, 1968 is 
“Human Rights in Armed Conflict.”6  This document is considered as establishing a link between 
                                                 
1 For a thorough discussion on conflict prevention mechanisms, see generally, Adedeji, A. (1999). Comprehending and 
Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance, London: Zed Books; Lund, M 
(1997), Preventing Violent Conflicts, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington; Bozeman, A. (1976). Conflict in Africa: 
Concepts and Realities, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Mazrui, A. (1995). ‘Towards Containing Conflict in 
Africa: Methods, Mechanisms and Values,’ East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights, vol.  2, pp. 81 – 90.; 
Mekenkamp, M., Van Tongeren, P and Van de Veen, H. (1999). Searching for Peace in Africa. An Overview of Conflict 
Prevention and Management Activities, Utrecht:  European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. 
2   See, for example, Fleck, D. (Ed.). (1995). Handbook of Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflicts, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 77; Meron, T. (1983) ‘On the Inadequate reach of Humanitarian and Human Right Law and the 
Need for a New Instrument’ in American Journal of International Law, vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 589-606; Solf, W.  ‘Human 
Rights in Armed Conflict: Some Observations on the Relationship between Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed 
Conflict,’ in Han, H. (Ed.), (1979) World in Transition: Challenges to Human Rights Development and World Order, 
Washington DC: University Press of America, pp.41 – 53. 
3 A discussion of an interface between human right and humanitarian law during armed conflicts is found in Watkin, K. 
(2004). ‘Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict’ in American 
Journal of international Law, vol. 98, No. 1, pp. 1–34. Watkin argues that the unique threat posed by non-state actors, 
combined with the lack of consensus on legal categorization of conflict, creates conditions where enforcement and 
armed conflict paradigm overlap. This overlap in turn, directly affects the applicability of human rights law, which is 
most commonly associated with enforcement, and humanitarian law, which applies during armed conflict.   
4 Thus, the AU has called for training, for example, for troops on the ‘concept and conduct of peace support operations’, 
and such training should include international humanitarian law, but has not made any specific reference to human 
rights. See, ‘Report of the Second Meeting of the Chief of Defence Staff of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism 
for Conflict Management and Resolution’, OAU/CHST/CO/RPT (II), para. 34.2; Dugard, J. (1998). ‘Bridging the Gap 
between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Punishment of Offenders’, International Review of the Red Cross, 
No. 324, p. 445 – 453. 
5 Kart, J. (1995). ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 2, Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, dir. Rudolf Bernhardt, p.910. 
6 Resolution XIII (UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/41). 
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these two human oriented laws.  The motive was armed conflict in the Near East, and the reason for 
linking the discussion of these two parts of International Public Law can be found in the newly 
emerging perspective that the force used in armed conflict by itself might be considered as the 
background for violation of Human Rights. As two commentators/scholars/legal experts noted 
regarding the resolution/situation on this occasion: “Peace is the underlying condition for the full 
observance of human rights, and war is their negation.”7 
     
 In this chapter, I focus on the relationship between the fields of human rights and conflict 
management as a means to prevent conflict.8  The complexities of their being both contradictory 
and complementary are discussed, and it is argued that the interaction between these fields should 
take place to a far greater extent than is currently the case.    
 
Exploring the relationship between human rights and conflict management, Michelle Parlevliet9 
notes that the two fields are often perceived as being in contradiction or competition.  Nevertheless, 
human rights actors and conflict management practitioners have a common interest in promoting 
sustainable peace with justice. They also frequently operate in the same environment, as many 
conflicts involve human rights violations of some sort, and activities by actors in the one field may 
impact efforts by actors in the other field. It is therefore necessary to explore the relationship 
between human rights and conflict management in more depth, and to examine whether and how 
they can contribute positively to one another. 
The interaction between human rights and conflict has been portrayed by many as a complex and 
dynamic one.10 This chapter explores that relationship, examining its powerful dynamics from 
                                                 
7 Louise, D and Sylvain, V. (1993). ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ International Review of 
the Red Cross, No. 293, pp. 94–119. 
8 Issues of human rights and conflict interact in multiple ways as discussed in Ramcharan, B. (2004).  ‘Human Rights 
and Conflict Resolution’, in Human Rights Law Review, vol. 4, No. 1 pp. 1-18; Summer, D. and Schnabel, A. (2003). 
Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion, UNU, Tokyo; Thoolen, H. (2001). ‘Early Warning and 
Prevention,’ in Alfredsson, G, et al. (Eds.), (2001). International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in 
Honour of Jakob Th. Moller, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 301; Mahoney, L. (2003). ‘Unarmed 
Monitoring and Human Rights Field Presences: Civilian Protection and Conflict Protection,’ The Journal of 
Humanitarian Assistance, August 2003, at <http//www.jha.ac/articles/a122.htm> last visited, September 8, 2009; Lutz, 
E., et al., (2003). ‘Human Rights and Conflict Resolution from the Practitioners’ Perspective,’ The Fletcher Forum of 
World Affairs, 27(1) (Winter/Spring); Saunders, J. (2002). ‘Bridging Human Rights and Conflict Prevention: A 
Dialogue between Critical Communities,’ Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, at 
<http//www.cceia.org/ viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/1/prmID/161> last visited, September 8, 2009; O’Flaherty, M 
(2004). ‘Sierra Leone’s Peace Process: The Role of the Human Rights Community,’ in Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 
26, No. 4, pp. 983-1027.; O’Flaherty, M. (2003). ‘Future Protection of Human Rights in Post-Conflict Societies: the 
Role of the United Nations,’ in Human Rights Law Review, vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 53-76. 
9 See Parlevliet, M. (2002). ‘Bridging the Divide: Exploring the Relationship Between Human Rights and Conflict 
Management’ in Track Two, vol. 11 No. 1, pp.8-43 
10Mertus, J.  & Helsing, J (Eds.).  (2006). Human Rights and Conflict: Exploring the Links Between Rights, Law and 
Peacebuilding, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, p.3.  
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several angles and showing that the relationship is also dialectical. The chapter asserts that the two 
fields are far from being mutually exclusive. It argues that human rights and conflict management 
practitioners ought to understand one another's fields much better than they do at present; that 
dialogue and interaction is needed between the fields; and that insights, skills and practices from the 
one field can strengthen activities in the other field.  The main argument is that a natural synergy 
exists between the two fields which, if left untapped, complicates and undermines processes that 
work towards peace, justice, and reconciliation. With regard to conflict management, the chapter 
argues that without a proper understanding of the human rights dimension in conflicts, conflict 
management is bound to be unsustainable.  Not only are efforts to protect and implement human 
rights essential to the constructive management of conflict, but institutionalized respect for human 
rights is also a primary form of conflict prevention.11  Moreover, processes that aim to resolve 
conflict must take place within a framework in which fundamental rights and freedoms are 
considered non-negotiable.  Concerning the human rights field, this chapter argues that conflict 
management can contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights in a variety of ways.  
There is wide scope for dialogue, negotiation and accommodation in dealing with conflicts.  
Conflict management can offer alternative and innovative methods of addressing conflicts over 
rights issues, and can also enhance the capacity of human rights actors to protect rights effectively.  
 
The overall aims are therefore twofold. The first is to highlight the importance of considering the 
fields of human rights and conflict management in conjunction with one another when dealing with 
conflicts in the world generally and in the Africa’s Great Lakes region in particular. The second is 
to point out that the relationship between conflict and human rights is both short-term and long-term 
in nature. In the short term, violent and destructive conflicts can lead to human rights violations. In 
the long term, a sustained denial of human rights can lead to conflicts, as fundamental needs of 
human beings are frustrated.     
 
The protection of rights is therefore of utmost importance if conflicts are to be dealt with in an 
effective, constructive, and sustainable manner. Just as denying basic rights fans the flames of 
conflicts, helping to guarantee those rights can prevent conflicts from arising in the first place.  It is 
the argument of this chapter, however, that this direct relationship between rights and conflict has 
been generally under-explored in trying to resolve the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts. Most of the 
                                                 
11 Patten, C. (2001, May 28 and 29). ‘Role of Human Rights and Democratization in Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution,’ Human Rights Forum, Brussels: p. 6. 
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methods applied to resolve conflicts in the region have focused on political dynamics with very 
little attention to the main source, namely a sustained human rights abuse. 
 
To achieve the above aims, the present chapter explores the subject through various subsections, 
which address the nature of the relationship between human rights and conflicts.  It first looks at the 
tensions between the two fields and explains why they are not better integrated.  The chapter then 
focuses on the relationship between human rights and conflict management through six analytical 
propositions that highlight the complementarities between the fields.  They are the following: 
• Human rights abuses are both symptoms and causes of violent conflict. 
• A sustained denial of human rights is a structural cause of high-intensity conflict.12 
• Institutionalised respect for right and structural accommodation of diversity is a primary 
form of conflict prevention. 
• For the effective and sustainable resolution of intra-state conflict, the prescriptive approach 
of human rights actors must be combined with the facilitative approach of conflict resolution 
practitioners. 
• Whereas human rights and justice per se are non-negotiable, the application and 
interpretation of rights and justice are negotiable in the context of a negotiated settlement. 
• Conflict management can function as an alternative to litigation in dealing with rights 
related conflicts. 
The last section of the chapter highlights two practical implications of the relationship between 
human rights and conflict management: the relevance of human rights training for conflict 
resolution practitioners and the relevance of conflict resolution training for human rights actors.   
 
6.2 The Relationship Between Human Rights, Conflicts and Conflict Management 
 
6.2.1 Principles and Standards 
 
In the event of a conflict, particularly a violent one, there is often of a response from both human 
rights institutions and conflict resolution mechanisms, either jointly or separately seeking to find a 
solution. In the short term, they both attempt to prevent the escalation of violence and advocate for 
                                                 
12 In the classification used by the Interdisciplinary Research Program on Causes of Human Rights Violation (PIOOM) 
based in Leiden (the Netherlands,) “high- intensity conflict” refers to open warfare among rival groups and / or mass 
destruction and displacement of sectors of the civilian population, in which 1000 or more people are killed in a 12 – 
month period. See this elaborated in Jongman, A. (2000). The World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2000: Mapping 
Dimension of Contemporary Conflicts and Human Rights Violations. Interdisciplinary Research Program on Causes of 
Human Rights Violations (PIOOM), Leiden: Leiden University:  The terms “intensity”, “violent” and “destructive” 
conflict are used here interchangeably. 
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an end to the violence and killings. In the long term, they seek to rebuild a society founded on the 
respect for human rights and institutionalise non-violent means of addressing future 
conflicts.13 In reaching these goals human rights institutions and conflict resolution mechanisms 
employ different strategies based on their normative backgrounds and perspectives of a particular 
conflict with the result that their approaches to a solution may be contradictory or mutually 
exclusive.14 This section looks at both points of convergence and tensions between human rights 
and conflict resolution in terms of their normative standards and objectives. 
 
6.2.2 International Normative Standards of Human Rights 
 
The toll of human suffering and gravity of human rights abuses experienced as a result of the two 
major World Wars and the formation of the United Nations (UN) marked a turning point in the 
development of normative standards for human rights.15 In the preamble to the UN Charter,16 the 
founding members aspired, among others, to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war 
and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights’.17 
 
The UN set out in its principles and purposes to maintain international peace and security and 
collectively take effective steps to remove threats to peace, suppress any forms of aggression and to 
settle by peaceful means and in accordance with principles of justice and international law any 
international disputes.18 Although the Charter itself does not spell out human rights provisions, it 
has nevertheless served as the institution under which many international human rights instruments 
have evolved, beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),19 adopted by 
the UN General Assembly on December 10th 1948. The Declaration presents in one document both 
civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other. Most 
of the provisions of the UDHR have developed into customary international law binding on states.20 
                                                 
13Lutz, E et al, (2003) ‘Human Rights and Conflict Resolution from Practitioners’ Perspectives’ The Fletcher Forum of 
World Affairs, vol.27, No.1, pp. 173-93 at p. 179. 
14 Ibid 
15Mugwanya, G (2003) Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the African Regional Human Rights 
System, New York: Transnational Publishers, p. 16.  The author also notes that international law, prior to the formation 
of the UN recognised some form of international human rights protection including state responsibility for injury to 
aliens, humanitarian intervention and the protection of minorities, however, the establishment of the UN represented a 
‘qualitative leap’ in the internationalisation of human rights protection and a recognition of the individual as a subject of 
international legal protection against human rights violations. 
16 Para 1 of the Preamble to the UN Charter. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter. 
19 UNG.A Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948). 
20 Alfredsson, G and Eide, A. (Eds.) (1999) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of 
Achievement, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p. xxvii. 
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It has been incorporated in the constitutions of many states and serves as a source of inspiration to 
judges in domestic and international tribunals. 
 
Almost three decades after the adoption of the UDHR, two principal covenants, which expanded the 
rights stipulated in the UDHR and added new ones, entered into force. These were the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)21 with its two Optional Protocols and the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR),22 also with an Optional Protocol adopted in December 10, 
2008. Both instruments place obligations on states to respect and ensure the rights contained in 
them to all persons within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction.23 
Both instruments provide for supervisory bodies, namely, the Human Rights Committee under the 
CCPR and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the CESCR. These two 
institutions ensure the compliance of states parties to the Conventions through the consideration of 
periodic reports submitted by states and an inter-state complaints procedure under the CCPR. The 
First Optional Protocol to the CCPR however provides for an individual complaints procedure. 
 
Other human rights treaties dealing with specific rights include the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (1951), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) (1969), monitored by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) (1979) and its Optional Protocol (2000), monitored by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination of Women; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) (1987) and its Optional Protocol (opened 
for signature on 4th February, 2003 and yet to enter into force), monitored by the Committee 
against Torture; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1989) and its two Optional 
Protocols on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Pornography (2002) and on the Rights of 
the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2002), monitored by the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child; and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (MWC) (adopted by General Assembly on 
December 18, 1990) and monitored by the Committee on Migrant Workers. In addition to these 
                                                 
21 UNGA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS. 171, entered 
into force on March 23, 1976. 
22 UNGA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS UNTS. 3, 
entered into force on January 3, 1976. 
23 See common Article 2 of the ICCPR and ICESCR. 
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documents, there is a plethora of Declarations, Principles, Recommendations and Guidelines24 that 
guide the member states of the UN in their conduct concerning the respect, protection, promotion 
and fulfilment of human rights. 
 
6.2.3 Normative Standards of Human Rights in Africa 
 
In Africa, the primary human rights norm-setting instrument is the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights.25 The ACHPR is hailed as the first human rights instrument to have incorporated 
first, second and third generation rights in one document.26  It also provides for duties alongside the 
rights it protects. In accordance with Article 30 of the ACHPR, the African Commission was 
established on November 2, 1987 ‘to promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure their protection 
in Africa’.27 Mugwanya28 notes that the ACHPR also takes inspiration from the UDHR when it 
clearly makes reference to universal human rights norms in its Preamble and in Articles 60 and 61. 
Furthermore, Articles 60 and 61 require the Commission to draw inspiration from international law 
on human and peoples’ rights, among others, as provided in the UN Charter, the UDHR and other 
human rights instruments adopted by and under the auspices of the UN and the OAU. 
 
Under Article 62, the ACHPR requires states to submit reports biennially to the Commission on the 
legislative and other measures they have taken towards the realisation of the rights recognised and 
guaranteed by the ACHPR as well an interstate and individual communications procedure under 
Articles 47 and 55 respectively. In 1998 the OAU adopted a Protocol to the ACPHR on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to complement the African 
Commission in the protection and enforcement of human and peoples’ rights. The Protocol entered 
into force on 25th January 2004. 
The ACHPR is complemented by a number of instruments and declarations that guarantee human 
rights, namely the OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
(1969); the Cultural Charter of Africa (1976); the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
African Child (1990); the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (2003) (not yet in force); and the Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration 
                                                 
24 See generally, ‘Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/law> last visited, September 8, 2009. 
25 Adopted on June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986 
(hereinafter referred to as “the ACHPR”). 
26Heyns, C. (2004)  ‘The African Human Rights System: the African Charter’ Penn State Law Review, vol 108, No. 3, 
pp. 679 – 702; Mutua, M. (2000) 'The African Human Rights System: A Critical Evaluation', Human Development 
Report 2000, background paper, United Nations, New York. 
27 See Article 30 of ACHPR. 
28 See Mugwanya, supra note 15, p. 190. 
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and Plan of Action (1999). The Constitutive Act of the AU also incorporates, as part of its 
objectives and principles, the promotion and the protection of human rights.29 The NEPAD will also 
assess the development of human rights in member states through the APRM in the broader context 
of sustainable development and good governance.30 
 
These international and African regional human rights norms and standards set out in the 
instruments mentioned above provide the launch pad for human rights institutions and advocates to 
qualify and quantify the level of human rights abuses occasioned as a result of conflicts. These 
standards may also be used to seek the commitment of parties to a conflict to put an end to violence 
and human suffering and to negotiate peace. 
 
6.2.4 Principles of Conflict Resolution 
 
Conflict resolution cannot boast of a codified and elaborate set of normative standards in 
comparison to the field of human rights. There is still argument over certain key concepts such as 
‘peace’ itself and the relationship of peace to justice.31 Lutz32 et al., however, argue that there is an 
implicit set of principles that guide any conflict resolution efforts. The first of these principles is 
participation. The authors argue that the most effective negotiation and decision-making processes 
are those that actively engage the principal stakeholders who have a prime interest in the outcome. 
The fundamental aim of any conflict resolution effort is therefore to bring the feuding parties and 
relevant stakeholders into some ad hoc or institutionalised forum where their input will be 
considered. This process, however, is easier said than done, and Bell33 reinforces this point when 
she notes for example in the context of pre-negotiation agreements, that: 
Parties move from violent to less violent forms of addressing conflict when they perceive that they can 
potentially gain more at the table than they can away from it. However, often, from the point of 
moving towards the negotiating table, the process is one of ‘trial and error’ for each actor, and the 
process is characterized by stops and starts, progress and breakdown.34 
 
                                                 
29 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15 (2001): Available at <http://www.africa-nion.org/About_AU/AbConstitutive_Act.htm>, 
last visited, September 8, 2009. 
30 Heyns, supra note 26 
31Sunders, J (2001), ‘Bridging Human Rights and Conflict Resolution: A Dialogue Between Critical Communities. 
Report on a July 16 –17, Carnegie Council Workshop’ available at 
<http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/prmID/161>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
32 Lutz, supra note 13, p. 177. 
33 Bell, C. (2000). Peace Agreements and Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 21. 
34 Ibid. 
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The second principle is inclusion. Inclusion, though similar to participation, differs in terms of the 
fact that it considers who participates rather than how the participation is directed. Thus, the authors 
argue that in resolving a conflict, it is better to include as many stakeholders as possible, including 
elements that may prove to be disruptive of the process, because to ignore them would ‘be a greater 
incentive to undermining any agreement that is reached.’35 
 
The third principle is empowerment. This principle considers the unequal bargaining positions that 
parties to a conflict may bring to the negotiating table ranging from a lack of experience to 
resources. The mediators in the conflict therefore have to be mindful of such disparities and may 
incorporate teaching, training and coaching to maximize the effectiveness of the parties to reach a 
settlement and also to provide a basis for genuine negotiations to proceed. 
 
The fourth principle is cultural sensitivity. Here Lutz et al. note that most cultures have their own 
mechanisms for handling conflicts and, for that reason, the adoption of culturally familiar practices 
and solutions will thrive long after the mediators have departed. Knowledge of such methods will 
be useful not only to resolve the conflicts but also to develop such indigenous mechanisms. 
 
The fifth principle is equity. This principle requires the mediator to treat all parties to the conflict 
with equal respect, giving equal attention and time to each side in spite of the imbalance in power 
and bargaining positions. To respect and give equal concern to the contributions made by each side 
to the negotiation makes ‘the forum more suitable to constructive discussion and problem 
solving.’36 
 
6.2.5  Points of Convergence and Divergence 
 
It is important to get a clear understanding of the fact that human rights violations both cause and 
result from violent conflicts, and can fundamentally alter the course of conflicts.37 While this 
dialectical relationship has been mentioned in the preceding sections, the relationship between 
human rights and conflict management needs to be looked at closely here. 
 
                                                 
35 Ibid 
36 Ibid. 
37 For examination of the myriad causes of conflicts, including human rights abuses as well as their various phases and 
evolving dynamics, see generally Siriram, C and Wermester, K. (2003). From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN 
Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.  
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The lack of integration between the fields of human rights and conflict management is due to a 
variety of factors.  Actors in both arenas have traditionally operated separately in conflict situations, 
largely because they view conflict from different perspectives.  Human rights actors are generally 
concerned with the application of objective standards to determine issues of justice and establish the 
extent to which parties have upheld or violated such standards.  Conflict management practitioners, 
on the other hand, seek to reconcile the needs, interests, and concerns of disputant parties in a 
constructive way, rather than trying to determine who is right and who is wrong.  This fundamental 
difference in perspective creates certain tensions between the two fields.  It also leads the two types 
of actors to emphasis different values, goals, and strategies in their approach to peace and conflict.38 
 
Arguably, the best known in this context is the "peace versus justice" debate, which has unfolded in 
various cases all over the world. Conflict management practitioners generally prioritise peace as a 
basis for justice, arguing that the cessation of violence and resolution of intra-state conflict is a 
precondition for the establishment of a viable and enduring system of justice.  They usually accept 
that this may necessitate negotiating with parties responsible for atrocities.  Human rights actors, 
however, focus more directly on justice as the foundation for a lasting peace.39  Their primary 
concerns are holding perpetrators accountable, restoring the rule of law, and building democratic 
institutions.  While many conflict resolution practitioners share these concerns, the two fields often 
differ on the relative priority and importance attached to the various imperatives.  As Baker puts it, 
"they share a common concern to end conflict, but favour different strategies in achieving it."40 
The peace versus justice debate played itself out dramatically in the context of Bosnia Herzegovina, 
when an anonymous author in a leading human rights journal accused the international human 
rights movement of prolonging the Balkan war.  He claimed that the human rights community had 
been increasing the death, suffering and destruction in its pursuit of perfectly just and moral peace 
that would bring "justice for yesterday's victims of atrocities,' but instead made "today's living the 
dead of tomorrow".41 Soon after this, an influential human rights scholar hit back, rejecting the 
charge that human rights actors disrupt peace processes. She argued the human rights community's 
                                                 
38 Kent, A. (1998). ‘Exploring the Relationship between Human Rights and Conflict Resolution’ FORUM, National 
Institute for Dispute Resolution: pp.1-5. See further Kunder, J. (1998). ‘How Can Transitional Human Rights be 
Integrated into Peace Processes?’ Conference Report. Washington DC: Fund for Peace. 
39 Said, A. and Lerche, C. (2006). ‘Peace as a Human Rights: Towards an Integrated Understanding’ in Meritus and 
Helsing, supra note 10, p. 129.   
40 Baker, P. (1996). ‘Conflict Resolution versus Democratic Governance: Divergent Paths to Peace?’ In Crocker, C. and 
Hampson, F. (Eds.). (1996). Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, Washington 
DC: United States Institute of Peace, p. 563. 
41 Anonymous, (1996). ‘Human Rights in Peace Negotiations’ Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 249-259 at 
p. 252. 
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articulation of concern, identification and analysis of the facts, and pressure for protection against 
abuses cannot be subject to the vagaries of international politics or the particulars of negotiations. 
The moral and strategic dilemma of how to balance peace and justice is now a regular feature of 
discussions where a settlement is being negotiated in intra-state conflict.42 
 
Human rights actors and conflict management practitioners also differ in their approaches to dealing 
with conflict.  Because of their focus on human rights standards that bind parties to specific 
behaviour and impose obligations on states to respect rights, human rights actors often adopt an 
adversarial approach in seeking redress for grievances, and explicitly point out the wrongs 
committed by states and non-state actors.  They may seek recourse through the legal system, and/or 
may denounce parties in public.  In contrast, many conflict management practitioners utilize more 
co-operative approaches with a view to maintaining or restoring relationships between parties and 
reaching mutually agreeable outcomes.  The normative orientation of human rights actors also 
means that they may attribute blame, whereas conflict management practitioners usually refrain 
from judging disputing parties.  In addition, human rights actors can be strict or rigid in their 
endeavours to uphold and abide by human rights norms, whereas conflict management practitioners 
are more flexible in their search for a resolution that meets the needs and interests of different 
parties. 
Overall, human rights actors are more focused on principles, whereas conflict management 
practitioners are more pragmatically oriented.  Baker has also suggested that the difference between 
the two sets of actors is one of outcome versus process.  In her view, conflict management 
practitioners are primarily concerned with processes that facilitate dialogue between the parties, 
whereas human rights advocates are preoccupied with the contents of the parties' agreements.43 
However, it would be far-fetched to argue that conflict management practitioners are not concerned 
with the outcome of negotiation processes.  Rather, the difference lies in human rights actors being 
more prescriptive, and conflict management practitioners being more facilitative, in their respective 
approaches to outcomes.  In this sense the former could be considered “outcome advocates" in that 
they advocate a particular type of outcome (one that emphasizes constitutionalism and the legal 
protection of rights). The latter, on the other hand, could be termed "process advocates" as they 
favour a specific kind of process in reaching an outcome (one that is facilitative, all-inclusive, 
participatory, and develops trust between parties). 
                                                 
42 Gaer, F. (1997). ‘Reflections on Human Rights in Peace Negotiations,’ Human Rights Quarterly,   
    vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1-8. 
43 Baker, supra note 40, p.568. See also Bell, C. (2006). ‘Human Rights, Peace Agreements and Conflict Resolution: 
Negotiating Justice in Northern Ireland’ in Mertus and Helsing, supra note 10, 345. 
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Differences between the two sets of actors may also arise over the question of whether and how 
human rights concerns should be raised in negotiations.  Conflict management practitioners aim to 
make the negotiation process as inclusive as possible in order not to alienate any party that has the 
potential to derail the process, irrespective of that party's human rights record.  Experience indicates 
that any peace process that does not include all stakeholders is less likely to hold firm.44  The 
decision by former South African President Mandela to involve two armed factions in Burundi in 
the Arusha peace process of 2000, in spite of their earlier exclusion, was based on this concern.45 
Human rights actors, on the other hand generally wish to exclude perpetrators from such processes, 
because their inclusion may grant them undue legitimacy and political influence in the post-conflict 
situation. This, for example, was the motivation for excluding the then President of the Republika 
Srpska (the Bosnian Serb Republic), Radovan Karadzic, and the chief military commander of the 
Army of the Republika Srpska, Ratko Mladic, from the Dayton Peace Process in 1996, following 
their indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.46 Human rights 
actors are keen to raise rights abuses as issues that need to be addressed in a negotiation process and 
the resulting settlement, whereas conflict management practitioners may try to frame such concerns 
in ways that make the parties concerned less defensive. In the eyes of human rights activists, 
however, such an approach may render a negotiation process illegitimate, because justice is deemed 
non-negotiable and because it may put potential and former victims at continued risk. 
A final difference relates to the roles that the actors play in times of conflict and how they position 
themselves in relation to conflicting parties.  Human rights actors are geared towards advocacy, 
monitoring, and investigation, whereas conflict management practitioners tend to play a more 
facilitative role in bringing parties together and assisting them to communicate with each other.  
Actors in both arenas have to take care to ensure that the functions they fulfil and the activities they 
undertake are in line with their primary roles, combining roles that are contraception in specific 
processes, especially if the different roles have conflicting principles or objectives. Indeed, the 
mediating role of a conflict management intervenor may be compromised if he or she is perceived 
                                                 
44 An example of the exclusion of the dissident General Laurent Nkunda from the initial Peace Processes in the DRC 
has left continued fighting in the volatile North Kivu province.  
45 Mandela has been quoted as saying “ this should be all inclusive – not only government, National Assembly and 
political parties, but also rebel groups on the ground … these are the people slaughtering civilians …and unless we 
include them in the negotiation it will be difficult to stop the violence.” See  
      <http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/security/a0022203.htm>, last visited September 8, 2009. 
46 In Africa, the debate on whether or not to exclude parties responsible for gross human rights violation has been 
particular heated regarding Sierra Leone and the leader of the Revolutionary United Front, Foday Sankoh. See further  
Holbrooke, R. (1998). To End a War, Random House New York; Human Rights Watch, (1999). ‘Sierra Leone: Getting 
Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape,’ July (HRW: A1103/6/99) Washington DC. 
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to criticize or blame a particular party because of human rights concerns.  For example, the 
Burundian peace process was put under severe pressure when the mediator, former South African 
President Mandela, incurred the wrath of the Burundian government through his harsh criticisms 
concerning political prisoners and their conditions in jail.47 
It should be acknowledged that neither human rights actors nor conflict resolution practitioners are 
neutral where issues of rights and justice are concerned.  However, while the latter may express 
their values, they ought to refrain from publicly criticizing parties if they wish to maintain all the 
parties’ trust and involvement in a negotiation process.  As a rule, conflict resolution practitioners 
carefully guard their impartiality so as to ensure their acceptability to all parties.  In contrast, human 
rights actors will not only express their values, but may also denounce parties guilty of human 
rights violations.  In this sense, they have no compunction about taking sides in a conflict, 
something conflict resolution practitioners are keen to avoid. The differences between the two fields 
in goals, values, roles, focus, and strategies are summarized in the table below. 
 
The above discussion indicates that several major differences between human rights actors and 
conflict management practitioners hinge on their different interpretation of moral issues in terms of 
strategies, focus, and approach. In the words of Nherere and Ansah-Koi, "human rights complicate 
the conflict resolution process by either bringing in or exacerbating the moral dimension in a 
conflict."48 To conclude from the above, however, that the fields of human rights and conflict 
management are necessarily in contradiction or competition with one another would be wrong.  
Here, this chapter starkly contrasts the two perspectives for illustrative purposes.  In reality, the two 
groups often overlap and share many objectives.  Peace processes generally reflect elements of both 
approaches and often include aspects of both in the form of power-sharing arrangements, 
institution-building, and mechanisms to uphold accountability.49 
There is also an increasing awareness that peace and justice are inextricably linked.  As Baker puts 
it, "peace is no longer acceptable on any terms; it is intimately linked with the notion of justice.  
Conflict resolution is not measured simply by the absence of bloodshed; it is assessed by the moral 
quality of the outcome."50 Nathan posits "the establishment of peace with justice" as the primary 
                                                 
47 “Mandela Steps up Pressure for Building to Realized Political Prisoners,” June 13, 2000; and “Mandela Leaves 
Burundi with Prison Issue Unresolved,” both from Hirondelle News Agency, June 14, 2001; at 
<http//www.hirondelle.org>, last visited, September 8, 2009. 
48 Nherere, P. and Ansah-Koi, K. (1990). ‘Human Rights and Conflict Resolution’ in Lindgren, G., Wallensteen, P. and 
Nordquist, K. Issues in Third World Conflict Resolution. Uppsala: Uppsala University, p. 3. 
49Kunder, supra note 38. 
50 Baker, supra note 40, p.566. 
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goal of efforts to prevent and end civil wars.51 Moreover, the reality of intra-state conflict 
necessitates a combination of the two perspectives. If, for example, the hard-line position–that those 
responsible for rights abuses cannot be involved in negotiations–was adhered to, there could be no 
negotiated settlements in civil wars.  After all, it is in the nature of civil wars that no one party can 
be absolved from responsibility for human rights violations.  Consequently, no party would qualify 
as a legitimate participant in peace negotiations.  Yet, resolving intra-state conflict without their 
involvement is impossible.  South Africa and Mozambique are obvious examples in this regard. 
 
The tension discussed above explains why it would be difficult to merge the two fields and why 
there are strong arguments to keep them separate. Nevertheless, this analysis underscores the 
importance of building greater mutual understanding, since actors in both fields have interest in 
achieving sustainable peace with justice. Their differences provide all the more reason for exploring 
the relationship between the fields and examining how co-operation between them can help to 
promote their goals. Moreover, knowledge of each other is necessary for actors in both disciplines 
to constructively manage the tensions that exist between them.  
 
 
                                                 
51 Nathan, L. (2000). ‘The four horsemen of the Apocalypse: The Structural Causes of Conflicts in  
Africa’ in Peace & Change, vol. 25, No. 2, pp 188- 207. 
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Table 1: Differences between human rights actors and conflict management practitioners (adapted 






































Conflict management practitioners 
 
Peace as the pre-condition for systemic justice 
(justice through peace) 
 
Aiming for the cessation of violence and resolution 
of conflict so that relationship between parties can 
be repairing and structural causes of conflict can be 
addressed    
  
Co- operative  
 
Include all relevant parties in the peace process 
 
 
Flexible: conflict resolution is negotiable – 
negotiated outcome must be acceptable to local 
actors and appropriate to local conditions   
 
Refrain from judging and criticizing parties, 
especially in public   
 
Focus on needs, interests, concerns of parties in 




Pragmatic focus  
 
Facilitative approach towards outcome and issues 
 
Process advocate; concerned with relationships and 
dialogue 
 
Facilitator, convener, reconciler, mediator 
 
 
Need to remain impartial with respect to all parties 
Human rights actors 
 
Transitional justice as pre-condition for 
sustainable peace (peace through justice  
 
Aiming for holding perpetrators 
accountable, restoring the rule of law, and 





Exclude parties responsible for gross 
human rights violations from the peace 
process 
 
Strict: justice is not a negotiable-outcome 
must be in line with international human 
rights standards 
Judge parties and attribute blame 
 
 
Focus on protection of rights and the extent 
to which parties have upheld international, 
regional and domestic human rights 
standards 
 
Focus on principles 
 
Prescriptive approach towards outcome and 
issue 
Outcomes advocate; concerned with 
constitutionalism and protection of rights 
 
Advocate, monitor, investigator, lawyer  
 
Need to speak out against justice and 
human rights violations and denouncing 




                                                 
52 The table provided in this chapter is more intensive than Barker’s and organizes the information in several categories. 
Baker distinguishes between “ conflict managers “ and democratizers”, and identifies the following differences: 
importance of cultural values/universal human rights values and standards; inclusive process/exclusive process; goal is 
reconciliation/goal is justice; pragmatic, confidence-building/principles institutionalizing law to build trust in the 
system; emphasis on process/emphasis on outcome; moral equivalence of belligerents/attributing blame; conflict 
resolution as negotiable/justice as non-negotiable; political  neutrality of outside actors/outside mediators cannot be 
morally neutral. See Baker, supra note 40, p.567.     
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6.3 Human Rights and Conflict: The Interface 
 
6.3.1 Human Rights Violation as Both Causes and Manifestations of Violent Conflict 
 
The relationship between rights abuses and conflict is a useful starting point for assessing how 
human rights and conflict management are linked.  Violent and destructive conflict can lead to gross 
human rights violations, but violations can also result from a sustained denial of rights over a period 
of time.53 In other words, human rights abuses can be a cause as well as a consequence, or symptom 
of violent conflict. In the most general sense, grievances over the denial or perceived denial of 
rights can generate social and political conflicts.54 Systematic discrimination, differential access to 
education or health care, limits on freedom of expression or religion, denial of rights to political 
participation are just some of the instances. Armed conflicts may also emerge where there are more 
serious incidents of human rights abuses--illegal detentions, extra judicial executions, 
disappearances, torture, widespread killing or even genocide. Here, it is unlikely that peaceful 
resistance will have much effect, so it is extremely likely that groups will take up arms to defend 
themselves. What is important in these instances is that human rights violations are an important, 
underlying cause of conflict. This means that once war has erupted, it is unlikely that merely 
negotiating an end to violence, engaging in peacekeeping and peace building etc., will suffice.55  
Any serious attempt at conflict resolution will also have to address the underlying sources of the 
original conflict, or else violence is likely to re-emerge once third party intervention has ended.56  
 
When violent conflicts erupt, the rights of a large section of the population, particularly members of 
the vulnerable groups are frequently violated. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda stands as one of the 
most chilling illustrations of the scope of atrocities that conflict can generate. The protracted 
conflicts in the DRC and Sudan demonstrate that this kind of abuse not only flares up in the short-
term; in both countries, the population has experienced decades of human rights violations resulting 
from the wars taking place. Conflicts over access to resources, such as diamond in Sierra Leone, 
                                                 
53 See a more elaborate account of this argument in Lutz, E. (2006). ‘Understanding Human Rights Violations in Armed 
Conflicts’ in Mertus and Helsing, supra note 10, p. 26. In this regards, Ellen Lutz argues that human rights violations 
are an integral part of every armed conflict, and that abuse of human rights also spawned many wars of liberation 
against colonial powers, and wars waged by leftist guerilla insurgents against corrupt or dictatorial government regimes. 
54 Widespread human rights abuses that developed since the time of King Leopold II in the present DRC and human 
rights violations on ethnic grounds since independence in Burundi came to be the main sources of violent conflicts in 
both countries to date. On the entrenchment of a culture of human rights abuse in Congo, see generally Hochschild, A. 
(1998).  King Leopold’s Ghost. A story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa. London: Macmillan. 
55 Annan, K. (1998). ‘The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in 
Africa.’ Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Security Council.  Document A/52/871-S/1998/318, 
United Nations, New York. 
56 This author is of the view that the continuing violent conflicts in Africa’s Great Lakes region has much to do with the 
fact that the underlying causes of conflicts are not addressed or inadequately addressed.  
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timber in Liberia, coltan in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and oil in Sudan have all not only 
had a great toll in the cost to human life on the battlefield, but have also caused the vast of harm to 
civilians as direct victims. In the case of Congo, violations included torture, murder and 
disappearances, rape, war crimes and crimes against humanity.57  One could argue that a culture of 
human rights abuse has become entrenched.58 At times, specific human rights abuses have 
deliberately been used as a strategy of war to fight and intimidate opponents and terrorize civilians. 
The mutilation and amputation of people's hands and other body parts by the rebels of Foday 
Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone is a case in point, as was the systematic use of 
rape in "ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.59  Human rights may also be affected in more indirect ways, 
through, for example, the destruction of people's livelihoods or the refusal of belligerent parties to 
allow humanitarian relief activities in areas under their control.60 
The causal nature of human rights violations, on the other hand, can be illustrated by the case of 
South Africa under the former apartheid regime.  A sustained denial of human rights gave rise to 
high-intensity conflict, as the state's systemic oppression of the civil and political liberties of the 
majority of the population, and its restraints on their social, economic, and cultural rights, resulted 
in a long-lasting armed liberation struggle.  Numerous other conflicts have been caused by human 
rights issues such as limited political participation, the quest for self-determination, limited access 
to resources, exploitation, forced acculturation, and discrimination.61 For example, the conflict in 
Burundi resulted largely from exclusionary measures and denial of the rights of certain ethnic 
groups in society (the Hutus in this case), to fully participate in the country’s political affairs.62 
Rights-related concerns also motivated the uprising of the Banyamulenge Tutsi Minorities in 
Eastern Zaire in 1996 and their overthrow of Mobutu.63 These concerns include, among other 
things, discrimination at the hands of Mobutu's regime over three decades, the decision of a 
                                                 
57 Montaque, D. (2003) ‘Stolen Goods: Coltan and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ SAIS Review, vol. 
22, No. 1, pp. 103-118. 
58 Lamb, G. (2000). ‘Putting belligerents in Context: The Case of Namibia and Angola’ in Chesterman, S. (ed.), 
Civilians in War, Colorado: Lynne Publishers, pp 25 – 43. 
59 On Sierra Leone, see Human Rights Watch, supra note 46 International Crisis Group. (1999). ‘Sierra Leone: A New 
Beginning? Situation Analysis, March 18, 1999; on Bosnia see International Criminal Attribution for the Former 
Yugoslava. (1996). Foca Indictment, Case number IT – 96 -23. Initial indictment June 26, 1996; first amended 
indictment October 7, 1999; found at <http:/www.icty.org/indictment/English>, last visited, September 8, 2009, and 
Amnesty International (1993). ‘Bosnia – Herzegovina. Rape and sexual abuse by Armed Forces’, London: A1 
International Secretariat. 
60 The Somalia Case. 
61 Nherere and Ansah-Koi, supra note 48. 
62 Personal interviews from Burundi indicated that such exclusionary and discriminatory policies which were instigated 
since colonial times have resulted into denial of various rights ranging from the right against discrimination to equality 
before the law; from right to equal ownership of property to the rights to education and so on. 
63 For a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the matter, see Mollel, A. (2008). ‘Minority Rights, Nationality Laws 
and Conflict Prevention: Rethinking the Banyamulenge in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ in Journal of African 
and International Law, vol. 1, No.1, p. 51 –82. 
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provincial governor to expel this minority group from Zaire where they had lived for more than a 
century, and Mobutu's support for Hutus Interahamwe (militia) who had been involved in the 
Rwandan genocide.64 It should be noted here that denial of human rights does not only occur 
through active repression, but can also come about through the inability of the state to realize the 
rights of its citizens, especially in the socio-economic domain.  Such passive violation also deepens 
social cleavages and rivalries, thus enhancing the potential for destructive conflict.  In several 
African countries, this is reflected in the way in which access to the political system is highly 
contested in societies marked by abject poverty. Control of the state is often the only way to achieve 
economic security.65 
For both human rights actors and conflict management practitioners, it matters whether gross 
human rights violations resulting from conflict is the main concern, or whether the focus is on 
conflict resulting from a denial of human rights. The problems to be addressed are different and so 
are the desired outcomes.  If human rights violations as a symptom of conflict are the issue, the 
primary objective is to protect people from further abuses.  International humanitarian law is an 
important instrument in this regard, as it seeks to limit the excesses of war and to protect civilians 
and other vulnerable groups.66  Activities of intermediaries are then aimed at mitigating, alleviating 
and containing the destructive manifestation of conflict.  They include peacekeeping, peacemaking, 
peace-enforcement, humanitarian intervention, humanitarian relief assistance, human rights 
monitoring, negotiating cease-fires, and the settlement of displaced persons.67 
On the other hand, when human rights violations are causing violent conflict, the main objective of 
activities by both human rights and conflict management actors is to reduce the level of structural 
violence through the transformation of the structural, systemic conditions that give rise to violent 
conflict in a society.  Galtung68 introduced the term structural violence to refer to situations where 
injustice, repression, and exploitation are built into the fundamental structures in society, and where 
individuals or groups are damaged due to differential access to social resources built into a social 
system.69 As explained further below, human rights standards are primary instruments in this 
                                                 
64 Nathan, supra note 51, p. 192. 
65 Examples including Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, ANGOLA, Mozambique, and Zambia. See also 
Annan, supra note 55,  para. 12. 
66 Serone, J. (2006). ‘Holding Military and Paramilitary Forces Accountable’ in Mertus and Helsing, supra note 10, 
p.217. 
67 Most of these terms are also discussed in An Agenda For Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking And Peace-
Keeping, A/47/277 - S/24111, June 17, 1992. 
68 Galtung, J. (1976), Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research, Vol. II, Copenhagen: Ejlers, p. 446. 
69 Galtung argues that violence exists when human beings are prevented from meeting their full potential. Direct or 
personal violence occurs when there is an actor that commits this violence (i.e., rape, murder and assault), and structural 
violence occurs where there is no such actor (i.e , poverty, homelessness and lack of health care.) in the latter case, 
unequal access to power and resources is built into the social system, leading to unequal life chances for individuals or 
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regard, as the protection and promotion of human rights are essential in addressing structural causes 
of conflict. Thus, whereas direct, physical violence is the main concern when one focuses on human 
rights violations as a cause relates to structural symptoms of destructive conflict, considering rights 
violations as a cause relates to structural violence. The desired outcome of the former is peace in the 
sense of an absence of direct violence–a so-called negative peace.  However, in the case of the 
latter, the goal is to achieve positive peace.  This refers to the absence of structural violence, or, 
framed differently, the presence of social justice, including harmonious relationships between 
parties that are conducive to mutual development, growth, and the attainment of goals.70  The above 
discussion is summarized in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: The causal relationship between human rights violation and conflict 




















Human rights abuses as 
symptom 
Gross human rights violations as a 




Protecting people from gross human 
rights violations stemming from 
destructive conflict 
 
Peacekeeping, peacemaking, human 
rights monitoring, settlement of 
displaced people, humanitarian 
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Human rights abuses as cause 
 
Violent conflict as a consequence of 




Addressing the structural problems that 
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reconciliation, institution-building, 
development and reconstruction, 
protection of rights, accommodation of 
diversity. 
Negotiated settlement, political and 
socio-economic justice, mechanisms to 






                                                                                                                                                                  
groups. See also Webb, K. (1986). ‘Structural Violence and the Definition of Conflict,’ in Pauling, L.,Laszlo, E. and 
Jong, Y.Y. World Encyclopedia of Peace. Vol. 2. Oxford, New York, Beijing, Frankfurt; Pergamon Press: pp. 431-434, 
for a further discussion of structural violence. 
70 See from Galtung, J. and Wirak, A. (1977). ‘Human Needs and Human Rights: A Theoretical Approach,’  
Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 8:pp 251-258; Yarn, D.  (1999). Dictionary of Conflict Resolution. Jossey-Bass Inc. 
Publishers, San Francisco: Yarn defends positive peace as a situation where state or non- state groups continuously 
engaged in the non- violent, constructive management of their differences with the goal of mutually satisfying relations. 
Yarn also argues that the notion is closely linked to “security” (lack of violence or civil disorder and stable relations 
among stable societies) and “justice “ (the stability is far equitable and cognizant of fundamental human rights.) 
71Parlevliet, supra note 9. 
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The table above shows that the distinction between human rights violations as a symptom and as a 
cause of destructive conflict, with specific focus on the aims of interventions does not depict 
different scenarios.  In other words, both aspects of the human rights/ conflict relationship can be 
present in the same situation, as in fact is generally the case in civil wars. 
 
It is important to note that these aspects are closely related in a number of ways, even though the 
distinction between causes and symptoms is made here for analytical purposes.  The ways in which 
human rights abuses as both a cause and a symptom of violent conflict are related are briefly 
mentioned here and will be discussed further below.  First, violent, high-intensity conflicts are 
largely manifestations of deeper-lying, structural problems.  If the latter are not addressed, peoples’ 
frustration, anger, and dissatisfaction may rise to such an extent that they mobilize to confront real 
or perceived injustice. In other words, in situations where human rights violations occur as a 
consequence of conflict, a sustained denial of rights often lies at the heart of that conflict (as 
exemplified by the case of Rwanda in the aftermath of the 1994 Genocide). Second, activities aimed 
at conflict mitigation and alleviation can have an impact on the prospects for longer-term efforts 
towards peace-building and conflict resolution.  If the symptoms of conflict are effectively and 
constructively addressed, this can provide a basis for parties to work on the more structural issues, 
particularly if trust has developed between them.  Third, the desired outcomes for human rights 
abuses as a cause or symptom of destructive conflict influence one another.  Negotiated agreements 
that address the symptoms of violent conflict (i.e. ones that pursue negative peace) must include 
provisions for further processes towards institution-building and transformation if they are to be 
sustainable.  If they are merely concerned with ending hostilities but do not address the core causes 
underlying the conflict, they will only be of temporary value.  Fourth, efforts to achieve positive 
peace are fundamentally tied to the ability of parties to end hostilities and to prevent violations of 
human rights. Peace-building processes and efforts to alter structural conditions in society are long-
term undertakings.  Securing negative peace is necessary to create the space and stability for such 
processes to take effect. 
 
6.3.2 A Sustained Denial of Human Rights as a Structural Cause of High-Intensity Conflict 
 
Having observed that a sustained denial of rights generally leads to conflict, it is necessary to 
analyze why it is a cause of rebellion and civil strife.  One conflict management perspective on 
human rights, put forth by Galtung and Wirak,72 provides an important theoretical explanation in 
                                                 
72 Galtung and Wirak, supra note 70: pp 251-258. 
   239 
this regard. This explanation is based on human needs theory as propounded by Burton73 and 
applied by Azar74 in his analysis of protracted social conflict.75 Burton and Azar focus on the 
question of how the frustration of human needs generates conflict.  Needs, defined by Burton as 
universal motivations that are an integral part of human beings, relate in this perspective to both 
material and non-material concerns.  They include not only goods such as food and shelter but also 
identity, recognition and personal growth.76 Burton distinguishes needs from values and interests.  
He defines values as the "norms, customs and beliefs associated with particular social communities" 
and interests as the "vocational, political and economic aspirations of individuals or groups.”77  The 
primary difference between these three concepts lies in their degree of negotiability.  Interests are 
negotiable; one can bargain over them and they can be exchanged against one another. However, 
values and needs are generally not negotiable; they cannot be traded or bargained away.  Thus, 
whereas interests tend to be transitory in nature, needs and values have a more permanent character. 
Needs constitute universal drives for the motivation and mobilization of people, and values are 
closely related to the identity of individuals or groups.  Needs are so fundamental to human 
survival, subsistence and development that people will consistently seek ways of meeting them– 
even if they are frustrated or oppressed.  In other words, when individuals or groups find that their 
needs and values are denied, they will behave in ways that express their frustration, or they will 
refuse to submit to practices and policies that are not acceptable to them.78 
 
In the human rights field, the concept of needs has mostly been considered in relation to socio-
economic rights.  Needs are primarily conceived of in terms of material and social goods such as 
food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and schooling.79 As indicated above, however, they are 
understood in a broader sense in the conflict management field.  Galtung and Wirak80 have 
highlighted the relevance of this conceptualization of human needs for human rights in a way that is 
                                                 
73 Burton, J. (1990). Conflict Resolution and Prevention, Macmillan, London. 
74 Azar, E. ‘Protracted international conflicts: Ten Propositions.’ in Azar, E and John, B (Eds.) (1986), International 
Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, Boulder, CO: Rienner, pp. 28-39. 
75 Miall, et al, (1999), Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 It must be noted that human needs theory has been criticized in the conflict management field. The criticism relate to, 
among other things, the “testability “ of basic human needs and their existence cannot be proven. It has also been 
questioned whether needs are truly universal and fundamental in the sense of not changing over time and in different 
contexts and whether a needs hierarchy exist. For critical commentaries on needs in theory. See, for example, Mitchell, 
C. (1990). ‘Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution : More Basic Questions about Basic Human Needs Theory’ in 
Burton, (ed.). (1990), Conflict: Human Needs Theory, St. Marten’s Press, New York: pp . 149- 176; Roy, R. (1990). 
‘Social Conflicts and Needs Theories: Some Observations’ in Burton, Ibid, p. 148. 
79 Claude, R. and Weston, B.  (Eds.). (1992). Human Rights in the World Community:  Issues and Action, 2nd edition.  
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 137 – 211. 
80 Galtung and Wirak, supra note 70. 
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further explained by human rights scholars.81  Galtung and WIrak suggest that needs relate to 
security, welfare, freedom, and identity.  Security-and identity-related needs have an individual and 
a collective dimension.  Security-related needs pertain to protection against attack and destruction, 
as well as physical and mental preservation.  Needs involving welfare fall within the physiological, 
ecological, and socio-cultural domain (e.g., food, shelter, clean environment, education, cultural 
preservation), whereas freedom-related needs are concerned with self-expression, self-actualization, 
affection, association, support, and recognition.82 This conceptualization of needs largely 
corresponds with the view of Max-Neef83 who identifies nine fundamental human needs in the 
context of human development: subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, 
leisure, creation, identity, and freedom. 
 
This approach helps to shed light on the relationship between human rights and basic human needs.  
From this perspective, all needs give rise to certain rights, which help secure the goods or services 
necessary to meet these needs.  As Gultung and Wirak84 put it, "human rights are instrumental to the 
satisfaction of needs."   
A comparison of the needs listed above with rights contained in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, shows that all rights relate to 
several needs.  Rights can be seen as the means to satisfy fundamental human needs; their 
implementation address such needs.  For example, the right to take part in the cultural life of a 
community would meet needs of participation, affection, identity, and understanding.  Self-
determination, usually conceived of in terms of rights, is a collective need for identity, freedom, and 
security.85  In the words of Osaghae86, "human rights are an instrument of individual and collective 
                                                 
81 Claude and Weston, supra note 79. 
82 Claude and Weston, Ibid, pp: 138- 144 elaborate on these categories of needs. 
83 Max -Neef, M. (1991). Human Scale Development Conception, Application and other Reflections, New York and 
London: The Apex Press, p.17. 
84 Galtung and Wirak, supra note 70, p.254. 
85The appropriateness of understanding rights in relation to needs is also reflected by considering the human rights 
model of Mc Doungal, Lasswel and Chen, discussed in Claude and Weston, supra note 79, pp. 5-6. This model 
emphasizes the value of respect, power, wealth, enlightenment, well being, skills, affection and rectitude as underlying 
human rights. These values closely relate to basis human needs as conceptualized in this Chapter. 
86 Osaghae, E. (1996). ‘Human Rights and Ethnic Conflict Management: The Case of Nigeria.’ Journal of Peace 
Research, vol. 33,No. 2, pp. 171-188. 
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struggle to protect core interests".87  Here he echoes Galtung's and Wirak's88 conclusion that "the 
rights are the means, and the satisfaction of needs is the end.”89 
 
The direct relationship between rights and needs explains why a sustained denial of rights may 
cause violent conflict in a society: such denial means a long-term frustration of needs, and people 
will persist in seeking ways to address their needs if these are not met.  If this is possible through 
peaceful and constructive avenues, individuals or groups will generally engage in conventional 
forms of political action in order to bring about change.  If, however, they are marginalized or 
excluded, they may eventually resort to armed resistance in the belief that this is the only way to 
bring about the transformation of society.  It is important to note that such exclusion or 
victimization can be either real or perceived as such by groups.  The latter is often the case when 
groups experience frustration in realizing their political and economic expectations.  Such perceived 
deprivation can also make groups more disposed to violence as a way of achieving their goals.90 
 
Deprivation of needs through the sustained denial of rights is a structural cause of violent conflict, 
because it is generally embedded in structures of governance, in terms of how the state is organized, 
institutions operate, and society functions.  For example, a particular social group may, on the basis 
of its identity, be systematically barred from participating in the political process through certain 
laws or policies.91  Or a state may be characterized by a consistent lack of development in those 
regions where the majority of inhabitants are members of a social group other than the politically 
dominant group.  Long-standing grievances over land and other resource allocations can also 
constitute structural causes of destructive conflict.92  Nathan identifies four critical structural 
conditions in Africa: authoritarian rule, exclusion of minorities from governance,  socio-economic 
deprivation combined with inequity, and weak states that lack the institutional capacity to manage 
conflicts constructively.93 The former United Nations Secretary–General, Kofi Annan, lists the 
following as key structural risk factors that fuel violent conflict: Inequity (disparities amongst 
                                                 
87 Note that Osaghae does not distinguish between interests and needs as I have done, following Burton and Azar. He 
uses the term “core interests” in referring to what have been called “needs “ in this chapter. 
88 Galtung and Wirak, supra note 70, p.258. 
89 They highlight that the relationship is not a simple one :one single need may be satisfied through the implementation 
of several rights, and one right may satisfy several needs. This underscores the indivisible and interdependent nature of 
rights. 
90 Gurr, T. (1970). Why Men Rebel? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,  p.23. 
91 This has been the case with the Banyamulenge minority groups in the eastern DRC, resulting in the long sustained 
conflict in that part of the country. See for further discussion on the marginalization of the Banyamulenge, Mollel, supra 
note 63. 
92 IRIN, (2004). ‘Great Lakes: Land Reform cited as Key to Issue in Conflict Management’ Nairobi, available at 
<http://www.jamboweb.com/ctnt/index.cfm?icontent_id=691&isection_id=19> last visited, September 8, 2009. 
93 Nathan, supra note 51, p.192. 
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identity groups), inequality (policies and practices that institutionalize discrimination), injustice 
(lack of the rule of law, ineffective and unfair law enforcement, inequitable representation in 
institutions serving the rule of law) and insecurity (lack of accountable and transparent governance 
and human security).94 Each of the causes highlighted by these authors can be traced back to human 
rights concerns related to security, identity, well-being and freedom as discussed by Galtung and 
Wirak.95  Osaghae thus argues that "the human rights approach to conflict management recognizes 
that conflict arise from inequalities, discrimination, domination, exclusion and injustices which 
attend the competition among people and groups for scarce political, social, and economic resources 
and benefits."96 The role of the state and issues of governance must come under discussion in this 
regard because the way the state is organized determines whether needs are frustrated or satisfied: it 
allows or denies groups access to the resources or processes necessary to address their needs. The 
state may deny needs out of unwillingness (because it perceives calls for wider political 
participation, autonomy, or self-determination as a threat) or inability (due to weak state structures, 
poor societal infrastructure, or lack of resources). 
 
According to Nathan, these structural conditions create tensions in society that provide fertile 
grounds for violent conflict.  He suggests that they give rise to a societal propensity to violence and 
as such pose a fundamental threat to human security and the stability of the state.97 This propensity 
stems from the non-negotiable character of needs and is enhanced if several structural problems are 
present simultaneously (e.g. when discrimination in one area coincides with marginalization in 
another).  A pattern of negative interaction between social groups–as manifested in hostility, fear, 
prejudices, and violent skirmishes occurring over a period of time–can also contribute to a 
propensity to violence. 
 
In other words, the absence of justice is often the primary reason for the absence of peace.  The 
presence of justice, on the other hand, can lead to both positive and negative peace.98 Thus, a 
sustained denial of human rights can be a fundamental cause of high-intensity conflict.  Violence 
manifested in such conflict often is evidence that needs are frustrated, legitimate aspirations are 
denied, and obvious injustices are present. 
                                                 
94 Annan . K. (2001). Prevention of Armed Conflict. Report of the Secretary – Generally to the United Nations General 
Assembly and Security Council. Document A/55/985 – S/2001/174. New York: United Nations, p.24 para 100. 
95Galtung Wirak,  Supra note 70. 
96 Osaghae, supra note 86, p. 173. 
97 Nathan, supra note 51, p. 194. 
98 Harris, P and Reilly, B.  (Eds.). (1998). Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA.), Stockholm,  pp. 21-22. 
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6.4 Human Rights and Conflict Management: Contradictory or Complementary? 
 
Human rights advocates and conflict resolvers share similar goals when responding to conflicts. 
However, to achieve their goals each group uses different methods based on different underlying 
assumptions. As a result, both groups occasionally adopt contradictory or even mutually exclusive 
approaches to the same conflict problem in the same conflict situation. For example, conflict 
resolvers, eager to achieve a negotiated settlement to a conflict with minimum loss of life, may fail 
to give sufficient weight to the relevance of human rights to the long-term success of their work. 
Human rights advocates, on the other hand, may undervalue the pressures under which mediators 
operate to bring about an immediate end to loss of life. If they limit their activities to shaming, 
negative publicity, and judicial condemnation of criminals, human rights activists may miss 
opportunities for improvements in the human rights situation that could be achieved through the use 
of the negotiation and diplomatic techniques upon which conflict resolvers rely.    
Despite these dilemmas, preventing conflicts and massive human rights violations, and rebuilding 
societies in the aftermath, requires an approach that incorporates the perspectives of both human 
rights advocates and conflict resolution practitioners. 
 
6.4.1 Respect for Human Rights as a Primary Form of Conflict Prevention Mechanisms 
 
Modern principles of rights protection and promotion as a form of conflict prevention were 
recognized in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  It states, "it is essential, 
if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and 
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law…"99 The analysis above 
explains why this is the case.  If the sustained denial of rights is a structure cause of highly – 
intensity conflict, it follows that the sustainable protection of rights is essential for dealing with 
conflict constructively. It is especially critical to the effective prevention of destructive conflict, 
because it avoids the structural injustices and inequalities in society that rise to violent conflict. 
 
As the discussion above highlights, it is more important to focus on the structural causes of violence 
than on violence itself if we are to prevent violent conflict in any way. Violence, however 
significant from a humanitarian point of view, is invariably the outward manifestation of a structure 
crisis. As long as destructive structural conditions remain in place in a society, the potential for 
violence remains.100 In its efforts to prevent violent conflict, the international community generally 
                                                 
99 Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), 
UN Doc A/810 1948), (hereinafter referred to as “the Universal Declaration”). 
100 Nathan, supra note 51, p. 195. 
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seek to keep a close eye on events that may have a destabilizing impact on particular societies such 
as a crop failure, significant currency devaluation, an influx of weapons, or strikes. Extensive 
databases are thus constructed for the purpose of “early warning" and this monitors a range of 
factors and events that may trigger or escalate a conflict, so–called accelerators.101  However, single 
events may have very different consequences in different contexts, depending on the structural 
conditions present. For example, a crop failure or the arrest of a political opponent may lead to the 
outbreak of violence in some states but go largely unnoticed in others, because they intensify the 
structural tension in the former but not in the latter.102  In other words, focusing on emergencies or 
crises where violence has started to occur is not sufficient to prevent violent conflict. Relevant in 
this regard is the distinction the Carnegie Commission for the Prevention of Deadly Conflict has 
made between operational and structural prevention of violent conflict.103  The former entails 
actions that can be employed when violence is imminent, and includes diplomatic interventions, 
fact – finding missions, and preventive deployment of military and civilian contingents. Operational 
prevention therefore aims to prevent latent conflict with the potential for violence from 
degenerating into serious armed conflicts. Structural prevention, on the other hand, is meant to 
address the deep–rooted socio–economic, cultural, environmental, institutional and other structural 
causes that underlie the immediate political symptoms of violent conflicts.104 In the case of 
operational prevention, prevention amounts to fire–fighting; structural prevention means removing 
the logs that catch fire.105 
  
The protection and promotion of human rights addresses structural causes of violent conflict by 
working towards the satisfaction of basic needs. Institutionalizing respect for human rights 
(through, for example, constitutional endorsement of fundamental human rights, the independence 
of the judiciary, and an independent human rights commission) may ensure that such protection is 
sustainable over a period of time and becomes a matter of policy. It helps prevent high-intensity 
conflict by limiting the power of the state, affording citizen protection against abuse of rights, and 
allowing them a large measure of freedom and participation. It should be noted that some degree of 
structure tension exists in all complex and heterogeneous societies, but the effect thereof are largely 
determined by the extent to which a specific society has effective and appropriate coping 
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   245 
mechanisms. This is related to, among other things, the available resources and source norms for 
dealing with dissatisfaction and dissent. Where transparent and representative system of governance 
exists with legitimate institutions, there is a greater capacity to manage such tensions in a 
constructive way.106 Therefore, institutionalized respect for human rights also means that 
mechanisms are developed within state structures that provide consensual and acceptable ways for 
dealing with discontent, thus limiting the need to resort to violence.  Respect for rights thus 
enhances the capacity of the state to engage in constructive conflict by facilitating dialogue and 
participatory decision-making. 
 
Specific attention must be devoted to the structural accommodation of diversity, which means 
formally incorporating inclusiveness and respect for diversity in the political system, state 
institutions, and the law.107 This is particularly important because identity groups tend to be the 
primary actors in intra-state conflict.  A strong sense of identity is often the core around which 
social groups are mobilized in order to raise grievances related to needs deprivation. The former 
High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Co-operation and 
Security in Europe (OSCE), Max van der Stoel, emphasized that "the protection of persons 
belonging to national minorities has to be seen as essentially in the interests of the state and of the 
majority.  As a rule, peace and stability are best served by ensuring that persons belonging to 
national minorities can effectively enjoy their rights”.108  It is interesting to note his 
acknowledgement that his work as High Commissioner involved many human rights aspects, and 
that his activities "may have some positive effect on implementing the rights of persons belonging 
to national minorities and building respect for human rights in general."109 He emphasized, 
however, that that was not the purpose of the HCNM's work, which is to try to prevent violent 
conflict. Nevertheless, he was effectively working towards conflict prevention through ensuring that 
minorities could enjoy their rights.  This goes to show how the protection of rights is an essential 
form of conflict prevention.  It also highlights how closely linked the fields of human rights and 
conflict management are in reality. 
The accommodation of diversity must entail more than a mere recognition of formal equality 
between various groups in society.  Efforts to treat people from different groups equally can amount 
to systematically precluding members from disadvantaged groups.  If, for instance, political parties 
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are organized along ethnic lines and the political system is based on a "winner-takes-all" approach, 
minorities will be completely and permanently excluded from governance in a formal democracy.  
In such situations of democratic majoritarianism, minorities may come to believe that political 
institutions and processes do not sufficiently meet their needs and interests, making them more 
inclined to violence as a means of expression and objection.110 The perception of marginalization 
will be even more enhanced in contexts where political power implies privileged access to 
economic opportunities and resources, which, as the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan111 
has pointed out, is the case in many African countries.  Indeed, the fact that the state is often not 
neutral, but rather controlled by a particular group pursuing its own interests, highlights the need to 
ensure that respect for the rights of identity groups is institutionalized.  Structural accommodation 
of diversity protects identity groups against biased use of the state machinery by those who control 
the state. 
 
There are various mechanisms available to this end.  These include constitutional rights regarding 
language, religion, and culture, forms of power-sharing (such as federalism, proportional 
representation, decentralization in which the local or regional units have a large degree of 
autonomy), and so on.  As the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities points out, 
realizing the aspirations of identity groups does not necessarily require a territorial arrangement 
(i.e., secession), but can be realized through legislation providing for the preservation of identity in 
the areas of culture, education, and language.  Other measures include guarantees of effective 
participation in public decision-making processes, and carefully constructed electoral processes.112 
At the very least, respect for diversity must be ensured through the formal acknowledgement that 
identity groups have a right to exist, a right to protect their language and culture, and to participate 
in public affairs on an equal basis with others.  In sum, the process of institutionalizing respect for 
human rights should be concerned not only with individual rights, but also with group rights. 
 
6.4.2 Combining the Prescriptive Approach of Human Rights Actors with the Facilitative 
Approach of Conflict Management Practitioners 
 
The previous discussion had highlighted how the human rights perspective is deeply concerned with 
substantive issues related to the distribution of political power and economic resources, security, 
and identity.  In the context of negotiation processes aimed at ending a long-term violent conflict in 
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a society; this generally translates into a prescriptive approach towards the outcome or product of 
negotiations.  The outcome must be in line with human rights standards and must embrace 
constitutionalism and the legal protection of rights.  While these are also concerns of conflict 
management practitioners, the latter generally adopt a more facilitative approach towards the 
outcome.  Their emphasis tends to be more on a particular kind of process--one that is aimed at 
establishing dialogue, developing relationships, and building trust between the parties.  There is 
great awareness within the conflict management field that the quality of the outcome depends on the 
process used to achieve it.  A process that is flawed in the eyes of involved parties contaminates the 
product by making its legitimacy questionable, hence undermining its sustainability.  If, for 
example, some parties have experienced a peace process as exclusive, they will not feel that their 
concerns have been heard, nor will they feel confident that their interests have been taken into 
account in the settlement reached.  Consequently, they have little incentive to co-operate with the 
implementation of that settlement, and may be inclined to obstruct it.  They are also more likely to 
resort to violence in order to guarantee attention for their case.  The point here is not that one aspect 
is more important than the other; rather, that process and product are so intertwined that they impact 
on one another, both negatively and positively, and should therefore both be given careful 
consideration. The sustainability of an agreement depends both on the substance of the outcome and 
on the process by which it was agreed upon. 
 
The process used in resolving issues between parties is especially significant in the context of intra-
state conflict where many groups, all with different needs, values and interests, co-exist within the 
same territory.  The conflictual nature of their relationships may originally stem from their different 
access to political and economic resources, but it is deepened by feelings of hostility, mistrust, and 
fear that have become entrenched over long periods of time.  In some cases, such polarization and 
enemy images become a driving dynamic in fuelling continuous conflict, with violence countering 
violence, leading Sisk to speak of the "self-perpetuating nature of civil wars."113   Others have also 
recognized the significant role of perceptions, emotions, and relationships in contemporary 
conflicts.  Nathan stresses that high-intensity conflict evokes and is fuelled by a range of strong 
emotions, including fear, insecurity, anger, a sense of grievance, and suspicion.  These emotions 
make the parties resistant to negotiations and inhibit progress once talks are underway because 
parties view their differences as irreconcilable and fear that a settlement will entail unacceptable 
compromises.  They lack confidence in negotiations as a means of achieving a satisfactory outcome, 
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Conflict. From War to Peace in Africa.  Nordiska Africa institute, Uppsala: p. 187. 
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even if they are unlikely to gain an outright victory on the battlefield.  Nathan therefore speaks of 
the "psycho-political dynamics" of civil conflict, a term that reflects that the subjective dynamics of 
conflict originate from objective conditions related to power and political relationships, such as 
exclusion, marginalization, and persecution.114 
 
Because the negative character of relationships between groups is both a product and a further cause 
of conflict, attention needs to be devoted simultaneously to addressing root causes and building 
positive relationships between parties.  As long as relationships remain fiercely adversarial, parties 
locked in positions of fear and suspicion will be reluctant to engage in negotiations towards a 
settlement.  The development of trust between parties in the course of negotiations is therefore 
essential; as three authors have put it, "negotiations tend to focus on issues, but their success 
depends on people."115 
 
Process issues relate to questions of who participates in negotiations; ground rules for talks; the 
time-table; the structure of the discussion; the size of negotiating delegations and how 
representation is organized; how deadlocks are addressed; how decisions are made; where the 
process takes place; and what to do about issues that fall beyond the scope of the process.  Whether 
intervention by a third party is required is also an important consideration.  Depending on the 
outcome of this assessment, questions arise about whether such an intervening body should be of a 
governmental, intergovernmental, or non-governmental nature,116 and about the facilitation 
techniques the intervenor will use.  For example, many interventions in African civil wars have 
been conducted by intergovernmental organizations, both regional and global.  These have often 
relied on a top-down approach where the leaders of parties are coaxed and bullied into negotiations 
through the use of "carrots and sticks". Nathan has argued, however, that the use of power and 
coercion by external intervenors in civil wars is problematic.117  It may well increase the 
                                                 
114 Nathan, supra note 51, pp. 19-20. See also Ledarach, J. (1997). Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in 
Divided Societies. Washngton DC: United States Institute of Peace. Lederach considers social – psychological 
perceptions to the dynamic that drives current conflict. Other scholars who have written on the social psychological 
dynamics of conflict war include Volkan, V. ‘Psychological processes in unofficial diplomacy meetings.’ in Volkan, V., 
Montville, J. and Julius, D. (Eds.), (1991) The psychodynamics of International relationships: Unofficial diplomacy at 
work, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
115 Bloomfield, D., Nupen, C. and Haris, P. (1998). ‘Negotiation Processes,’ in Harris and Reilly, supra note 98, p. 63. 
116 See the role of the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Foundation, an NGO that played an informal intermediary role (Track 
Two Diplomacy) by supporting the former Tanzania president, Julius Nyerere in his efforts in mediating the Arusha 
peace negotiations for Burundi conflicting parties. See also generally Mpangala, G and Mwansasu, B (Eds.) (2004), 
Beyond Conflict in Burundi, Dar es Salaam: The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation. 
117 See Nathan, supra note 51, p. 19. 
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intransigence of parties by heightening their insecurity and causing resentment towards solutions 
that are imposed on them.   
 
A confidence-building approach is therefore likely to yield a more positive result, also with a view 
to the psycho-political dynamics of conflict referred to above. This is a style of mediation that is 
oriented towards raising the parties' confidence in each other, in negotiations, and in the mediator.  
It entails non-coercive facilitation of communication and joint problem-solving between parties by 
an intermediary who has their consent, is not a party to the conflict, and who seeks to facilitate an 
agreement in an even-handed way and on terms acceptable to the parties.  Nathan argues that this 
approach "renders mediation a non-threatening venture and mitigates the pathology of mistrust."118 
Moreover, a process that takes place on this basis also builds norms of dialogue, accommodation, 
and co-operation among political actors, thus laying the foundation for future political relations 
between groups and individuals.  In other words, the process by which the product is agreed upon 
should, ideally, embody the values that are to be contained in the settlement, as this will enhance its 
sustainability. 
 
The emphasis on addressing root cause and building relationships given here implies that the 
resolution of intra-state conflict is a lengthy process.  Short-term interventions are likely to be stop-
gap measures with limited long-term effect.  The reality of civil wars defies "quick-fixes", as the 
issues involved are manifold, complex, and deep-rooted, and situations have degenerated over long 
periods of time.  This also means that local actors must play central roles in devising both the 
product and the process.  Local ownership pre-empts the build-up of resentment against solutions 
imposed by foreign actors.  Moreover, local actors have a deep understanding of the causes, 
dynamics, and issues underlying violent conflict in their context.  They are most aware of the needs 
and interest of various parties, and can thus help to develop an agreement that is appropriate and 
acceptable in the local context.  Most importantly, local ownerships of the process is necessitated by 
basic human needs such as freedom, identity, and especially participation.  If such needs are not met 
when addressing root causes of violent conflict, the foundation is laid for renewed conflict in the 
future. 
Combining the prescriptive focus from the human rights field with the facilitative emphasis from 
the conflict management field will ensure that peacemaking and peace-building processes, both in 
                                                 
118 Nathan does not argue against the use of leverage in negotiation per se, but emphasizes that it should not be 
undertaken by the intervenor him/herself, but rather by outside parties. See Nathan; supra note 51, p. 22. 
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form and content, are in line with universal human rights standards, and will develop relationships 
between parties that provide a basis for future co-existence. 
 
6.4.3 Integrating Human Rights and Justice Issues in Managing Conflicts 
 
Many human rights advocates tend to consider human rights and justice as absolute concepts.  
Human rights and freedoms, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights119 and other human rights instruments, are 
fundamental and therefore not negotiable.  Rights reflect internationally and /or nationally agreed-
upon norms of behaviours between individuals, groups of people, and between the state and its 
citizens.  Moreover, the close relationship between rights and needs as explained above underlines 
the non-negotiable character of fundamental rights and freedoms.  Rights thus set the parameters for 
the management of conflict. 
 
However, within this framework, there is great scope for variation in how rights are realized in 
terms of, for example, the electoral system, form of government, degree of autonomy of regional 
units, constitutional arrangements, and the precise formulation of a Bill of rights.  A useful 
distinction in this regard is between needs and the means of satisfying them.  Basic human needs are 
considered finite and are generally understood to be the same in all cultures and throughout time. 
What changes over time and across cultures is the way or the means by which those needs are 
satisfied.  Thus, whereas basic human needs are not negotiable, the possible means to satisfy them 
are, and these will vary depending on the context.120 Similarly, fundamental rights and freedoms are 
not negotiable, but the manner in which they are recognized is indeed negotiable.  There are many 
different ways in which rights relating to participation, equality, freedom, identity, well-being, and 
security can be realized without undermining the substance and significance of those rights.  
Institutionalised respect for human rights, as discussed earlier, strongly points to democratic 
governance as the necessary basis for the sustainable and effective prevention of destructive conflict 
and the management of normal political and social conflict.  Yet there is no single form of 
democracy that applies across the globe.  On the contrary, the shape and form of democratic 
institutions have developed according to political, cultural, and historical conditions.121 
 
                                                 
119 The ACHPR, supra note 25. 
120 Max neef, supra note 83, pp. 16-28. 
121 Ludwig, R. ‘Free and Fair Elections: Letting the People Decide’ in Krasno, Jean (Ed.). (2004). The United Nations: 
Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society, Bouder/London: Lynner Rienner Publishers, p. 116.  
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The political structure of the state (i.e., federalism, decentralization), the form of the state's 
legislature and executive, and the electoral system are three broad areas of constitutional design that 
warrant examination in this regard.  This entails considering different forms of power-sharing 
arrangements, federalism and autonomy, parliamentary versus presidential government, electoral 
system design, and the structure and procedures of legislative bodies, among others.122 It is essential 
that the details of such structural arrangements are worked out by local actors through inclusive 
negotiations so as to enhance the suitability and sustainability of the mechanisms adopted.   
Institutions that are transplanted from other contexts or imposed by external intervenors, however 
democratic they may be, tend to have little staying power, because they may be inappropriate or 
considered illegitimate by the local population.  The importance of local actors in shaping the 
institutions that regulate their society suggests that the implementation of rights is negotiable and 
depends on the context, even though the rights themselves are not negotiable. 
 
The same argument can be applied to the concept of justice.  Justice is as non-negotiable as human 
rights are; it is, without doubt, the foundation for a sustainable peace.  Yet, the interpretation of 
"justice" is invariably disputed and the form in which justice is shaped in a particular case, is 
negotiable.  Within the human rights field, there has been extensive debate on the forms justice can 
take in a transitional situation with regard to accountability for violations committed during the 
conflict. In exploring the legal, ethical, and political aspects of the quest for justice in transitional 
situations, questions of punishment and /or pardon, and of establishing the truth and /or establishing 
criminal responsibility tribunals, have received much attention.  Much research has focused on 
various mechanisms for transitional justice-such as truth commissions, war crimes tribunals, and/or 
their respective virtues and drawbacks.123 
 
Nevertheless, whether the discussion emphasizes retributive or restorative justice, in both cases the 
"justice" concerned is mainly backward-looking.  This preoccupation with the past is flawed in 
several respects.  Firstly, it hinges in part on the assumption that holding perpetrators accountable 
will end a culture of impunity. There is insufficient evidence to support this thesis.  Secondly, the 
threat of prosecution and accountability can inhibit the resolution of the conflict because it can be a 
                                                 
122 Harris and Reilly, supra note 98, pp. 133-259. 
123 See these matters discussed in Hayner, P. (2001) Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity, New 
York/London: Routledge; Kritz, N. (Ed.).(1994) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon  with former 
Regimes, Vol. I – III, Washington  DC: United States Institute of Peace; Mendez, J. (1997). ‘Accountability for Past 
Abuses,’ Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 19: pp. 255 – 282; Roht-Arriaza, N. (Ed). (1995). Impunity and Human Rights 
in International Law and Practice. New York: Oxford University Press; Bronkhorst, D. (1995). Truth and 
Reconciliation: Obstacles and Opportunities for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Dutch Section,  
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clear disincentive for actors in an armed conflict to give up their resort to violence, as Mendez 
acknowledges.124  This is not to argue that a blanket amnesty is appropriate or necessary, but rather 
to acknowledge that the process of addressing past human rights violations must take into 
consideration the need to consolidate a young and volatile democracy (or other form of 
government) and the need to end hostilities between parties.  Thirdly, it raises the impression that 
justice is dependent on dealing with past atrocities, whereas justice is concerned with both the past 
and the future.  Justice does not only relate to the human rights violations committed during a 
violent conflict, but equally to transforming unjust structures and to entrenching respect for human 
rights in state institutions, and rehabilitating victims in a post-conflict society.  Other measures that 
secure future justice should be taken as seriously and pursued as vigorously. A good example would 
be the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.125 
 
Thus, while the attainment of justice is related to the pursuit of accountability for past abuses, it is 
also dependent on wider processes of transformation, redistribution, and reform.  This was the 
conclusion of a conference focusing on the integration of human rights in peace processes organized 
by the Fund for Peace and the United States Institute of Peace in 1997. The conference emphasized 
that the scope and definition of human rights should be expanded to include at least four 
components:  
o transitional justice (in the sense of prosecutions and /or truth-telling); 
o mechanisms to ensure the personal freedom and security of civilians and identity groups 
during the transition;  
o mechanisms to prevent the outbreak of future hostilities (including constitutional reforms, 
restructuring of the government, security forces, and judicial system);  
o mechanisms aimed at broader social, political, and economic reform (targeting social and 
economic inequities, redistribution, discrimination, etc.).126  
Jean Arnault, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Chief of Mission for the 
UN Mission to Guatemala, noted: 
     [If a "just peace" is understood as focusing on the issue of criminal or moral  
accountability for past abuses by the leaders of both factions, if the test is a sort  
of purge and sanction test, obviously the peace process in Guatemala would not  
meet the criteria… On the other hand, if the test…is a comprehensive blueprint  
                                                 
124 Mendez, Ibid, p. 273. Amsterdam. 
125 Parlevliet, M. (1998). ‘Between Facilitator and Advocate: the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.’  
FORUM, National Institute for Dispute Resolution, December, No.36: pp. 6-15. 
126 Kunder, supra note 38, pp. 4-5. 
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that includes not only the end of war, not only human rights provisions, not  
only institutional changes that consolidate observation of rights, but also socio- 
economic issues, the bridging of the gap between the …minority and majority,  
if this is the test…[then] the peace process in Guatemala is one of the strongest  
statements that has ever emerged from the negotiation of an internal armed  
conflict]”.127 
 
This is not to deny that accountability for past abuses is important and should be given serious 
consideration in the context of negotiating a settlement.  Past human rights violations can 
undermine future reconstruction by fuelling resentment, triggering, and reinforcing a message of 
impunity.  Rather, the point here is that this is only one aspect of implementing justice, and that 
justice has multiple components that should be taken into account.  Even if rights and justice are 
non-negotiable, there is no single, absolute way in which they should be applied or implemented in 
each context.  The human rights priorities of local actors should inform their interpretation and 
application in each case.  This approach does not diminish the critical value of human rights and 
justice, but ensures that these are implemented in line with the needs and circumstances of 
particular contexts within the internationally accepted framework of human rights.  It also 
encourages paying more attention to the question of how justice can be built into settlements in a 
prospective way (ensuring the protection of rights in a structural, institutional manner) rather than 
overemphasizing its retrospective aspects.  Admittedly, human rights actors may take issue with this 
approach, especially because it has taken so long for human rights issues to be explicitly accepted 
on the agenda in peace processes.  However, it may be a matter of assessing how one makes the 
most progress: fighting so much over one step forward that one gets struck or taking one step in 
order to ensure that the path forward remains open. 
 
6.4.4 Conflict Management as an Alternative to Litigation in Dealing with Rights- Related 
Conflicts 
 
As discussed in chapter three, conflict management experts distinguish three general approaches for 
dealing with conflict, namely: power-based, rights-based and interest-based approaches.128          
These approaches should be assessed to determine which is most appropriate in a specific conflict.  
                                                 
127 Arnault, as quoted in Ibid, p. 4. 
128 See this reference in Peck, C. (1996), The United Nation as a Dispute Settlement System: Improving Mechanisms for 
the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 10; Ury, W., Brett, J. and 
Golberg, B. (1988). Getting Disputes Resolved. Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict, San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass Inc. Publishers, pp. 7-15. 
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Advantages and disadvantages may arise according to the resources that are necessary for 
implementing a specific approach, and the effect of a particular approach on the relationship 
between parties.  They may also involve parties' satisfaction with the outcome, meaning how well 
the outcome addresses their concerns, as well as the recurrence of the dispute, referring to the 
sustainability of the outcome.  The use of rights-based methods to deal with conflicts over rights is 
well-established.  Cases of sexual harassment, assault, or discrimination are often settled through 
the use of the judicial system. In some instances, human rights actors may use power–broadly 
defined as mentioned above–to deal with human rights issues.129 Letter-writing campaigns by 
Amnesty International on behalf of political prisoners can be seen in this regard; pressure is brought 
to bear on another party (a state) in order to force it to release prisoners or at least provide them 
with better treatment.  Publishing the human rights record of a particular state or denouncing a party 
for its abusive practices are other ways in which human rights advocates may use their power of 
persuasion or pressure. Of course, in these cases, the use of "power" takes place within a human 
rights context.  Calling public attention to torture is only possible because an international standard 
that prohibits the use of torture and other inhumane, degrading, or humiliating treatment exists.130  
While human rights actors are more inclined to take rights-and power-based approaches when 
dealing with conflict, conflict management practitioners emphasize the value of interest and needs-
based methods.  Because of their co-operative nature, focus on the interests and needs of parties and 
emphasis on joint problem-solving, these methods tend to reduce the strain on relationships and 
make parties more satisfied with the outcome, thus reducing the chances of renewed conflict.  At 
times, they may also use fewer resources, both material (financial) and emotional (psychological 
stress). 
In addressing conflict over rights, actors are not confined to using rights-based methods in order to 
ensure that human rights are protected.  There may be constraints on the use of this approach for 
safeguarding rights in certain environments. 
Interest and needs-based methods, such as mediation and negotiation, can assist in this regard.  In 
the latter, parties negotiate directly with one another to seek a solution to the conflict, whereas in 
the former, an outside intermediary assists parties in communicating with one another and engaging 
in joint problem-solving.  While focusing on the interests and needs of parties, such methods can 
ensure that parties reach an outcome that is in line with the relevant legislation, upholds the rights of 
parties, meets their interests, and satisfies their needs.  This approach requires willingness on the 
                                                 
129 The Definition of power used here is thus broader than that of realists who tend to equate power with force. 
130 See the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNGA 
Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (hereinafter “CAT”). 
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part of parties to negotiate their differences and an awareness of the constitutional and legislative 
framework within which they must reach agreement. The parties may be assisted by a third-party 
who is a skilled facilitator, negotiator, and mediator.  Additionally, this approach can restore, 
maintain, or even strengthen the relationships between parties as trust develops between them; they 
may discover that their interests are not mutually exclusive.  It can also build their understanding of 
the value and   meaning of rights because this approach often involves getting parties to understand 
why rights exist and why it is in their interests to respect rights. 
 
Mediation and negotiation may also assist in balancing conflicting rights.  If the rights of both 
parties are in conflict with one another, negotiation and/or mediation can be a way of reaching an 
outcome that meets both parties' needs and interests.  For example, in the case of land redistribution 
to people who have been dispossessed of their land, their rights to the land must be balanced to 
people against those of the current land-owner.  A rights-based approach to the resolution of such a 
conflict would involve getting a court to decide whether a rightful claim to the land exists.  The 
court would then make a finding on the basis of evidence that is placed before it, e.g., old title 
deeds, oral history of the parties, whether the claimants are rightful descendants, and so on.  
Negotiation and mediation can play a role when it comes to determining the award to be made to 
the claimant, by exploring whether the underlying interests and needs of both parties can be 
reconciled.  For example, if monetary considerations play a large role, compensation may be a 
feasible means of resolving this conflict.  If the claimants require the land for cultural or religious 
reasons (for example, access to burial sites), it may be possible to provide them with access (for the 
purpose of visiting and tending to the graves of their ancestors, for example) without necessarily 
transferring the ownership of the land. No definitive answer can be given in an example like this, 
because the outcome of such a mediation or negotiation process depends on the needs and interests 
of parties from case to case. In determining an award, the outcome is negotiated or mediated within 
this framework. The conflict in this example is separated into two stages, in which the first 
(deciding on the validity of the claim) uses a rights-based approach, and the second uses an interest-
based approach.  In this way, the rights of both parties are balanced against one another and their 
interests and needs are taken into account. 
 
It is not that interest and needs-based approaches are necessarily better than rights-based methods in 
dealing with conflicts over rights issues.  Actors addressing rights-related conflict need not rely 
exclusively on a rights-based approach.  Interest and needs-based methods can also promote the 
protection of rights. Thus, litigation and mediation should be seen as options on a spectrum of 
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conflict management techniques.  In each case, actors must carefully consider the different 
approaches available and determine which is most appropriate.  Moreover, as the above example 
illustrates, within one conflict, different approaches can be used to resolve different parts of the 
conflict.  There may be good reasons for utilizing litigation in a particular situation.  These may 
include the gravity of the human rights violation, the need to uphold a standard, or the precedent-
setting nature of the case.  The power balance between the parties may also be so skewed so as to 
warrant the intervention of the courts in order to protect the victim. If, on the other hand, the parties 
will continue to interact, interest and needs-based approaches may be more suitable, as these are 
less confrontational and adversarial.  Furthermore, because the outcomes of interest and needs-
based processes are not imposed on parties, but rather agreed upon by them, they are less likely to 
be resented by one party.  A key point worth repeating is that negotiation or mediation of rights-
related conflict takes place within set parameters consisting of constitutional and international 
human rights standards; these processes do not require a compromise of fundamental principles. 
 
Negotiating over interests and needs within a human rights framework may be especially relevant 
on a grassroots level where the limitations of the judicial system are most acutely experienced.  It 
also seems particularly applicable to countries where socio-economic conditions pose constraints on 
the use of the judicial system (although not exclusively so, as is indicated by the extensive use of 
alternative dispute resolution).131 The question may arise as to whether an interest and needs-based 
approach to resolving rights related conflicts is mostly applicable to individual cases, rather than to 
situations where human rights violations are committed on a wide-spread and systematic scale or 
where there is a particular pattern of abuses. In the latter cases, one may seek to obtain a legal 
judgment that acts as a precedent and inhibits further violations of that kind.  In mediations, 
agreements reached often only apply to a particular case and carry little weight beyond that case.  
No general legal rule is laid down that can prevent such abuses from recurring. In other words, 
agreements reached in a mediation process usually do not set a precedent, and therefore have 
limited deterred value.  For example, if several farm owners demolish informal housing of farm 
workers living on their farms and each of these cases is mediated separately, there is little to stop 
another farm-owner from demolishing informal structures on his or her land as well.  However, if 
one of the initial cases were taken to court, resulting in a clear judgment that the destruction 
constitutes a criminal act, then other farmers will think twice before trying the same thing.  Another 
question for consideration is whether the use of mediation or negotiation in conflict over rights is 
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confined to democratic contexts.  These are questions that require further examination.  Generally, 
the use of mediation and negotiation in conflicts over rights as an alternative to judicial proceedings 
depends on many factors.  These include the nature of the rights involved, the gravity and scale of 
human rights violations, the nature of the dispute, the parties involved, and the competence and 
legitimacy of the courts. 
 
The six propositions laid out above have many implications for a variety of actors, including 
governmental bodies and intergovernmental agencies.  Clearly there is a need for dialogue between 
the fields of human rights and conflict management in order to gain an understanding of one 
another's mission, guiding principles and methods, and to strengthen efforts towards peace, justice, 
and reconciliation.  Closely related is the need to pursue an integrated approach in dealing with 
conflicts involving issues of rights. Many conflicts cannot be addressed solely from either a human 
rights or a conflict management resolution perspective.  The two fields should be considered in 
conjunction with one another because of the close relationship between human rights and conflict 
management. Only a combination of the two perspectives can ensure that strategies are developed 
for resolving rights-related conflicts in ways that uphold the rights of various parties, while taking 
their needs and interests into account as well. 
 
6.5 Capacity Building and Training Programmes 
The development of individual and collective abilities or capabilities to transform the violent 
expression of conflict into a non-violent, positive, constructive force is highly desired in conflict 
management. Collectively, capacity-building also refers to the strengthening of civil institutions 
(local government, judiciary etc.) which allow society to address and resolve disputes non-violently. 
In the previous section of this chapter, I argued for the need for human rights actors and conflict 
management practitioners to be more familiar with each other's principal concerns and methods.  In 
this section, I discuss training as a strategy to enhance mutual understanding between and 
effectiveness of both sets of actors. 
 
6.5.1 Training Conflict Management Practitioners on Human Rights Awareness and 
Instruments 
As argued above, there are strong reasons why actors in the conflict management field should 
acquire greater understanding of human rights and be more knowledgeable about human rights 
instruments.  Conflict management must take place within a framework in which human rights are 
non-negotiable.  While there is much scope for dialogue, negotiation, and accommodation within 
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that framework, practitioners must be aware of its parameters in order to ensure hat their 
interventions are in line with fundamental rights and freedoms.  Moreover, instruments such as the 
Universal Declaration or the African Charter provide internationally accepted principles of freedom, 
fairness, and respect.  Actors within the conflict management field can use such standards to gain a 
different perspective on possible solutions, assess different options, or lay the foundation for 
agreements.  Human rights standards thus provide practitioners and parties to a conflict with 
objective measures for understanding the moral and legal consequences of their actions.  Individual 
parties may not always realize that certain activities or practices are violating the rights of other 
parties.  Practitioners with human rights knowledge can assist such parties in making them aware of 
their obligations and how respect for rights can help to resolve conflictual issues.132 Moreover, 
human rights serve to protect all parties, which means that respect for human rights is pragmatically 
in everyone's interests (groups, individuals, and political parties).  It has also been suggested that, in 
the context of peace process, conflict management actors can help conflicting parties understand 
that supporting human rights may enhance their domestic and international stature, legitimacy, and 
negotiation position, thus prompting their co-operation with the process.133 
 
A primary reason for training conflict management actors in human rights is that they need to 
understand the relationship between rights and conflict, and in particular the conflict-causing 
potential of rights denial, or they will not act effectively.  Their analysis of a conflict helps conflict 
management practitioners to determine an intervention strategy.  If they are insufficiently aware of 
the conflict's human rights aspects they may focus more on the manifest, visible, issues that trigger 
conflict rather than on the structural causes that underlie violent conflict.  As indicated earlier, such 
an approach is likely to be unsustainable; it may merely buy some time before destructive conflict 
erupts again.  If, however, human rights concerns are identified early on as core causes of conflict, 
practitioners are more able to integrate these into a negotiation process from the outset, and can 
develop agreements that address structural inequities. 
 
It should be noted that the relevance of human rights knowledge for conflict resolution practitioners 
does not only apply in situations where a denial of human rights is a cause of high-intensity conflict.  
It also applies to instances where gross human rights violations occur as a consequence of violent 
conflict.  In these cases, intervenors must be aware of the rules and instruments that can help to 
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regulate or mitigate conflict. In its 1993 assessment of five large UN field operations, the 
international non-governmental organization, Human Rights Watch, noted that human rights were 
often integrated only to a limited extent into peacekeeping efforts, to the detriment of these 
operations.  Only in El Salvador were human rights a high priority in the UN mission.  According to 
Human Rights Watch, the deployment of human rights monitors as part of the peacekeeping 
mission limited human rights violations and contributed to the peace process by strengthening the 
prospects for a lasting peace.134 The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in southern Sudan 
is reportedly engaged in a similar initiative; it wants to have chaplains trained in human rights 
standards, located throughout the territory under its control in an effort to limit and prevent abuses 
of rights.   And in co-operation with various actors in Lesotho, the Lesotho Network for Conflict 
Management negotiated a National Peace Accord or "Harmony Pact" to guide the behaviour and 
activities of various parties–including political parties, security forces, traditional authorities, 
churches, labour, business, and civil society–before and during the elections in 2002.135 The Accord 
is based on respect for human rights (especially civil political rights) and seeks to limit the potential 
for violent conflict before and during the elections27 In this context, it is important to note that the 
integration of human rights concerns into efforts to regulate and mitigate violent conflict in the 
short term will lay the foundation for their inclusion in activities geared towards the long-term 
resolution of structural causes of conflict. 
 
Knowledge of human rights and an understanding of the language of rights is also important for 
conflict management practitioners because they need to liaise with human rights organizations in 
situations where both sets of actors are involved.  Human rights actors can alert conflict 
management practitioners if a situation seems to be deteriorating; mounting human rights violations 
are widely acknowledged as an early warning sign of imminent conflict.  Serving as indicators of 
communities or states in distress, the occurrence and frequency of human rights violations signal 
the need for timely intervention and constructive methods to address social, political and economic 
inequities.  Conflict management practitioners also need to assure human rights actors that their 
concerns will be addressed during a peace process, and how this will be undertaken; If they fail to 
do so, they risk critical, public statements by human rights actors that may affect the process 
negatively.  Moreover, human rights actors are often aware of solutions used in other countries to 
manage certain rights issues, or they can provide lessons learned from elsewhere that may assist the 
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Washington/London/NewYork, pp. 1–35. 
135See Parlevliet, supra note 9.  
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process.  Finally, conflict management practitioners need to be able to explain to human rights 
actors how and why a certain agreement came about, if it is "less than ideal".136 
 
6.5.2 Training Human Rights Actors on Conflict Management Skills 
 
As much as conflict management practitioners must learn about human rights, human rights actors 
can also benefit from training in conflict management. They often work in volatile environments 
characterized by tension, polarization and violence. They frequently deal with people who are 
coming to terms with loss, anger and fear, and who may be so distressed, anxious or afraid that 
facilitated communication is essential to ensure that substantive dialogue can take place about what 
happened.  Human rights activists also often have to deal with conflict in the course of 
implementing their mandate.  For example, gaining access to prisoners, to potential witnesses, or to 
sites where gross human violations have allegedly occurred, often involves some degree of 
negotiation.  Human rights actors may also encounter officials or non-states actors who try to 
impede or thwart their work for fear of outside scrutiny, or because human rights activities are seen 
as subversive.137  In addition, human rights actors may be called upon to intervene in conflicts or 
facilitate meeting with several parties, especially if they enjoy respect in communities because of 
their principled and independent stance.138 Techniques for crisis intervention, negotiation and 
facilitation, problem-solving skills and communication skills are useful for human rights actors.  
Communication skills are particularly relevant, as these can help defuse tension and prevent 
confrontation.  Conflict management training also enables human rights actors to frame rights issues 
in terms of interests, meaning that they can explain to others why it is in their interests to respect 
rights.  This enables human rights actors to convey the importance of upholding rights without 
resorting to bland and categorical statements along the lines that rights must be protected.  People 
are generally more willing and capable of understanding rights issues if these are explained in 
relation to their own needs and interests, than if they encounter a prescriptive or adversarial stance 
about what rules apply and what action should not be undertaken.  For example, insisting to the 
police that they have to respect human rights may get them to comply but does not necessarily build 
their understanding of why this is necessary and important.  On the contrary, it may cause 
resentment if rights are perceived as impeding their work and benefiting suspects.  However, when 
it is explained exactly how they can benefit from rights protection, they are more likely to make a 
genuine effort to comply with an instruction to uphold rights.  Such an explanation could include 
                                                 
136Arnold, supra note 132,  p. 3.  
137 Donnelly, J. (1998). International Human Rights, Second Edition. Westview Press, Boulder, CO, p. 28. 
138Arnold, supra note 132, pp. 2-3.  
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the following points: respecting human rights has the potential to improve their relationships with 
the communities in which they work; it may strengthen their service delivery; and it may limit civil 
claims against the police.  It would also be important to stress that police officials themselves are 
also protected by rights.  Similarly, defence forces may know that they have to abide by the Geneva 
Conventions139 because that is the law, but their compliance is more likely if they understand how 
international humanitarian law could benefit them, should they be taken as prisoners of war, etc. 
 
In this sense, the arguments in favour of a confidence-building approach to mediation rather than a 
power-based one can be extended to the realm of human rights work.  Because it relies on coercion 
to obtain the co-operation of parties, power-based mediation often hardens the resistance of parties 
and leads to resentment against solutions imposed upon them. In contrast, a confidence-building 
approach seeks to obtain the co-operation of parties through dialogue, relationship-building and the 
development of trust.  As such, it is more likely to secure a lasting agreement.140  Similarly, a 
confidence-building approach to the protection and promotion of rights tends to make parties less 
defensive.  This approach involves raising human rights concerns in a constructive and non-
confrontational way, and developing relationships between parties. The combination of human 
rights education with conflict resolution stems from the realization that teaching people about their 
rights without building a capacity to talk about, defend and present those rights in a non-adversarial 
way is like giving a fisherman a net with gaping holes.  Rights have to be respected and if they are 
not, individuals must be able to demand respect in an appropriate way, i.e. a non-violent and 
strategic way.141 
In cases of mediation, such a confidence-building approach is generally preferable.  In a human 
rights context, on the other hand, the most appropriate communication style should probably be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis in light of the specific situation and the objectives pursued.  There 
may be situations in which human rights actors have to take a strong, confrontational stance in order 
to emphasize that certain practices are illegal and wholly unacceptable, and that universal standards 
have to be upheld. Training in conflict management theory and practice helps human rights actors 
reflect on how their attitude, behaviour and communication style can escalate or defuse conflictual 
                                                 
139 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 
1949 (‘Geneva I’); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea 1949 (‘Geneva II’); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War 1949 (‘Geneva III’); and Geneva Convention Relative to the protection of Civilian Person in Time of War 1949 
(‘Geneva IV’). 
140 Nathan, supra note 51. 
141 Utterwulghe, S. (2001). ‘This also Happens in Angola: Internally Displaced People Resolving Conflicts’ 
(unpublished paper.). On file with the Author. 
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situations.  Based on this awareness, they can then determine how best to address certain rights 
concerns. 
 
The skills mentioned above are as relevant for humanitarian agencies as they are for human rights 
actors.  The humanitarian context is pre-eminently one where the fields of human rights and conflict 
management intersect.  Whether their mandate is to protect refugees, internally displaced people 
and children, or provide immediate relief, or restore essential services, humanitarian agencies are 
constantly dealing with conflict. For example, extensive assistance to displaced people often 
provokes tension amongst local populations because of scarce resources.  Aid to civilians in areas 
under the control of insurgents can feed suspicions of supporting the enemy or pursuing a political 
agenda, which need to be managed.  Mass movements of people require negotiation around issues 
of settlement, integration, and repatriation.  Conflict is also highly likely to erupt in situations where 
many people of different cultural, ethnic, religious and political backgrounds are thrown together in 
a confined area, such as a refugee camp.  Many acknowledge that humanitarian intervention in war 
zones is inevitably politicised and that the organizations involved play a number of conflict 
management roles.142 
 
 Institutions like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) may not be conflict-management organizations, 
but they have to manage conflict continuously in the implementation of their humanitarian 
mandates.143 For example, the ICRC has had to negotiate ceasefires with belligerent parties at times 
in order to reach populations affected by the fighting.  In 1998, a group of Namibians from the 
Caprivi region fled to Botswana following violent clashes with government forces, after the group 
had allegedly called for secession of the region. The group applied for asylum in Botswana on 
grounds of political persecution, but the Namibian government demanded their extradition to face 
charges of treason.  The regional office of the UNHCR was then asked to intervene in order to 
resolve the situation.144 Similarly, the UNHCR office in northern Kenya facilitated an agreement in 
1997 between Oromo refugees and local communities after conflicts over livestock had led to 
                                                 
142 Miall et al. (1999), supra note 75, pp. 145-147; Anderson, M. ‘Humanitarian NGOs in Conflict Intervention. in 
Crocker, C. and Hampson, F.(Eds.), (1999) Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Response to International 
Conflict., Washington: United State of Institute of Peace, pp. 343-354. 
143 See, for example, Nathan, supra note 51. 
144Africa Confidential, Vol. 40, No. 1,8 January 1999.   
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fighting and loss of life.145  In other words, an organization such as the UNHCR must address 
certain types of conflict in order to fulfil its mandate.  Thus, training in conflict management skills 
enhances the capacity of humanitarian bodies to perform their mandated functions and allows them 
to develop appropriate strategies for conflict situations that they regularly encounter in the 
execution of their primary humanitarian duties in complex and volatile environments. 
 
6.6 Insights Gained from Linking Human Rights and Conflict Management in Practice 
 
6.6.1 The Dialectical Nature of the Relationship Between Human Rights and Conflicts 
 
The previous sections of this chapter have sought to highlight the analytical and strategic linkages 
between human rights and conflict management and have emphasized the importance of bridging 
the gap between the two fields.  It has been shown how gross human rights violations can occur as a 
consequence of violent conflict, and how a sustained denial of human rights can lead to violent 
conflict.  In working with various organizations in the fields of human rights and conflict 
management, it has transpired that the relationship between human rights and conflict is more than 
twofold, especially if one considers "conflict" more broadly than high-intensity conflict.  For 
example, the protection and enforcement of human rights can also lead to conflict.  Enforcing the 
rights of marginalized or disadvantaged groups can threaten the status quo, and may challenge 
prescribed notions of inferiority and superiority, as well as traditional power relations. The 
realization of women's rights in traditionally patriarchal societies constitutes a prime example in this 
regard. 
Other aspects of the rights/conflict relationship include the possibility that conflict may arise over 
different interpretations of a single human right and in situations where different rights have to be 
balanced against one another.  Moreover, when expectations about the realization of rights are not 
met, this can give rise to conflict.  In various interviews conducted with local conflict resolution 
organizations, for example, participants shared their impression that human rights impoverished 
areas where they operated.  In their view, as people became more aware of their rights, the 
discrepancy between the rights they were supposed to have and the lack of realization thereof, 
especially in the socio-economic domain, become glaringly obvious.  Conflict resolution 
fieldworkers felt that rights education had in fact exacerbated existing tensions in these 
                                                 
145 See this issue thoroughly discussed by Galaty, J. ‘Time, Terror, and Pastoral Inertia: Sedentarization and Conflict in 
Northern Kenya’ in Fratkin, E and Roth, E. (Eds.).  (2005). As Pastoralists Settle: Social, Health and Economic 
Consequences of Pastoral Sedentarization in Marsabit District, Kenya, New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
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communities by making people more acutely aware of the structural inequities and inequalities in 
society.  While acknowledging the importance of human rights education, these fieldworkers 
grappled with the question of how to deal with the resulting tension and its negative manifestation 
(fights, threats, intimidation, etc.). They also indicated a need to discuss this potentially negative 
effect of such education with human rights organizations, so that joint strategies could be developed 
for addressing tension and ensuring that education would not take place in a vacuum.146 These 
additional aspects of the rights/conflict relationship further underscore the importance of dialogue 
between the two fields, as they demonstrate the complexities that looking at human rights and 
conflict management in conjunction may reveal. 
 
6.6.2 Targeting Actors from both Fields Separately 
 
Human rights actors generally have a strong need to develop their capacity to deal with conflict in a 
constructive manner while undertaking activities towards rights protection and promotion. For 
them, it is important to learn how communication skills, negotiation, problem–solving, and 
facilitation can strengthen their work. Building their understanding of interest–based conflict 
resolution also enables them to frame the human rights issue in terms of the interests of parties and 
to assess on a case-by-case basis whether litigation or meditation would be most suitable in a 
particular conflict situation. The needs of conflict management practitioners, on the other hand, 
relate more to developing an understanding of the meaning and value of human rights for their 
work, and identifying human rights aspect in conflicts. They need to be familiar with the 
constitutional and legislative frameworks, and must be able to conduct their interventions in line 
with the human rights instruments relevant to the context in which they operate. 
 
 Therefore targeting actors in both fields separately is most appropriate for the purpose of capacity-
building and training, because it allows for in-depth training courses that are tailored to the needs of 
the specific audience. Nevertheless, bringing practitioners from both fields together may be 
particularly relevant when developing strategies that require both human rights intervention and 
conflict management. Input from both perspectives is required to develop strategies for issues such 
as land reform, the question of tradition leadership in a constitutional democracy, xenophobia, and 
integrating human rights into peace processes, to name but a few. 
                                                 
146 From informal interviews conducted with respondents from church organisations involved in the Congo conflict 
management; MONUC personnel, human rights NGOs in the DRC; and officers involved in the Burundi Peace Process 
under such centers as Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation; Center for the Study of Forced Migration.  
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In such situations, a holistic and comprehensive approach must be adopted that integrates insights, 
methods and values from both fields, and that ensures that conflicts are constructively addressed in 
ways that uphold human rights. 
 
6.6.3 Conflict Resolution as an Imperative Aspect in Human Rights Education and Training 
 
International human rights law defines the right to education in terms of the standard, quality and 
content of education.147 Thus, education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and, 
further, that education shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, 
racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance 
of peace.148  
  
From the foregoing, one may argue that human rights education promotes values, beliefs and 
attitudes that encourage all individuals to uphold their own rights and those of others. It develops an 
understanding of everyone's common responsibility to make human rights a reality in each 
community. It constitutes an essential contribution to the long-term prevention of human rights 
abuses and represents an important investment in the endeavour to achieve a just society in which 
all human rights are valued and respected.  
 
Traditional human rights education generally focuses on making people aware of their rights and 
the various instruments and mechanisms available for the protection and promotion of human 
rights. However, building peoples’ knowledge of rights and enhancing their capacity to identify 
rights is not necessarily sufficient to ensure that they will be able to enjoy those rights. They also 
need to gain the capacity and confidence to exercise those rights. The discussion above has already 
highlighted the usefulness of conflict resolution skills in the areas of negotiation, communication 
and meditation, in ensuring respect for human rights. Problem solving skills are also relevant, 
especially in contexts where serious constraints prevent the full realization of rights. Problem-
solving skills enable people to identify obstacles that exist in their environment and to generate a 
variety of options that can be employed for the implementation of rights. They also enhance 
peoples’ ability to assess what actions they can undertake on their own account, individually or 
within their communities, rather than relying solely in the state for the implementation of rights. 
                                                 
147 See Lord, J and Flowers, N. ‘Human Rights Education and Grassroots Peacebuilding’ in Mertus  & Helsing, supra 
note 10 , p.432. 
148 Article 26 of the UDHR. 
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Including conflict resolution in human rights training and education is not only beneficial to 
participants, but also to trainers. 
 
Conflict resolution can help human rights trainers and educators to address such conflict in the 
training environment and to deal with extreme points of view and strong emotions generated by 
human rights issues. Again, it is not much use overriding peoples’ opinions and telling them how 
they ought to feel on certain issues and what the law says, as this often simply fuels resentment and 
hostility. Rather, trainers and educators must engage their audience in ways that make them willing 
to question their own assumptions and perspective, and this is facilitated by the use of conflict 
resolution skills. Conflict resolution can thus build the ability and confidence of trainers and 
education in managing the tension and conflict that arise in the context of training and education of 
human rights. 
 
6.6.4 Raising Human Rights Indirectly in Training Settings: A Strategic Approach 
 
It is sometimes preferable to raise the issue of human rights indirectly in training, through notions 
of human dignity and basic human needs rather than framing issues directly in terms of rights. 
Participants may know of human rights, but do not necessarily have much understanding of what 
they mean and why they are relevant. Human rights are often seen as legal, abstract concepts with 
little bearing on the daily lives of people. Participants often find it easier to relate to concepts such 
as human dignity and basic human needs, which they can link immediately to social, political, 
economic and cultural concerns. These concepts thus enable human rights issues to be grounded in 
the experiences of participants and assist in “demystifying” human rights, as will be illustrated 
below.  
 
Moreover, state officials and politicians still sometimes see human rights as subversive or 
problematic. For example, the people may believe that the rights afforded to individuals accused of 
breaking the law essentially protect criminals and complicate the maintenance of law and order. The 
government of a country may consider an identity group’s rights to self-determination subversive, 
viewing it as threatening the unity of the state. The perception of rights as problematic can lead to 
defensiveness and hostility. Mentioning, “human rights” in certain contexts can cause participants 
to “shut off” and distance themselves from training and education. Engaging people in discussions 
about human dignity or basic human needs is generally less threatening, and may ensure that they 
engage more substantially in the desired training. A final reason for opting for an indirect approach 
to rights education relates to the claim that rights are a Western concept. When discussing rights in 
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an African environment, the question is often raised as to what extent human rights are Western or 
Northern inventions that have little relevance in Africa.149 Concepts such as needs and “dignity”, 
however, are easily located in the local context. Most cultures have the notion “dignity” included in 
their norms, custom, and worldview. These concepts are therefore helpful in illustrating that human 
rights are not totally unrelated to the Africa context, even though some major human rights 
instruments were originally drawn up in the West. 
 
The concept of human dignity helps participants in human rights and conflict management training 
to reflect on any violations that they may have endured and draw out their ideas as to how people 
should relate to one another.  Many participants relate the concept to civil and political   concerns 
(such as respect for equality, tolerance, non-exclusion, or non-discrimination rights), but some have 
also linked it to social economic issues. Through the notion human dignity, a basis is created for 
discussing rights, the relevance of rights for the protection of peoples’ dignity, the responsibilities 
of state and citizens, and the consequences of insufficient respect for rights. It has proven to be an 
excellent way of building participants’ understanding of the origins of human rights instruments 
such as the Universal Deceleration of Human Rights, the African Charter of Human and People’s 
Rights and others international human rights instruments. 
 
As indicated above, the concept of basic human needs is useful in building participants’ 
understanding of human rights. The ideas of human beings having needs that are fundamental to 
their survival and development generally resonate immediately with trainees. A discussion of needs 
can be introduced through, for example, a discussion of causes of conflict in a particular country or 
region, the idea of human security, or by getting participants to generate a list of what people need 
in order to feel safe and secure. Needs can be related to rights, and the surprise of trainees at finding 
the close link between rights and needs is often palpable when they compare the list of needs they 
have generated with an instrument like the African Charter. The idea of needs can also help trainees 
to grasp the relationship between direct and structural violence, or manifest and latent conflict. It 
enables them to recognize these dynamics in their own countries. Indeed, the concept of needs has 
been particularly helpful in building peoples’ understanding of the consequences of denying rights 
in terms of increasing the potential for conflict. 
The concepts of human dignity and needs thus provide a basis for talking about human rights in a 
way that helps participations grasp the meaning, value, and relevance of rights. Introducing rights in 
                                                 
149 See this issue thoroughly discussed in Mollel, A. (2008). ‘African Culture versus Human Rights: The Case of FGM 
among the Maasai Society in East Africa,’ in Journal of African and International Law, vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 126-157. 
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such an indirect way is not meant to diffuse rights or lessen their importance. Rather, it is a strategy 
aimed at building understanding of and appreciation for human rights in a way that ensures that 





The main aim of this chapter has been to lay out the differences and commonalities within the fields 
of human rights and conflict resolution, with the ultimate purpose of enhancing their roles in 
managing conflicts.  The chapter introduces many practical challenges and dilemmas that face 
lawyers, human rights actors, conflict resolvers, policy makers and advocates in conflict situations. 
This chapter has shown that there are so many links between human rights and conflict management 
that it does not make sense to contemplate these fields in isolation from one another. Human rights 
are relevant in the generation, manifestation, resolution and prevention of destructive conflict, and 
must therefore be taken into account throughout the whole conflict management process. At the 
same time, skills and insights from the conflict management fields can make a contribution to the 
protection and promotion of rights by strengthening the capacity of human rights actors to deal with 
conflict over rights issues. The various propositions discussed here, as a well as their practical 
implications, constitute compelling reasons for actors in human rights and conflict management to 
explore how they can co-operate with and support one another given their common goal of reaching 
an enduring and just peace. 
 
The propositions discussed undoubtedly require great specificity and nuance in different context, 
and they should be pursued through further research and analysis. Nevertheless, it appears that the 
fields of human rights and conflict management are far more complementary than contradictory. 
Certain tensions do indeed exist between them, to the extent that activities or attitudes by one type 
of actors may negatively affect efforts by actors in the other field. These tensions perhaps 
demonstrate that the two fields cannot or should not be merged, and that human rights actors cannot 
become conflict management experts and vice versa. However, these tensions should not cause 
actors in each field to remain withdrawn from one another as if they were competitors in the pursuit 
of a sustainable peace. On the contrary, these tensions should be seen as creative differences that 
prompt human rights actors and conflict management practitioners to interact with one another and 
understand the mission, methods and principles guiding each other. Tension ideally should 
encourage them to seek ways of contributing to one another’s activities and optimising their efforts 
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towards peace, justice, and reconciliation. Insufficient recognition of the close relationship between 
human rights and conflict management is detrimental to the objectives pursued by both fields. Peace 
and justice are inextricably linked. The absence of justice generally leads to an absence of peace. 
Thus, the fields of human rights and conflict management are in reality inextricably linked. This is 
because, as discussed in this chapter, the success of those working to prevent, manage or resolve 
conflict is enhanced by incorporating human rights advocacy into their efforts. At the same time, 
efforts to secure greater respect for human rights and humanitarian norms are furthered when 
coordinated with efforts to build peace by laying the foundation for a society that is not only just, 
but also stable. 
Ideally, human rights and conflict resolution work should be mutually reinforcing; respect for 
human rights is a necessary precondition of a lasting peace, and conflict resolution efforts offer 
opportunities for creating forward-looking mechanisms to ensure rights are respected. 
 
In the final analysis, it can be concluded that the violations of human dignity that occur during 
conflicts cannot be resolved by any unitary approach that isolates human rights. International 
humanitarian law is always focused on armed conflict and the need to mitigate the suffering of 
those touched by it; however, it does not deal with the causes of war or with the question of whether 
one conflicting party or the other is right.  In this regards, more remains to be done to explore the 
role of human rights in conflict management. As the two fields draw closer together, the ways in 
which transitional crime creates challenges requiring different strategies needs further exploration. 
Although the relationship between human rights and conflict management is viewed as complex 
and dynamic, it demands an equally dynamic response from those who work to protect human 
rights and who strive to bring about peace. 
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7 GENERAL CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
7.1 Lessons: Possibilities and Challenges 
Having reviewed the various ways that have been used to resolve conflicts both within the UN 
system and beyond it, it is now possible to consider what this survey as a whole demonstrates about 
what challenges must be confronted and what possibilities exist when one proposes a human rights 
approach to conflict prevention and management. To discuss challenges and possibilities, it is 
necessary to consider separately some of the UN approaches to conflict resolution undertaken in 
resolving the Africa’s Great Lakes conflicts and other recent conflicts.  This chapter recalls in brief 
outline what this study has revealed about the successes and failures of the UN as a conflict 
prevention and management system in that region.  The conclusion is that the challenges facing 
peacemakers and peacekeepers would be better met by bringing together the two fields of conflict 
resolution and human rights.  
 
The successes and failures of the United Nations in conflict management have been subject to 
increased scrutiny in recent years.  There have been countless studies conducted that have tested the 
abilities of the United Nations in managing conflict at the crisis level and beyond. The general 
conclusion derived therefrom is that, until now, the UN system has continued to put most of its eggs 
in the more costly basket of peace restoration, while neglecting peace maintenance and peace 
building.  
        
Experience over the past few years, however, has clearly pointed out not just the costs but the 
dangers of ignoring prevention, given the complexities of trying to intervene at the point where 
conflicts are locked into a process of escalation. Indeed, the UN’s successes and failures have 
confirmed findings about the best timing of conflict resolution. The literature has shown that third 
party intervention is most likely to be successful either early in a dispute or once the parties have 
arrived at a stalemate.1  As previously mentioned, the UN has had major successes at the latter 
point, where exhaustion and deadlock have set in, but it has rarely even attempted to intervene at 
the former stage, when the costs to the disputants--and to the international system--have not yet 
begun to multiply. Of course, this does not imply that international organisations should not act to 
resolve full-blown conflict or to ameliorate the suffering of victims at any time when they are able 
to do so, but the fact that a very late stage is the least opportune moment for intervention means that 
there is a major flaw in the system. 
                                                 
1 See Peck, C. (1996), The United Nation as a Dispute Settlement System: Improving Mechanisms for the Prevention 
and Resolution of Conflicts, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 263. 
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Scrutiny of the efficacy of the UN conflict resolution system comes as no surprise. Many people 
had high hopes that the United Nations, when it was formed, would be a guarantor of peace and 
security for the whole world. As stated in the initial provisions of the UN Charter, the organisation 
was expected “to maintain international peace and security, …to take effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and to bring about by peaceful means adjustment 
or settlement of international disputes”2 The UNSC was given the main responsibility of 
implementing the objectives and principles of collective security.3 Member states were obliged to 
give armed forces to the UN to make it possible for the organisation to meet its responsibilities. The 
use of force, if other means had failed, was to be decided upon by the UNSC with the assistance of 
the Military Staff Committee. 
 
 Although any answer to the question whether the UN has been successful is bound to be tentative, 
given the fact that successes and failures are relative terms in international relations, it is still 
reasonable to ask the question about what conflict-resolution role the UN should play in the future.4 
Recent lessons learned from the developments in Rwanda and Srebrenica provide very vivid 
insights into how the UN’s approach to unfolding conflicts and deadly violence has historically 
proven to be a failure. In both cases, the UN was present but failed to take effective action to 
prevent genocide from taking place. In each case there was plenty of warning of the forthcoming 
mass killings, but the UN mishandled them both. Seven thousand Muslim men were executed 
despite the fact that Srebrenica was declared a safe haven by the UN.5 In Rwanda, the UN 
commander, Romeo Dallaire, had warned the UN by sending what is now referred to as the 
‘genocide fax’ in January 1994--three months before the genocide--indicating that the Hutus were 
preparing lists of Tutsi to be killed, had large amounts of weapons stored, were providing training, 
and were turning more and more extremist.6 The fax was ignored by the UN bureaucracy and never 
forwarded to the UNSC. Two reports examining these cases were finally published in late 1999.  
These reports assigned partial blame for the unfortunate handling by the UN of the role given to it 
                                                 
2 See Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter. 
3 See generally Chapter VI of the UN Charter. 
4 Väyrynen, R. (1985) ‘Is there a Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution?’ Journal of Peace Research, 
vol.22, No.3, pp. 189-196. 
5 See UNSC Res. 819 (1993) of April 16, 1993 in which the Council demanded, “all parties and others treat Srebrenica 
and its surroundings as a safe area, which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act”. It also 
demanded “the immediate cessation of armed attacks by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against Srebrenica and their 
immediate withdrawal from the areas surrounding Srebrenica”, and further demanded that “the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary 
units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. 
6 For a detailed discussion about this early warning through the “genocide fax” see Kuperman, A. (2001), The Limits of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda, Washington, DC: Publisher Brookings Institution Press, generally but 
particularly pp. 87-88. 
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as the key global security organisation during the Srebrenica and Rwanda genocides.  These reports 
have assumed a high profile and could and should have a large impact on making policies for 
conflict prevention and conflict management in the future. 
 
In Rwanda, there was early warning of the coming massacres.  The Special UN Representative in 
Rwanda reported that one group was in clear violation of the peace agreement by stockpiling 
ammunition, distributing weapons and reinforcing positions in Kigali. Also, the now infamous cable 
mentioned above referred unequivocally and urgently to information about planning and practical 
preparations for mass killings. The problem with early warning was twofold: first, the information 
was not processed correctly at the UN, owing to sloppiness and wrong lines of communication at its 
New York headquarters; second, the lack of capacity for intelligence analysis contributed to an 
erroneous interpretation by the UN of the Arusha peace process and the intentions of the parties 
thereto. The lack of in-depth analysis of the political situation on the ground in Rwanda was clearly 
evidenced when no attention was paid to the alarming report by the Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights that--just two weeks before the UNAMIR mission was launched--
pointed to the deteriorating human rights situation and explicitly referred to the dangers of 
genocide.7 
 
Another lesson learned in conflict prevention is that the peace implementers should be able 
continually to adjust the mission mandates, rules of engagement, troop strength and military 
capacities of peace missions to changing realities on the ground. The Rwanda mandate changed in 
nature from Chapter VI to Chapter VII of the Charter at a stage in the conflict when it would still 
have been possible to stop the genocide. But UNAMIR II failed, in the final analysis, because of the 
unwillingness of UN member States to provide troops for it. Two months after the Security Council 
agreed to the mission, UNAMIR II still only had 550 troops instead of the agreed-upon 5,500. In 
the case of Srebrenica, after the Security Council had established the safe areas, the force 
commander requested 34,000 troops, but finally had to settle for a “light option” with a minimal 
troop reinforcement of around 7,600, to be defended, if necessary, by NATO air strikes.8 
 
As the preceding chapters have shown, the relationship between human rights and conflict is 
dynamic, complex, and powerful, constantly shaping and reshaping the course of both peace and 
                                                 
7 Ibid, p. 22. 
8 United Nations Protection Force, UN Department of Public Information, September 1996, see 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko /. Last visited, September 8, 2009. 
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war. Yet, despite its importance, the understanding of this relationship has long been fragmentary, 
chiefly because different schools of thought concerning human rights and humanitarian law have 
offered different and often contradictory perspectives. Therefore, one cannot lean on only one of 
these branches as the definitive means to resolve internal armed conflicts like those in the Africa’s 
Great Lakes Region. Although human rights law continues to apply even during armed conflicts, 
some human rights treaties permit suspension of certain rights (e.g. freedom of movement, liberty 
and security, freedom of association) during public emergencies, to the extent strictly required by 
the situation (with the exception of a ‘hard core’ of human rights that may never be limited or 
suspended under any circumstances, not even during public emergencies or armed conflict).9 
 
Since international human rights law (hereafter, IHRL) is designed to function in peacetime, it 
contains no rules governing the methods and means of warfare and it applies to only one party to a 
conflict. During armed conflict, IHL comes into effect as well along with any rules established by 
treaty or custom. The purpose of IHL is to protect the lives and human dignity of people who are 
not or are no longer taking part in the fighting and to set limits on conducting war. It thus aims to 
limit the suffering and the damage caused by war. The rules of IHL may never be restricted or 
suspended, precisely because they were conceived for the extreme situation of armed conflict. Thus, 
IHL is a set of fundamental rules to protect people affected by armed conflict, which necessarily 
includes the ‘hard core’ of human rights as well. But even with the existence of IHL rules, less is 
expected, especially when it comes to the non-international armed conflicts discussed in this study. 
 
The reasons are very obvious. Embedded in the classical system of international law, a system still 
mostly resting on the Sovereign Equality of States doctrine,10 and the related principle of non-
intervention,11 international humanitarian law is predominantly concerned with international (i.e. 
inter-state) armed conflicts as opposed to internal (i.e. intra-state) conflicts. Among the Geneva 
Conventions, only Common Article 312 expressly applies to non-international armed conflicts. 
Common Article 3 provides protection from only the most serious abuses.13 While Protocol II to the 
                                                 
9 See for example Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967) (hereinafter referred to as 
the “ICCPR”); See further Fleck, D (Ed.), (1995) Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; Meron, T. (1983) ‘On the Inadequate reach of Humanitarian and Human Right Law and the Need  
for a New Instrument’ in American Journal of International Law, vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 589-606. 
10 Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. 
11 Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. 
12 Article 3 is identical in each of the four Geneva Conventions and is thus referred to as Common Article 3. 
13 Common Article 3 prohibits the following acts against persons taking no part in the hostilities: “violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; the taking of hostages; outrages upon 
personal integrity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; and the passing of sentences and the carrying out 
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Geneva Conventions14 also applies to non-international armed conflicts, and it provides 
significantly less protection to individuals than Protocol I which is applicable only to international 
armed conflicts or occupation and certain analogous situations. Application of the Hague 
Conventions15 is similarly limited to situations of international armed conflicts.16 
  
While neither the Hague Conventions nor the Geneva Conventions define the phrase “armed 
conflict,” definitions in international jurisprudence for both international and non-international 
armed conflicts have been set forth by international criminal tribunals.  According to the 
jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals, an armed conflict exists “whenever there is a 
resort to armed forces between States or protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organised groups or between such groups within a State.”17 As can be noted above, 
the traditional subject of international law and therefore international humanitarian law is the State. 
However, as illustrated by the research subject of this study, non-state actors through intra-state 
conflicts have instigated some of the dominant types of conflicts in the 20th and 21st centuries, 
limiting the effectiveness of international humanitarian law as a means of resolving such conflicts. 
 
This study brings conflict resolution and human rights perspectives together to create a composite 
picture of the relationship between human rights and conflict. Throughout the study, the role played 
by human rights at different stages in a conflict cycle are captured: from human rights abuses that 
precipitate violence, to violent conflicts that result in human rights abuses, through third-party 
interventions in different forms.  The study lays out the actors and issues involved and analyzes the 
attendant dynamics and dilemmas. 
 
This thesis argues that violent conflicts present one of the most urgent human rights challenges in 
the Great Lakes Region. The region has, in recent history, experienced the first of Africa’s 
genocides (Rwanda) closely followed by a less-acknowledged one in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. The situation in the DRC has been labelled “Africa’s World War” because of the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” 
14 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, 1977  (Protocol II), 1125 UNTS 609. 
15 The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899, 1 Bevans 230; 1 AJIL 103 
(1907); The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1907, 1 Bevans 577; 2 AJIL 
Supp. 43 (1908). 
16 Note, however, that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has greatly expanded the scope of 
norms applicable in non-international armed conflicts. In the Tadic Case, the Appeal Chamber found that certain norms 
of international armed conflict have evolved through customary law and now apply during non-international armed 
conflict as well. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal Decision (ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 1995). 
17 Tadic Appleal Decision, Ibid, para 70. 
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involvement of a host of other countries in the conflict. Burundi has experienced a civil war for 
most of the period since 1993, while an atrocious war has been perpetrated in northern Uganda for 
the last 20 years, leading to massive displacements and suffering. In addition, and partly as a result 
of this state of affairs, illicit weapons have proliferated in the region, aiding the escalation of 
conflict, crime and general human rights violations among both rural and urban communities in 
several countries.  
 
The cost of these conflicts has been tremendous, since high levels of human rights violations have 
contributed to poverty and retardation in development. Everywhere in the region, there is a major 
concern for the welfare of displaced peoples and refugees, for the reconstruction and rehabilitation 
of infrastructure and the peoples, for care of victims of war, and for reconciliation and healing. The 
lasting negative impact on communities of the failure of military interventions and the high cost of 
peacekeeping operations and reconstruction indicate that the promotion of peace and human 
development in the region requires a fundamental shift from reactive-only approaches to conflict, to 
more proactive and preventive approaches. 
 
 Looking at the combination of old and new threats, the question addressed in this study is whether 
traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation, adjudication, peacekeeping, and peace 
enforcement are still effective in managing and resolving conflict. How can conflict management 
efforts and the various institutions that attempt to implement them succeed—be they 
intergovernmental organisations like the UN, states, coalitions of the willing, or NGOs? 
 
As discussed in this study, multiple conflict resolution approaches have been adopted in trying to 
resolve conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes Region. Some approaches have taken regional and 
international dimensions while others have taken a country-by-country dimension. Of the traditional 
approaches to conflict resolution discussed in Chapter 3, both the Charter-based and non-Charter-
based have been applied.  The lessons learned indicate general limitations to each of the methods, 
calling for an alternative approach to conflict resolution in the region. 
 
To start with, diplomatic efforts within the SADC, OAU/AU and the UN culminated in the signing 
of the Lusaka Agreement18 and the holding of the inter-Congolese political negotiations that ended 
                                                 
18 For a detailed analysis of the Agreement itself, see International Crisis Group, ‘The Agreement on Ceasefire in the 
DRC,’ August 20, 1999. 
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with adoption of the Final Act of the “Global and All-Inclusive Agreement”19 and an interim 
Constitution of the DRC. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), from the abortive Addis Ababa 
meeting, through the Sun City I process of February-April 2002, to the December 2002 Pretoria 
Agreement and then to the Sun City II final talks of April 2003, is just one such diplomatic attempt 
to resolve the Congolese Conflict, which has been just one manifestation of the Africa’s Great 
Lakes regional conflict. Although these diplomatic approaches paved way for “peaceful” elections 
in 2006 and for the deployment of the MONUC, this approach has not achieved much. Initially, the 
Inter-Congolese Dialogue was expected to be an appropriate conflict resolution strategy that would 
address both the contextual factors of the Congo War (in particular the failure of Mobutu’s Zaire) 
and the greedy motives of most belligerents. It had the foresight to indicate that the belligerent 
parties were not to be considered the only relevant political actors. There was an attempt to 
convince all actors that there was no need to continue to resort to violence. At the end of the day, 
however, although a few resolutions were approved at Sun City that might later reveal their peace-
building value, key issues for the reconstruction of the Congo were not adequately (if at all) 
addressed during the whole process.  
 
The ICD can thus be considered a failure in spite of the signing of the “global and all-inclusive” 
agreement.  In fact, and ironically, it can be considered a failure because of the signing of this very 
agreement. Not only was this peace deal (and the subsequent memorandum) negotiated largely 
outside the framework of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, but (because of the nature and 
shortcomings of the Pretoria II agreement), far from laying the foundations of a new Congo, the 
ICD was reduced to a bargaining forum between warlords and predatory leaders.20    How to explain 
this failure? There are three main reasons. 
 
The first reason is that, as the Congolese conflict put a serious stain on the rights of millions, it 
would have required a resolution that could address healing the wounds of those who had 
experienced such horrendous human rights atrocities by holding responsible all perpetrators of such 
abuses.  Quite to the contrary, the ICD talks were gradually reduced to a far narrower objective and 
ultimately hijacked by greedy warlords for their own political ends.  
 
                                                 
19 See Apuuli, P. (2004). ‘The Politics of Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Inter-
Congolese Dialogue Process’ in African Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 4 No.1, pp.65-84.; See further the text of 
‘the Inter-Congolese Dialogue:  Political Negotiations on the Peace Process and on Transition in the DRC Global and 
Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (on file with the Author). 
 
20 Furley, O and May, R. (2006) Ending Africa’s Wars: Progressing to Peace, Aldershot, Ashgate, p. 111. 
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The second reason is that the ICD was not purely “inter-Congolese.” Neighbouring countries played 
a major role in the Congo War and continued to exert their influence during the ICD process 
through their proxies. Thus, while the ICD aimed ultimately at reunifying the country and re-
establishing the sovereignty of the DRC over all the Congolese territory, neighbouring countries 
could not be expected to support it as long as they perceived these goals would be achieved at their 
expense. 
 
This study does note that UN peacekeeping as another traditional instrument used to resolve and 
manage the Africa’s Great Lakes conflict fared no better than the ICD. Two instances where 
peacekeeping operations were applied to resolving the Africa’s Great Lakes conflict bear witness to 
the above assertion.  The first of these, the United Nation’s initial operation in Rwanda (UNAMIR), 
had barely been fully deployed when on April 6, 1994, the plane carrying Presidents Habyarimana 
of Rwanda and President Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed under suspicious circumstances, killing 
everyone on board. Violence immediately erupted, primarily directed against civilians from the 
Tutsi minority and opponents of the Rwanda government. Following frantic efforts to evacuate 
foreign nationals from Rwanda, the Belgian government (the former colonial power) immediately 
pulled its contingent from the UNAMIR.21  On April 20, the Secretary-General presented the UNSC 
with the option of adding several thousand troops to the UNAMIR and changing its mandate to give 
it enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This was rejected by the Council, 
which chose the Secretary-General’s second option: reducing the Force. On April 21, the UNSC 
reduced the authorized strength of the UNAMIR from over 2,000 to 270. The continuing horrific 
killings and mutilations were characterized as genocide by the Secretary-General, and estimates of 
the deaths reached several hundred thousands by the end of June. The ability of the UN to turn 
away when Rwandans were in their hour of need was shocking both within and outside Rwanda. 
The reality was that no one had a stomach for assertive peacekeeping, and the thought of the UN 
entering the fray, coming less than a year after the Somalia adventure, left the big powers feeling 
awkward but unmoved.22  Even when realities later dictated, forcing the UNSC to augment the 
                                                 
21 See UN Document, S/1994/446, April 15, 1994. 
22 The Council had before it that week the report of its Commission of Inquiry to look into the attacks on the United 
Nations in Somalia. The report included the following recommendations: 
270. The United Nations should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within internal 
conflicts of states. If the United Nations decides nevertheless to undertake a further peace enforcement operation, 
the mandate should be limited to specific objectives and the use of force would be applied as the ultimate means 
after all peaceful remedies have been exhausted. 
271. The United Nations should, where necessary, continue peacekeeping operations of the traditional type under 
its Charter, but with increased emphasis on preventive diplomacy, assistance in peaceful nation-building efforts 
and preparedness to respond quickly to emergencies. S/1994/653, June 1, 1994. 
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UNAMIR with 5,500 troops, the organization proved incapable of galvanizing member states to 
quickly deploy these troops as part of the peacekeeping operation. After two months, 90 percent of 
UNAMIR reinforcements had yet to arrive.23 There were then and still are expectations that the 
United Nations could act to save lives in danger, but the delays involved in getting personnel to 
Rwanda exemplify the difficulty of getting the nations of the world to mobilize quickly enough to 
save thousands from certain misery and death. 
 
The second UN example of a UN attempt to resolve and manage the Africa’s Great Lakes conflict, 
the MONUC in Congo, was also disheartening. Although the mission achieved some successes, the 
failures were too many and too grave to be ignored. The UN peacekeeping mission in Congo, the 
MONUC, has been described as one of the world's largest, but least effective, peacekeeping forces. 
This thesis shows that effective peacekeeping in the DRC was hampered by two major problems.  
First, MONUC had to struggle with a vague concept of and an inconsistent approach to the concept 
of 'robust peacekeeping'.  During key moments of the peace process, it tried to”wage peace” when it 
should have used force. Second, it failed to adapt to a dynamic conflict environment. Both problems 
actually rested on flawed assumptions about the peace process, the behaviour of local actors, and 
the presumed benefits of 'post-conflict' elections. 
 
In the final analysis, peacekeeping as conflict resolution method in the DRC was a “mixed bag.” 
Although the situational difficulty in the country was a daunting challenge, this paper argues that a 
more important impediment to peace implementation was rooted in fundamental conceptual and 
operational problems about the use of force in robust peacekeeping operations. For decades, the 
“use of force only for self-defence” has been a cornerstone of peacekeeping. Doing away with this 
principle in the name of robust peacekeeping requires more than rhetorical acrobatics by UN 
officials.  Modern peacekeeping may need to look like warfare in order to wage peace.24 Such views 
try to reconcile long-established principles (impartiality, the use of force only for self-defence) with 
modern-day requirements of peacekeeping in often-hostile environments like those in Rwanda and 
the DRC. Peacekeepers require precise rules of engagement that cover a large if not infinite number 
of scenarios that provide clear guidance in the field. Therefore, clarifying the vague concept of 
“robust peacekeeping” should not be left to the discretion of those conducting missions in the field. 
Efforts by the DPKO, the UN Secretariat, troops-contributing countries, the UNSC and other 
                                                 
23 Henkin, H (Ed) (2000), Honouring Human Rights, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, p. 146. 
24 See Tull, D. (2009) ‘Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting  
War’ in International Peacekeeping, vol.16, No.2, pp. 215-230. 
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members of the UN ought to give peacekeepers unambiguous mandates and rules of engagement. In 
addition, the overall approach of the international community to stabilize war-torn countries needs 
to be reconsidered. A self-sustaining peace requires more than elite-centered peace and transition 
arrangements and/or elections that too often result in a negative peace. The international community 
needs to pay more attention to conflict dynamics and the shifting interests of local actors, especially 
if efforts to bring peace stretch over many years, as is so often the case. More effective 
peacekeeping also requires a well-defined strategy that does not treat crucial challenges like DDR 
and peacebuilding as residual challenges.  
On many occasions, it has been emphasized that peacekeeping cannot be a substitute for political 
settlement of disputes. Therefore, the United Nations should re-focus its attention on conflict 
prevention, which is the very raison d'être of the organization. 
 
 Another method used, is a judicial and legal process by way of adjudication as discussed in Chapter 
Five. Traditionally, international judicial bodies primarily adjudicated using international law. In 
particular, the decisions of the PCIJ and its successor court, the ICJ (often called the “World 
Court”), command an unrivalled respect in the field. With the advent of international adjudication, 
international law made an unprecedented development, catching the imagination of people beyond 
the traditional realm of foreign policy makers and the diplomatic elite. It was assumed that 
international law backed up by international adjudication would eventually create and secure a 
global community where recourse to force would only be permitted in the interest of the world 
community or, better yet, would not be encountered at all. This vision of a world of peace and 
prosperity was closely associated with the then recently established international adjudicative 
procedures which, it was hoped, would settle issues in both interstate and intra-state relationships. 
But the negligent treatment of the organs of the international community by those in power who, 
disregarding the UN, proceed to prepare for some military engagement is obvious.  This happened 
to the League of Nations before 1939, but it also has happened in most military campaigns up to 
and including the intervention in Iraq by the US-British forces in 2003, the military forces acting in 
Kosovo (which will ironically seek to diligently enforce international adjudication procedures if it 
seems in their national interests to do so), or the recent Colombian military operations in Venezuela 
and Ecuador. This negligent treatment naturally goes together with a certain disregard for 
international adjudicative bodies, which are felt by some to be an embarrassment.25 However, their 
existence and procedures have continued to develop impressively on the sidelines of major political 
                                                 
25 The rejection by the USA to ratify the ICC Rome Statute is the case in point. 
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events, thriving on the surviving hope that such courts would contribute to a more peaceful and 
prosperous world. 
 
This paper discusses the application of adjudication as a conflict resolution method in the DRC 
conflict as has been discussed with reference to two different case studies. One is the Case 
Concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. 
Uganda) and the second relates to individual criminal responsibility in the Case of Thomas 
Lubanga, which is in progress before the ICC. The first case demonstrated that jurisdictional and 
structural limitations seriously impede the effectiveness of international adjudication under the ICJ 
in resolving armed conflicts. 
 
As to the second case study (although it is still ongoing), this study notes that the role of 
international criminal adjudication in the resolution of internal armed conflicts is still very limited. 
The criminality of acts violating the laws or customs of war in non-international armed conflicts has 
been somewhat obscure until quite recently. It is true that war crimes were early considered in terms 
of their individualized authors and that this resulted from the now-famous ‘Nuremberg Resolution’ 
thus: 
“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only 
by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions international law be 
enforced.”26 
The establishment of the two international criminal tribunals, for the former Yugoslavia and 
for Rwanda, by the UNSC in the early 1990s and the works of these two tribunals, as well as 
the hybrid courts and mixed tribunals27 which have been established since, resulted in the 
maturation of international criminal law into a fully accepted and important body of law.  
 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a further manifestation 
thereof and is considered by many as a landmark achievement in the fight against impunity. 
Since the first cases under the ICC are still in the inquiry stage, it is too early to make a 
reasoned judgement of its successes.  Nevertheless, it is a timely moment to take a step back 
and assess the extent to which punitive justice and international criminal adjudication an 
appropriate means of addressing mass atrocities, especially in internal armed conflict 
situations. 
                                                 
26 Trial of the Major War Criminals (1947), vol.1, p. 223. 
27 Hybrid and mixed Courts have been established in Sierra Leone (2000), East Timor (2000), Kosovo (2000), 
Cambodia (2003) and Lebanon (2007). 
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The ICTR was established as a response to the Rwandan conflict which threatened 
international peace and security. The challenge of the tribunal is to prove that international 
criminal adjudication can contribute to the creation of lasting peace in the aftermath of 
social breakdown.  Whether and to what extent can international criminal adjudication 
contribute to the reconciliation process in the wake of genocide?28 Although the Arusha 
tribunal has broken new ground in international law and recorded several accomplishments 
that have contributed to the efficacy of international criminal justice, it has often been 
criticised as having tried too few numbers of people to date and for a perceived slowness in 
the pace of its trials. In any case, trials inevitably fail to apportion all the guilt to all those 
responsible.29  The former Prosecutor of the Tribunal has already indicated that the 
"essential objective" of his office is "to bring to justice those most responsible both at the 
national and local level for the mass killings that took place in Rwanda in 1994," referring in 
particular to persons in positions of leadership and authority.30  The tiny number of suspects 
that the court has processed so far has been a source of concern and distress.31  Contrary to 
the expectations of many of the survivors, the ICTR cannot at this juncture be expected to 
address the bulk of Rwanda's staggering volume of genocide-related criminal cases.  
 
Furthermore, according to Resolution 977 of the United Nations Security Council adopted on 
February 22 1995, the official seat of the Tribunal was established in Arusha, Tanzania.32  This was 
probably an unfortunate decision.  Although the tribunal was intended to establish or confirm 
principles that should inform behaviour worldwide, it was created to “contribute to the process of 
national reconciliation and to restoration and maintenance of peace.”33  This objective highlights the 
fact that the tribunal ultimately has a primary audience, namely, the people of Rwanda.  They, more 
than the rest of the world, need to see the tribunal at work, to be reminded on a daily basis that the 
international community is committed to the establishment of justice and accountability for the 
                                                 
28 See also Preamble, ICTR Statute. 
29 Bass, G. J& Goldsmith, J (1999) ‘Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation,’ Michigan Law Review, vol. 
97, pp. 2129-84; M Minow (1998); but see generally M Osiel (1997). 
30 See, Press Statement by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, December 12, 1995, 
Justice Richard Goldstone.  But see Morris, challenging what she calls “anomalies of inversion” in which the 
international tribunal prosecutes (or strives to prosecute) the leaders, leaving to national governments the rest of the 
defendants M Morris (1997) 7(2) Duke J. of Comp. & Int’l L. available at 
<http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/amdipl_6/morrisinfo.html> last visited, September 8, 2009. 
31 As of August 2000, there were 42 people detained in the ICTR’s detention centre in Arusha.  Five defendants have 
been sentenced to life imprisonment and three others to various years of imprisonment.  See ICTR Detainees Status on 8 
August 2000 available at <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/factsheets/detaineess.htm> last visited, September 8, 2009. 
32 S.C. Res. 977, U.N. Doc. S/RES/977 (1995). 
33 Preamble, ICTR Statute. 
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heinous crimes of 1994.  Particularly for a country like Rwanda, where a substantial percentage of 
the population cannot benefit from newspaper or television coverage of the trials, the process of 
justice should be accessible and visible. 
 
 Despite this, according to Payam Akhavan, a legal advisor in the prosecutor’s office, “the symbolic 
effect of prosecuting even a limited number of such leaders before an international jurisdiction 
would have considerable impact on national reconciliation as well as deterrence of such crimes in 
the future.”34  But to say this is to say that effective reconciliation will inevitably depend on the 
interaction between international trials and the domestic situation.  Isolated from a corresponding 
effort to foster justice internally, the work of the international tribunal will remain selective and 
unsatisfactory, its contribution to reconciliation inevitably frustrated.  
  
International criminal adjudication is selective in the sense that achieving true justice in the 
aftermath of violence means looking beyond only those who actually acted to perpetrate human 
rights atrocities. Thus, majority of Rwandans believe that UN officials should now take 
responsibility for doing nothing when the genocide took place and that former colonial powers 
should be responsible for having created ethnic tensions in Rwanda. Furthermore, international 
criminal adjudication is selective in the sense that the ICTR has only indicted the Hutus and not the 
RPF, which definitely takes a lion’s share of blame for serious human rights atrocities during and 
immediately after the 1994 genocide.  
 
While human rights advocates generally promote using trials to establish post-conflict justice and 
accountability, this shorter-term measure in Arusha may not ultimately serve the long-term shared 
goals of achieving both human dignity and security. Holding trials may reinforce the perceived 
victory or dominance of one group over another, but in many internal conflicts like those discussed 
in this study, what may be best for the nation or community is not that one side win but that both 
sides find a way to live together in harmony. Human rights must be a critical component of such a 
shared future.  Because this is the case, truth commissions may be more conducive to achieve a 
lasting peace between two or more opposed groups. Chapter 5 arrives at the conclusion that, 
although the adjudicatory role of international judicial bodies is a crucial method in pacific 
settlement of disputes, it is unlikely to suit armed conflicts situations.  
                                                 
34 Akhavan, P. (1997), ‘Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 325-
48. 
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The failure of the approaches discussed in this paper does not necessarily mean that these kinds of 
conflict resolution strategies should be dismissed altogether. Rather, the contention is that human 
rights considerations should be taken into account as an important element in each of these 
strategies. 
 
7.2 Enhancing Effectiveness in Conflict Prevention and Management 
The discussion of the difficulties faced by those trying to resolve the conflict in the DRC and in the 
Africa’s Great Lakes Region in general, illustrates the weaknesses and limitations of the UN in 
conflict resolution. It is important in this regard to recall that conflict prevention is a central feature 
of the United Nations Charter, which authorizes the Security Council, the Secretary-General, and 
the General Assembly in Chapters VI and VII to settle disputes peacefully and to prevent the 
outbreak of wars and other forms of armed confrontation. Chapter VI contains a series of preventive 
devices such as fact-finding, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, and 
arbitration.35 
Much of the discussion over enhancing the effectiveness of conflict prevention centers on how to 
design preventive action plans and strategies that accomplish the stated objectives and the desired 
preventive outcome. There is agreement that effective prevention must be country- context-specific, 
that there must be strategic coordination, and that multiple prevention measures be utilized. There 
should be a concerted call for basing preventive action plans on existing case studies and 
generalizing from the lessons learned in order to ask what methods of preventive action work best 
in various contexts. Several political developments have prompted the search for enhancing the 
effectiveness of preventive action strategies, including concerns over policy errors, failures in 
prevention that were based on action that was not appropriate or effective for the situation, and 
indirect and negative consequences of preventive action.36 
 
Strengthening United Nations capacities for resolving armed conflict requires that the organization 
be made more effective in maintaining peace and security by giving it the resources and tools it 
needs for conflict prevention, the peaceful resolution of disputes, peacekeeping, and post-conflict 
peace-building and reconstruction. The United Nations is a uniquely global institution, with 
universal membership. In order to continue to act as a catalyst for change and to provide a forum for 
dialogue and effective action, the system will have to be renewed and modernized to cope with the 
                                                 
35 For a detailed treatment of these methods, see generally Merills, J. (2005) International Dispute Settlement, 4th ed, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
36 Lund, M. ‘From Lessons to Action’ in Hampson, F. and Malone, D. (2002), From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: 
Opportunities for the UN System, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
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challenges of this millennium. In particular, there is a need to strengthen the ability of the member 
States to work together, to extend partnerships and ensure the security of the UN staff as they carry 
out the mission of the United Nations. 
 
Peacekeeping is one important aspect of the UN system where clear improvements can be made. 
The Brahimi Report,37 a review of peacekeeping presented to and endorsed by the UNSC in 2000, 
contained numerous practical proposals and has already had a major impact. Among its goals is the 
promotion of rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces. This aim had been recognized earlier as 
best achieved by states earmarking units in advance for possible UN service so that, instead of 
having to take hasty ad hoc arrangements, the Secretary-General could draw on a roster of available 
units when a peacekeeping force was needed. The Secretary-General began reporting on these 
issues to the UNSC in 1994, and efforts to create a standby force have been quite successful as 
more than eighty states now have had such units designated.38 
Less successful has been the attempt to ensure that peacekeeping troops are available in the 
numbers needed, a matter of particular concern in view of the number of UN operations currently 
being undertaken. When reviewing the steps needed to implement the Brahimi Report, the 
Secretary-General made the point that peacekeeping must be seen as the responsibility of all the 
member States and that, for performance in this area to improve, it is essential for those with the 
greatest capacity to move most pro-actively.  Notably, the Permanent Members of the Security 
Council should participate in such operations by contributing troops. So far, however, the response 
to this call has been unenthusiastic, because the Permanent Members and the developed States in 
general evidently prefer to provide only financial and logistical support, leaving the actual troops to 
be found elsewhere. It is doubtful, however, if extensive UN peacekeeping can be sustained on this 
basis. A significant step forward therefore would be for the developed States to be more active. 
 
Another issue raised by the Brahimi Report is the question of peacekeeping mandates. Chapter 4 
demonstrates that peacekeeping operations can take many forms and that confusion over the nature 
of a mission (or the related phenomenon of ‘mission creep,’ i.e. the expansion of a mission’s 
mandate through force of circumstances after it has begun as happened with MONUC) is highly 
undesirable. The Brahimi Report, reflecting experience with peacekeeping in Somalia, Rwanda and 
the former Yugoslavia over the previous decade, emphasized the need for clear, credible and 
                                                 
37 Text in (200) 39 ILM, p. 1432. For discussion, see Gray, C (2000), International Law Governing the Use of Force,   
     2nded, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 239-51. 
38 Ibid, p. 239. 
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achievable mandates, and its recommendations to that effect have been accepted by the UNSC.39 
For such a policy to be achieved however, it would be necessary either to develop a broad resource 
base for peacekeeping operations, or for the UNSC to limit its ambitions. Either way, ensuring that 
the UN peacekeeping always has a clear, credible and achievable mandate is another way in which 
the method can be improved. 
 
7.3 Final Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this study has been to examine the different approaches to conflict prevention 
and management within the UN system to determine their efficacy in responding to contemporary 
conflicts in the Africa’s Great Lakes region. To achieve this objective, the study examines the 
conflict resolution mechanisms that have been applied in resolving the Africa’s Great Lakes 
conflicts over the last few years. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the general approaches to 
conflict prevention and management currently applicable in resolving conflicts. In the subsequent 
chapters, a few such approaches have been further analysed, focusing mainly on those applied in 
resolving the DRC conflicts, which have been taken as case studies within the general dimension of 
the Africa’s Great Lakes Region.  A mixture of diplomatic methods and military measures used in 
three actual cases were discussed. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) political negotiations, the 
deployment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Congo (MONUC), and international 
adjudication of both the Case Concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) which ended in 2005 and the Thomas Lubanga Case, 
which, at the time of this writing, is pending before the ICC. Given the nature of the conflicts in the 
region, this examination calls for an alternative approach that integrates human rights with conflict 
resolution strategies. 
 
Although the UN was established with a wide range of optional mechanisms for the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts, including interest-based, rights-based and power-based procedures, only a 
very limited part of its potential was used during its first half century. These approaches were, in 
fact, drastically curtailed by the various developments within the UN even as it was being founded.  
These developments included the all-consuming post-World-War-II bipolar power-struggle which 
developed between the East and the West, and the reign of terror that was brought on by the 
production and proliferation of nuclear weapons to the present anarchical state of affairs, 
characterised by unilateral actions by powerful states, especially the US, in disregard of 
                                                 
39 See the UNSC Res.1327 (2000), text in (2001) 40 ILM, p. 503; and see further Gray, supra note 39 p. 243. 
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authorization of the UN as the legitimate expression of the collective will of the peoples of the 
world. 
 As demonstrated in this study, in recent years the United Nations Security Council, an organ 
entrusted with the role of maintaining international peace and security, has proven to be unable to 
solve major international crises effectively. It has become a truism that, after the demise of Cold 
War nationalism, religious fundamentalism and ethnic and religious hatred have spawned violence, 
ethnic cleansing and bloodshed. Internal conflicts have mushroomed. The Security Council has 
been unable to keep up with the staggering increase in violence. No one can contest its inability to 
react promptly and effectively or to put a stop to massacres amounting to serious threats to the 
peace or breaches of the peace in Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia including Kosovo, 
Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Middle East, and so on. 
 
The argument of this paper is that, rather than creating an anarchical international society through 
unilateralism or “coalitions of the willing,” an alternative approach should be sought if the UN 
traditional approaches to conflict prevention and management are as ineffective as this study has 
shown them to be. For this reason, this paper considers some theoretical perspectives both for 
human rights and conflict management.  Throughout the discussion, a human rights approach has 
been argued for.  
 
Chapter 1 argues that traditional conflict resolution approaches currently applied under the auspices 
of the UN and regional bodies such as the AU are limited in impact and sustainability when 
undertaken without due consideration of human rights concerns. The relationship between conflict 
and human rights is both short-term and long-term in nature. In the short term, violent and 
destructive conflicts can lead to human rights violations. In the long term, a sustained denial of 
human rights can lead to conflicts, as fundamental needs of human beings are frustrated. 
 
The chapter before this one demonstrates that there are three stages in conflicts during which human 
rights concerns are at stake. At the early stage (i.e. that is, during conflict intensification), human 
rights abuses are considered as the root cause of conflicts. During the armed conflict stage, human 
rights standards, in the form of international humanitarian law are applicable in protecting civilians. 
In the post-conflict stage, human rights play a great role in peace agreements, during peacekeeping 
missions, and in human rights education campaigns 
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It has been argued in this study that human rights and conflict resolution are fields of inquiry and 
practice that have emerged relatively recently in human history; thus human rights doctrines and 
conflict resolution principles and processes are still developing. The contribution of both fields to 
sustainable peace and respect for human development are paramount. It is imperative that areas of 
tensions between the two fields in terms of methodologies and tactical objectives be viewed not as 
hindrances but as opportunities for further growth and understanding. This paper contends that it is 
possible to envisage a comprehensive framework to which practitioners of both fields could 
contribute by reflecting and theorizing from their own experiences. These practitioners are currently 
in a system-creation phase; human rights and conflict resolution partners can productively 
contribute to the understanding and the actualization of a true constructive synergy for peace.  
 
The thesis has attempted to demonstrate that a rights-based approach provides much greater 
credibility and justification for conflict resolution and conflict prevention efforts than do interest-
based or power-based approaches. Galtung and others have advocated an integrated approach which 
stresses a holistic understanding of conflict formation and transformation, linking the subjective and 
objective approaches. The newer theorists are moving beyond the disjunction between subjectivist 
and objectivist (or relational and structural) thinking by exploring ways in which both subjective 
and objective views are interpreted inter-subjectively within a culture of shared meaning, one in 
which the discourse of theorists and of participants in conflict plays a crucial role. This kind of 
exploration of new territory links closely with the emphasis on the cultural context of conflict and 
the appreciation that both perception of basic human needs and of acceptable methods of 
transformation are culturally bound. 
 
This thesis also points to common threads from the discussion in this study, focusing in particular 
on those issues and factors that seem always to play a part in the dynamic interaction between the 
assertion of rights, the pursuit of justice and quest for peace. By doing so, it looks towards the 
future and, more particularly, towards the prospects for integrating the approaches typically with the 
human rights, humanitarian law and conflict resolution constituencies. The signs are encouraging. 
For example, human rights and humanitarian law advocates are increasingly interested in conflict 
prevention. The growing emphasis given to “conflict transformation” in the conflict-management 
field means that justice and peace are increasingly overlapping values, and the inclusion of human 
rights provisions in peace agreements and in conflict resolution and prevention initiatives is 
growing more common. The increased focus on the protection of civilians in all stages of conflicts 
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necessarily includes human rights, humanitarian law and conflict resolution, and should therefore 
bring actors from all the three approaches together in common cause.  
 
However, while the common ground shared by the three approaches is gaining greater recognition, 
the tensions between them cannot be ignored. The priorities and baselines orientations of the three 
approaches differ. When hard choices must be made, these differences become especially evident.  
The human rights approach opts for whatever will best promote individual human dignity, the 
humanitarian law approach makes humane conduct in wartime the priority, and the conflict 
resolution approach focuses on the promotion of peace. 
 
The diverse conflict resolution methods discussed in this study suggest that there is no single 
blueprint for making tradeoffs and resolving dilemmas in complex conflicts like those in the 
Africa’s Great Lakes region. However, opportunities do exist--and have been taken—for members 
of the different fields to work together cooperatively and effectively. This study seeks not only to 
enhance understanding of how human rights and conflict interact, but also to stimulate interaction 
among scholars, practitioners and policymakers. All these groups have important roles to play in 
contributing to the quest for a world in which peace and human rights are equally respected. 
 
In conclusion, two precautions must be taken. First, despite the results of this study, one should not 
be led to the conclusion that the United Nations is wholly ineffective in managing conflict.  It is 
important that the whole story of the UN’s conflict management be studied at all levels of the 
conflict process to see what contributed to success or lack of success.  It is important that future 
research focus on United Nation’s involvement in the earliest stages of the conflict process, 
including a complete look at militarised disputes, non-militarised disputes, and conflicts of interest.  
 
Second, despite the complementarity of the two fields, as argued in this study, human rights and 
conflict resolution are at times in tension, especially when issues of culpability for past violations 
are raised. Resolving conflict mainly involves getting parties who have fought each other violently 
to agree to engage with each other in a non-violent and political manner. Those parties who have 
resorted to violence are typically those who have seriously violated human rights. It is rare that 
political actors who are engaged in negotiations to end war have not been involved directly or 
indirectly in serious violations of human rights. Yet, peace processes must seek to engage these 
actors and move them towards the political mainstream. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
do so if such actors were told that their willingness to move from violent politics to non-violent 
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politics would lead, not just to their political irrelevance, but to prison. Most facilitators thus find 
themselves in the position of having to make excuses for, if not politically to forgive, the 
perpetrators of human rights violations in order to maintain peace processes. This is true, in 
particular, prior to the disarmament of armed groups or militaries in peace processes. 
 
It is from these realities that Chapter 6 endeavours to build an understanding and appreciation of the 
relationship between human rights and conflict management. By providing the link between causes 
of conflict and denial of basic human needs, it illustrates how unmet needs may lead to violations of 
human rights, which in turn, may heighten the potential for conflict. According to John Burton, a 
conflict resolution theorist, basic human needs are universal motivations that are an integral part of 
human beings, and they relate to both material concerns such as food, clothing and shelter, and non-
material concerns such as dignity, respect and affection.40 
The relationship between pursuing human rights and resolving conflict is usually complementary, 
and one generally advances the other. This is because violent conflict invariably leads to severe 
violations of human rights–death, torture, imprisonment, destruction of livelihoods, deterioration of 
health, to name but only a few. Similarly, violations of human rights, when people are imprisoned, 
tortured, discriminated against on the basis of class, ethnicity, or religion by the state, and excluded 
from political participation, can lead people to oppose the state, generating conflict. So, generally 
speaking, protecting human rights is good for making peace and making peace is generally good for 
protecting human rights. In sum, human rights can be both a cause and a consequence of violent 
conflict. Seen in this light, the promotion and protection of human rights should lessen the potential 
for violent conflict. Human rights, therefore, should be used as a mechanism or framework for 
conflict management. 
 
As the fields of human rights and conflict resolution draw closer, it is important to do further 
research on the challenges that atrocities perpetrated during armed conflicts create. This study is an 
initial contribution to what is hoped will be much wider and deeper discussion about the 
interrelationship between human rights and conflict resolution, which is not only complex and 
dynamic, but which also demands an equally dynamic response from those who work to protect 
human rights and who strive for sustainable peace. 
                                                 
40 Burton, J, (1990), Conflict Resolution and Prevention, London: Macmillan, pp. 37 – 38. 
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Appendix B: Selected UN-Mandated Peacekeeping Operations, 1945-2008 
 
    
                
              LOCATION  
 
NAME OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATION 
 
TIME PERIOD 
            Middle East  United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)  May 1948-present 




         Egypt/Israel (Suez Canal) First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)  Nov.1956-June 1967 
          Lebanon United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) June 1958-Dec.1958 
         Congo (Zaire)  United Nations Operation in Congo (UNOC) July 1960-June 1964 
          West New Guinea United Nations Security Force in West Guinea (UNSF) Oct. 1962-April 1963 
         Yemen United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) July 1963-Sept 1964 
        Cyprus United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) March1964-present 
        Dominican Republic UN Mission of the Representative of the Secretary General in the 
Dominican Republic (DOMREP) 
 
May 1965-Oct. 1966 
        Indian/Pakistan  UN Indian- Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) Sept.1965-March1966 
        Middle East Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) Oct.1973-July 1979 
        Syria/Golan Heights United Nations Disengagement Force (UNDOF) June 1974-present 
        Lebanon United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) March 1978-present 
          
       Afghanistan/Pakistan 
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(UNGOMAP) 
 
May 1988-May 1990 
        Iran/Iraq UN Iran-Iraq Military Observe Group (UNIIMOG) August 1988-Feb. 1991 
       Angola UN Angola Verification Mission I, II, III (UNAVEM I-III) Jan.1989-June 1997 
       Namibia UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) April 1989-March 1990 
        Central America  UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) Nov. 1989-Jan. 1992 
        Iraq-Kuwait UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) April 1991-Oct.2003 
       Western Sahara UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) April 1991-present 
       El Salvador UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNUSAL) July 1991-April 1995 
       Cambodia  UN Advance Mission In Cambodia (UNAMIC) Oct.1991-March 1992 
       Former Yugoslavia UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Feb. 1992-March 1995 
       Cambodia UN Transactional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) March 1992-Sept. 1993 
       Somalia  UN Operation in Somalia I, II (UNOSOM I, II) April 1992-March 1995 
       Mozambique  UN Operation in Mozambique (UNUMOZ) Dec. 1992-Dec. 1994 
       Uganda/Rwanda UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) June 1993-Sept. 1994 
        Georgia UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) Aug. 1993-present 
        Liberia UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) Sept. 1993-Sept. 1997 
       Rwanda  UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Oct. 1993-March 1996 
       Haiti UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) also UNSMIH, UNTMIH, 
MINOPUH 
Sept. 1993-March 2000 
      Chad/Libya UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) May 1994-June 1994 
      Tajikistan UN Observer Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT) Dec. 1994-May 2000 
       Croatia UN Confidence Restoration Organisation in Croatia (UNCRO) May 1995-Jan.1996 
       Macedonia  UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) March 1995-Feb. 1999 
       Bosnia-Herzegovina UN-Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) Dec.1995-Dec. 2002 
      East Slavonia UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) Jan. 1996-Jan. 1998 
      Prevlaka (Croatia & FRY) UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) Jan 1996-Dec.2000 
      Guatemala  UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) Jan.1997- May 1997 
      Angola  UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) June 1997-Feb. 1999 
      Croatia UN Police Support Group (UNPSGC) Jan. 1998-Oct.1998 
      Central  African Republic UN Mission in Central African Republic 
(MINURCA) 
April 1998-Feb. 2000 
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       Sierra Leone UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) July 1998-Oct. 1999 
       Kosovo UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) June 1999-present 
       Sierra Leone  UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) Oct. 1998-Dec. 1999 
      East Timor UN Transitional Administration In East Timor (UNTAET) Oct. 1999-May 2002 
      Democratic Rep. of    
       Congo 
UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (MONUC)  
 
Nov.1999-present 
       Ethiopia/Eritrea UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) July 2000-July 2008 
       East Timor UN Mission of Support in East Timor UNMISET) May 2002-May 2005 
       Liberia UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Sept.2003-present 
       Côte d'Ivoire UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) April 2004-present 
        Haiti UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) June 2004-present 
       Burundi UN Operation in Burundi (UNOB) June 2004-Dec.2006 
        Sudan UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) March 2005-present 
       East Timor UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste  (UNMIT) August 2006-present 
       Sudan/Darfur African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) July 2007-present 
        Central African    
        Republic/Chad 





Source: (Adapted partly from Malone, D, pp. 653-674) and http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/home.shtml 
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Appendix C: Interview Questions and Questionnaire List 
 
 
Research Theme: A Human Rights Approach to Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in the 




A. Respondent’s Personal Profile: 





6. Position in Organization/Institution……………… 





B. Data Profile: 
In trying to prevent and resolve violent conflicts in the DRC Congo, the UN Security Council 
established an observer mission, which was later transformed into a peacekeeping mission (known 
by its French acronym as MONUC).   
1. How much (to what extent) do you know the MONUC? 
2. For how long did you know it and in what capacity? 
3. Which difficulties has the MONUC faced in the course of fulfilling its objectives? 
4. The deployment of the force and its role in preventing and resolving the conflict in the DRC 
has been:- 
a) Very important; 
b)  Significant; 
c) Insignificant; 
d) Relatively negligible 
5. Would you please give your opinion on the following attributes of the failure or success of 
the deployment of the force in the DRC: 
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a)      It has achieved its goals and objectives, 
b) It assisted in bringing about peace in the DRC, 
c) It aggravated (worsened) the conflict situation in the DRC 
6. Do you consider the deployment of peace-keeping mission as an effective mechanism for 
conflict prevention in the Africa’s Great Lakes? 
7. In your opinion, do you find any achievements of MONUC on its goals and objectives? 
8. To what extent has the MONUC contributed to the transition towards peace during the 
election in the DRC? 
9. Was the deployment of the MONUC an appropriate response by the UN to the Congo crisis? 
 YES-----, NO------- 
10. Was the DRC ready for peacekeeping operations as an approach to conflict prevention? 
11. Did the MONUC fill a crucial gap in keeping the peace in the DRC? 
12. Was the MONUC strategic in developing a transition process in the DRC? 
13. Peace-Keeping forces are characterised by a number of problems, including taking sides in 
the conflict situations. YES-----, NO--------- 
14. Has the MONUC been impartial in the DRC conflicts? (i.e. Did it take sides in the conflict?) 
15. Did Members of the local communities in the DRC appreciate the presence of MONUC in 
their area? That is, how did they react to its deployment? 
16. Is the presence of the MONUC still desirable after the “democratic” election in the DRC? 
17. What do you consider to be the serious shortcomings of the MONUC in its operations in the 
DRC?  
18. Do you consider human rights violations as one of the sources of conflicts in the Africa’s 
Great Lakes Region? 
19. Do you think there are some specific types of rights constantly being violated in the region 
with the resultant conflicts?  Please mention a few of those rights. 
20. Did the presence of the MONUC in the DRC contribute to respect for human rights and 
freedoms? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
